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Preface
As I write this preface in March 2009, the United States is in the midst of 
the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. The Obama administra-
tion has established a massive stimulus package to get the economy back on 
track. As I show in this book, however, there are fundamental problems with 
the U.S. economy that predate the current crisis. Even in recovery, the U.S. 
economy will not generate stable and equitable growth—or what I call “sus-
tainable prosperity”—unless these problems are fi xed.
For the past three decades the distribution of income in the United States 
has become more unequal, with a hugely, and some might say grotesquely, 
disproportionate share of total national income now going to the very richest 
households. Over the same period, the U.S. economy has experienced an in-
exorable disappearance of “middle-class” jobs—stable employment opportu-
nities that provide a decent standard of living. A key fi nding of this book is that 
even when economic conditions are generally prosperous, economic insecurity 
affl icts well-educated and highly experienced members of the U.S. labor force. 
Yet these are the people who should be best positioned to make a good living. 
In this book, I analyze the ways in which the “New Economy business 
model” in the information and communications technology (ICT) industries 
has contributed to this instability and inequity. In the last decade, U.S.-based 
ICT companies have been replacing well-educated and highly experienced 
U.S. workers with qualifi ed labor in lower-wage nations such as China and 
India. The contribution to the growth of these developing economies repre-
sents progress. The problem is that rather than use the profi ts from globaliza-
tion to sustain and upgrade the employment of U.S. workers, companies like 
Cisco Systems, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Intel, and Microsoft have been using 
these profi ts to repurchase billions of dollars annually of their own outstanding 
shares in an effort to boost their stock prices. 
Underlying this mode of corporate resource allocation is the corporate 
governance ideology that contends that to achieve superior economic perfor-
mance companies should “maximize shareholder value.” In this book, I expose 
the fallacies of this argument, and I show how in practice shareholder-value 
ideology contributes to instability and inequity in the economy and tends to 
undermine the accumulation of innovative capability. This book provides an 
alternative perspective on how corporate resource allocation can contribute to 
the achievement of sustainable prosperity.
The research that underpins this book goes back some two decades, when 
I fi rst started analyzing the fi nancialization of the U.S. corporate economy and 
the consequent decline of what the eminent business historian Alfred Chan-
xiii
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dler called “managerial capitalism,” or what I call the “Old Economy business 
model.” In the last half of the 1980s, when my principal academic appointment 
was in the economics department of Barnard College at Columbia Univer-
sity, my work benefi ted greatly from my involvement with Al Chandler and 
“the Business History Group” at Harvard Business School. One result was the 
publication of Business Organization and the Myth of the Market Economy 
(Cambridge University Press 1991), a critique of the notion that the neoclas-
sical theory of the market economy can comprehend the actual allocation of 
resources in the U.S. economy. Another result, published in Industrial and 
Corporate Change in 1992, was “Controlling the Market for Corporate Con-
trol: The Historical Signifi cance of Managerial Capitalism,” my fi rst extended 
critique of agency theory and shareholder-value ideology. 
Shortly thereafter, I met Mary O’Sullivan, a graduate of the Harvard 
Business School MBA program and a doctoral candidate in the Harvard Busi-
ness Economics PhD program. Her insights into corporate fi nance, fi nancial 
economics, and the evolution of the industrial corporation have contributed 
signifi cantly to the analysis in this book. Our fi rst major project, funded by 
the Jerome Levy Economics Institute, resulted in an edited volume, Corpo-
rate Governance and Sustainable Prosperity (Palgrave 2002), which focused 
on the disappearance of good jobs in the U.S. economy under a shareholder-
value corporate governance regime. Among the contributors to this volume 
were Bob Forrant, Phil Moss, and Chris Tilly, my colleagues in the Department 
of Regional Economic and Social Development (RESD) at the University of 
Massachusetts, Lowell, with whom I have had ongoing discussions about em-
ployment and income distribution in the U.S. economy.
In 1993 I had been lured away from Columbia University to UMass Low-
ell by Chancellor William Hogan and Vice Chancellor for University Relations 
and Development Frederick Sperounis, both of whom were committed to a 
university-wide program of interdisciplinary research informed by an in-depth 
understanding of the realities of economic and social development. My RESD 
colleague John Wooding subsequently became provost in the Hogan adminis-
tration. I would like to thank this trio for creating the intellectual environment 
and working conditions in which the type of research that is found in this book 
could be pursued.
Since the early 1990s I have sharpened my perspective on the distinc-
tive evolution of U.S. capitalism through comparative research on corporate 
governance, innovation, and economic performance in Europe and Asia. An 
understanding of the European experience is important because of the persis-
tence of distinctive corporate governance regimes across the European Union 
and the resistance of Europeans—to their ultimate benefi t, I would argue—to 
the wholesale adoption of the U.S. shareholder-value model. An understanding 
xiv
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of the Asian experience is important because, starting with Japan in the 1950s, 
the world’s most dynamic developing economies have emerged in this region, 
with, as in the most recent cases of China and India, an increasingly heavy 
emphasis on the ICT industries as the engines of growth and the availability of 
highly capable labor forces to make that growth happen.
I am grateful to Keith Smith for introducing me, beginning in 1993, to 
the European collaborative research environment through my involvement in 
the Studies in Technology, Innovation, and Economic Policy Group in Oslo, 
Norway, when he was the director of that research institute. From 1996 to 
2007 I carried out my research as a faculty member of INSEAD, the Institut 
Européen d’ Administration des Affaires, or European Institute of Business 
Administration, in Fontainebleau, France. While at INSEAD, I led a major 
European Commission project, Corporate Governance, Innovation, and Eco-
nomic Performance (CGEP), and was a participant in a subsequent EC project, 
European Socio-Economic Models of a Knowledge-Based Society (ESEMK), 
led by Yannick Lung of Université Montesquieu-Bordeaux IV. Research car-
ried out under these projects has contributed to this book, as has work done 
with Henrik Glimstedt of the Stockholm School of Economics and Ulrich Jür-
gens of Wissenschaftszentrum-Berlin.
My research on Asia began in the early 1990s with a project with Kazuo 
Wada of the University of Tokyo and Takeshi Abe of Osaka University on 
the dynamic interaction of organization and technology in Japanese economic 
development. I greatly deepened my understanding of Japanese development 
when I was a visiting professor in the faculty of economics at the University of 
Tokyo in 1996 –1997, as well as through a subsequent project on the Japanese 
enterprise led by Akira Kudo of the University of Tokyo and Glenn Hook of 
the University of Sheffi eld. I also benefi ted immensely from numerous discus-
sions about Japanese and comparative capitalism with Ronald Dore, a person 
of remarkable knowledge and insight. 
From 1997 to 1999, I was joined at INSEAD by my Harvard sociology 
student Qiwen Lu, whose pioneering book, China’s Leap into the Information 
Age (Oxford University Press 2000), alerted me to the innovative capabilities 
being developed in China, a subject I address in Chapter 5 of this book. Sadly, 
Qiwen died just after his book manuscript was completed. Through Qiwen’s 
work, I got to know Dic Lo of the University of London’s School of Oriental 
and African Studies (SOAS) and Renmin University of China, who in 2006 
hosted me on an illuminating trip to China. I have also learned much about 
China from my UMass Lowell graduate students, especially Hao Xie, Yue 
Zhang, and He Gao.
My fi rsthand insights into Indian development began in 1993 with a United 
Nations Development Programme project on the jute industry with my UMass 
xv
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Lowell colleagues Michael Best and the late Sukant Tripathy. At the time there 
were tens of millions of educated unemployed in India. The rapid growth of 
the Indian information technology (IT) services industry from the late 1990s 
changed all that. In 2007 I made two trips to Bangalore, the center of the Indian 
IT services industry, to observe the economic transformation that had taken 
place. I owe special thanks to Parteii Sawyan of Shillong, who, through her 
friend, Naina Kidwai, CEO of HSBC India, helped me gain access to execu-
tives at a number of Indian IT services companies, including Infosys, Mindtree, 
and Wipro. For sharing with me their knowledge of the Indian ICT industries, 
I am grateful to Arundhati Chakraborty, Amrita Dhindsa, and Sunil Swarup 
of HP India; Muthukrishnan Subramanian of IBM India; Somnath Baishya, 
Bikramjit Maitra, and Deependra Moitra of Infosys; Srini Rajam of Ittiam; 
Puneet Jetli, Krishnakumar Natarajan, and R.K. Veeraraghavan of Mindtree; 
Mohan Kumar of Motorola India; Swati Bhatia and Marion Leslie of Reuters 
India; and Ranjan Acharya, Jatin Dalal, Vinod Harith, Ashok Herur, Divakaran 
Mangalath, Sudip Nandy, Veena Padmanabhan, Jessie Paul, and Swapna Pillai 
of Wipro. 
In the United States, I received a grant in the late 1990s from the Russell 
Sage Foundation to study how, in the Internet boom, Lucent Technologies, 
a major high-tech employer in Massachusetts, was coping with shortages of 
skilled production workers at its Merrimack Valley Works, which had 5,600 
employees. As I was doing this research, however, boom turned to bust, and 
the project ended up being about the demise of a major high-tech manufactur-
ing plant and the subsequent employment transitions of its displaced workers. 
Through this project, I came to know Edward March, director of engineering 
at Merrimack Valley Works, who subsequently was for a number of years a 
highly valued colleague of mine at UMass Lowell and who continues to en-
lighten me about the processes of technological change. 
This plant-level study fed into a substantial research effort, initially in col-
laboration with Marie Carpenter and Mary O’Sullivan at INSEAD as part of 
the CGEP project, to analyze the impact of the New Economy business model, 
as epitomized by Cisco Systems, on strategy, organization, and fi nance at Old 
Economy communications equipment companies such as Lucent, Nortel, and 
Alcatel. INSEAD provided us with excellent access to executives at Alcatel, 
headquartered in Paris. I am especially grateful to François Béhague, Jean-Luc 
Corniglion, and Elizabeth Eastland for the time that they spent with us explain-
ing the changes in organization and technology that occurred at Alcatel during 
the Internet boom and bust. Subsequently, in 2003, I also began to do research 
with Henrik Glimstedt on Ericsson, the Swedish communications equipment 
giant. With the extraordinary cooperation of Marcus Sheard, the company’s 
xvi
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vice president of worldwide compensation and benefi ts, we analyzed how Er-
icsson adopted U.S.-style employee stock option plans and then transformed 
their use to fi t with the much more egalitarian Swedish business model. 
Building on our research on the communications equipment companies, in 
August 2007 Marie Carpenter, Henrik Glimstedt, Ed March, and I organized a 
conference at INSEAD on innovation and competition in the global communi-
cations technology industry that brought together practitioners and academics. 
Besides providing material for this book, the conference led to an ongoing col-
laborative study of the global communications technology industry with Petter 
Kilefors and Martyn Roetter of Arthur D. Little consultants. 
While all of this work has fed into Sustainable Prosperity in the New Econo-
my? it was a grant from the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research that 
transformed a wide-ranging research agenda into a focused book. The Upjohn 
Institute’s support for this project went far beyond funding. Susan Houseman 
encouraged me to apply for the grant and provided much-appreciated 
guidance and patience throughout the project. Two anonymous referees pro-
vided constructive comments on my original book proposal. Kevin Hollenbeck 
made excellent suggestions concerning the organization and editing of the 
book. Bob Wathen was a superb copy editor; he helped me to emphasize the 
bigger picture that I was painting while cleaning up my errant brushstrokes. 
The production of the book was then placed in Richard Wyrwa’s very capable 
hands and Benjamin Jones did a great job of proofreading the galleys.
Since 2005 the material in this book has been presented at invited lectures 
in various venues around the world. Previous versions of some of the chapters 
have been published in various journals and edited volumes, in most cases with 
considerably more empirical detail than has been included in this book. These 
publications include Internet and Digital Economics; The Future of Work in 
Massachusetts; Employee Pensions: Policies, Problems, and Possibilities; The 
Oxford Handbook of Information and Communication Technologies; Perspec-
tives of Corporate Governance; Industrial and Corporate Change; Louvain 
Economic Review; and Capitalism and Society. 
Besides those people whose intellectual contributions I have already 
mentioned, in writing this book I have benefi ted from discussions with and/
or comments from Ron Adner, Sanjay Anandaram, Tosun Aricanli, Randy 
Barber, Ross Bassett, Christophe Belleval, Michael Best, Margaret Blair, 
Danny Breznitz, Eric Brousseau, Kristine Bruland, Bob Buchele, Leonardo 
Burlamaqui, Jose Cassiolato, Ha-Joon Chang, François Chesnais, Chris Clott, 
Andrea Colli, Tony Daley, Stephen Diamond, Yves Doz, Ciaran Driver, Steve 
Early, Jim Elliott, Dieter Ernst, Jan Fagerberg, Kaidong Feng, Tom Ferguson, 
Lou Ferleger, Patrick Fridenson, James Galbraith, Teresa Ghilarducci, Debbie 
Goldman, Margaret Graham, Leslie Hannah, Susan Helper, Ronil Hira, Ha 
xvii
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Hoang, Ken Jacobson, Martin Kenney, Bruce Kogut, Jackie Krafft, Sarah Kuhn, 
Kenji Kushida, Helena Lastres, Feng Lu, Robin Mansell, Stephen Marglin, 
Bill Mass, John Mathews, Mariana Mazzucato, Lars Mjøset, David Mowery, 
David Musson, Wim Naudé, Mario Pianta, Andrea Prencipe, Mike Prokosch, 
Dan Raff, Ravi Ramamurti, S.L. Rao, Petri Rouvinen, Mari Sako, Catherine 
Sauviat, Claude Serfati, Stefano Solari, Ed Steinmueller, Tim Sturgeon, Jomo 
Kwame Sundaram, Christian Weller, Chip White, Steven White, Cynthia 
Williams, Peer Zumbansen, and John Zysman. Among the research assistants 
who contributed to this book, Bob Bell, He Gao, Mustafa Erdem Sakinc, Oner 
Tulum, Hao Xie, and Yue Zhang have themselves become collaborators in my 
ongoing research projects. I would also like to thank Isa Cann, Tim Harrigan, 
Ben Hopkins, Sarah Johnson, Léah Lazonick, Mindy Lu, Paulsen Mrina, 
Dimitra Paparounas, and Susan Roe for their research assistance.
My daughters, Ashley, Léah, and Casey, heard me say all too often that the 
book was almost done. Now that it actually is fi nished, I want them to know 
how much their interest in their dad’s work means to me. The person who 
heard me talk about this book-in-progress more than any other was Carol Oja, 
a brilliant musicologist and incredible human being, whose pertinent questions 
and insights helped me to clarify my arguments in my mind and on the written 
page. Finally, I would like to dedicate this book to the memory of my parents, 
Louis Lazonick (1914–1995) and Pearl Lazonick (1917–2005). Coming of age 
as they did in the Great Depression, they understood the importance of achiev-
ing stable and equitable economic growth. 
xviii
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1
1
What is New, and Permanent, 
about the “New Economy”?
THE END OF “THE ORGANIZATION MAN”
The Internet boom of the last half of the 1990s seemed to herald the 
arrival of a “New Economy” with its promise that, after the stagnation 
of the early 1990s, innovation in information and communication tech-
nologies (ICT) would regenerate economic prosperity. The sharp eco-
nomic downturn in 2001–2002 called into question the New Economy’s 
ability to deliver on this promise—and it even raised questions about 
whether there had really been anything “new” about the economy of the 
late 1990s after all. Perhaps the journalist John Cassidy (2002) was cor-
rect to title his book on the Internet boom Dot.con: The Greatest Story 
Ever Sold. If the New Economy was all smoke and mirrors, one would 
expect that, once the debris left behind by the storm of speculation and 
corruption had been cleared away, economic life would return to what 
it had been before the boom took place.
It is now clear that there was plenty of e-con in the New Economy. 
At the same time, however, there was something new, important, and 
permanent about the New Economy that transformed the economic 
lives of many from those they had led before. The core of that some-
thing new, important, and permanent is what I call the “New Economy 
business model” (NEBM), a mode of organizing business enterprises 
that has dramatically changed the ways in which, and terms on which, 
people in the United States are employed and, indeed, the way in which 
the U.S. economy operates. 
NEBM emanated from Silicon Valley and spread to other regions of 
the United States. NEBM also affected employment relations in other 
areas of the world, especially Europe and Asia, as U.S.-based ICT com-
panies extended their global reach and as high-tech companies based 
outside the United States sought to adopt elements of the new busi-
ness model. With well-educated high-tech labor fl owing into the United 
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States from abroad (especially from India and China) and with U.S.-
based ICT companies offshoring various types of business activities 
to other countries (again especially to India and China), the ICT labor 
force had become vastly more globalized by the 2000s than it had been 
prior to the Internet revolution.
Although the Internet boom of the late 1990s made the New Econo-
my a household phrase, the end of the boom did not result in the demise 
of NEBM. To the contrary, its characteristic features have become more 
widespread and entrenched in U.S. high-tech industries in the 2000s. 
With its start-up fi rms, vertical specialists, venture capital, and highly 
mobile labor, NEBM is a business model that remains dominant in the 
United States, and it is one that many national policymakers and corpo-
rate executives around the world seek to emulate. 
At the same time, within the United States, it is a business model 
that has been associated with volatile stock markets, unequal incomes, 
and unstable employment, including the insecurity associated with the 
offshoring of high-skill jobs. If we defi ne “sustainable prosperity” as a 
state of economic affairs in which growth results in stable employment 
and an equitable distribution of income, then U.S. economic prosper-
ity would appear to be unsustainable. There is a need to understand the 
organizational and industrial dynamics of NEBM to determine how the 
tapping of its innovative capability might be rendered compatible with 
more socially desirable outcomes.
The “Old Economy business model” (OEBM) that dominated the 
U.S. corporate economy in the decades after World War II and into the 
1980s offered employment that was far more stable and earnings that 
were far more equitable than employment and earnings in the NEBM 
era. The sociological foundation of OEBM was “the organization man.” 
Popularized in the United States in the 1950s (Whyte 1956), the stereo-
typical organization man was a white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant male 
who had obtained a college education right after high school, secured 
a well-paying job with an established company early in his career, and 
then worked his way up and around the corporate hierarchy over three 
or four decades of employment, with a substantial defi ned-benefi t pen-
sion, complemented by highly subsidized medical coverage, awaiting 
him on retirement.1 The employment stability offered by an established 
corporation was highly valued, while interfi rm labor mobility was 
shunned.
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The organization man could trace his origins back to the early 
decades of the twentieth century, and in the immediate post–World War 
II decades he was ubiquitous in the offi ces of U.S. corporate enterpris-
es. Somewhat ironically, when formidable Japanese competitors con-
fronted U.S.-based Old Economy companies in the 1980s, many U.S. 
observers of Japan’s “lifetime employment” system viewed it as a mode 
of organization that was quite alien to the American way of life. During 
the fi rst half of twentieth century, however, U.S. corporations had trans-
formed the salaried professional, technical, and administrative employ-
ees who peopled the managerial structure into organization men. By 
the 1950s and 1960s, moreover, even unionized production workers, 
ostensibly paid on an “hourly” rather than salaried basis, found that 
collective bargaining protected their positions of seniority, so that they 
too experienced, and in a growing economy came to expect, lifetime 
employment as well as defi ned-benefi t pensions and comprehensive 
health benefi ts, just like the salaried managers of the companies for 
which they worked.
From this historical perspective, NEBM can best be described as 
“the end of the organization man.” It is not that New Economy compa-
nies have ceased to build complex and durable organizations. To attain 
and sustain competitive advantage, companies such as Intel, Microsoft, 
and Cisco—the blue-chip enterprises of the New Economy—need to 
integrate the labor services of tens of thousands of individuals who 
participate in complex hierarchical and functional divisions of labor. 
In an innovative enterprise, the role of an integrated division of labor 
is to develop and utilize new technologies. Indeed, one might argue 
that, given heightened technological complexity and intensifi ed market 
competition in the ICT world of “open systems,” the building of unique 
organizational capabilities has become more, not less, critical to the 
success of the enterprise (Lazonick 2008a). 
Nor is it necessarily the case that employees who spend their entire 
careers with one company have become an endangered species. The 
leading industrial corporations still have low levels of employee turn-
over. Rather, what is new is the lack of a commitment, explicit or implic-
it, on the part of U.S. high-tech companies to provide their employees 
with stable employment, skill formation, and rewarding careers. When 
an employee begins to work for a company in the New Economy, he 
or she has no expectation of a career with that particular enterprise. 
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Nor does a person with high-tech capabilities necessarily want to work 
for one company for years and decades on end. Interfi rm labor mobil-
ity can bring benefi ts to an employee, including working for a smaller 
company, choice of geographical location, a signifi cant increase in sal-
ary, access to employee stock options, and new learning experiences. 
The NEBM represents dramatically diminished organizational commit-
ment on both sides of the employment relation as compared with its Old 
Economy predecessor. 
A corollary of this diminution in organizational commitment under 
NEBM has been an increased globalization of the types of labor that 
U.S.-based ICT fi rms employ. This globalization of labor has occurred 
through the offshoring of high-tech work and the international mobil-
ity of high-tech labor, neither of which is a new phenomenon, but both 
of which have intensifi ed over the past decade or so. The employment 
relations of major U.S.-based ICT companies have become thorough-
ly globalized, based on corporate strategies that benefi t from not only 
lower wages but also the enhancement of ICT skill levels in non-U.S. 
locations, especially in Asia. 
While the extent of these impacts of NEBM on high-tech employ-
ment has become evident only since the last half of the 1990s, NEBM 
itself has taken a half-century to unfold. Indeed, its origins can be 
found in the mid-1950s, at precisely the time when the Old Economy 
industrial corporation was at the pinnacle of its power. The evolution 
of NEBM was integral to the microelectronics revolution. The devel-
opment of computer chips since the late 1950s provided the techno-
logical foundation for the microcomputer revolution beginning in the 
late 1970s, which in turn created the technological infrastructure for the 
commercialization of the Internet in the 1990s. Although the U.S. gov-
ernment and the research laboratories of established Old Economy cor-
porations played major, and indeed indispensable, roles in supporting 
these developments, each wave of innovation generated opportunities 
for the emergence of start-up companies that were to become central to 
the commercialization of the new technologies. 
The regional concentration of these new ventures in what would 
become known by the beginning of the 1970s as Silicon Valley rein-
forced the emergence of a distinctive business model. From the late 
1960s, venture capitalists backed so many high-tech start-ups in the 
vicinity of Stanford University that they created a whole new indus-
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try for fostering the growth of young technology fi rms. These start-ups 
lured “talent” from established companies by offering them compensa-
tion in the form of stock options, typically as a partial substitute for 
salaries, with the potential payoff being the high market value of the 
stock after an initial public offering (IPO) or the private sale of the 
young fi rm to an established corporation. 
As these young companies grew, annual grants of stock options to 
a broad base of potentially highly mobile people became an important 
tool for retaining existing employees as well as attracting new ones. 
The subsequent growth of these companies occurred, moreover, not 
only by investing more capital in new facilities and hiring more people 
but also by acquiring even newer high-tech companies, almost invari-
ably using their own stock rather than cash as the acquisition currency. 
In addition, wherever and whenever possible, ICT companies were sys-
tem integrators that designed, tested, and marketed fi nal products, while 
outsourcing the manufacture of components so that they could focus on 
higher value-added work. This outsourcing strategy became both more 
economical and more effi cient over time as specialized contract manu-
facturers developed their capabilities, including their global organiza-
tions and highly automated production processes, for a larger extent of 
the market. 
These features of the new ICT business model were already evident 
to industry observers in the late 1980s. It was only in the Internet boom 
of the last half of the 1990s, however, that this business model had a 
suffi cient impact on new fi rm formation, product market competition, 
interfi rm labor mobility, and productivity to give popular defi nition to a 
New Economy. In this book, I document the evolution of NEBM over 
the past half-century as a foundation for understanding the origins of 
the globalization of high-tech employment in the 2000s and its implica-
tions for high-tech employment opportunities in the United States. 
NEBM has defi nitively replaced OEBM as the dominant mode of 
business organization in the ICT industries of the United States. NEBM 
has been, and continues to be, an important engine of innovation in 
the U.S. economy, and hence an important source of economic growth. 
The performance of an economy, however, is not measured by growth 
alone. Economists give high marks to an economy that not only gener-
ates growth but does so in a way that provides stable employment and 
an equitable income distribution—what I call “sustainable prosperity.” 
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Yet over the past decade or so, NEBM has been an engine of innovation 
that, as I show in this book, has contributed to instability and inequity. 
ICT continues to help make the United States the richest economy in the 
world, in terms of both absolute and per capita income. The increased 
dominance of NEBM in the organization of the ICT industries, howev-
er, has meant increasingly insecure employment and incomes for most 
workers in this sector, and it has become an important factor in the 
trend toward greater employment instability and income inequality in 
the U.S. economy as a whole.
Following the Internet boom and bust, what has been particularly 
novel about the employment situation of the 2000s thus far is the extent 
to which this insecurity has affl icted highly educated and experienced 
members of the U.S. ICT labor force, as their former employers prefer 
to hire younger high-tech workers in the United States. At the same 
time, companies are also offshoring to lower-wage locations the types of 
high-skill jobs that Americans had thought could never be done abroad. 
In terms of their education and qualifi cations, the U.S. high-tech work-
ers who suffer employment insecurity under NEBM are the types of 
people who in another era would have been the prototypical organi-
zation men, although they are no longer so uniformly white, Anglo-
Saxon, Protestant, or male, as the organization men of the 1950s were 
apt to be. The public outcry against the “export of American jobs” in 
this fi rst decade of the twenty-fi rst century in effect laments the demise 
of the organization man. 
In this book I explain the origins of this new era of employment 
insecurity and income inequality, and I consider what governments, 
businesses, and individuals can do about it. I ask whether the United 
States can refashion its high-tech business model to generate stable and 
equitable economic growth. Across the globe, government policymak-
ers and corporate executives generally view the U.S. business model, 
with its innovative power, as one that, if only it could be implemented 
in their own nations and regions, would make their countries and com-
munities big and strong. If the U.S. economy, including the business 
model that dominates the way in which it allocates resources, is to serve 
as an exemplar for the rest of the world, it is incumbent upon those of 
us who analyze its operation and seek to infl uence its performance to 
understand why it is failing to contribute to stable and equitable eco-
Lazonick.indb   6 7/31/2009   8:42:37 AM
What is New, and Permanent, about the “New Economy”?   7
nomic growth in the United States and what can be done to improve 
this record.
This book represents a step in my own quest to understand the insti-
tutional and organizational conditions under which an advanced econ-
omy—not only the U.S. economy—can achieve sustainable prosperity. 
Analogously, although I focus on the origins, operation, and impact of 
the dominant ICT industries, my interest is not in the operation and 
performance of the ICT sector per se. Rather, I have studied the ICT 
industries closely because they have been at the core of the innovative 
capability of the U.S. economy over much of the past century, especial-
ly over the past few decades. In order to grow, the economy needs inno-
vation, which I defi ne in economic terms as the generation of higher-
quality, lower-cost goods and services than were previously available 
at prevailing factor prices. Innovation does not, however, necessarily 
result in sustainable prosperity. In this book I ask what types of national 
institutions and business organizations support the innovation process, 
and what are the implications of this national innovation system for 
employment stability and income equality in the economy as a whole.
INNOVATION AND GROWTH IN THE U.S. ECONOMY
The United States is the world’s largest economy, with a gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita that surpasses those of all other 
developed nations. Table 1.1 shows the growth of real GDP per capita 
from 1950 to 2006 (in 1990 international dollars) in the United States 
and other large advanced economies, some smaller advanced econo-
mies, and some of the most rapidly growing developing economies. 
These data show varying rates of change in GDP per capita, which sug-
gests that the nation still matters as a unit of analysis for economic 
growth even in a globalized era (Lazonick 2007a). 
The most dramatic success story of the last half of the twentieth 
century is that of Japan, which emerged from a state of devastation 
after World War II to become, in terms of total GDP, the second larg-
est advanced economy by 1970 (see Maddison 2007). Japan became 
rich by transferring technology from abroad, primarily from the United 
States, and then developing and utilizing that technology to generate 
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Real GDPa
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2006
United States $9,561 $11,328 $15,030 $18,577 $23,201 $28,403 $30,983 
United States (298.4)b 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Japan (127.5) 20 35 65 72 81 73 73
Canada (33.1) 76 77 80 87 81 79 80
France (61.7) 55 67 78 81 78 74 72
Germany (82.7) 41 68 72 76 69 67 65
Italy (58.1) 37 52 65 71 70 66 63
United Kingdom (60.6) 73 76 72 70 71 71 74
Finland (5.2) 44 55 64 70 73 70 75
Netherlands (16.5) 63 73 80 79 74 78 75
Norway (4.6) 57 64 67 81 80 88 90
Sweden (9.0) 70 77 85 80 76 72 77
Switzerland (7.5) 95 110 112 101 93 79 76
South Korea (48.8) 9 11 14 22 38 50 58
Taiwan (23.0) 10 13 20 32 43 60 64
China (1,310.8) 5 6 5 6 8 12 21
India (1,095.4) 6 7 6 5 6 7 8
a 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars.
b 2006 population (in millions) in parentheses; United States = 100, for any year. 
SOURCE: Maddison (2007); Conference Board (2008).
Table 1.1  Real GDP per Capita in Selected Nations Compared with the United States, 1950–2006  
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higher-quality, lower-cost products than the United States was capable 
of producing. What is remarkable about Japan’s success is that, through 
innovation, it ultimately gained competitive advantage over the United 
States in the 1970s and 1980s in industries (such as mass-produced 
automobiles, consumer electronics, machine tools, steel, and semicon-
ductors) in which the United States had reigned supreme in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Although low wages and long work hours (along with the oil 
crisis and the consequent demand for small, fuel-effi cient cars) helped 
Japan capture U.S. markets in the 1970s, the proof that Japan had devel-
oped a highly innovative economy was its ability to extend its competi-
tive advantage in the late 1970s and 1980s even as its wage rates rose 
substantially (as refl ected in the GDP per capita fi gures in Table 1.1). 
Indeed, in the mid-1990s, the Japanese even began to work fewer hours 
per year on average than Americans (International Labour Organization 
1999).
Since the 1980s, the Japanese challenge to U.S. dominance in high-
technology and capital-intensive industries has been repeated by a num-
ber of other Asian economies, most notably South Korea, Taiwan, and 
China. In labor-intensive information-technology services, India has 
become a formidable competitor over the past decade as well. Critical 
to the development of these economies has been not only the transfer 
of technology from the United States but also, to an extent that was 
never the case for Japan, the development of the productive capabili-
ties of nationals through graduate education and work experience in the 
United States—a phenomenon that I explore in considerable depth in 
this book.
While many of the Asian economies have been catching up, the 
United States remains a highly innovative economy in the 2000s. Real 
GDP per capita grew by an annual average of 3.04 percent in the 1960s, 
2.18 percent in the 1970s, 2.10 percent in the 1980s, 1.86 percent in the 
1990s, and 1.49 percent in the 2000s. Whatever problems there may 
be with the U.S. economy in the 2000s, they are not problems that, 
averaged over the whole population, result from a lack of productive 
power. At the same time, the United States has experienced a long-term 
trend toward a slower rate of increase in real GDP per capita alongside 
growing international competition from nations such as China and India 
that have developed enormous innovative capabilities but still have far 
lower wages than those that prevail in the United States. These changes 
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may exacerbate tendencies to instability and inequity in the U.S. econo-
my, thus making sustainable prosperity more diffi cult to attain.
Instability
From 1930 through 1941, the U.S. unemployment rate averaged 
about 17.4 percent, ranging from 8.9 percent in 1930 to 25.2 percent in 
1933 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1976, p. 126). It took the United States’ 
entry into World War II to get the nation out of the Great Depression. 
After the war, Congress passed the Employment Act of 1946, which 
placed the federal government under obligation to pursue economic 
policies to secure conditions of full employment for American citizens. 
Since then, the civilian unemployment rate has not reached double dig-
its, although it went as high as 9.7 percent in 1982 and 9.6 percent 
in 1983. As shown in Figure 1.1, the unemployment rate averaged 4.5 
percent in the 1950s, 4.8 percent in the 1960s, 6.2 percent in 1970s, 7.3 
percent in the 1980s, 5.6 percent in the 1990s, and 5.0 percent in the 
2000s (through 2007).
Although government intervention has apparently eradicated the 
possibility of another Great Depression, the rate at which Americans 
can fi nd employment is still far from stable over time, both within and 
across decades, as shown in Figure 1.1. Blacks and Hispanics experi-
ence much higher unemployment rates than whites, and in 1983 the 
black unemployment rate was at a Depression-level 19.5 percent. 
Moreover, as can also be seen in Figure 1.1, married men with spouses 
present, who as a group have among the lowest unemployment rates, 
also experience substantial fl uctuations over time in the rate at which 
they are employed.
In the era of the organization man, lengthy tenure with one compa-
ny became the foundation of employment security in the United States. 
In a recent survey of changes in job security, Henry Farber (2008, p. 1) 
stated that “there is ample evidence that long-term employment [with 
one company] is on the decline in the United States.” Using Current 
Population Survey data for 1973–2006, Farber (p. 27) showed that, 
in the 1990s and 2000s, members of the U.S. labor force experienced 
shortened job tenure, with the impact being most pronounced for males. 
Moreover, education and experience are no longer the guarantors of 
employment security that they once were. Using Displaced Worker Sur-
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vey data to analyze rates of job loss, Farber (p. 35) found that those 
with college educations had job loss rates 22 percent lower than those 
with high school educations in the 1980s, but only 12 percent lower in 
the 2000s. He also found that workers aged 45–54 had job loss rates 19 
percent higher than workers aged 20–24 in the 1980s, whereas the job 
loss rates of the older age group were 58 percent higher than those of 
the younger age group in the 2000s.
If employment incomes have become more unstable over the course 
of one’s career, so too have the fi nancial returns on accumulated wealth. 
Large numbers of Americans have substantial wealth invested in the 
stock market, not only in direct holdings but also indirectly through 
their investments in mutual funds, pensions, and insurance policies. 































































All civilian workers Males, 20 years and over
Females, 20 years and over Both sexes, 16–19 years
Whites Blacks
Hispanic or Latino ethnicity Married men, spouse present
Women who maintain families (NSA)
NOTE: Until 1972 the black unemployment rate included other races. NSA means not 
seasonally adjusted. The average annual unemployment rates for the U.S. civilian la-
bor force were as follows: 1950s, 4.5 percent; 1960s, 4.8 percent; 1970s, 6.2 percent; 
1980s, 7.3 percent; 1990s, 5.8 percent; 2000–2007, 5.0 percent.
SOURCE: U.S. Congress (2009, table B-42); U.S. Bureau of the Census (1976, p. 135).
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In 1999 holdings of corporate equities in the U.S. economy were at a 
record 211 percent of GDP, about 3.5 times the percentage in 1990, and 
holdings of corporate equities per capita were at a peak of $86,994 in 
2007 dollars (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2008, 
table L213). In 2007, holdings of corporate equities per capita were 41 
percent higher in real terms than they had been in 1996, at the onset of 
the Internet boom.
In 1945 households directly held 93 percent of the value of corpo-
rate equities in the U.S. economy; by 2007 it was only 25 percent. Nev-
ertheless, in 2007, on a per capita basis, the direct holdings of house-
holds in 2007 dollars were more than 88 percent greater than in 1945. 
Pensions (private and government) held only 6 percent of corporate 
equities in 1965, but they held 28 percent in 1985. Although this share 
stood at 23 percent in 2007, a steadily increasing proportion of sav-
ings has poured into mutual funds, which represented only 5 percent of 
corporate stockholdings in 1985 but 26 percent in 2007. The growth of 
mutual funds refl ected the shift from defi ned-benefi t to defi ned-contri-
bution pensions and the trend toward the management of defi ned-con-
tribution pensions through individual retirement accounts (IRAs; see 
Chapter 4). The mutual fund share of IRA assets grew from 17 percent 
in 1985 to 49 percent in 1999. In 1999, mutual funds absorbed 30 per-
cent of defi ned-contribution assets but only 6 percent of defi ned-benefi t 
assets, and they were heavily invested in equities (Engen and Lehnert 
2000, pp. 802–803). 
Stock market returns are very unstable, not only from year to year 
but also from decade to decade, as shown in Table 1.2 (which does not 
include the negative results for 2008). The extraordinarily high price 
yields in the 1980s and 1990s lured Americans into thinking that invest-
ments in the stock market could give them long-run fi nancial security. 
High price yields may refl ect real productivity gains made by innova-
tive enterprises (as was indeed partly the case in those decades), but 
they may also refl ect a high volume of speculative stock trading that 
imparts instability to the stock market. Furthermore, when innovation 
and speculation do not sustain increases in stock prices, corporate exec-
utives, encouraged by Wall Street, may seek to do so through manipula-
tion. Hence, as I show in Chapter 6, with stock markets sluggish in the 
2000s, U.S. companies, including leading high-tech enterprises, have 
turned to large-scale stock repurchases to boost their stock prices, thus 
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redistributing income to shareholders from other stakeholders in the 
corporate economy. Yet I shall argue that, even for shareholders, stock-
price appreciation based on stock repurchases is not sustainable over 
the long run.2
Inequity
A key characteristic of OEBM was the separation of asset owner-
ship from managerial control over the allocation of corporate resources 
(Lazonick 1990, 1991). The salaries of those at the top of the corporate 
hierarchy were regulated much less by an external labor market for top 
executives than by the internal salary structure of the managerial orga-
nizations over which they presided. Managerial personnel, who gener-
ally had college educations, could look forward to promotion within 
the company over the course of their careers. When they retired, they 
would receive a guaranteed stream of income from a defi ned-benefi t 
pension plan that rewarded years of service. Clerical and production 
workers, who generally had high school educations, could also look 
forward to spending their whole working lives with the same company, 
notwithstanding the fact that they were deemed to be “hourly” rather 
than “salaried” employees. 
Research on the distribution of income in the United States has 
shown that there was a movement toward more equality in the immedi-
ate post–World War II decades that came to a halt in the mid-1970s. A 
1960–69 1970–79 1980–89 1990–99 2000–07
Real stock yield 6.63 −1.66 11.67 15.01 0.96
Price yield 5.80 1.35 12.91 15.54 2.09
Dividend yield 3.19 4.08 4.32 2.47 1.64
Change in CPIa 2.36 7.09 5.55 3.00 2.78
Real bond yield 2.65 1.14 5.79 4.72 3.34
Table 1.2  Average Annual U.S. Corporate Stock and Bond Yields (%), 
1960–2007
NOTE: Stock yields are for Standard and Poor’s composite index of 500 U.S. corpo-
rate stocks (about 75 percent of which are listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
[NYSE].) Bond yields are for Moody’s AAA-rated U.S. corporate bonds.
a Consumer price index.
SOURCE: Updated from Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000a) using U.S. Congress (2009, 
tables B-62, B-3, B-95, and B-96).
Lazonick.indb   13 7/31/2009   8:42:38 AM
14   Lazonick
marked trend to more income inequality started with the recessionary 
years of the early 1980s and has continued to the present (see Autor, 
Katz, and Kearney 2008; Bradbury 1996; Danziger and Gottschalk 
1995; Goldin and Katz 2008; Jones and Weinberg 2000; Levy and Mur-
nane 1992; Moss 2002; Piketty and Saez 2003, 2006; Pryor 2007; Saez 
2005). These movements can be seen in Figure 1.2, which charts the 
Gini coeffi cient for households from 1947 to 2007. The Gini coeffi cient 
is a measure of the amount of income inequality. The higher the Gini 
coeffi cient, the greater the extent of income inequality across house-
holds—the coeffi cient would be 0.0 if all households had the same 
income and 1.0 if one family had all the income and the remaining 
families had no income. An improvement in income equality is discern-
ible until the mid-1970s, after which it became much worse.
A worsening in the distribution of income among households after 
the mid-1970s is also evident in Figure 1.3, which shows that the 
household income ratios of various higher to lower percentiles in the 
U.S. household income distribution have all trended upwards, with the 



























































SOURCE: Table F-4 in U.S. Census Bureau (2009).
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most marked upward trend occurring among the more extreme ratios 
(90th/10th and 95th/20th). Figure 1.4, based on data collected by Piketty 
and Saez (2006), shows that the top 1 percent of the income distribu-
tion gained a dramatically larger share of total income since 1985. The 
next 4 percent (top 2–5 percent in Figure 1.4) have also increased their 
share since the early 1980s. In 2004, 37 percent of all corporate equities 
were held by the wealthiest 1 percent of households and 80 percent by 
the top 20 percent in the wealth distribution (Allegretto 2006). And, as 
we shall see, many if not most of the ongoing increases in top executive 
pay have come from stock options as a mode of remuneration. If the 
increased reliance of households, governments, and corporations on the 
stock market has made the U.S. economy more unstable, the distribu-
tion of returns from the stock market has made the U.S. economy much 
more unequal.
Figure 1.3  Changes in the Relative Incomes of Selected Income 
Percentiles in the U.S. Distribution of Income, 1967–2007
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ICT INDUSTRIES
What is a business model, and how do OEBM and NEBM differ? 
We can defi ne a business enterprise by the product markets for which it 
competes and the ways in which it mobilizes capital and labor to com-
pete for those markets (for an elaboration, see Lazonick 2007b). Hence, 
as shown in Table 1.3, a business model can be characterized by three 
components: 1) its strategy, the types of product markets for which 
a company competes and the types of production processes through 
which it generates goods and services for these markets; 2) its fi nance, 
the ways in which it funds investments in processes and products until 
they can generate fi nancial returns; and 3) its organization, the ways in 
which it elicits skill and effort from its labor force to add value to these 
investments. 
The evolution of NEBM has been intimately related to the develop-
ment of the ICT industries in the United States. The U.S. Department 
Figure 1.4  Shares of the Top Income Earners of the Total U.S. Income, 
1913–2002
SOURCE: Piketty and Saez (2006, p. 201). Excel fi le available at http://elsa.berkeley
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OEBM NEBM
Strategy, product Growth by building on internal capabilities; 
expansion into new product markets based on 
related technologies; geographic expansion to 
access national product markets.
New fi rm entry into specialized markets; sell 
branded components to system integrators; 
accumulate new capabilities by acquiring young 
technology fi rms.
Strategy, process Development and patenting of proprietary 
technologies; vertical integration of the value 
chain at home and abroad.
Cross-license technology based on industry 
standards; vertical specialization of the value 
chain; outsourcing/offshoring of routine work.
Finance Venture fi nance from personal savings, family, 
and business associates; NYSE listing; pay 
steady dividends; growth fi nance from retentions 
leveraged with bond issues.
Organized venture capital; IPO on NASDAQ; low 
or no dividends; growth fi nance from retentions 
plus stock as an acquisition currency; stock 
repurchases to support stock price.
Organization Secure employment: career with one company; 
salaried and hourly employees; unions; defi ned-
benefi t pensions; employer-funded medical 
insurance in employment and retirement.
Insecure employment: interfi rm mobility of labor; 
broad-based stock options; nonunion; defi ned-
contribution pensions; employee bears greater 
burden of medical insurance. 
Table 1.3  Old Economy Business Model (OEBM) and New Economy Business Model (NEBM) in ICT Industries
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of Commerce (2003) has defi ned ICT industries as those engaged in 
producing computer hardware, computer software and services, com-
munications equipment, and communications services.3 According to 
the department’s report Digital Economy 2003, the output of ICT indus-
tries accounted for about 9 percent of U.S. GDP in 2000 at the peak of 
the Internet boom and about 8 percent in the early 2000s (Henry and 
Dalton 2003, p. 16). 
Employment in U.S. ICT industries increased by 51.9 percent from 
1993 to 2000, compared with a 20.8 percent increase for all business-
sector industries. In 2000 these industries employed a total of 5.38 mil-
lion people, representing 4.8 percent of employment by all U.S. busi-
ness-sector industries. Although ICT employment declined by 0.6 per-
cent in 2001 and by 10.7 percent in 2002, ICT industries still employed 
4.78 million people, or 4.4 percent of employment in the U.S. business 
sector, in 2002 (Cooke 2003, pp. 21–22). According to Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (BEA) data, ICT-producing industries, which do not 
include communications services,4 employed (in full-time equivalents) 
4.68 million people in 2000, representing 4.4 percent of all business-
sector employees in the United States, 3.67 million (3.5 percent) in 
2003, and 3.76 million (3.5 percent) in 2006 (BEA 2009).
Figures 1.5 and 1.6 show the changes in employment and real wag-
es (in 2000 dollars) in four main ICT industry classifi cations. As shown 
in Figure 1.5, employment in each of these four industry classifi cations 
increased substantially in the last half of the 1990s and peaked in 2001 
with a total employment of 1,658,628, almost 2.4 times the number of 
employees in 1994. From 2001 to 2003, there was a net loss of just over 
320,000 jobs, although more than 140,000 of these jobs were regained 
by 2006. Real wages in all of these classifi cations increased in the latter 
half of the 1990s, and then, for reasons that will be explained in Chapter 
2, spiked in 2000—dramatically in the case of semiconductors and soft-
ware publishing—before falling off sharply with the downturn of 2001 
and showing little if any increase through 2006 (Fig. 1.6).
Employees in ICT industries earn, on average, much more than 
those in most other sectors of the economy. In 2006 the average annual 
incomes (in current dollars) of U.S. ICT employees were $111,212 in 
software publishing, $77,915 in semiconductors, $76,462 in custom 
computer programming services, $73,497 in computer system design 
services, and $62,620 in data processing, hosting, and related services 
Lazonick.indb   18 7/31/2009   8:42:39 AM
What is New, and Permanent, about the “New Economy”?   19
(U.S. Census Bureau 2008a).5 In 2006 a full-time equivalent employee 
in U.S. ICT-producing industries had 56 percent higher average com-
pensation than a full-time equivalent employee in U.S. business sector 
goods-producing industries in general (BEA 2009). Following the ICT 
downturn in 2001–2002 and the “jobless recovery” of 2003–2004, ICT-
producing industries had real growth in output of 13.3 percent in 2005 
and 12.5 percent in 2006. The value-added of ICT-producing industries 
was 3.9 percent in 2006, contributing 14.2 percent of real GDP growth 
in the U.S. economy (Howells and Barefoot 2007). 
Although the United States remains the world leader in ICT indus-
tries, it nevertheless has been running trade defi cits in ICT goods, 
as shown in Table 1.4. The U.S. Census Bureau categorizes trade in 
Advanced Technology Products into 10 categories: Biotechnology, 
























NOTE: SIC classifi cations for 1994–1997 and NAICS classifi cations for 1998–2006: 
Semiconductors and related devices: SIC 3674, NAICS 334413; Software publish-
ing: SIC 7372, NAICS 511210 and 334611; Computer programming services: SIC 
7371, NAICS 541511; Computer system design: SIC 7373 plus half of 7379, NAICS 
54152.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2008a).
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Life Science, Opt-Electronics, Information and Technology, Electron-
ics, Flexible Manufacturing, Advanced Materials, Aerospace, Weap-
ons, and Nuclear Technology. Except for Aerospace exports in 2006 
and 2007, ICT exports have been greater than every other category 
of exports since 2002, and ICT imports have been fi ve to seven times 
greater than the next largest categories, Electronics and Aerospace. A 
substantial portion of these ICT trade defi cits refl ect the globalization 
of investment and employment in ICT value chains, with U.S.-based 
multinational companies playing leading roles. It cannot, therefore, be 
assumed that the trade defi cit measures a lack of competitiveness of 
U.S.-based companies in ICT industries. 
Indeed, in the fi rst half of the 2000s, U.S. ICT industries remained 
highly innovative. U.S.-based ICT fi rms accounted for 26.0 percent of 
all company-funded research and development (R&D) in the United 
States in 2000 and 31.2 percent in 2001 (Henry and Dalton 2003, p. 
18). At the beginning of 2003, ICT companies employed 40 percent of 
Figure 1.6  Real Wages (in 2000 dollars) in Four ICT Industrial 
Classifi cations, 1994–2006
NOTE: See Figure 1.5 for SIC and NAICS classifi cations.
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the 1,075,500 full-time equivalent research and development (R&D) 
scientists and engineers in the U.S. business sector (National Science 
Foundation 2003). Table 1.5 shows R&D expenditures of the U.S. ICT 
companies that were among the top 100 globally in R&D spending in 
2006. 
Firm-level R&D spending is infl uenced by, among other factors, the 
technologies that a company develops and the product markets in which 
it competes. Note, for example, the high levels of R&D as a percent 
of sales for semiconductor companies such as Intel, Texas Instruments 
(TI), Qualcomm (the design of integrated circuits for code division mul-
tiple access [CDMA] wireless devices that the company pioneered rep-
resents a major part of its business), Advanced Micro Devices (AMD), 
and Broadcom. IBM and Hewlett-Packard (HP), the two largest ICT 
companies by total sales revenues, had by far the lowest levels of R&D 
as a percentage of sales and R&D dollars spent per employee. As we 
will see in Chapter 3, the limited extent to which IBM and HP allocate 
resources to R&D in the 2000s is the direct result of their transforma-
tions from OEBM to NEBM. 
Whether they are U.S.-based or foreign, ICT companies are the 
leading patenters in the United States. IBM has been the top patenter 
every year since 1993, with Canon being either second or third. In 2007 
IBM (USA) had 3,148 U.S. patents, Samsung (South Korea) 2,725, 
Canon (Japan) 1,987, Matsushita (Japan) 1,941, Intel (USA) 1,865, 
Microsoft (USA) 1,637, Toshiba (Japan) 1,549, Sony (Japan) 1,481, 










ICT as % 
of ATP 
exports
ICT as % 
of ATP 
imports
ICT as % 
of U.S. 
ATP defi cit
2002 53.3 100.7 −47.4 29.6 51.8 285.6
2003 53.1 110.1 −57.0 29.5 53.2 212.4
2004 59.3 132.5 −73.2 29.4 55.6 198.7
2005 64.1 147.2 −83.1 29.7 56.7 190.2
2006 69.2 160.8 −91.6 27.4 55.3 240.3
2007 74.8 179.7 −104.9 27.4 55.0 196.2
Table 1.4  U.S. Exports and Imports of ICT Products, Relative to All 
Advanced Technology Products (ATP), 2002–2007
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2008b).
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Table 1.5  U.S. ICT Companies among the Global Top 100 R&D Spenders, 2005 and 2006
Global rank
R&D expenditures 
($m) R&D as % of sales
R&D expenditures 
per employee ($000s)
ICT Company 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005
Microsoft 5 7 7,121 6,584 13.9 14.9 90 93
Intel 12 14 5,873 5,145 16.6 13.3 62 52
IBM 14 11 5,682 5,378 6.2 5.9 16 16
Motorola 22 24 4,106 3,680 9.6 10.0 62 53
Cisco Systems 23 30 4,067 3,322 14.3 13.4 81 86
Hewlett-Packard 28 26 3,561 3,490 3.9 4.0 23 23
Oracle 48 55 2,195 1,872 12.2 13.0 29 33
Texas Instruments 50 51 2,190 2,015 15.4 15.1 71 57
Sun Microsystems 56 49 2,008 2,046 14.5 15.7 53 54
Qualcomm 66 89 1,516 1,011 20.1 17.8 135 109
EMC 77 90 1,254 1,005 11.2 10.4 40 38
Google 79 119 1,218 578 11.5 9.4 114 102
Advanced Micro Devices 80 77 1,205 1,144 21.3 19.6 73 116
Applied Materials 86 95 1,138 941 12.4 13.5 81 73
Broadcom 89 115 1,117 681 30.5 25.5 213 159
Electronic Arts 95 108 1,041 758 33.7 25.7 132 105
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NOTE:Microsoft, Oracle, Sun Microsystems, and Electronic Arts all have fi scal years that end in the fi rst half of the year. For these 
companies the data for 2006 are for the fi scal year ended in the fi rst half of 2007 and the data for 2005 are for the fi scal year ended in 
the fi rst half of 2006. In 2005 Freescale Semiconductor was ranked 74th and Lucent Technologies 75th among global R&D spenders. 
R&D expenditures as a percentage of sales were 20.3 percent at Freescale and 12.5 percent at Lucent. R&D expenditures per 
employee were $52,000 at Freescale and $39,000 at Lucent. In December 2006 Freescale was taken private and Lucent was acquired 
by Alcatel; hence comparable data for these companies for 2006 ate not available.
SOURCE: Hira and Ross (2007).
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10 patenters, Matsushita, Samsung, and Sony are partially in ICT, and 
the other seven, including the fi ve U.S.-based companies, are primarily 
or wholly in ICT. Other U.S.-based ICT companies that were among 
the top 35 patenters in 2007 were TI (seventeenth with 752 patents), 
Sun Microsystems (twenty-sixth, 610), Cisco Systems (twenty-seventh, 
582), Broadcom (thirty-fi rst, 533), and Xerox (thirty-third, 517) (IFI 
Patent Intelligence 2008).
ICT products contribute to productivity throughout the U.S. economy. 
In a review of the book Manufacturing Matters, by Cohen and Zysman 
(1987), Robert Solow (1987) observed that, despite the authors’ cen-
tral belief that computerized manufacturing would produce a break 
with past patterns of productivity growth, how effectively U.S. indus-
try would make use of computer automation remained an open ques-
tion. Solow went on to remark that Cohen and Zysman, “like everyone 
else, are somewhat embarrassed by the fact that what everyone feels to 
have been a technological revolution, a drastic change in our produc-
tive lives, has been accompanied everywhere, including Japan, by a 
slowing-down of productivity growth, not by a step up.” Solow then 
quipped, now rather famously: “You can see the computer age every-
where but in the productivity statistics.” 
Ultimately, however, the failure of the expansion of investment in 
and access to computers to result in productivity growth in the 1980s 
and early 1990s was replaced with an explosion of ICT-related pro-
ductivity growth in the late 1990s and 2000s (Baily and Sichel 2003; 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2003; Gordon 2003; Jorgenson 2001; Oliner and 
Sichel 2002; Roach 2003). Why did it take so long for the “computer 
age” to make its mark on productivity growth? 
The key to answering this question is the recognition that produc-
tivity depends on the development and utilization of technology. The 
development of technology in and of itself does not generate productiv-
ity. Indeed, the development of technology lowers productivity because 
it absorbs inputs into economic activity without generating valued out-
puts. An individual, enterprise, region, or nation that develops technol-
ogy realizes productivity over time only when it actually utilizes that 
technology to sell products and generate revenues. In effect, through 
the utilization of technology, the high fi xed costs of the development of 
technology can be transformed into low unit costs (see Lazonick 1991, 
2006, 2008b). Developmental costs, which are included in the econo-
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mist’s conception of fi xed costs, depend on both the size of the invest-
ment in productive resources that is made at a point in time and the 
duration of time over which the productive capability of those resources 
must be developed before they can generate fi nancial returns. 
It is for this reason that it is often necessary for a government to 
make developmental investments in physical infrastructure and a 
knowledge base in order to induce business enterprises (which by defi -
nition must generate profi ts to survive) to enter an industry that is based 
on new technology. The U.S. government played a fundamental role in 
funding the computer revolution. Without the backing of the develop-
mental state, the microelectronics revolution would not have occurred 
(Braun and MacDonald 1982; Flamm 1987, 1988; Lécuyer 2006; Les-
lie 1993a,b; Mowery and Langlois 1996; National Research Council 
1999; Tilton 1971).6 
As they developed, the ICT industries created a demand for edu-
cation and research in science and engineering, with externalities for 
other sectors of the economy in terms of access to advanced research 
and educated labor (e.g., Lenoir et al. 2003). The evolution in the 1960s 
of what would become known as Silicon Valley also created a demand 
for venture capital that, as I elaborate on in Chapter 2, had emerged by 
the early 1970s as an industry in its own right that was devoted to new 
fi rm formation. 
The NEBM that was put in place in Silicon Valley in the 1970s 
and 1980s also depended on the investment decisions and productive 
resources of Old Economy companies, the most important of which was 
IBM. The world’s leading computer company from the 1950s, IBM’s 
development of the personal computer in the early 1980s based on an 
Intel microprocessor and a Microsoft operating system was the most 
important impetus to the emergence and consolidation of the vertically 
specialized industrial structure that came to characterize NEBM. 
Even in the 1980s, when to a large extent (to paraphrase Solow), 
computers were everywhere but productivity nowhere, the two parts of 
ICT developed separately, with computer production and voice trans-
mission having virtually nothing to do with each other as industries. It 
was only with the introduction of data communications based on packet 
switching that the information and communication technology indus-
tries came together, initially in the second half of the 1980s in the form 
of local area networks and then in the fi rst half of the 1990s in the form 
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of the Internet. Concomitantly, the wireless communications revolution 
was taking place, with “3G” (third-generation) convergence with infor-
mation technology via the Internet in the 2000s. The contribution of 
the ICT industries to productivity growth from the mid-1990s on and 
the subsequent dominance of NEBM over OEBM in the ICT industries 
were part and parcel of the integration of information and communica-
tion technologies in the form of the Internet, giving meaning to the 
letters ICT.
THE TOP 20 OLD ECONOMY AND NEW ECONOMY 
COMPANIES
In 2005 there were 53 companies in the U.S. Fortune 500 that could 
be classifi ed as ICT.7 Combined, these 53 companies had $909 billion 
in revenues and 2.6 million employees. Of these 53 companies, 26, with 
$332 billion in revenues and 871,000 employees, could be defi ned as 
New Economy. Tables 1.6 and 1.7 list the top 20 Old Economy and top 
20 New Economy ICT companies, respectively, by 2005 revenues and 
the number of people these companies had employed over the previous 
decade. For inclusion in Table 1.7 as New Economy, a company had to 
fulfi ll three criteria: 1) have been founded in 1957 or later, 2) not have 
been established by the spin-off of an existing division from an Old 
Economy company, and 3) not have grown through acquisition of, or 
merger with, an Old Economy company (as was the case for Electronic 
Data Systems, Comcast, and IAC, which are included as Old Economy 
companies). 
I have chosen 1957 as the earliest date for inclusion in the New Econ-
omy list because that was the year that eight scientists and engineers left 
Shockley Semiconductor Laboratories in Palo Alto, California—itself 
founded just two years before—to launch Fairchild Semiconductor 
in nearby Mountain View. Fairchild Semiconductor was a division of 
Fairchild Camera and Instrument, based in Long Island, New York. As 
is well known, the creation of Fairchild Semiconductor sparked a chain 
reaction that resulted in the emergence of Silicon Valley as a center for 
the development of microelectronics (Berlin 2005; Kenney 2000; Lécuy-
er 2006; Lee et al. 2000; Lenoir et al. 2003). As I will show in Chapter 
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2, it was fi rst and foremost in Silicon Valley, beginning in the late 1950s, 
that NEBM emerged as a viable, and ultimately dominant, business mod-
el. Note that 14 of the 20 New Economy companies listed in Table 1.7 are 
based in California, and 11 of those are in Silicon Valley. 
Headed by the giants IBM and HP, six of the Old Economy com-
panies in Table 1.6, including Xerox, Electronic Data Systems (EDS), 
First Data, and NCR, are strictly information technology companies.8 
The two semiconductor companies, TI and Freescale Semiconductor, 
supply chips to both the information technology and communication 
technology sectors of ICT but with an emphasis on communications 
applications. TI’s major business is designing digital signal processing 
chips for the cell-phone industry, whereas Freescale is a 2004 spinoff 
of the wireless communications technology company Motorola. Along 
with Motorola in the communications equipment segment of ICT is 
Lucent Technologies, which was spun off from AT&T Corp. in 1996 
and was merged with the French telecommunications equipment com-
pany Alcatel to become Alcatel-Lucent in 2006.9 
The remaining 10 companies in Table 1.6 are communications ser-
vice providers. Five of them are direct descendents of the old Bell Sys-
tem that, until its breakup on January 1, 1984, functioned as a regulated 
monopoly in the provision of local and long distance telephone services. 
AT&T, the parent company within the Bell System, included regional 
operating companies throughout the United States. AT&T’s wholly 
owned subsidiary, Western Electric, manufactured equipment for the 
Bell System, while Bell Labs, the world famous research organization 
jointly owned by AT&T and Western Electric, engaged in basic and 
applied scientifi c research. The breakup of the Bell System separated 
seven regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs) from AT&T Corp., 
which now included Western Electric and Bell Labs within its internal 
organization as its AT&T Technologies division. The seven RBOCS 
were Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, NYNEX, Pacifi c Telesis 
(PacTel), Southwestern Bell Corp. (SBC), and US West. Subsequently 
Bell Atlantic and NYNEX were merged into Verizon; Ameritech, Pacif-
ic Telesis, and AT&T Corp. into SBC, which in 2005 changed its name 
to AT&T Inc.; and US West into Qwest. In December 2006 AT&T Inc. 
acquired BellSouth, so that in the 23 years since the breakup of the Bell 
System, AT&T Corp. and the seven RBOCs had become consolidated 
into three companies: AT&T Inc., Verizon, and Qwest.10
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employeeOld Economy companies 1996 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
International Business Machines 
(1911; NY; 10)
91.1 240,615 316,309 319,876 315,889 319,273 329,001 329,373 $277,000 
Hewlett-Packard (1939; CA; 11) 86.7 112,000 88,500 86,200 141,000 142,000 151,000 150,000 $578,000 
Verizon Communications 
(1885; NY; 18)
75.1 62,600 260,000 247,000 229,500 203,100 210,000 217,000 $346,000 
AT&T Inc.a (1885; TX; 39) 43.9 61,540 220,090 193,420 175,400 168,950 162,000 189,950 $231,000 
Motorola (1928; IL; 54) 36.8 139,000 147,000 111,000 97,000 88,000 68,000 69,000 $533,000 
Sprint Nextelb (1899; KS; 59) 34.7 48,024 84,100 83,700 72,200 66,900 59,900 79,900 $434,000 
Comcastc (1963; PA; 194) 22.3 16,400 35,000 38,000 82,000 68,000 74,000 80,000 $279,000 
BellSouth (1885; GA; 106) 20.6 81,241 103,900 87,875 77,000 76,000 62,564 63066 $326,000 
Electronic Data Systemsd
(1962; TX; 108)
20.5 100,000 122,000 143,000 137,000 132,000 117,000 117,000 $175,000 
Xerox (1906; CT; 142) 15.7 86,700 92,500 78,900 67,800 61,100 58,100 55,200 $284,000 
Qwest Communications 
(1885; CO; 160)
13.9 720 67,000 61,000 47,000 47,000 41,401 39,348 $353,000 
Texas Instruments 
(1930; TX; 167)
13.4 59,927 42,481 34,724 34,589 34,154 35,472 35,207 $381,000 
DirecTV Group (1932; CA; 168) 13.2 86,000 9,000 13,700 11,600 12,300 11,800 9,200 $1,435,000 
First Data (1871; CO; 224) 10.5 40000 27000 29000 29000 29000 32000 33000 $318,000 
Alltel (1943; AR; 251) 9.5 16,307 27,257 23,955 25,348 19,986 18,598 21,373 $444,000 
Lucent Technologies 
(1869; NJ; 255)
9.4 124,000 126,000 77,000 47,000 34,500 31,800 30,500 $308,000 
Table 1.6  Employment, 1996 and 2000–2005, at the Top 20 Old Economy Companies by 2005 Sales
Lazonick.indb   28
Lazonick.indb   28
7/31/2009   8:42:41 A
M
7/31/2009   8:42:41 A
M
  29
NOTE: In parentheses: year of founding, state in which headquartered, and rank in 2006 Fortune 500 list. Included in the ICT industries are 
companies that the Fortune 500 2006 list classifi es as being in the following industries: Computer Peripherals, Computer Software, Com-
puters, Offi ce Equipment, Financial Data Services, Information Technology Services, Internet Services and Retailing, Network and Other 
Communications Equipment, Semiconductors and Other Electronic Components, and Telecommunications. Blank = not applicable.
a In 2005 SBC Communications, founded in Texas in 1885 and ranked 33rd on the Fortune 500 list, acquired AT&T, founded in 1877 and 
ranted 56th on the 2005 list. SBC then changed its name to AT&T Inc. Employment fi gures for 1996 and 2000–2004 are for SBC. AT&T 
Corp.’s employment fi gures were: 1996, 130,000; 2000, 166,000; 2001, 117,800; 2002, 71,000; 2003, 61,000; and 2004, 47,565.
b In August 2005 Sprint, 65th on the Fortune 500 2005 list, acquired Nextel, founded in 1987 and 157th on the 2005 list.
c Comcast began its transformation into the largest Internet cable company in the United States through its acquisition of subscribers from 
AT&T Broadband in 2000–2001.
d General Motors bought Electronic Data Systems in 1984 and spun it off as an independent company in 1996.
e In 1998 HSN (formed out of Home Shopping Network) purchased USA Networks, which had been owned by Paramount and MCA. In 
the early 2000s, the company changed its name, fi rst to USA Interactive and then to IAC/InterActiveCorp.
f In late 2004 Motorola spun off its semiconductor division as Freescale Semiconductor.
SOURCE: Fortune (2006); hoovers.com; S&P Compustat database.
Cox Communications (1898; 
GA; 273)
9.0 7,200 19,000 20,700 21,600 22,150 22,350 22,530 $399,000 
IAC/InterActiveCorpe 
(1977; NY; 313)
7.1 4,750 20,780 16,900 23,200 25,700 26,000 28,000 $254,000 
NCR (1884; OH; 357) 6.0 38,600 32,900 31,400 30,100 29,000 28,500 28,200 $213,000 
Freescale Semiconductorf 
(1928; TX; 368)
5.8 22,700 $256,000 
Averages (per fi rm, except 
sales per employee)
27.3 72,808 96,885 89,334 87,621 83,111 81,062 81,027 $391,000 
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New Economy Companies  1996 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Dell Computer (1984; TX; 25) 55.9 8,400 36,500 40,000 34,600 39,100 55,200 65,200 $857,000 
Microsoft (1975; WA; 48) 39.8 20,561 39,100 47,600 50,500 55,000 57,000 61,000 $652,000 
Intel (1968; CA; 49) 38.8 48,500 86,100 83,400 78,700 79,700 85,000 99,900 $388,888 
Cisco Systems (1984; CA; 83) 24.8 8,782 34,000 38,000 36,000 34,000 34,000 38,413 $646,000 
Computer Sciences 
(1959; CA; 141)
15.8 33,850 58,000 68,000 67,000 90,000 90,000 79,000 $200,000 
Apple Computer 
(1977; CA; 159)
13.9 10,896 8,568 9,603 10,211 10,912 12,561 15,810 $879,000 
Oracle (1977; CA; 196) 11.8 23,111 41,320 42,297 42,006 40,650 41,658 49,872 $236,000 
Sanmina-SCI (1980; CA; 198) 11.7 1,726 24,000 48,774 46,030 45,008 42,115 42,821 $273,000 
Sun Microsystems 
(1982; CA; 211)
11.1 17,400 38,900 43,700 39,400 36,100 32,600 31,000 $358,000 
Solectron (1977; CA; 227) 10.5 10,781 65,273 60,000 73,000 66,000 59,500 47,000 $223,000 
EMC (1979; MA; 249) 9.7 4,800 24,100 20,100 17,400 20,000 22,700 21,000 $462,000 
Amazon.com (1994; WA; 272) 8.5 151 9,000 7,800 7,500 7,800 9,000 12,000 $708,000 
EchoStar Communications 
(1993; CO; 273)
8.4 1,200 11,000 11,000 15,000 15,000 20,000 21,000 $400,000 
SAIC (1969; CA; 285) 8.0 20,931 39,078 41,500 40,400 38,700 44,900 43,800 $183,000 
Jabil Circuit (1966; FL; 303) 7.5 2,649 19,115 17,097 20,000 26,000 34,000 40,000 $188,000 
Applied Materials 
(1967; CA; 317)
7.0 11,403 19,220 17,365 16,077 12,050 12,960 12,750 $549,000 
Google (1998; CA; 353) 6.1 1,628 3,021 5,680 $1,074,000 
Table 1.7  Employment, 1996 and 2000–2005, at the Top 20 New Economy Companies by 2005 Sales
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NOTE: In parentheses: year of founding, state in which headquartered, and rank in 2006 Fortune 500 list. Included in the ICT industries 
are companies that the Fortune 500 2006 list classifi es as being in the following industries: Computer Peripherals, Computer Software, 
Computers, Offi ce Equipment, Financial Data Services, Information Technology Services, Internet Services and Retailing, Network 
and Other Communications Equipment, Semiconductors and Other Electronic Components, and Telecommunications. Blank = not ap-
plicable.
SOURCE: Fortune (2006); hoovers.com; S&P Compustat database.
Advanced Micro Devices 
(1969; CA; 367)
5.8 12,200 14,696 14,415 12,146 14,300 15,900 15,900 $365,000 
Qualcomm (1985; CA; 381) 5.7 6,000 6,300 6,500 8,100 7,400 7,600 9,300 $613,000 
Yahoo! (1995; CA; 412) 5.3 155 3,259 3,000 3,600 5,500 7,600 9,800 $541,000 
Averages (per fi rm, except 
sales per employee)
15.3 12,816 30,396 32,640 32,509 32,242 34,366 36,062 $424,000 
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In contrast, only three of the top 20 New Economy companies are 
clearly communications technology companies: Cisco Systems, which 
makes Internet routers and switches; EchoStar Communications, a 
major force in satellite television11; and Qualcomm, a wireless equip-
ment manufacturer. Even so, Cisco’s rise to dominance in its industry 
derives from its development of software that has enabled the conver-
gence of information and communication technology—what is called 
the “triple play” of voice, data, and video—using the same infrastruc-
tures and equipment. The evolution of those infrastructures and equip-
ment has depended critically on the development of ever more power-
ful, compact, and affordable computers—in short, the microelectronics 
revolution. At the center of this revolution were the hardware company, 
Intel, and the software company, Microsoft, both of which grew large 
supplying crucial inputs to the IBM personal computer (PC) and what 
used to be called its clones, including Dell Computer, no. 1 on the New 
Economy list. AMD, founded in Silicon Valley a year after Intel, sus-
tained its growth for decades by serving as a second source for the sup-
ply of Intel chips, although in recent years it has increasingly been com-
peting head-to-head with Intel with its own chip designs. 
Applied Materials is the world’s largest maker of semiconductor 
production equipment, while Solectron (since 2007 part of Flextron-
ics), Sanmina-SCI, and Jabil Circuit are among the world’s leading 
electronic manufacturing service (EMS) providers, supplying printed 
circuit boards and other components to companies such as IBM, HP, 
Dell, and Cisco. Other companies have established their own distinctive 
niches in the information technology sector, such as Apple in innova-
tive computer products, Sun Microsystems in computer workstations, 
and EMC in information management and storage. Oracle is the leader 
in database management software, while Computer Sciences (CS) and 
SAIC line up behind “Old Economy” EDS in providing information 
technology services. Finally, Amazon.com, Google, and Yahoo! are, 
along with “Old Economy” IAC, in the Fortune industry classifi ca-
tion “Internet Services and Retailing,” which was newly created for the 
2005 list. The revenues that each of them generated in 2005 put them 
on the top 20 New Economy list for the fi rst time (compare Lazonick 
2007b, pp. 67–68).
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NEBM AS A FORCE FOR UNSTABLE AND INEQUITABLE 
ECONOMIC GROWTH
The basic thesis of this book is that the demise of OEBM and its 
replacement by NEBM together represent important parts of the expla-
nation for the trend toward greater employment instability and income 
inequality in the U.S. economy over the past three decades—a reversal 
of the trend toward more stable and more equitable economic growth 
in the three decades after World War II. While NEBM has been evolv-
ing since the 1960s in ICT industries, the Internet boom and bust of the 
late 1990s and early 2000s was pivotal in the replacement of OEBM by 
NEBM as the dominant mode of business organization. 
New Economy companies such as Intel, Microsoft, Oracle, Sun 
Microsystems, and Cisco Systems grew on the basis of NEBM. Among 
the major Old Economy companies, IBM led the shift to NEBM during 
the 1990s as it changed its product market strategy from lower mar-
gin hardware to higher margin software and services; its R&D orienta-
tion from proprietary technology systems to open technology systems, 
with extensive patenting as a source of leverage in cross-licensing and 
strategic alliances with other companies; its fi nancial behavior from 
providing stable dividend yields to shareholders to boosting its stock 
price through massive stock repurchases; and its employment relations 
from its signature “lifelong employment” system with defi ned-benefi t 
pensions to a focus on fl exibility in the employment of labor, includ-
ing the move to portable pension systems designed to be attractive to 
younger, highly mobile employees. During the late 1990s, other major 
Old Economy ICT companies such as Lucent, Xerox, Motorola, TI, and 
HP adopted aspects of NEBM, and with the sharp downturn of the early 
2000s, NEBM became the norm for all ICT companies. In this book, 
I document this shift to NEBM in the ICT industries and analyze its 
implications for the possibilities for sustainable prosperity in the United 
States. 
Chapter 2 provides a historical analysis of the rise of NEBM, from 
its origins in Silicon Valley in the 1960s to its consolidation as the dom-
inant business model in ICT in the Internet boom of the late 1990s. I 
stress the role of the stock market in facilitating the reallocation of capi-
tal and labor from the security of the Old Economy in which established 
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corporations dominated to the insecurity of the New Economy with its 
waves of start-ups. Facilitating the reallocation of capital was the emer-
gence of NASDAQ (National Association of Securities Dealers Auto-
mated Quotations), a national electronic stock market with much laxer 
listing requirements than the Old Economy New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE). Facilitating the reallocation of labor was the transformation 
of the employee stock option from a means of increasing the after-tax 
income of top executives under OEBM to a mode of luring a broad base 
of professional, technical, and administrative employees from secure 
employment under OEBM to insecure employment under NEBM.
Chapter 3 analyzes how major Old Economy companies—with 
a focus on the important cases of IBM, HP, and Lucent Technolo-
gies—restructured in attempts (in the case of Lucent unsuccessful) to 
make the transition from OEBM to NEBM. With its central positions 
in both Old Economy mainframes and New Economy PCs, in the early 
1990s IBM proactively, dramatically, and successfully made the transi-
tion from OEBM to NEBM. So too did HP, beginning with its 1999 
spinoff of Agilent—the original business that William Hewlett and 
David Packard had built—to focus on its open systems printer busi-
ness, launched about 15 years earlier. In contrast, Lucent Technologies, 
the 1996 spinoff from AT&T that housed the famed Bell Labs and that 
was the largest telecommunications equipment company in the world in 
1999, almost destroyed itself trying to adopt elements of NEBM and a 
decade later was a subsidiary of a French company, Alcatel-Lucent. All 
three cases in this chapter demonstrate the greatly heightened employ-
ment insecurity that the transition from OEBM to NEBM entails. In the 
cases of IBM and HP, we see that even when Old Economy corpora-
tions have made a successful transition to NEBM, employment inse-
curity increases. In the case of Lucent, we see the disastrous results of 
an Old Economy company in which top executives became fi xated on 
the company’s stock price as the measure of economic performance but 
failed to make the transition to NEBM.
Chapter 4 analyzes the relations between employment security and 
retirement security under both OEBM and NEBM. Under OEBM, the 
traditional nonportable, “back-loaded” defi ned-benefi t pension plan 
encouraged employees to remain with a company for a career. In mak-
ing the transition to NEBM, some Old Economy companies adopted 
portable but still defi ned-benefi t cash-balance plans that favored the 
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employment of younger workers, often as a prelude to replacing a cash-
balance plan with a portable defi ned-contribution 401(k) plan. In con-
trast, most New Economy companies such as Microsoft, Oracle, Cisco, 
and Dell have offered their employees only defi ned-contribution plans 
over the course of their corporate histories. Many Old Economy compa-
nies have used existing defi ned-benefi t pensions as a tool for downsiz-
ing the labor force by means of early retirement schemes that enhance 
the value of one’s pension. By the mid-2000s, most Old Economy cor-
porations offered only defi ned-contribution plans to new hires and, at 
some companies, even to all employees. The major exceptions can be 
found in those ICT companies in which industrial unions have remained 
strong as collective-bargaining agents. Under NEBM, members of the 
U.S. high-tech labor force confront a high-quality, low-wage global-
ized labor supply with no effective collective institutions to protect their 
conditions of work and pay.
Chapter 5 analyzes the forces that have underpinned the globaliza-
tion of the ICT labor force. Since the 1960s the development strate-
gies of national governments and indigenous businesses in many Asian 
nations have interacted with the investment strategies of U.S.-based 
ICT companies as well as U.S. immigration policy to generate a global 
high-tech labor supply. This process has entailed fl ows of U.S. capital 
to Asian labor as well as fl ows of Asian labor to U.S. capital. As a result, 
new possibilities to pursue high-tech careers, and thereby develop pro-
ductive capabilities, have opened up to vast numbers of individuals in 
many Asian nations. By the same token, it is increasingly the case that 
members of the U.S. high-tech labor force must compete for jobs with 
highly qualifi ed, but often much less expensive, labor situated halfway 
around the world. With the acceleration of offshoring in the 2000s, even 
well-educated and highly experienced members of the U.S. ICT labor 
force are facing unprecedented economic insecurity. Under these condi-
tions, what is needed in the United States is the creation of employment 
opportunities that can make full use of the productive capabilities of 
educated and experienced U.S. high-tech labor.
Chapter 6 shows that, driven by a pervasive, but theoretically unten-
able, ideology that corporations should be run to maximize shareholder 
value, top executives of ICT companies have chosen to allocate corpo-
rate resources in a way that, at best, fails to support and, at worst, under-
mines the ability of members of the U.S. high-tech labor force to com-
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pete with a global labor supply without sacrifi cing their standards of 
living. Rather than use the profi ts of globalization to upgrade the capa-
bilities of the U.S. high-tech labor and to create new opportunities for 
creative employment at home, top executives have become obsessed (if 
I may use such a psychological term) with allocating corporate fi nancial 
resources to buying back their companies’ own stock. I argue that the 
only purpose of stock repurchases is to boost a company’s stock price, 
and that, as recipients of abundant stock option awards, the top execu-
tives who decide to buy back stock are themselves prime benefi ciaries 
of these corporate allocation decisions. 
Finally, Chapter 7 discusses the implications for sustainable pros-
perity of the rise and dominance of NEBM. With the transformation of 
employment relations, the globalization of the high-tech labor force, 
and the corporate commitment to maximizing shareholder value, well-
educated and highly experienced members of the U.S. high-tech labor 
force are facing economic insecurity, even when the U.S. ICT corpora-
tions that could provide them with stable and remunerative employ-
ment opportunities are highly profi table. In terms of their accumulated 
capabilities, these ICT personnel should be among the best-positioned 
in the U.S. labor force to fi nd stable and remunerative employment. 
Yet, notwithstanding the existence of older underemployed and unem-
ployed high-tech workers, high-tech executives perpetually claim that 
there is a shortage of capable STEM (science, technology, engineer-
ing, and mathematics) labor in the United States. What these executives 
actually want is a large supply of younger workers who will work long 
hours for less pay. 
These executives go on to blame an underperforming U.S. K–12 
education system for failing to generate this abundant labor supply. The 
U.S. government does need to remain committed to investment in the 
nation’s educational infrastructure. Government investment, however, 
will not in and of itself generate sustainable prosperity. The achieve-
ment of stable and equitable economic growth, both for existing mem-
bers of the U.S. high-tech labor force and for those segments of U.S. 
society who have been left behind, will require a confrontation with 
the destructive “shareholder-value” ideology that currently guides the 
resource allocation decisions of U.S. business corporations. 
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Notes
 1. In the early 1950s, the sociologist C. Wright Mills (1951) had written an infl uen-
tial academic treatise on the signifi cance of the “white collar” employee. William 
H. Whyte, who wrote his best-selling The Organization Man while an editor of 
Fortune, later became a prominent urban sociologist. Whyte’s characterization of 
“The Organization Man” has often been interpreted as pejorative, the victim of 
the bureaucratic suppression of rugged individualism. Whyte himself, however, 
denied this interpretation. In a 1982 interview, Whyte stated: “I didn’t mean The 
Organization Man as a pejorative work. . . . After all, I’ve been an organization 
man myself in some very good organizations. And I don’t think one loses grace by 
being a member of an organization. Yet many people interpreted this thing on its 
own, not having read it, as an attack on modern American life. That anybody who 
worked for a corporation had lost his soul. And I meant no such thing.” Interview 
by Richard H. Heffner on “The Open Mind” October 15, 1982, available at http://
www.theopenmind.tv/searcharchive_episode_transcript.asp?id=1509 (accessed 
June 26, 2009).
 2. In Jeremy Siegel’s well-known book, Stocks for the Long Run, now in its fourth 
edition, there is only one passing reference to stock buybacks (Siegel 2008, p. 98), 
notwithstanding the fact that, since the late 1990s, repurchases have become the 
major mode of distributing corporate revenues to shareholders. 
 3. The Department of Commerce (2003) described these industries as IT. I use the 
term ICT to describe the same set of industries in order to highlight the orga-
nizational separation of information and communication technologies in OEBM 
and the ongoing convergence of information and communication technologies that 
characterizes NEBM. 
 4. The BEA defi nes ICT-producing industries as consisting of computer and elec-
tronic products, publishing industries (includes software), information and data 
processing services, and computer systems design and related services.
 5. U.S. Census Bureau (2008a, 1994–1997 data: http://censtats.census.gov/cbpsic/
cbpsic.shtml; 1998–2006 data: http://censtats.census.gov/cbpnaic/cbpnaic.shtml).
 6. See also Hambrecht (1984) for the views of a prominent Silicon Valley investment 
banker.
 7. Given the gestation period of this book, I have organized collection of data around 
the top 20 OEBM and NEBM companies by revenues in 2005, taken from the 
Fortune 500 list published in 2006. The top 20 lists for 2007, taken from the For-
tune 500 list published in 2008, have 15 of the same Old Economy companies and 
18 of the same New Economy companies as in Tables 1.6 and 1.7, respectively. 
Gone from the Old Economy list in 2007 are BellSouth (acquired by AT&T Inc. in 
December 2006), Lucent Technologies (acquired by Alcatel in December 2006 to 
become Alcatel-Lucent), Cox Communications (taken private in December 2004 
and included on the Fortune 500 list in 2005 but not thereafter), NCR (which with 
$6.2 billion in revenues in 2007 did not make the top 20 Old Economy list), and 
Freescale Semiconductor (taken private in December 2006). In place of these fi ve 
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companies on the 2007 Old Economy list are Liberty Media (thirteenth), Auto-
matic Data Processing (fourteenth), Liberty Global (fi fteenth), Virgin Media (sev-
enteenth), and Embarq (twentieth, a spinoff of Sprint Nextel’s local telephone 
business in May 2006). Liberty Media, Liberty Global, and Virgin Media are all 
new companies with Old Economy roots. Gone from the New Economy list in 
2007 are Solectron (acquired by Flextronics, based in Singapore, in October 2007) 
and AMD (which with $6.0 billion in revenues in 2007 did not make the top 20 
list). Their replacements on the 2007 New Economy list are eBay (eighteenth) and 
Cablevision Systems (twentieth).
 8. HP acquired EDS in August 2008 in a $13.9 billion deal.
 9. In 2000, Lucent spun off Avaya, an enterprise networking company that, with 
$4.9 billion in revenues and 18,555 employees, ranked 434th in the Fortune 500 
in 2005, and in 2001, it spun off Agere Systems, a communications chips company 
that, with $1.7 billion in revenues and 6,200 employees, ranked 904th in the For-
tune 1000 in 2005.
 10.  With the growth of wireless communications, in 2001 AT&T Corp. spun off AT&T 
Wireless as a separate company, while in the same year, SBC and Bell South cre-
ated the wireless company Cingular as a joint venture. In 2004 Cingular acquired 
AT&T Wireless. In December 2006, AT&T Inc. (formerly SBC) acquired Bell-
South, and as a result Cingular, renamed AT&T Mobility, is now wholly owned by 
AT&T Inc.
 11. On January 1, 2008, EchoStar Communications changed its name to DISH Net-
work, while spinning off some of its businesses as EchoStar Corporation.
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2
The Rise of the New 
Economy Business Model
ORIGINS OF THE MICROELECTRONICS REVOLUTION
Technologies that were discovered and developed by Old Economy 
corporations provided the essential foundations for the rise of the New 
Economy in ICT. During the post–World War II decades, AT&T, a regu-
lated monopoly since 1913, dominated the communications industry. 
A U.S. government antitrust suit was launched in 1949 that sought to 
sever the exclusive relation between AT&T and Western Electric. The 
suit resulted in a 1956 consent decree that permitted AT&T to maintain 
exclusive control over its manufacturing company but barred the Bell 
System from competing in industries other than telecommunications. 
In addition, AT&T and Western Electric had to license their patents to 
other companies at reasonable fees (Lewis 1956). As a result, the R&D 
of Bell Labs, including the transistor invented there in 1947, supported 
the development of the ICT industries generally while the communica-
tions and computer industries remained organizationally distinct.
During the 1950s and 1960s, building on its overwhelming dom-
inance of the punch-card tabulating machine industry, IBM came to 
dominate the computer industry. IBM introduced its fi rst computer in 
1952, and emerged as the undisputed leader of the computer industry 
within a decade. IBM grew from $166 million in revenues in 1950 to 
$1.8 billion in 1960, $7.5 billion in 1970, and $26.2 billion in 1980. By 
1958 IBM was already the thirty-seventh largest industrial company 
by revenues in the United States, and a decade later it was the seventh 
largest. By 1963 IBM’s dominance was such that its U.S. revenues of 
$1,244 million from data-processing computers were well over eight 
times those of its nearest competitor, Sperry Rand. Indeed, the eight 
companies that followed IBM had combined U.S. revenues of $539 
million, or only 43 percent of IBM’s (Chandler 2001, p. 86). 
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In the 1950s and 1960s, advances in computers, and in electronics 
more generally, came to depend critically on advances in semiconduc-
tors, the generic name for solid-state electronic devices. AT&T/West-
ern Electric and IBM became important developers of semiconductors, 
but only for in-house use. Technology-rich and well-established Old 
Economy companies such as General Electric (GE), RCA, Raytheon, 
Sylvania, Philco-Ford, and Westinghouse entered the semiconductor 
industry. These companies were the leading manufacturers of the elec-
tronic vacuum tubes that were being replaced by the far smaller and 
less power-hungry semiconductor devices (Tilton 1971, chap. 4). On 
the face of it, GE was in a particularly strong position to dominate in 
microelectronics. In the early 1950s, GE’s revenues were 9 to 10 times 
those of IBM, and GE Labs had been in existence since the beginning 
of the century. GE did hold 8 to 9 percent of the semiconductor market 
between 1957 and 1966 (p. 66), but thereafter GE, which is still among 
the largest and most powerful technology companies in the world, did 
not become a force in the commercialization of semiconductors.
The most successful merchant semiconductor companies in the lat-
ter half of the 1950s and in the 1960s were smaller fi rms, most notably 
Texas Instruments (TI), the leader with 17 percent of the U.S. market 
in 1966, Motorola, with 12 percent, and Fairchild, with 13 percent. TI 
remained the world leader in market share through 1984, and in 2007 
stood in fourth place, with 4.3 percent of the world market, behind only 
Intel (15.0 percent), South Korea’s Samsung (7.9 percent), and Japan’s 
Toshiba (4.3 percent) (Gartner 2008). Motorola was second to TI in 1979 
as the microcomputer revolution was unfolding, and the two companies 
remained neck and neck in 1984, when both had revenues from semi-
conductors that were almost twice those of Intel. From 1985 through 
1990, Motorola was the top U.S. chip company. In 1991, it relinquished 
that position to Intel, which has been the world leader since 1992. In 
2004 Motorola spun off its chip division as Freescale Semiconductor, 
which by 2007 had captured 2.1 percent of the world market.
Motorola and TI were founded just two years apart—Motorola as 
the Galvin Manufacturing Company in Illinois in 1928 and TI as Geo-
physical Service Inc. (GSI) in New Jersey in 1930. Over the ensuing 
decades, these companies became exemplars of OEBM, and employ-
ment relations at both Motorola and TI remained Old Economy in 
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the 1980s (see Gutchess 1985a, pp. 280–281, and 1985b, pp. 62–66; 
Simison 1985). 
An innovator in wireless communications technology, Galvin Man-
ufacturing made the “Motorola” brand name of its car radios the com-
pany name in 1947, the same year it launched its television business 
and the transistor was invented at Bell Labs. In 1948 Motorola opened 
its own semiconductor research lab in Phoenix, Arizona, to develop 
devices for its electronic products. By 1954 the lab had evolved into 
a manufacturing facility that employed 800 people, and in the latter 
half of the 1950s, Motorola was selling not only transistorized radios, 
two-way radios, and pagers but also, as a distinct semiconductor busi-
ness, germanium transistors. In 1958 Motorola hired Lester Hogan, a 
former Bell Labs researcher and at the time a Harvard applied physics 
professor, to head its semiconductor operations (Holbrook et al. 2000, 
p. 1024). 
In the 1930s, GSI manufactured innovative seismic signal process-
ing equipment for oil exploration (see Pirtle 2005, pp. 2–5). After shift-
ing its headquarters from New Jersey to Dallas, Texas, GSI expanded 
during World War II as a defense contractor making submarine detec-
tion equipment. In 1951 GSI licensed the transistor from Bell Labs with 
a view to digitizing its seismic equipment. In the same year it changed 
its name to Texas Instruments. To lead the development of the semicon-
ductors that it needed for its products, in 1953 TI lured away a promi-
nent chemist, Gordon Teal, from Bell Labs by offering him the chance 
to run his own research lab in his home state of Texas (Teal 1991). 
Within two years of joining TI, Teal and his team had developed 
the fi rst commercializable silicon transistor. By 1957 TI had captured 
20 percent of the semiconductor market. In 1958, a TI researcher, Jack 
Kilby, invented the integrated circuit, just ahead of Robert Noyce at 
Fairchild Semiconductor (Reid 1985). TI had $27 million in revenues 
and 2,100 employees in 1953, $233 million in revenues and 16,900 
employees in 1960, and $828 million in revenues and 44,800 employ-
ees in 1970. 
Given the prominence of companies such as Motorola and TI, the 
development of the U.S. semiconductor industry was not only a Sili-
con Valley phenomenon. The Silicon Valley semiconductor industry, 
however, gave rise to NEBM, and the key company in the evolution of 
Silicon Valley was Fairchild Semiconductor.
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EVOLUTION OF THE NEBM
Strategic Characteristics
In September 1957 eight scientists and engineers left Shockley 
Semiconductor Laboratories in Palo Alto, California, to form Fairchild 
Semiconductor, a manufacturer of diffused silicon transistors, in nearby 
Mountain View. Just two years earlier, William Shockley, coinventor 
of the transistor, had recruited the “traitorous eight,” as he later called 
them, to his new enterprise from different parts of the United States. The 
interfi rm mobility of talented people to found or join start-ups was aided 
by a unique California law that prohibited employers from demanding 
that employees sign post-employment covenants not to compete (Gil-
son 1999). Over the following decades, this mobility became the defi n-
ing characteristic of the dynamic regional economy that Shockley Labs 
and Fairchild Semiconductor inadvertently helped to create. 
As shown in Figure 2.1, from 1959 through 1970, 42 new semicon-
ductor fi rms—21 in 1968 and 1969 alone—were launched in the vicin-
ity of Fairchild in what became known by the beginning of the 1970s 
as Silicon Valley.1 By 1985 the number of Silicon Valley semiconductor 
start-ups since the founding of Fairchild totaled 125. Of these 125 fi rms, 
32 were founded by at least one person who had left employment at 
Fairchild for that purpose, while another 35 companies were offspring 
from these “Fairchildren” (especially from National Semiconductor, 
Intel, Signetics, and Synertek). Fairchild was so important to the emer-
gence of Silicon Valley because it not only drew people and knowledge 
from the established R&D labs of the electronic tube companies such 
as GE, RCA, Westinghouse, and Sylvania, but it also invested heavily 
in research, especially related to manufacturing processes for the mass 
production of diffused silicon transistors (Berlin 2005, chaps. 5–6; 
Lécuyer 2006, chaps. 5–6; Tilton 1971, p. 4). 
Following the founding of Fairchild, the fi rst wave of Silicon Valley 
semiconductor start-ups consisted of 10 fi rms launched between 1959 
and 1964 oriented toward military markets. Between 1955 and 1963, 
the annual value of total U.S. semiconductor production rose from $40 
million to $610 million, and the proportion that was for the U.S. mili-
tary varied between 35 and 48 percent. In 1968, when the value of U.S. 
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semiconductor production stood at $1.2 billion, the value of military 
production was still 25 percent of the total. By that time, integrated 
circuits accounted for 27 percent of the value of all U.S. semiconduc-
tor production, up from less than 3 percent fi ve years earlier. Military 
demand was critical to the growth of this important product category, 
accounting for 94 percent of integrated circuit production in 1963 and 
37 percent in 1968 (Tilton 1971, pp. 90–91). 
Meanwhile, the price per integrated circuit declined from $31.60 
in 1963 to $2.33 in 1968, thus dramatically increasing the economic 
viability of using integrated circuits for cost-conscious civilian markets 
(Tilton 1971, pp. 90–91). The realization of these commercial oppor-
tunities precipitated the second wave of Silicon Valley start-ups. From 
1968 through 1972, the region hosted 40 semiconductor start-ups, 13 
of which were Fairchildren and another eight of which were offspring 
of Fairchildren. Among these Fairchildren were Intel, founded in 1968 
by Gordon Moore and Robert Noyce with Andrew Grove as their fi rst 
employee, and Advanced Micro Devices (AMD), founded in 1969 by 
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Jerry Saunders, who brought with him seven other Fairchild executives 
(see Berlin 2005, chap. 7; Lécuyer 2006, chap. 7). When Moore and 
Noyce founded Intel to produce memory chips that could replace the 
magnetic coil memories then in use, they specifi cally declined to cre-
ate a separate R&D lab and refused to accept government contracts for 
research (Bassett 2002, chap. 6). 
The third wave of Silicon Valley semiconductor start-ups began 
in 1978, peaked in 1983, and continued to 1985. During these years 
there were 58 new fi rms created, of which seven were Fairchildren and 
another 26 offspring. In contrast to the dynamic random access memo-
ry (DRAM) and erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM) 
chips that had underpinned the growth of the second-wave companies 
such as National, Intel, and AMD, third-wave fi rms such as VLSI Tech-
nology (1979), LSI Logic (1981), Cypress Semiconductor (1983), Cir-
rus Logic (1984), and Chips and Technologies (1985) focused on logic 
chips—microprocessors and application-specifi c integrated circuits 
(ASICs)—for which value-added lay in chip design rather than high-
yield, low-defect mass production. 
In pursuing this design-oriented strategy, the founders of these start-
ups and their backers were taking advantage of new commercial oppor-
tunities opened up by the growth of consumer and business electronic 
product markets. Meanwhile during this third wave, integrated Japanese 
producers such as NEC, Hitachi, Toshiba, and Fujitsu that sold only a 
portion of the memory chips that they produced were taking command 
of the “commodity chip” markets that second-wave companies such as 
Intel and National had served (see Chase 1983; Patterson 1981, 1982). 
Underlying the formidable Japanese challenge were superior manu-
facturing methods that resulted in fewer defects and higher yields (see 
Burgelman 1994; Okimoto and Nishi 1994). 
Around 1985 this Japanese challenge undermined the profi tabil-
ity of all the major memory producers, Intel included. So great was 
the Japanese threat in commodity chips that the most powerful U.S. 
semiconductor companies banded together to form SEMATECH (an 
acronym for Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology) with partial 
funding from the U.S. government, in an attempt to ensure that the 
United States would not lose indigenous capability in the production 
of semiconductor fabrication equipment as well (Browning and Shetler 
2000; Grindley, Mowery, and Silverman 1994). By the beginning of the 
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1990s, however, Intel reemerged as the dominant U.S. competitor in the 
global semiconductor market, its revenues surpassing TI’s starting in 
1990 and Motorola’s in 1991. 
The foundation of Intel’s success was the microprocessor, the “com-
puter on a chip” that it had invented in 1971 and that became the major 
source of revenues for the company with the IBM-led PC revolution of 
the 1980s. In 1981 IBM announced its PC, with the operating system 
supplied by Microsoft and the microprocessor by Intel. Both Microsoft 
and Intel retained the right to sell these products to other companies. In 
1982 IBM accounted for almost 14 percent of Intel’s revenues (Chase 
1983). 
In 1982 IBM’s PC sales were $500 million, and just two years later 
they were 11 times that amount, more than triple the 1984 revenues of its 
nearest competitor, Apple, and about equal to the revenues of IBM’s top 
eight rivals. Subsequently, the very success of the IBM PC combined 
with open access to the Microsoft operating system and Intel micropro-
cessor meant that, in the last half of the 1980s and beyond, IBM lost 
market share to lower-priced PC clones such as Compaq, Gateway, and 
Dell (Chandler 2001, pp. 118–199, 142–143). 
Nevertheless IBM’s strategy for entering the microcomputer mar-
ket had consolidated and reinforced the vertically specialized structure 
of the industry in line with what can be viewed as the Silicon Valley 
model (Best 2001, p. 124; Grove 1996, chap. 3; Langlois 1992). The 
subsequent domination by Intel and Microsoft of the product markets 
for microprocessors and operating software, respectively, created an 
immense barrier to entry to actual and potential competitors who would 
directly confront the New Economy giants. At the same time, however, 
by defi ning the “open systems” standards for the computer industry, 
Intel and Microsoft opened up countless opportunities for new entrants 
to develop specialized niche products that conformed to the “Wintel” 
architecture (Borrus and Zysman 1997; Pollack 1985a). 
Yet for the major Silicon Valley semiconductor companies in the 
1970s, vertical specialization in chips was a competitive outcome, not a 
strategic choice. A 1979 New York Times article subtitled “The Cloning 
of I.B.M.’s Computers” observed, “It is almost axiomatic in the elec-
tronics industry that companies in the semiconductor business want to 
go into end-user businesses, in other words to vertically integrate into 
fi nished products and systems” (Schuyten 1979). As part of a strategy to 
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integrate forward into consumer products, National Semiconductor and 
Fairchild started producing and marketing calculators (Sporck 2001, 
pp. 228–230). In 1972 Intel acquired a Silicon Valley digital watchmak-
er, Microma, which pioneered liquid crystal display watches. Nation-
al Semiconductor and Fairchild Camera and Instruments (the parent 
company of Fairchild Semiconductor and by this time based in Silicon 
Valley) were also producing digital watches, as was TI (BusinessWeek 
1976). Indeed, price competition from its semiconductor rivals led Intel 
to exit the watch business in 1978, taking a loss of $15 million on the 
venture (Manners 1997; Sporck 2001, pp. 185–187; Wharton 1990). 
The semiconductor companies had somewhat more, but neverthe-
less limited, success integrating forward into capital goods. During 
the 1970s National manufactured checkout scanners and made money 
in that business before being outcompeted by IBM and NCR (Sporck 
2001, pp. 230–231). Following the lead of Silicon Valley-based Amdahl, 
National had also entered the plug-compatible mainframe (PCM) mar-
ket, producing clones of IBM’s machines. By the early 1980s, however, 
all of National’s PCMs were manufactured by Hitachi (BusinessWeek 
1983), and in 1989, Hitachi and Electronic Data Systems bought 
National’s mainframe business (Molloy 1989). 
In addition, leading Silicon Valley semiconductor companies, 
including Intel, National, and Intel-spinoff Zilog, entered the minicom-
puter industry in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but they were outcom-
peted by not only the Japanese but also by fi rms in the Route 128 high-
tech corridor to the north and west of Boston in Massachusetts, such 
as Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) and Data General, as well 
as by IBM and HP. In 1981 Intel entered the microcomputer industry, 
one in which National was already engaged using Intel’s 8086 micro-
processor. Intel’s director of corporate planning, Les Vadasz, argued 
that Intel’s forward integration into microcomputers was strategic: “We 
develop products because they fi t into our overall architecture of things” 
(BusinessWeek 1981a). But 1981 was also the year that IBM launched 
its PC, using Intel’s microprocessor. IBM’s success pushed Intel out of 
the microcomputer business and helped to ensure that the leading pro-
ducer of microprocessors would grow to world dominance as a special-
ized semiconductor company.
The Silicon Valley semiconductor companies, therefore, had tried 
to integrate forward into fi nal products, but competition from integrated 
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Japanese and U.S. rivals forced them to specialize in chips. Vertical 
specialization, however, did not stop there. A number of Silicon Valley 
design-oriented chip companies that entered the industry in the 1980s, 
and even more so in the 1990s, did so without investing in the manufac-
ture of semiconductors. For example, many producers of programma-
ble logic devices and graphics processors such as Altera, NVIDIA, and 
Xilinx turned to foundries to manufacture their chips. The Taiwanese in 
particular took advantage of the opportunity, as the Taiwan Semicon-
ductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) and United Microelectronics 
Corporation (UMC) became the largest semiconductor contract manu-
facturers in the world (Brown and Linden 2005, pp. 288–293; Leach-
man and Leachman 2004; Taiwan Industry Semiconductor Association 
2007; Zerega 1999).
If a layer of vertical specialization emerged in the manufacture of 
chips, so too did it emerge in the assembly of chip sets, printed circuit 
boards, and, increasingly, even fi nished products (Sturgeon 2002). In 
the 1980s and early 1990s contract manufacturers, also known as elec-
tronic manufacturing service (EMS) providers, operated as job shops 
that took on extra work from integrated original equipment manufactur-
ers (OEMs) in periods of peak demand. Then, during the mid-1990s, a 
few Old Economy companies—particularly IBM, HP, and Ericsson (in 
Sweden)—took the lead in selling existing plants to EMS providers (see 
Chapter 3). Meanwhile the newest New Economy companies, such as 
Cisco and 3Com, which engaged in internetworking, outsourced almost 
all of their manufacturing from the outset. 
In the Internet boom of the late 1990s, the demand for EMS capac-
ity soared. New Economy companies that did no manufacturing relied 
on EMS providers for not only assembly but also an increasing array of 
services including testing, design, documentation, and shipping (Cur-
ran 1997). Old Economy telecommunications equipment companies 
such as Motorola, Lucent, Nortel, and Alcatel also undertook major 
outsourcing programs to EMS providers; by 2000 there was a rush by 
these companies to offl oad manufacturing plants. 
In the process, fi ve dominant EMS providers emerged: Celestica, 
Flextronics, Jabil Circuit, Solectron, and Sanmina-SCI (Carbone 2000, 
2002, 2004). From 1993 to 2003, the revenues of the largest EMS pro-
vider, Flextronics, increased from $93 million to $13.4 billion, and 
employment increased from 2,000 to 95,000. During the same period, 
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Solectron, the second largest EMS provider, saw an increase in rev-
enues from $836 million to $11.0 billion and in employment from 4,500 
to 66,000. Flextronics acquired Solectron in 2007. In 2007 dollars, the 
top fi ve had combined revenues of $5.7 billion in 1994, $23.3 billion 
in 1999, $58.7 billion in 2004, and (including the combined operations 
of Flextronics and Solectron) $50.0 billion in 2007. Total employment 
at these companies was 90,000 people in 1999, 268,000 in 2004, and 
356,000 in 2007.
Organizational Characteristics 
These changes in industrial organization had far-reaching implica-
tions for the employment of labor. The start-up phenomenon and vertical 
specialization depended upon, and over time reinforced, the existence 
of industry-wide standards as distinct from the in-house proprietary 
standards that had characterized OEBM with its vertically integrated 
enterprises such as AT&T/Western Electric and IBM. The existence of 
industry-wide standards facilitated the movement of high-tech labor 
from one company to another over the course of a career. New Econo-
my executives valued the industry-wide experience, including knowl-
edge of the latest developments in technology and product markets, 
that new employees often brought with them to their company. The 
regional concentration of ICT fi rms in Silicon Valley further facilitated 
this movement of labor from one fi rm to another—one could change 
employer without relocating—while the networks created by regional 
concentration and interfi rm mobility generated new learning to which 
participants in the regional labor force had privileged access relative to 
high-tech labor outside the region (Saxenian 1994).
The interfi rm mobility of high-tech labor brought with it a new form 
of compensation—nonexecutive stock options—for attracting, retain-
ing, and motivating a broad base of employees. The executive stock 
option had its origins in the United States from the late 1930s as high-
level salaried corporate managers sought a form of compensation that 
would be subject to the 25 percent capital-gains tax rate rather than 
personal-income tax rates on the highest income brackets that reached 
91 percent in the 1950s (Lazonick 2003a). The Revenue Act of 1950 
transformed this possibility into reality (Pearson 1950), and over the 
course of the 1950s, top executives of U.S. corporations saw income 
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from options become an important component of their total remunera-
tion (Lewellen 1968). 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, a backlash of public 
sentiment against this enrichment of top executives led the U.S. Con-
gress to place restrictions on the use of stock options as a mode of com-
pensation. In 1959, the AFL-CIO issued a pamphlet in which it warned 
against an erosion of the New Deal legislation that sought to prevent 
the opportunity for “a handful of insiders to rig the game for their own 
ends” (Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, 1959, p. 4). In a much 
less strident article in the Harvard Business Review, Erwin Griswold, 
Dean of Harvard Law School, criticized the tax rules on stock options 
for favoring a special class of people who did not in any case make 
investments that justifi ed capital gains (Griswold 1960). He argued that 
option grants focused the minds of executives more on the gamble of 
holding publicly traded stocks than on the requirements of managing 
large corporations. 
Griswold’s article provoked a vigorous academic debate (e.g., Bak-
er 1963; Campbell 1961; Holland and Lewellen 1962; Lent and Menge 
1962). Nonacademic participants in this discussion included Henry 
Ford II, CEO of Ford Motor Company; Thomas Watson, Jr., CEO of 
IBM; Nelson Rockefeller, governor of New York; and Albert Gore, sen-
ator from Tennessee. In a special message on tax reduction and reform 
delivered in January 1963, President John F. Kennedy advocated taxing 
executive stock options at ordinary income tax rates and thus “remove 
a gross inequality in the application of the income tax” (Washington 
Post 1963).
Gore championed this position in Congress, which revised the tax 
code in 1964 (Albright 1964; Cohen 1964; Gore 1965; Nossiter 1961). 
The “restricted” stock option of the 1950 Act became a “qualifi ed” 
stock option; to qualify for capital-gains treatment, the option had to 
be exercised within fi ve rather than 10 years, and, upon exercise, the 
acquired stock had to be held for three years rather than six months. In 
addition, the exercise price of the option had to be 100 percent of the 
market price, whereas previously it could be 85 to 95 percent. The new 
tax law also placed restrictions on the repricing of stock options should 
the company’s stock price decline (Cohen 1964). Each of these changes 
reduced the probability that executives would realize as much in ben-
efi ts from stock options as they had been receiving.
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In 1969 and 1976, moreover, Congress raised the capital-gains 
rate and lowered the personal-income rate, thus mitigating the origi-
nal purpose of options. Moreover, under the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 
Congress eliminated the capital-gains treatment of all future employee 
stock options. In 1978, Graef Crystal (1978, p. 145)—a compensation 
consultant who would later become a vocal critic of excessive execu-
tive pay (Crystal 1991)—stated that qualifi ed stock options, “once the 
most popular of all executive compensation devices . . . have been given 
the last rites by Congress.” 
That was not the end of executive stock options, however. Con-
gress subsequently lowered both the personal-income and capital-gains 
rates, and in 1981 restored the capital-gains treatment and relaxed the 
rules on the granting and exercising of stock options, thus resuscitating 
them (BusinessWeek 1981b; Noble 1981; Rankin 1981). In the fore-
front of lobbying Congress to bring back capital-gains treatment for 
stock options were the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) 
and the American Electronics Association (AeA), both of which were 
nationwide organizations that emanated from Silicon Valley (Bacon 
1981; Reiner 1989, chap. 6). In the 1980s and 1990s, stock options for 
both executives and nonexecutives would become a distinctive mode of 
compensation under NEBM.
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed an explosion in executive pay, driv-
en by stock options. Between 1980 and 1994, the mean value of stock 
option grants to CEOs of large U.S. corporations rose from $155,037 
to $1,213,180, or by 683 percent, while the mean value of their salary 
and bonus compensation rose from $654,935 to $1,292,290, or by 95 
percent. As a result, stock options accounted for 19 percent of CEO 
compensation in 1980 but 48 percent in 1994 (Hall and Leibman 1998, 
p. 661). 
A study of CEO remuneration in S&P 500 companies found that 
average compensation in 2003 dollars rose from $3.5 million in 1992 
to a peak of $14.8 million in 2000, declining to $8.7 million in 2003 
(Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck 2005, p. 33). The value of stock options 
accounted for 28 percent of this pay in 1992, 49 percent in 2000, and 38 
percent in 2003. Of the change in pay from 1992 to 2000, 10.5 percent 
came from salaries, 15.4 percent from bonuses, and 56.7 percent from 
stock options. Of the decline in pay from 2000 to 2003, 14.1 percent 
came from salaries, 11.2 percent from bonuses, and 65.0 percent from 
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stock options. It has been estimated that, largely as a result of gains 
from the exercise of stock options, the ratio of the pay of CEOs of major 
U.S. corporations to that of the average worker increased from 42:1 in 
1980 to 85:1 in 1990 to 531:1 in 2000 (Dash 2006). Notwithstanding 
the less ebullient stock markets that prevailed in the fi rst half of the 
2000s, this ratio remained very high at 411:1 in 2005 and 364:1 in 2006 
(AFL-CIO 2007).
With good reason, both academics and journalists who are critical of 
high executive pay have focused most of their attention on the excess-
es of executive stock options. Yet the vast majority of employee stock 
options in the United States have been issued to nonexecutive personnel 
as part of what became known as “broad-based” programs (Hall and 
Murphy 2003, pp. 51–53; Mehran and Tracy 2001; Oyer and Schaefer 
2005; Sabow and Milligan 2000; Sesil et al. 2002). During the Internet 
boom, broad-based stock option programs diffused to many more com-
panies, with top executives getting more of them and increasing num-
bers of nonexecutive employees getting them for the fi rst time. 
The signifi cant use of stock options for nonexecutive employees 
originated in the 1960s when high-tech start-ups began to offer them 
to scientists, engineers, and managerial personnel at all levels, not just 
top executives, to lure them away from employment at established 
companies. Old Economy corporations could credibly promise secure 
employment to professional, technical, and administrative employees, 
with superior compensation taking the form of pay increases tied to 
promotion up the managerial hierarchy. Start-ups, their futures highly 
uncertain, could not realistically hold out the expectation of employ-
ment security. They could, however, use stock options, with exercise 
prices often at pennies a share, to attract well-educated and experienced 
personnel. If the start-up did an IPO or was sold to an already-listed 
company, these stock options would become very valuable.
The high concentration of start-ups in Silicon Valley meant that 
in the 1980s new ventures increasingly not only used stock options to 
induce high-tech labor to leave secure employment with established 
corporations, but they also competed among themselves for person-
nel, with an emphasis on stock options in their compensation packages. 
Besides attracting “talent” and giving these new hires a stake in getting 
the start-up to an IPO, ample stock options could substitute to some 
extent for cash salaries (e.g., see Uchitelle 1990). 
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At the same time, a company could also grant its employees non-
qualifi ed stock options on which ordinary taxes had to be paid at the 
time of exercise, but on which the company could claim a dollar-for-
dollar tax credit without having to show the cost of stock options as an 
expense that would in turn reduce reported earnings (and as a result 
presumably place downward pressure on its stock price). In 2000, at 
the peak of the boom, this tax benefi t from nonqualifi ed employee stock 
options was worth $887 million to Intel, $5,535 million to Microsoft, 
and $2,495 million to Cisco.
Given the lowering of ordinary tax rates in the early 1980s, non-
qualifi ed options became a favored form of stock-based compensation, 
especially in Silicon Valley, where new ventures abounded. No longer 
were stock options viewed as an exclusive privilege of top executives. 
Rather, in the New Economy, stock options could be seen as necessary 
to attract “talent” to supply their expertise and effort to innovative new 
ventures that could drive the growth of the U.S. economy.
The growing importance of stock options to attract new employees 
placed pressure on high-tech fi rms to use options to retain them as well. 
For this reason, the practice evolved in New Economy fi rms of making 
annual option grants, with the vesting period for any annual block of 
option grants being 25 percent of the grants at the end of each of the 
fi rst four years after the grant date. Once the options were vested, they 
could typically be exercised for a period of 10 years from the grant 
date, so long as one remained with the company. Without creating the 
Old Economy expectation among employees of “lifelong careers” with 
the company, the perpetual pipeline of unvested options functions as a 
tangible retention mechanism. Indeed, for most employees, the amount 
of options that an individual can expect to receive is tied to his or her 
position in the fi rm’s hierarchical and functional division of labor, so 
that the retention function of stock options is integrally related to the 
employee’s career progress within the particular company. 
There is a widespread consensus among ICT fi rms that the prime 
function of stock options is to manage interfi rm mobility on the labor 
market by attracting and retaining labor. As displayed in Figure 2.2, the 
importance that ICT compensation executives ascribed to the “attract” 
and “retain” objectives (along with the integrally related objective to 
“provide competitive total compensation”) in the late 1990s and ear-
ly 2000s is evident in their responses to the annual survey, conducted 
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by the consulting fi rm iQuantic, on the “most important” objectives 
of ongoing high-tech stock option programs. Note the stability of the 
relative rankings between 1996 and 2003, notwithstanding the fact, as 
noted in Figure 2.2, that the number of companies that responded to the 
survey varied markedly over this period, as did their average number of 
“most important” responses. 
Figure 2.2  Objectives of Ongoing Stock-Option Programs, ICT 
































Provide competitive total compensation
Attract
Link individual to overall company performance
Encourage stock ownership
Reward past contributions
Reward specific milestones or goals
Other
NOTE: The objectives were ranked in any given year by the percentage of companies 
listing an objective as “most important” for their ongoing stock options plans. Com-
panies gave multiple “most important” objectives, ranging from an average of 2.2 in 
1996 to 3.6 in 2000. The ICT companies included in the survey changed from year to 
year. Number of companies surveyed: 1996, 68; 1997, 68; 1998, 82; 1999, 81; 2000, 
180; 2001, 166; 2002, 174; and 2003, 136. In 1996, “Rewarding past contributions” 
was a frequent response in the “Other” category.
SOURCE: 1996–1997: iQuantic High-Tech Equity Practices Survey; 1998–2000: 
iQuantic Equity Practices Survey for High Technology Industries; 2001–2002: iQuan-
tic-Buck Information Services Equity Practices Survey for the High Technology In-
dustries; 2003: Mellon Equity Practices Survey for the High Technology Industries 
(April 2004).
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In their early years, some Silicon Valley start-ups like Intel, Oracle, 
Sun Microsystems, and Cisco Systems granted stock options to sub-
stantial proportions of their employees. Many New Economy compa-
nies located outside Silicon Valley—for example, Microsoft, based in 
Washington State, and Dell, based in Texas—did so as well (Lazonick 
2007b). During the 1980s and 1990s, New Economy companies main-
tained, and in some cases enlarged, their broad-based stock option pro-
grams even as they grew to employ tens of thousands of people. 
By the 2000s, stock option awards outstanding accounted for a sub-
stantial proportion of the total common stock outstanding of the leading 
ICT companies (Table 2.1). Compensation professionals call this ratio 
the “overhang.” The numerator in the overhang depends on the number 
of options awarded over the past decade (assuming that is the exercise 
period), changes in stock prices that make it worthwhile for employ-
ees to exercise these options, and cancellation of outstanding options 
when employees leave the company. The denominator in the overhang 
depends on the extent to which a company issues new common stock or 
retires outstanding common stock. In the 2000s the widespread practice 
of massive stock repurchases (as will be discussed in Chapter 6) tended 
to increase the overhang.
Microsoft, for example, started giving its 200 employees stock 
options in 1982, and four years later, with about 1,000 employees and 
$200 million in revenues, went public to provide liquidity to the shares 
that employees purchased when they exercised their vested options 
(see Lazonick 2003a). As the company grew to employ over 20,000 
people in 1996 and almost 40,000 four years later, virtually all Micro-
soft employees got options. In May 2001, with stock prices tumbling, 
Microsoft doubled the option grants of all employees. Just over two 
years later, however, with 55,000 employees, the company announced 
that it would no longer award stock options. Since then, as Table 2.1 
shows, Microsoft’s overhang has been on the decline, despite its large-
scale stock repurchases. 
Until 1997 Intel awarded stock options to only about half of its 
employees. As the Internet boom heated up, and as the word spread 
among Intel’s almost 50,000 employees that CEO Andrew Grove had 
raked in some $98 million from exercising stock options in 1996, the 
company expanded the program to include almost all of its employees. 
In contrast, Intel’s main Silicon Valley rival, AMD, gave options to only 
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
AMD 13.87 14.76 16.50 14.53 12.69 11.39 9.04 7.90
Cisco Systems 12.94 13.89 15.53 17.60 19.50 21.56 23.35 22.49
Dell 13.33 12.77 13.33 14.27 15.00 14.97 13.79 13.29
Hewlett-Packard 7.04 9.79 13.58 15.76 17.63 18.81 17.58 15.36
Intel 9.33 10.49 12.17 12.98 13.64 14.73 14.93 13.03
IBM 8.70 9.77 11.64 13.65 14.80 15.11 14.44 11.88
Lucent Technologiesa 11.53 16.78 14.05 8.81 9.24 9.27 6.47 na
Microsoft 15.38 16.22 15.83 14.67 11.56 8.40 7.45 5.59
Motorola 6.14 8.37 11.02 12.73 13.40 12.20 10.20 9.90
Oracle 9.45 9.23 8.13 8.52 8.60 8.81 9.07 8.44
Sun Microsystems 13.87 14.86 16.29 17.67 18.09 17.18 15.61 13.33
Texas Instruments 8.39 8.92 10.24 12.10 13.61 13.81 14.69 14.61
Table 2.1  Stock Options Outstanding as a Percent of Common Stock Outstanding, Selected U.S. ICT Companies, 
2000–2007
NOTE: Fiscal years ending: January, Dell; May, Oracle; June, Microsoft and Sun Microsystems; July, Cisco Systems; September, Lucent 
Technologies; October, Hewlett-Packard; December, AMD, IBM, Intel, Motorola, and Texas Instruments.
a On December 1, 2006, Lucent ceased to exist when it was merged into the France-based company Alcatel to form Alcatel-Lucent.
SOURCE: Company 10-K fi lings.
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11 percent of its 13,000 employees in 1983 and has never given options 
to more than 25 percent of its labor force, reaching that proportion in 
1998, when it employed 12,800 people. Through the fi rst half of the 
1980s, AMD stood out in Silicon Valley as a company that had a “no-
layoff” policy (Gutchess 1985b, pp. 24–27; see also McEnaney 1985).2 
Even in Silicon Valley, under certain conditions and for certain fi rms, 
the offer of employment security may have been more important than 
the offer of stock options in performing the retention function.
Cisco Systems, which had 10 employees as a start-up in 1984 and 
some 200 employees when it did its IPO in 1990, extended annual stock 
option grants on a systematic basis to virtually all of its employees over 
the course of the 1990s, even as its payroll reached 40,000 in 2000. With 
66,129 employees at the end of fi scal 2008, Cisco still gives almost 
everyone options. Its overhang soared to almost 24 percent in 2006, but 
then, notwithstanding ongoing stock repurchases, declined in 2007 and 
then again in 2008 (to 20.16 percent) as the result of the exercise and 
cancellation of options. Like Cisco, Dell, Oracle, and Sun have histori-
cally given options to all employees. 
HP, an Old Economy company located in the heart of Silicon Val-
ley, awarded stock options only to upper-level employees in the early 
1980s, but then gradually extended stock options to a larger proportion 
of the labor force from the mid 1980s to 1998. In 1985 the proportion 
of HP employees holding options was only 8 percent, but it increased to 
18 percent in 1990, 25 percent in 1995, and 30 percent in 1998. At the 
height of the Internet boom, this proportion jumped sharply, fi rst to 57 
percent in 1999 and then 98 percent in 2000. At the end of fi scal 2007, 
the proportion of HP employees holding options had declined to 58 
percent, or 99,000 employees, but all regular HP employees have been 
eligible to receive options since 2000. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, IBM, like most Old Economy com-
panies, reserved stock options for top executives, but in making the 
transition to the NEBM (see Chapter 3), the company increasingly and 
substantially broadened the base of recipients. As can be seen in Table 
2.1, the overhangs of HP, IBM, Intel, Motorola, and TI were on the 
rise in the fi rst half of the 2000s, in large part because these companies 
have spent billions of dollars annually buying back shares in the 2000s, 
hence reducing the number of shares outstanding. 
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For NEBM employees, stock options are not only a potential form 
of remuneration for work but also, hopefully, a source of retirement 
savings. As will be shown in Chapter 4, almost all New Economy 
companies have defi ned-contribution rather than defi ned-benefi t pen-
sion plans, often with a low level of contribution by the company. The 
expectation is that the accumulation of wealth through the exercise of 
stock options will form a much more signifi cant fi nancial foundation 
for retirement than the company pension plan per se. 
During the Internet boom, at companies like Microsoft, Cisco, and 
Intel, income from broad-based stock options soared with speculative 
stock prices. Since 2001 a new reality has set in that includes lower lev-
els of high-tech employment and wages that are based mostly on sala-
ries. Using County Business Pattern (CBP) data, Figures 2.3 and 2.4 
show the changes in full-time employment levels, and Figures 2.5 and 

























Figure 2.3  Full-Time Employees in the Semiconductor Industry, Silicon 
Valley, Route 128, Dallas, and Oregon, 1994–2006
NOTE: SIC 3674 for 1994–1997; NAICS 334413 for 1998–2006.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2008a).
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ductors and software publishing—from 1994 through 2006 for districts 
in the United States that have high concentrations of ICT workers.3 
In the case of semiconductors, I have included data for Silicon Val-
ley, Route 128, the Dallas area (home of TI), and the state of Oregon, 
which is Intel’s main location for microprocessor fabrication. With 
15,500 employees in Oregon in 2008 (down from 16,000 in 2005), Intel 
is the state’s largest business employer, and the area around Portland 
has Intel’s largest concentration of employees worldwide. In the case of 
software publishing, I have included data for Silicon Valley, Route 128, 
the Dallas area, and Washington State, which is the home of Microsoft. 
In Figures 2.5 and 2.6, I have included series of real wages for these 
industries for the United States in addition to the district/state data.
U.S. semiconductor employment peaked at 225,000 in 2001, but it 
was 39 percent lower in 2005 before increasing by 4 percent in 2006. 
Figure 2.3 shows that Silicon Valley dominated semiconductor employ-
ment in the United States from 1994 through 2006, but with a smaller 
Figure 2.4  Full-Time Employees in Software Publishing, Silicon Valley, 
Route 128, Dallas, and Washington State, 1994–2006
NOTE: SIC 7372 for 1994–1997; NAICS 511210 and 334611 for 1998–2006.
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share of declining total numbers in the mid-2000s. Dallas increased its 
share to almost 10 percent in 2000 and maintained that share through 
2006. Oregon’s share was also higher in the fi rst half of the 2000s than 
in the second half of the 1990s, largely because Intel kept its most 
advanced microprocessor design and fabrication in the United States 
while offshoring to other countries much of the less sophisticated semi-
conductor work that Intel had been doing at other locations in the Unit-
ed States. 
U.S. software publishing employment increased dramatically in the 
second half of the 1990s, and, like semiconductor employment, reached 
a peak in 2001. The number of software publishing employees dropped 
by 41 percent in 2002, but subsequently recovered so that it was at 93 to 
97 percent of its 2001 level from 2003 through 2006. Figure 2.4 shows 
that Silicon Valley dominated software publishing employment in the 
latter half of the 1990s, but that Washington was catching up because 
Figure 2.5  Real Wages (in 2000 dollars) in the Semiconductor Industry, 
United States, Silicon Valley, Route 128, Dallas, and Oregon, 
1994–2006
NOTE: SIC 3674 for 1994–1997; NAICS 334413 and 334611 for 1998–2006.
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of the growth of Microsoft. Indeed, in 2006, the number of software 
publishing employees in Washington surpassed the number in Silicon 
Valley for the fi rst time. Route 128 had a larger share of software pub-
lishing employees in the second half of the 1990s than in the fi rst half 
of the 2000s, with a recovery of share in 2005 and 2006 compared with 
2001–2004.  
As was shown in Figure 1.5, the largest numbers of ICT employees 
are in the computer programming and computer system design indus-
tries. Of the 506,321 people employed in computer programming in 
2006, 9.1 percent were located in Silicon Valley and 3.6 percent along 
Route 128. Of the 486,523 people in computer system design in 2006, 
5.0 percent were in Silicon Valley and 3.3 percent along Route 128. 
Figure 2.5 shows that Silicon Valley led other areas in semiconduc-
tor wages by a considerable margin throughout the period. This differ-
ential probably refl ects a combination of competition for labor among 
Figure 2.6  Real Wages (in 2000 dollars) in Software Publishing, United 
States, Silicon Valley, Route 128, Dallas, and Washington 
State, 1994–2006
NOTE: SIC 7372 for 1994–1997; NAICS 511210 for 1998–2006.
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the large number of semiconductor companies in Silicon Valley and the 
high cost of living there. Note also the sharp spike in average real wages 
in Silicon Valley, Oregon, and Route 128 at the peak of the Internet 
boom. Indeed from 1996 to 2000, real wages in semiconductor employ-
ment in Silicon Valley almost doubled, from $79,600 to $156,300. 
Even more dramatically, as shown in Figure 2.6, average real wag-
es of software publishing employees in Washington more than tripled, 
from $112,600 in 1996 (already almost double 1994 real wages) to 
$380,038 in 2000. The reason—employees at companies such as Intel 
and Microsoft were cashing in on stock options at infl ated stock market 
prices. In computer programming as well as computer system design 
employment, Silicon Valley wages were also higher than in other dis-
tricts, and average real wages also moved up sharply in the boom.
The importance of the gains from the exercise of stock options indi-
cated by the CBP data is confi rmed when we calculate the gains from 
the exercise of stock options at the company level, using data from 
company fi lings to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In 
their proxy statements, companies provide data on the gains from the 
exercise of stock options of the CEO and the four other highest paid 
executives (the “top fi ve”). Table 2.2 shows the average annual income 
per top fi ve executive from the exercise of stock options from 1995 to 
2007 at the same 12 ICT companies that are listed in Table 2.1. 
In general, the gains peaked in fi scal 2000 or 2001, although Intel’s 
top fi ve experienced their peak in 1998. At Oracle each of the top fi ve 
averaged almost $170 million from exercising stock options in 2001, 
although they reaped no gains in 2002, which was a relatively bad year 
for stock option gains at all of the companies. (Dell’s fi scal year ends 
on January 31, and its 2002 average of $28.6 million primarily refl ects 
options exercised in calendar year 2001.) Even before Microsoft ceased 
to award stock options, neither William Gates, its current chairman, nor 
Steven Ballmer, its current CEO, derived any earnings from the exercise 
of stock options, although in 2007 their stakes in Microsoft placed them 
at numbers 1 and 31, respectively, among the richest people in the world 
(Forbes 2007). Unlike most of the other companies, whose top fi ve did 
very well from exercising options, Microsoft’s top fi ve averaged a paltry 
$5,180 in 2005 and zero in 2006, in sharp contrast to the $22.0 million 
(2005) and the $13.0 million (2006) that the top fi ve received on average 
at Oracle, one of Microsoft’s most important software rivals. 
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Table 2.2  Average Gains (thousand U.S. dollars) per Top Five Executive from the Exercise of Stock Options, 
Selected U.S. ICT Companies, 1995–2007
AMD CSCO DELL HPQ INTC IBM LU MSFT MOT ORCL JAVA TXN
1995 546 4,065 387 534 4,892 152 2,505 3,190 4,301 727 4,066
1996 2,011 15,790 820 1,074 24,585 5,383 — 0 1,038 8,302 2,786 0
1997 4,549 3,124 1,977 2,161 12,516 3,764 248 4,127 180 3,620 4,425 1,265
1998 190 5,972 14,417 1,114 40,137 10,239 15,597 3,271 0 3,752 11,515 1,492
1999 139 60,586 36,937 8,732 4,796 24,457 165 30,178 2,297 6,754 5,619 5,037
2000 20,080 51,302 98,791 4,360 32,063 13,293 6,100 50,653 607 83,504 25,180 15,048
2001 3,517 11,884 75,151 0 4,117 29,296 0 31,531 546 169,674 18,441 992
2002 16 805 28,612 127 3,514 943 1 1,405 114 0 5,406 0
2003 81 1,291 2,103 502 6,298 2,139 0 6,870 0 13,001 1,323 9,178
2004 115 14,207 14,019 182 6,338 2,876 0 8,564 808 8,633 1,432 493
2005 1,649 15,804 9,364 2,319 4,208 3,550 183 5 2,913 21,953 2,397 2,220
2006 4,746 17,614 31,466 4,903 2,929 3,210 — 0 8,178 12,998 564 7,286
2007 1 22,517 6,692 8,837 4,339 2,454 0 554 46,865 666 1,302
NOTE: AMD, Advanced Micro Devices; CSCO, Cisco Systems, DELL, Dell; HPQ, Hewlett-Packard; INTC, Intel; IBM, International 
Business Machines; LU, Lucent Technologies; MSFT, Microsoft; MOT, Motorola; ORCL, Oracle; JAVA, Sun Microsystems; and TXN, 
Texas Instruments. — = not available.
SOURCE: Company proxy statements.
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In addition to the information on top fi ve compensation, the notes to 
company 10-K fi nancial statements provide data that permit an estimate 
of the average gains per company employee (including those who may 
not have received options) from the exercise of stock options. Hence, 
the ratio of the average gains of the top fi ve to those of the average 
employee can be calculated.4 Table 2.3 shows the average gains per 
employee (excluding the top fi ve) from exercising options for the same 
12 companies listed in Table 2.2. Very signifi cant average gains were 
made by employees at these companies at the peak of the Internet boom, 
especially at Cisco, Dell, Intel, Microsoft, Oracle, and Sun, all of which 
awarded options to virtually all of their employees in the second half 
of the 1990s. 
The gains that have been reaped more recently from the exercise of 
stock options pale in comparison to those achieved during the boom, 
even at Cisco, where a 60 percent increase in its stock price over the 
course of fi scal 2007 enabled its 55,700 employees to average $73,000 
in stock-option gains. The cessation of new option grants at Microsoft 
from 2003 accounts for its sharp decline in average employee gains 
from 2005 to 2007.  
At IBM the average gains from the exercise of stock options for the 
decade 1996–2005 were $95.9 million for the top fi ve and $29,000 for 
the average employee. In the mid-1990s, IBM was beginning to transi-
tion from the Old Economy practice of awarding stock options only 
to upper-level executives to the New Economy practice of distributing 
options to a broader base of nonexecutive employees. The relatively low 
average gains per employee at IBM compared with the average gains 
at most of the other companies listed throughout the period 1995–2007 
refl ect the facts that 1) a smaller proportion of IBM employees received 
options; 2) with 386,558 employees at the end of 2007, IBM’s head-
count was more than three times that of Intel, the next largest employer 
among the 12 ICT companies; and 3) the movement of IBM’s stock 
price was much more damped than those of most of the other com-
panies during the Internet boom. At the height of the Internet boom, 
HP also substantially broadened the base of those who received stock 
options. The spike in average gains per employee to almost $18,000 in 
2000 refl ects the spike in HP’s stock price as well as substantial increas-
es in the number of stock options granted per option holder in the late 
1990s.
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Table 2.3  Average Gains (in U.S. dollars) per Employee (excluding the top fi ve) from the Exercise of Stock Options, 
Selected U.S. ICT Companies, 1995–2007
AMD CSCO DELL HPQ INTC IBM LU MSFT MOT ORCL JAVA TXN
1995 1,086 60,894 3,833 2,362 18,746 671 51,829 — — 2,468 2,136
1996 1,490 93,399 7,194 2,213 16,010 1,823 — 79,022 471 7,367 7,992 892
1997 5,075 85,159 11,219 3,156 25,295 3,615 1,019 154,196 1,058 6,588 7,626 2,932
1998 1,435 92,947 40,547 2,676 75,890 4,066 5,449 238,377 361 5,019 10,799 4,473
1999 1,687 193,476 126,639 6,613 56,589 5,790 7,505 369,693 4,055 5,650 27,477 47,880
2000 20,113 290,870 84,818 17,987 112,018 4,200 23,281 449,142 3,218 37,214 60,431 22,881
2001 2,115 105,865 76,122 1,498 18,235 4,011 828 143,772 415 88,723 46,763 6,767
2002 537 13596 33167 838 10413 1195 955 95310 334 6950 4550 4,650
2003 1,163 8,917 10,739 936 10,406 1,553 11 80,283 42 6,193 1,182 4,803
2004 5,103 32,804 12,216 638 8,405 1,842 486 50,690 1,381 7,908 1,960 6,144
2005 12,786 24,432 11,297 1,739 8,347 1,256 615 14,500 8,688 6,926 1,187 12,512
2006 18,197 25,487 8,724 6,809 3,396 1,857 558 6,208 3,852 9,514 1,249 11,142
2007 1,149 73,004 221 9,982 6,915 3,524 14,991 4,395 14,927 2,740 19,209
NOTE: See Table 2.2 for company ticker abbreviations. — = not available.
SOURCE: Company 10-K fi lings.
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AMD CSCO DELL HPQ INTC IBM LU MSFT MOT ORCL JAVA TXN
1995 231 60 83 202 232 200 45  — 221 14
1996 705 150 93 426 1,388 2,462 — 0 2,202 989 288 0
1997 482 33 149 623 440 909 212 25 170 487 506 4
1998 77 58 307 334 477 2,234 6,587 13 0 643 929 4
1999 48 202 252 1,186 75 3,755 19 74 566 949 175 1
2000 419 156 1,000 214 246 2,758 224 101 189 1,807 364 8
2001 651 94 835 0 194 6,442 0 192 1,316 1,575 324 2
2002 15 48 745 123 290 682 0 13 341 0 951 0
2003 43 119 175 452 531 1,268 0 77 0 1,728 834 22
2004 12 386 1,031 221 566 1,459 0 156 487 1,266 571 1
2005 72 585 745 1,077 454 2,557 298 0 335 2,709 1,527 2
2006 142 621 3,153 616 737 1,581 — 0 2,123 1,227 345 9
2007 1 227 10,475 504 366 439 0 78 2,245 157 1
NOTE: See Table 2.2 for company ticker abbreviations. — = not available.
SOURCE: Company proxy statements and 10-K fi lings.
Table 2.4  Ratios of Average Top Five Gains from the Exercise of Stock Options to Average Gains of Other 
Employees, Selected U.S. ICT Companies, 1995–2007
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Table 2.4 shows the ratios of the average top fi ve gains from the 
exercise of stock options to the average gains of all other employees 
at each of the 12 companies in Tables 2.2 and 2.3, using the highest 
monthly stock prices to estimate the gains (see Note 4). As can be seen, 
the ratios have varied markedly not only from company to company for 
a given year but also from year to year for a given company. For exam-
ple, in fi scal year 2006 (year ending January 31, 2006), the ratio for 
Dell was 3,153, as average options gains per employee fell to $8,724, 
the lowest level since 1996. Meanwhile, the average top fi ve gains from 
exercising options stood at $31.5 million. In fi scal 2007, the Dell ratio 
soared to 10,475, as the top fi ve averaged $6.7 million in gains from 
stock options while all of Dell’s other employees—well over 85,000 of 
them worldwide—received an average of $221.
Just like the stock market boom from which the gains from the exer-
cise of stock options fl owed, the high levels of earnings could not be 
sustained when the ICT markets and the stock markets turned down. The 
decline in GDP that accompanied the end of the Internet boom lasted from 
March to November 2001. Subsequently, however, with the resumption 
of growth, there was a contraction in employment in the U.S. economy as 
a whole until the fourth quarter of 2003. In this jobless recovery, certain 
ICT occupational categories were hit particularly hard. Fourth-quarter 
surveys by the Bureau of Labor Statistics revealed that employment of 
computer programmers in the United States fell from 530,730 in 2000 
to 501,580 in 2001 to 457,320 in 2002 to 403,220 in 2003, with average 
real annual wages declining from a peak of $65,517 in 2001 to $65,170 in 
2003. Fourth-quarter employment of electrical and electronic engineer-
ing technicians fell from 244,570 in 2000 to 220,810 in 2001 to 194,960 
in 2002 to 181,550 in 2003, although the average real annual wages of 
those who remained employed rose from $33,155 in 2000 to $46,190 in 
2003 (U.S. Department of Labor 2008). The Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) estimated an unemployment rate for com-
puter programmers of 6.4 percent on average in 2003 and 7.6 percent 
on average in the fi rst half of 2004 (IEEE–Central Texas Section 2008). 
The problem, it was widely argued, was a marked acceleration in the 
2000s of offshoring, especially to India (see Chapter 5), of what had been 
well-paying ICT jobs in the United States. Even in recovery, it seemed, 
the New Economy was failing to deliver on the promise of prosperity to 
many of the better-educated groups in the U.S. labor force.
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Financial Characteristics 
A major reason why stock options made such a signifi cant contribu-
tion to the incomes of employees in Silicon Valley during the Internet 
boom was the competition for high-tech labor not only from established 
companies, but also from a proliferation of start-ups: stock options 
acted as the key to inducing interfi rm labor mobility. From the begin-
ning of the 1980s, start-ups found ample fi nance from venture capital, 
a mode of funding new fi rm formation in which Silicon Valley was far 
better provisioned than anywhere else in the world. In the period from 
1995 to 2000, when start-ups became integral to the Internet boom, the 
San Francisco–Oakland–San Jose consolidated metropolitan statisti-
cal area (CMSA) accounted for 28 percent of the venture-backed deals 
and 24 percent of the venture-backed investments in the United States. 
By comparison, the CMSA around Boston accounted for 11 percent 
of deals and 9 percent of investments, while the CSMA around New 
York accounted for 10 percent of deals and 12 percent of investments
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008a).
In its origins, however, the evolution of venture capital as a distinct 
industry for new fi rm formation depended on Old Economy money of 
East Coast origin. In the immediate post–World War II decades, the 
wealth of Old Economy families, including the Rockefellers, Mellons, 
and Whitneys, was an important source of venture capital funding (Wil-
son 1986, chap. 2). The fi rst formal venture capital organization was 
American Research and Development (ARD), established in Boston in 
1946 for the express purpose of supporting entrepreneurs in the found-
ing of new fi rms to commercialize the accumulation of advanced sci-
entifi c and technological capability that, as a result of military spend-
ing, had accumulated through World War II. Much of this capability 
could be found at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). In 
the post–World War II decades, both MIT and ARD played important 
roles in the growth of the Route 128 high-tech corridor to the north and 
west of Boston (Hsu and Kenney 2005; Rosegrant and Lampe 1992, 
chaps. 2–4). From 1958 on, under the Small Business Administration, 
the U.S. government also supported the growth of venture capital by 
providing subsidies to small business investment corporations (Ken-
ney and Florida 2000; Noone and Rubel 1970; Reiner 1989, chap. 5; 
Wilson 1986). 
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Meanwhile, also in the aftermath of World War II, Frederick Ter-
man, dean of Stanford’s School of Engineering, espoused a vision of a 
high-tech industrial district, anchored by a major research university, in 
the area surrounding Stanford in Palo Alto, California (see Berlin 2001; 
Lécuyer 2000; Leslie and Kargon 1996; Saxenian 1994). During the 
late 1940s and the 1950s, in the context of Cold War military spend-
ing, many start-ups were spun off from Stanford, and many established 
industrial corporations set up operations in the area, transforming Palo 
Alto and its environs into a major center for microwave and aerospace 
technology (Leslie 2000). Semiconductors came to the West Coast in 
1955 after William Shockley, an inventor of the transistor at Bell Labs 
and a preeminent solid-state physicist, failed to work out a deal to set 
up a semiconductor lab at Raytheon, a leading military contractor in the 
Boston area with close ties to MIT. Instead Shockley secured the back-
ing of Los Angeles–based Beckman Instruments to set up shop close to 
Stanford. 
In 1957, a little more than a year after being hired by Shockley, eight 
scientists and engineers—Julius Blank, Victor Grinich, Jean Hoerni, 
Eugene Kleiner, Jay Last, Gordon Moore, Robert Noyce, and Sheldon 
Roberts—left Shockley Labs in search of funding. As Kleiner wrote in 
a now-famous letter to his father’s broker at the New York investment 
bank Hayden Stone, they were looking for “a corporation interested in 
getting into the advanced semiconductor device business” in the lower 
San Francisco Peninsula (quoted in Lécuyer 2000, p. 163). At this time, 
there were some individuals involved in venture fi nance working for 
certain San Francisco fi nancial institutions, most notably Reid Dennis 
of the Fireman’s Fund and an informal circle of friends (Dennis 2000, 
pp. 182–183),5 but there were as yet no fi rms on the West Coast specifi -
cally organized for the purpose of providing venture capital.6 
Kleiner’s letter asked where the “well-trained technical group” of 
Shockley defectors might get funding that “could get a company into 
the semiconductor business within three months.” The broker to whom 
the letter was written passed it on to Arthur Rock, a young Hayden 
Stone employee with a Harvard MBA. Rock had already been involved 
in the venture fi nancing, IPO, and sale of an East Coast semiconduc-
tor company, General Transistor (Lécuyer 2000, pp. 163–164).7 Rock 
quickly responded, and after considerable time and effort, convinced 
Fairchild Camera and Instrument (a highly innovative company from 
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Long Island, New York) to fund Fairchild Semiconductor.8 The eight 
Shockley defectors each received a 7.5 percent equity stake in Fairchild 
Semiconductor, with Hayden Stone holding 17 percent, and the other 
23 percent reserved for allocation in hiring new managers. The deal 
was structured so that, at its option, Fairchild Camera could buy out the 
shareholders for $3 million at any time before the semiconductor com-
pany had three successive years of net earnings greater than $300,000 
or for $5 million if the option was exercised between three years and 
eight years (Berlin 2001, p. 76; Lécuyer 2000, p. 166). 
Fairchild Semiconductor experienced almost immediate success. 
In early 1958 the new enterprise landed a subcontract with IBM for 
semiconductors for the Minuteman missile. In 1958 Hoerni drew on 
Bell Labs research to perfect the planar process for the manufacture of 
silicon chips. Building on this breakthrough, the following year Noyce 
invented the integrated circuit (Berlin 2001, p. 64). In two years, the 
semiconductor company had grown from 13 to 700 employees and was 
highly profi table.9 Its revenues for its second year through September 
1959 were $6.5 million, 80 percent of which were military sales (Berlin 
2001, p. 81). In October 1959, just two years after the launch of Fair-
child Semiconductor, Fairchild Camera exercised its option to buy back 
the company for $3 million. The eight scientists and engineers who had 
founded Fairchild Semiconductor received publicly traded shares of 
Fairchild Camera and became employees of the company—now a divi-
sion of the East Coast parent—that they once had collectively owned 
(Wall Street Journal 1959).
As for Arthur Rock, he was by no means fi nished with West Coast 
semiconductor start-ups or with the eight Fairchild Semiconductor 
founders. In 1960, while still a Hayden Stone employee, Rock arranged 
fi nancing for two former executives of the West Coast conglomerate 
Litton Industries to launch Teledyne, a Los Angeles–based electron-
ics fi rm. Rock remained actively involved in Teledyne’s affairs, and in 
1961, Hoerni, Kleiner, Last, and Roberts left Fairchild Semiconductor 
to found Amelco as a semiconductor division of Teledyne. In the same 
year, Rock left Hayden Stone and relocated to the San Francisco area, 
where he quickly teamed up with Tommy Davis, a local fi nancier with 
a legal background and links with Stanford’s Terman, to establish a 
venture capital fi rm, Davis and Rock. Among those who invested in 
the Davis and Rock venture fund were the eight Fairchild Semiconduc-
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tor founders. When two of them, Moore and Noyce, decided to leave 
Fairchild in 1968 to found their own company, Intel, they turned to 
Rock for fi nancing. Within days he had raised $2.5 million to fund the 
start-up (Perkins 1994; Wilson 1986, p. 38). 
Rock was, therefore, a leading venture capitalist in both the fi rst 
and second waves of Silicon Valley semiconductor start-ups. As shown 
in Figure 2.7, there was a coevolution between venture-capital fi rm 
entrants in the Silicon Valley region and semiconductor start-ups. As 
with the founding of semiconductor fi rms, the pattern of venture-capi-
tal fi rm entrants exhibits three waves of growing amplitude, the fi rst 
around 1958–1962, the second around 1968–1972, and the third around 
1978–1983. With the exception of Rock, however, who himself had 
become involved with West Coast start-ups while in the employ of an 
East Coast investment bank, there was little involvement of San Fran-
cisco Peninsula venture capital with semiconductor start-ups until the 
second wave.
Figure 2.7  Coevolution of Venture Capital Entrants and Semiconductor 
Start-Ups in Silicon Valley, 1957–1983
SOURCE: Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International (1995); West Coast 
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That involvement picked up slowly in the middle of the second 
wave, and toward the end of the period the semiconductor industry 
began contributing some of its well-known executives to the venture 
capital industry. In 1972 Donald Valentine, an engineer who had been 
head of marketing at Fairchild before joining National Semiconduc-
tor in 1967, founded Sequoia Capital, which became one of Silicon 
Valley’s most successful venture capital fi rms. Also in 1972 Eugene 
Kleiner joined with HP executive Thomas Perkins to found a venture 
capital fi rm, Kleiner Perkins, which, renamed Kleiner Perkins Caufi eld 
and Byers in 1978, is commonly considered to be the exemplar of Sil-
icon Valley venture capital. The fi rm’s offi ces were located in a still 
largely vacant new complex at 3000 Sand Hill Road in Menlo Park, 
adjacent to Stanford and with easy access to the San Jose and San Fran-
cisco airports (Lane 1994). Sequoia also located there, as did many 
other Silicon Valley venture capital fi rms and the Western Association 
of Venture Capitalists, out of which grew the National Venture Capital 
Association (NVCA) in 1973. The second wave of semiconductor start-
ups, therefore, not only gave Silicon Valley its name but also laid the 
foundation for an organized venture capital industry.
In the 1980s technology-oriented venture capital fi rms had become 
integral to both Silicon Valley and NEBM. These fi rms were organized 
as general partnerships of venture capitalists who handled fi ve duties: 1) 
raised funds, largely from institutional investors such as pension funds, 
universities, and banks; 2) reviewed and selected the particular portfo-
lio of industrial ventures in which to invest; 3) maintained control over 
resource allocation to these ventures, including the staging of funding 
as the venture evolved; 4) maintained control over resource allocation 
by these ventures, including the hiring and fi ring of executive person-
nel; and 5) sought to realize returns to the venture capital fund through 
either an IPO of the stock of the venture-backed industrial fi rms or a 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deal with an already-established cor-
poration. It was Silicon Valley practice, which became the standard for 
U.S. venture capital by the 1980s, for the general partners of the ven-
ture capital fi rm to receive, in addition to a 2 percent management fee, 
a “carried interest” of at least 20 percent of the returns of a particular 
venture capital fund that they raised, distributing the remainder to the 
institutions or individuals who, as limited partners, provided the general 
partners with the capital for the fund (see Sahlman 1990).
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It was the innovative capabilities of the companies in which venture 
capitalists invested that created the value from which money could be 
made. By the 1970s, the microelectronics revolution had resulted in 
a growing range of business and household product applications, and, 
coming out of the semiconductor revolution, the Silicon Valley venture 
capitalists had become part of the regional institutional environment. 
What was needed now was an adequate supply of capital for the invest-
ments in new ventures that could take advantage of the plethora of tech-
nological and market opportunities that the microelectronics revolution 
had opened up. Over the course of the 1970s, a number of changes in 
U.S. fi nancial institutions encouraged the fl ow of capital into venture 
capital funds, thus favoring the growth of Silicon Valley and NEBM. 
The launch of NASDAQ in 1971, with its much less stringent list-
ing requirements than the NYSE, made it much easier for a young com-
pany to do an IPO, thus enhancing the ability of venture capitalists to 
use this mode of exit from their investments. In 1971, for example, less 
than three years after being founded, Intel did its IPO on NASDAQ, 
with a loss before extraordinary items of $513,000, offset by a gain of 
$1,427,000 for “sale of manufacturing know-how,” for a net income of 
$914,000 (Intel 1973). Fourteen of the 20 New Economy fi rms in Table 
1.7 are listed on NASDAQ: Intel (IPO in 1971), Applied Materials 
(1972), Apple Computer (1980), Microsoft (1986), Sun Microsystems 
(1986), Oracle (1986), Dell Computer (1988), Cisco Systems (1990), 
Qualcomm (1991), Sanmina (now Sanmina-SCI) (1993), EchoStar 
(renamed DISH Network in 1997) (1995), Yahoo! (1996), Amazon.com 
(1997), and Google (2004). The other six are listed on NYSE. 
In 1975 the SEC barred stock exchanges from charging fi xed com-
missions on stock-trading transactions, ending a practice that had pre-
vailed on Wall Street since 1796 (Wall Street Journal 1974a). This 
change made it less costly for stock-market investors to buy and sell 
shares to realize capital gains as an alternative to holding the shares for 
the sake of a stream of dividend income. This change thus facilitated 
early IPOs of new ventures that were not yet profi table enough to pay 
dividends. It also favored the subsequent growth of the fi rm as a public-
ly listed company because of the willingness of capital-gains oriented 
stock-market investors to forego dividends, thus leaving more earnings 
in the company for internal investment. 
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In 1978, in response to intensive lobbying led by AeA and NVCA 
(both of which were dominated by Silicon Valley interests), the U.S. 
Congress reduced the capital-gains tax from as high as 49.875 percent 
to a maximum of 28 percent, thus reversing a 36-year trend toward 
higher capital gains taxes (Pierson 1978). In 1981 the capital-gains tax 
rate was further reduced to a maximum of 20 percent (Auten 1999). 
Venture capitalists saw lower capital-gains taxes as encouraging both 
entrepreneurial investment in new companies and portfolio investment 
by individuals in the publicly traded stocks of young, potentially high-
growth companies. 
During the 1970s, however, venture capitalists still faced con-
straints on the amount of money that they could raise for venture funds, 
mainly because of restrictions on their access to the vast accumulation 
of household savings held by pension funds. In the early 1970s, there 
was only a trickle of institutional money invested in venture capital, 
and even that fl ow dried up when the passage of the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974 made corporations respon-
sible for underfunded pensions and pension fund managers personally 
liable for breaches of their fi duciary duty to use the “prudent man” 
rule when making investments (see Niland 1976). Under these circum-
stances, pension fund managers, who controlled the allocation of an 
ever-increasing share of U.S. household savings, avoided investment 
in venture capital funds. On July 23, 1979, however, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor decreed that pension fund money could be invested not 
only in listed stocks and high-grade bonds but also in more speculative 
assets, including new ventures, without transgressing the prudent man 
rule (Ross 1979). 
As a result, pension fund money poured into venture capital funds. 
Funds raised from pension funds (in 1997 dollars) by independent ven-
ture partnerships (the type that prevailed in Silicon Valley) were $69 
million in 1978 (15 percent of all funds raised), $160 million in 1979 
(31 percent), $400 million in 1980 (30 percent), and $421 million in 
1981 (23 percent). By 1983, pension fund investment in independent 
venture partnerships had reached $1,808 million in 1997 dollars, of 
which private pension funds accounted for $1,516 million. Throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s, pension funds provided anywhere from 31 per-
cent to 59 percent of the funds raised by independent venture capital 
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partnerships, which in turn increased their share of all venture funds 
raised from 40 percent in 1980 to 80 percent a decade later (Gompers 
and Lerner 2002, p. 8).
Like the reduction in the capital gains tax rate, the clarifi cation of 
ERISA did not just happen. Both the venture capital community and the 
managers of large corporate pension funds lobbied the U.S. government 
for the relaxation of the strictures of ERISA (Avnimelech, Kenney, and 
Teubal 2005, pp. 200–201). For example, in 1998, the NVCA gave its 
fi rst Lifetime Achievement Award to NVCA cofounder David Morgen-
thaler for his seminal efforts in leading the NVCA in lobbying for the 
capital gains tax reduction as well as for the clarifi cation of ERISA 
(Morgenthaler 2008).
As another example, in 1994 Janet Hickey, now comanaging direc-
tor of Sprout Group, a venture capital affi liate of Credit Suisse, was one 
of the fi rst inductees into the Private Equity Hall of Fame for her lobby-
ing of the U.S. Department of Labor to permit pension funds to invest in 
venture capital at a time when she was involved in the management of 
General Electric’s pension fund, one of the largest in the United States 
(Sprout Group 2009).
The massive infusion of capital into venture funds from the pen-
sion savings of U.S. households underpinned the third wave of entry 
of Silicon Valley venture capital fi rms. These venture capitalists in turn 
became much more active in funding semiconductor start-ups as well 
as those new fi rms producing the array of electronic products that sili-
con chips made possible. Semiconductor fi rms were supplying micro-
processors and ASICs for a growing range of computer applications, 
which created a multitude of new opportunities in computer hardware 
and software that venture capitalists could fund, extending from video 
games and disk drives in the early 1980s to e-commerce and optical 
networking gear in the late 1990s. 
Apple Computer’s highly successful IPO in December 1980 is gen-
erally credited with setting off the start-up and IPO boom of the early 
1980s. After achieving spectacular returns on its investments, averaging 
about 35 percent, between 1978 and 1983, the venture capital industry 
was punished for overinvesting, as its returns averaged less than 10 per-
cent in the latter half of the 1980s. After 1990, returns moved up once 
again, soaring to almost 150 percent at the peak of the Internet boom 
before turning negative in the crash of 2001 and 2002 (Lerner 2002). 
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The Silicon Valley venture capital model spread to other parts of the 
United States, especially during the 1990s, with investments being made 
in many different locations and a wide range of industries. Measured in 
2000 dollars, total venture capital investment in the United States rose 
from $9.1 billion in 1995 to $22.3 billion in 1998 before soaring to 
$55.9 billion in 1999 and $105.0 billion in 2000. After falling to $39.5 
billion in 2001, venture capital investment averaged $21.4 billion per 
year from 2002 to 2007, including $25.3 billion in 2007 (or $30.5 bil-
lion in 2007 dollars; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008b). Silicon Valley 
has remained, however, by far the world’s most important location for 
venture capital (Gompers and Lerner 2002, p. 14; Green 2004). 
Over time there have been shifts in the leading sectors for venture 
fi nancing. Offi ce and Computer Machinery was the leading sector from 
the second half of the 1960s through the fi rst half of the 1980s, before 
being barely surpassed by the Communications and Electronics sectors 
in the latter half of that decade. In the fi rst half of the 1990s, Biotech-
nology became important (Gompers and Lerner 2002, pp. 12–13; Green 
2004). If we consider Media and Entertainment investments to be Inter-
net related, the average share of ICT in venture capital investment was 
69 percent in 1996–1999, 71 percent in 2000–2003, and 54 percent in 
2004–2007 (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008b). The 17-percentage-point 
decline in the ICT share of investment in 2004–2007 compared with 
2000–2003 has been more or less offset by an increase in the shares 
of Biotechnology and Medical Devices. In 2004–2007 Biotechnol-
ogy absorbed 17.6 percent of venture capital investment and Medical 
Devices 10.9 percent. 
The importance of telecommunications and networking as recipi-
ents of venture capital in the 1990s and beyond refl ects the evolution 
of converged information and communication technologies out of what 
had been, in the absence of networking, just information technologies. 
The origins of this convergence go back to the early 1970s when, at 
Xerox PARC, the Palo Alto–based research arm of the Old Economy 
copier company, Robert Metcalfe led a team that developed Ethernet, 
a technology that enabled computers to communicate with one anoth-
er (Hiltzik 2000, ch. 13). When Xerox declined to commercialize this 
technology, Metcalfe sought to do so by cofounding 3Com—which 
stands for “computer, communication, and compatibility”—in 1979. 
With the widespread adoption of the IBM PC from 1982 on, 3Com was 
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well positioned to be a leader in providing the hardware and software 
for local area networks (LANs). 
After 3Com acquired the Silicon Valley company Bridge Commu-
nications in 1987, it became the largest supplier of LAN equipment, fol-
lowed by Novell, based in Provo, Utah (Mulqueen 1989a). By this time, 
however, business, government, and nonprofi t organizations that had 
installed LANs in geographically dispersed locations wanted bridges or 
routers that would link their LANs with wide area networks (WANs). 
The company that, by the beginning of the 1990s, was most successful 
in developing this internetworking technology was Cisco Systems. 
In 1984 Leonard Bosack and Sandy Lerner, a husband-and-wife 
team, founded Cisco10 and initially ran it from their living room. While 
working in computing in different parts of Stanford University, Bosack 
and Lerner had been involved in the development of the university’s 
LANs and then had taken up the challenge of internetworking them. At 
the end of 1987, Cisco received an infusion of $2.5 million in venture 
funds from Sequoia Capital (Bellinger 1989; Mulqueen 1989b; Watson 
1988). Yet with $10 million in revenues in fi scal 1988, venture fi nance 
was probably the least important of Sequoia’s contributions to the 
growth of the fi rm. The case of Cisco exemplifi es the nonfi nancial role 
of Silicon Valley venture capitalists in developing a promising start-up 
into a going concern. The Sequoia partner most actively involved with 
the young company was Donald Valentine, who became a member of 
Cisco’s board of directors. During 1988 Valentine directed the hiring 
of professional managers at Cisco, including John Morgridge as Cis-
co president and CEO. More generally, with over a quarter century of 
experience in Silicon Valley as fi rst a semiconductor executive and then 
a venture capitalist, Valentine provided Cisco with business expertise 
that was based on an intimate understanding of the industrial environ-
ment in which the fi rm was trying to compete. 
Morgridge stepped down as CEO in 1995 but remained Cisco’s 
Chairman of the Board until 2006. Valentine also remained a mem-
ber of the board until 2006. Beyond the initial professionalization of 
the company in the late 1980s, Morgridge and Valentine oversaw the 
phenomenal growth of Cisco from less than $28 million in sales in the 
year ending July 1989 to over $22 billion in sales in the year ending 
July 2001. The ways in which Cisco fi nanced this growth as a publicly 
traded company exemplify NEBM.
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Cisco’s IPO in February 1990 netted the company $48 million which 
was used for working capital and cash reserves. Funds from operations 
easily covered the company’s capital expenditures, not only in 1990 
but also for every subsequent year. During its 18 years of existence as 
a public company, Cisco has collected $18.3 billion from its employ-
ees as they have exercised their stock options, a result of the fact that 
the company uses its stock as a compensation currency. But Cisco has 
never done another public stock offering. Rather, as will be detailed 
in Chapter 6, Cisco has also used its stock as a combination currency, 
doing 81 acquisitions for $38.1 billion from 1993 to 2003, 98 percent 
of which was paid in stock. 
Typifying NEBM, Cisco has never paid any dividends. Of the 20 
New Economy companies listed in Table 1.7, only fi ve are currently 
paying cash dividends on an ongoing basis: Intel since 1992, Microsoft 
and Qualcomm since 2003, Applied Materials since 2005, and Jabil Cir-
cuit since 2006. Another four have paid dividends sporadically: Apple 
from 1987 through 1995, Computer Sciences once in 1998, EMC once 
in 2001, and EchoStar one time each in 2004 and 2008. Like Cisco, 
the other 10 leading New Economy ICT companies have never paid 
dividends. 
In all 20 cases, no distributions to shareholders were made during 
the early years as public companies; all earnings were reinvested in the 
growth of the fi rm. Once these New Economy companies had reached 
a certain level of maturity, however, most of them began to distribute 
cash to shareholders by repurchasing their own stock. For the decade 
of 1998–2007, fi ve of the companies did repurchases in every year: 
Microsoft (a 10-year total of $87.2 billion), Intel ($53.0 billion), Dell 
($28.1 billion), Oracle ($25.5 billion), and Applied Materials ($8.9 bil-
lion). Cisco did repurchases every year from 2002 to 2007 for a total 
of $43.1 billion. In 2007 13 of the 20 companies in Table 1.7 did buy-
backs, averaging $4.1 billion. As I show in Chapter 6, the sole purpose 
of stock buybacks is to boost a company’s stock price.
As we have seen in this chapter, the stock market played a major 
role in the emergence and growth of NEBM. As manifested by stock 
buybacks, by the 2000s, stock-price performance had become integral 
to the resource allocation decisions of top executives at these compa-
nies. In the boom years of the late 1990s, employees of these compa-
nies, as participants in broad-based stock-option plans, saw their com-
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pensation rise and in some cases soar as a result of the run-up in their 
companies’ stock prices. Stock repurchases redound to the benefi t of 
these employees, but only if they can keep their jobs. The main issue for 
high-tech workers in the 2000s is employment security under NEBM. 
If, in the 1980s and 1990s, these workers had responded to the lure 
of stock-based compensation by eschewing secure employment in Old 
Economy companies for insecure, but potentially more remunerative, 
employment in New Economy companies, in the 2000s they would 
fi nd that their ticket across business models had been one-way. By the 
2000s, as we shall see in the next chapter, the leading Old Economy 
ICT companies had made the transition from OEBM to NEBM and in 
the process had put an end to the tradition of “the organization man.”
Notes
 1. The fi rst public use of the term “Silicon Valley” is credited to the journalist Don 
C. Hoefl er in a series of articles that he wrote for Electronic News in 1971.
 2. In 1986, however, amid the crisis among U.S. chip companies in the face of Japa-
nese competition, AMD’s no-layoff policy came to an end (see Electronic Times 
1986). 
 3. Semiconductor employees are in SIC 3674 (semiconductors and related devices) 
for 1994–1997 and NAICS 334413 (semiconductor and related device manufac-
turing) for 1998–2006. Software publishing employees are in SIC 7372 (prepack-
aged software, which includes software publishing and reproduction of software) 
for 1994–1997 and NAICS 511210 (software publishers) plus NAICS 334611 
(software reproducing) for 1998–2006. The proportion of NAICS 334611 employ-
ees to all software publishing employees is small, ranging from a low of 0.73 
percent in 2003 to 1.57 percent in 1997. For the matching of SIC and NAICS 
classifi cations, see U.S. Census Bureau (1997). 
 4. Since the mid-1990s, companies have reported not only the number of options 
exercised in any given year but also the weighted average exercise price (WAEP) 
of the options exercised. To generate these estimates of employee gains from 
the exercise of stock options, I assume that employees exercise options evenly 
over the course of the year in all months in which the highest market price of the 
stock is greater than the WAEP for the year. I then use the difference between the 
mean market price and WAEP during each such month to derive the gains over 
the course of the year, shown in Table 2.2. For Table 2.3, I use the highest monthly 
market price rather than the mean market price to calculate the average gains per 
employee in order to avoid biasing the calculations of relative gains from exercis-
ing options in favor of high top fi ve/employee ratios. I am grateful to Yue Zhang 
for her assistance in developing these estimates.
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 5. In 1957 Boston-based ARD backed the founding of Digital Equipment Corpora-
tion, taking 78 percent of the ownership for a $70,000 investment (Wilson 1986, 
p. 19). When the eight defectors from Shockley Labs did get funding to start Fair-
child Semiconductor in 1957, Fairchild Camera’s investment was $1.38 million. 
Even if these eight men had been willing to relocate to Route 128, it is unlikely 
that they would have been able to raise that kind of money through ARD.
 6. The fi rst fi rm in the San Francisco Peninsula devoted specifi cally to venture capi-
tal was Draper, Gaither, and Anderson (DGA), started in 1959; see BusinessWeek 
(1960), New York Times (1959),  and Wilson (1986, p. 34). A product of the Cold 
War, DGA was founded by men who included two former generals in the U.S. 
Armed Forces, William H. Draper, Jr., and Frederick Anderson, and the former 
chairman of the Ford Foundation, H. Rowan Gaither, Jr., who was also the titular 
head of the committee that, in the wake of the Soviet launch of Sputnik in October 
1957, produced the top secret Gaither Report, offi cially titled “Deterrence and 
Survival in the Nuclear Age,” to advise President Dwight D. Eisenhower on the 
capability of the United States to respond to a nuclear attack (see Halperin 1961).
 7. See Rock (2000, p. 141): “The reason I got so excited about Fairchild Semicon-
ductor was because I’d already been in the semiconductor business through Gen-
eral Transistor.” 
 8. The head of Fairchild Camera and Instrument, Sherman Fairchild, was no ordi-
nary corporate backer. His father had been a founder and chairman of Comput-
ing-Tabulating-Recording Company, which in 1924 changed its name to Inter-
national Business Machines. As a result, Sherman Fairchild ended up as IBM’s 
largest single shareholder. He also invented the aerial camera, founded Fairchild 
Camera in 1920, and founded Fairchild Aviation in 1925 (see http://en.wikipedia
.org/wiki/Sherman_Fairchild).
 9. In announcing that his company would exchange Fairchild Camera shares for all 
of the Fairchild Semiconductor shares, President John Carter said the expansion 
of Fairchild Semiconductor’s sales and profi ts would allow the company to grow 
without additional equity fi nancing (Wall Street Journal 1959).
 10. The company’s name, short for San Francisco, was actually spelled “cisco,” with 
a lower-case initial “c,” until it went public in 1990.
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3 
The Demise of the Old 
Economy Business Model
OLD ECONOMY EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN THE 1980s
In the 1970s, even before the rise of NEBM, the postwar era of 
employment security at U.S. industrial corporations had begun to 
change (see Lazonick 2004a). Corporations that had acquired too many 
companies in too many unrelated lines of business in the conglomer-
ate movement of the 1960s became impossible to manage strategically 
and began to unravel. Also in the 1970s, U.S. corporations that had 
provided secure employment faced new competitive challenges from 
the Japanese in the very industries that the United States had domi-
nated. Furthermore, the 1970s saw the postwar prosperity of the 1950s 
and 1960s give way to “stagfl ation”—a partial cause of which was the 
breakdown of OEBM before a viable alternative business model could 
be put in its place. In 1978, Congress superseded the Employment Act 
of 1946 with the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act, which 
focused not only on employment, but also on productivity, infl ation, 
balancing the federal government budget, and achieving a balance of 
trade. 
Then, in the 1980s, U.S. corporate executives began to invoke 
the ideology of “maximizing shareholder value” to legitimize down-
sizing the labor force and increasing distributions to shareholders in 
the forms of not only dividends but also stock buybacks. Among the 
prime benefi ciaries of this “restructuring” process were the top execu-
tives themselves, who have seen their remuneration explode since the 
1980s, mainly because of the gains on the bountiful stock options that 
their boards of directors have bestowed upon them. In the wake of the 
widespread corporate takeovers and plant closings of the 1980s in what 
became known as the Rust Belt, Harrison and Bluestone (1988) percep-
tively identifi ed a “great U-turn” that had occurred in the distribution 
of income, from the trend toward greater equality in the post–World 
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War II decades to a trend toward greater inequality from the late 1970s 
onward. Some three decades later, as shown in Chapter 1, that trend 
toward inequality still prevails.
In the 1980s, however, ICT was far from the Rust Belt. Notwith-
standing the Japanese challenge to U.S. industry in commodity chips, 
ICT was a dynamic growth sector in which U.S. companies continued 
to be world leaders. As a result, most of the top 20 Old Economy ICT 
companies listed in Table 1.6 were still able to hold out the promise 
to their employees of career employment with one company in that 
decade. IBM and HP—the two largest ICT companies by revenues in 
2005—stood out in the 1980s as companies that had “no-layoff” poli-
cies (Gutchess 1985b, pp. 27–30, 38–44). In 1985, with revenues of 
$50.1 billion and more than 405,000 employees, IBM was by far the 
largest ICT company and ranked fi fth on the Fortune 500 list. In 1985 
HP had revenues of $6.5 billion, placing it at number 58 on the Fortune 
500 list, and employed more than 90,000 people. The case of HP is 
of particular importance not only because its revenues surpassed those 
of IBM by 2007, but also because it is generally considered to be the 
pioneering company in the region around Stanford University, where, 
some two decades after HP was founded, NEBM began to emerge.
The second largest ICT company in 1985 was AT&T. The previous 
year AT&T had emerged out of the breakup of the Bell System as both a 
provider of long-distance telecommunications services, in competition 
with companies such as MCI and Sprint, and the leading telecommuni-
cations equipment company in the United States, in possession of the 
still-famous Bell Labs and the former Western Electric. AT&T employ-
ees were susceptible to layoffs both before and after the breakup of the 
Bell System. Nevertheless, AT&T retained Old Economy employment 
relations in the 1980s and 1990s, secured in part by the presence of a 
unionized workforce, unlike nonunion IBM and HP. 
By the 2000s OEBM-style employment relations had met their 
demise at all of these companies, with the exception (to be consid-
ered in Chapter 4) of the unionized labor force of AT&T. By that time, 
however, AT&T was no longer a high-tech company. In what became 
known as the “trivestiture,” in 1996 AT&T spun off its communications 
technology division as Lucent Technologies, which would now house 
Bell Labs, and its recently acquired information technology division as 
NCR. In this chapter, I will analyze the transformation of employment 
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relations that occurred at IBM, HP, and Lucent from the mid-1980s to 
the mid-2000s. IBM and HP were successful in making the transition 
to NEBM, but Lucent was not. In 2006 it was absorbed by the French 
communications equipment company Alcatel. Yet, in all three cases, the 
demise of OEBM resulted in greatly increased employment insecurity 
for the high-tech labor force.
THE DESTRUCTION OF “LIFELONG” EMPLOYMENT 
AT IBM
IBM’s proactive decision to begin a radical transformation from 
OEBM to NEBM in the early 1990s was a direct result of the busi-
ness model that it had adopted in making its rapid and successful entry 
into the microcomputer industry in fi rst half of the 1980s. The IBM 
PC consolidated the vertical structure of the microcomputer industry 
by outsourcing the microprocessor to Intel and the operating system 
to Microsoft. In the process, IBM played a major role in setting indus-
try-wide standards that favored cross-licensing of technology and stra-
tegic alliances rather than in-house proprietary research. As a result, 
the retention of older employees with career-long experience with the 
company became much less valuable, and the recruitment of younger 
employees with experience at other companies much more valuable, to 
the company. 
In 1985 IBM controlled more than 70 percent of the global main-
frame computer market, and it was also the clear-cut global leader in 
sales in the minicomputer, microcomputer, and computer peripherals 
markets (Chandler 2001, pp. 118–119). At a time when Americans 
had come to see “permanent employment” as a key institution in the 
competitive success of Japan, Jack Kuehler, head of IBM’s worldwide 
manufacturing operations, could state, “Our people when they come to 
this company work for life. They work as an IBM team, for the common 
goal to be very competitive. A lot of the things you read about Japa-
nese management techniques, IBM has been doing for years” (Kotkin 
1985).
Until the early 1990s, IBM was widely known as a company that 
offered both managerial and production personnel “lifelong employ-
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ment,” with a full array of benefi ts. In 1934 IBM gave all of its 7,600 
employees access to group life insurance, and the company added sur-
vivor benefi ts in 1935. Two years later, it was one of the fi rst major 
U.S. corporations to give employees paid vacations, in this case six days 
per year. Looking back, Thomas Watson, Jr., who succeeded his father, 
Thomas Watson, Sr., as head of IBM in 1956, said that his father had 
“tried to blur the distinction between white-collar and blue-collar work-
ers,” and that while he did not think that “his primary motive was to keep 
unions out,  . . . that was one effect” (Watson and Petre 1990, p. 310).
The competitive success and sustained growth of IBM in the post-
war decades helped to institutionalize a no-layoff policy. In 1952, when 
IBM employed almost 41,500 people, it was claimed that no employ-
ees had been laid off since 1921, and that the company had never 
experienced a slowdown or strike (Potter 1953). Moreover, treading 
in his father’s footsteps, Watson, Jr., continued to “blur the distinction 
between white-collar and blue-collar workers.” In 1958, with almost 
89,000 employees, IBM was the fi rst major company to place all hourly 
workers on salary (Wall Street Journal 1958). 
IBM’s lifelong employees could expect to be retrained and reas-
signed to new jobs within the company as its mix of products and 
processes changed. Between 1970 and 1975, a period of rapid tech-
nological change in the computer industry, IBM “retrained and physi-
cally relocated 5,000 employees as part of the most extensive corporate 
education program in the U.S.” (BusinessWeek 1975). The same article 
quoted IBM chairman Frank Cary as saying: “If people are not worried 
about being laid off, they are fl exible in making the changes we ask of 
them. We get a high degree of cooperation from the work force in mak-
ing changes that are benefi cial to the corporation. This is very important 
to us in a high-technology business.” 
One way in which IBM avoided layoffs was by staffi ng “lean,” at 
85 percent of the labor force that would be required to meet normal 
demand, and then using a combination of overtime (Saturday) work 
and subcontracting to bring supply up to the normal level when required 
(Gutchess 1985b, pp. 38–44). When demand was above normal, IBM 
would have the regular labor force work even more Saturdays and 
would also hire temporary workers. In periods of slack demand, IBM 
would produce for inventory, increase maintenance and repair work, 
and recondition equipment used by its sales force.
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Throughout the 1980s, IBM touted its no-layoffs policy (see, e.g., 
the Economist 1986). As Watson, Jr., put it in his autobiography,
[E]very IBM employee had job security, going back to the days 
when Dad had refused to fi re people during the Depression. If a 
man proved ineffectual at his new assignment, he wasn’t going 
to be put out on the street; instead we would assign him to a level 
where he could perform well. In doing this we would sometimes 
strip a man of a fair amount of his dignity, but we would then make 
a great effort to build his self-respect. We also abided by the IBM 
custom of promotion from within. As inexperienced as our execu-
tives might be in their new jobs, they had all come up from the 
bottom and knew what IBM stood for as well as they knew their 
own names. (Watson and Petre 1990, pp. 288–289)
Even in the last half of the 1980s, when IBM cut its total employment 
from a record high 405,535 people in 1985 to 373,816 in 1990, all of the 
reductions came through voluntary retirement schemes. 
In the early 1990s, however, IBM took advantage of a slowdown in 
the computer industry to bring lifelong employment to an end. IBM’s 
annual revenues dropped in 1991, 1992, and 1993. The average revenues 
during these three years were $64.0 billion, just over 7 percent less than 
1990 revenues of $69.0 billion but greater than the company’s aver-
age revenues for the years 1988–1990. Although this drop in revenues 
was not dramatic, especially in a nationwide recession, IBM had not 
experienced a year-to-year decline in revenues since 1946. With shrink-
ing gross profi t margins and losses totaling $15.9 billion in 1991–1993, 
IBM’s top management portrayed the company as being in a crisis, and 
the general public came to view the world’s leading computer company 
as an Old Economy “lumbering giant” (Burgess 1993; Kehoe 1991).
From 1990 to 1994, IBM cut employment from 373,816 to 219,839, 
reducing its labor force to only 59 percent of its year-end 1990 level. 
During this period, much of IBM’s downsizing continued to be accom-
plished by making it attractive for its employees to accept voluntary 
severance packages, including early retirement at age 55. In 1993 and 
1994, however, with CEO Louis Gerstner in charge, many thousands of 
IBM employees were fi red outright. 
IBM’s losses of $15.9 billion in 1991–1993 included an $8.1 billion 
defi cit in 1993, which was the largest annual loss in U.S. corporate his-
tory at the time. Workforce-related restructuring charges (including the 
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cost of employee separations and relocations) accounted for 86 percent 
of these losses—in effect the cost to the company of ridding itself of 
its once-hallowed tradition of lifelong employment. Other restructuring 
charges, mainly for the consolidation of manufacturing capacity and 
elimination of excess space—both part and parcel of the massive down-
sizing process—amounted to $10.6 billion over the three years. Ignor-
ing restructuring charges, IBM recorded positive net incomes before 
taxes of $939 million in 1991, $2,619 million in 1992, and $148 million 
in 1993. Although IBM continued to downsize at a torrid pace in 1994, 
most of it was done outside the United States and without voluntary 
severance provisions. During 1994 the company booked no restructur-
ing charges and had after-tax profi ts of $3,021 million.
In March 1993 the company began involuntary layoffs, with 2,600 
terminations that month (Ramstad 1994a). With the arrival of Gerstner 
as the new CEO on April 1, 1993, there was no longer any pretence 
of retaining IBM’s tradition of employment security. Previously CEO 
at RJR Nabisco, Gerstner’s own appointment was a departure from 
IBM’s practice of promoting top executives from within. In May 1993 
Gerstner hired Jerome York, Chrysler’s chief fi nancial offi cer, as his 
cost-cutting CFO. Then he hired Gerald Czarnecki, CEO of Bank of 
America–Hawaii, as his head of human resources, with a mandate (set 
in July 1993) to fi re 35,000 people over the next year (Miller 1993). 
Czarnecki was fond of telling IBM employees, “It’s going to be 
painful for those who have one foot on the platform and one on the train, 
because the train is leaving” (Hays 1994a). Another of Czarnecki’s quips 
to IBM employees: “If you don’t enjoy what you’re doing, you ought 
to work for someone else” (Lohr 1994). In January 1994, after having 
handed about 7,000 IBM employees one-way tickets out the door, Czar-
necki was asked (presumably tongue-in-cheek) whether an employee 
could any longer assume “lifetime employment” at IBM (Lohr 1994). 
His response: “It’s not that it’s no longer sacred—it’s gone, period.” 
Indeed, by April 1994, after less than a year on the job, so too was 
Czarnecki, apparently taking his own advice. He said that he resigned 
because he did not enjoy this line of work (Hays 1994a), but CFO York 
reportedly axed Czarnecki for falling far short of the layoff objectives 
(Hays 1994b).
After further restructuring in 1994, IBM resumed its growth, with its 
revenues rising to almost $99 billion in 2007. The company increased 
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employment from 219,839 in 1994, the lowest level since 1966, to 386,558 
in 2007. The share of U.S. employees in IBM’s worldwide employment 
declined, however, from 52.2 percent in 1996 to 32.8 percent in 2007. 
The net increase in IBM employees outside of the United States was 
26,387 in 2006 and 37,961 in 2007.1 One-quarter of IBM’s 2007 employ-
ees worldwide were in Brazil, Russia, India, and China, with 74,000, or 
19 percent of all IBM employees, in India alone (IBM 2008).
IBM employed 125,618 people in the United States in 1996 and 
126,804 in 2007. Indeed, except for a net increase of six U.S. employ-
ees in 2006, the number of U.S. employees at IBM declined in every 
year from 2001 through 2007. Moreover, refl ecting IBM’s shift out of 
manufacturing and hardware, the types of employment that these U.S. 
workers performed changed dramatically. From 1996 to 2007, “techni-
cians” fell from 10.0 to 7.6 percent of IBM’s U.S. labor force, “offi ce/
clerical” workers from 7.1 to 3.7 percent, and “operatives” from 12.3 
to 1.3 percent. During the same period, the proportion of the U.S. labor 
force employed in marketing increased from 12.6 to 32.2 percent.
Measured in 2007 U.S. dollars, IBM’s sales per employee increased 
from an annual average of $257,000 in 1984–1990 to $383,000 in 1994–
2000. In 2001–2007 real sales per employee fell back to an average of 
$294,000 ($264,000 in 2006 and $256,000 in 2007) as IBM increased 
its employment in India and other lower-wage areas of the world. Over 
the period from 1996 to 2005, IBM’s annual net income averaged 8.2 
percent of revenues, although it climbed to 10.3 percent in 2006 and 
10.5 percent in 2007. The fact that this profi t rate was well below the 
13.7 percent average rate that IBM recorded from 1976 to 1985 refl ects 
the much more competitive New Economy environment that IBM has 
faced since that time.
During the 1990s, IBM pursued a strategy of shifting its business 
out of hardware into services (Garr 1999; Gerstner 2002; Lazonick 
2007b; Lohr 2004). Continuing a trend that began in the late 1980s, 
the share of revenues from hardware declined from 48 percent in 1996 
to 25 percent in 2006, while the services share increased from 29 per-
cent to 53 percent.2 In December 2004 there was considerable public-
ity concerning IBM’s sale of its PC business to Lenovo, an indigenous 
Chinese computer electronics company formerly known as Legend (see 
Chapter 5). The 2006 gross margins of 37 percent in hardware and 27 
percent in services were virtually the same as in 1996. Software’s share 
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of revenues increased from 15 percent in 1996 to 20 percent in 2006, 
however, and the segment’s already high gross margin of 74 percent in 
1996 rose to 85 percent in 2006. 
In the early 1990s, IBM was one of the fi rst Old Economy compa-
nies, along with HP, to outsource manufacturing to Solectron, a com-
pany that became one of the largest electronic manufacturing service 
(EMS) providers before being acquired by Flextronics in 2007. Over 
the course of the 1990s, IBM rid itself of its manufacturing capacity. In 
the fi rst transfer of an established production facility to the new breed 
of EMS provider, Solectron purchased IBM’s electronic subassembly 
operations in France and North Carolina in 1992 and had IBM as its 
initial customer (Business Wire 1992). One of the top fi ve EMS provid-
ers today is Celestica, which began life as IBM Canada and was spun 
off as a separate company in 1996. 
These changes in product and process strategy were accompanied 
by signifi cant reductions in IBM’s R&D expenditures as a percentage of 
sales, refl ecting the company’s much greater orientation toward product 
development rather than basic research. The proportion of R&D to sales 
at IBM averaged 7.1 percent from 1981 to 1993, but it averaged only 
5.6 percent from 1994 to 2007. IBM’s total expenditures of $5.7 billion 
on R&D in 2006 placed it fourteenth among all R&D spenders glob-
ally. But its R&D expenditures of $16,000 per employee were lower 
than all but 22 other companies in the list of top 100 R&D spenders, far 
lower than fi fth-place Microsoft’s $90,000 per employee, twelfth-place 
Intel’s $62,000, and twenty-third-place Cisco’s $81,000 (Hira and Ross 
2007). As the IBM 2003 Annual Report (IBM 2004, p. 49) stated, “A 
key transformation that has been taking place over the past decade and 
that continues today is the change in the focus and the culture of IBM’s 
R&D organization to be more closely linked to and be primarily driven 
by industry-specifi c and client-specifi c needs.”3 
Integral to this strategy has been extensive patenting for the purpos-
es of cross-licensing and intellectual property (IP) revenue generation 
(Chesbrough 2003; DiCarlo 1999; Grindley and Teece 1997). Cross-
licensing has enabled IBM to gain access to technology developed by 
other companies rather than relying on in-house R&D. IBM sees its IP 
revenues, which averaged $1.3 billion per year over 2000–2004, as a 
direct return on its R&D expenditures, which averaged $5.3 billion over 
the same period. During the 1990s, as IBM scaled back its R&D expen-
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diture rate, it ramped up its patenting activity. IBM was ninth in the 
number of U.S. patents awarded in 1989 and 1990, eighth in 1991, and 
sixth in 1992. With a 29 percent increase in patents awarded in 1993, 
IBM moved into the number one spot and has maintained that position 
in every subsequent year to the present (IFI Patent Intelligence 2008). 
The company’s new emphasis on services and software, as well as 
the vertically specialized structure of the ICT industry, which IBM itself 
had played a major role in creating, rendered the use of a fl uid and fl ex-
ible high-tech labor force much more desirable and possible than had 
been the case in the 1980s. Given the absence of in-house investments 
in proprietary systems, the organizational and technological rationales 
for Old Economy lifelong employment no longer existed at IBM. The 
company now favored younger employees, whose higher education was 
up-to-date and who had work experience at other companies within the 
ICT industries, over older employees who had spent their careers with 
IBM. In 1995 IBM rescinded the early-retirement offer that had helped 
it downsize its labor force; the offer had accomplished its purpose, 
and in any case, IBM no longer wanted to encourage all employees to 
remain with the company even until the age of 55 (Schultz 2000).
THE END OF “THE HP WAY”
Founded by William Hewlett and David Packard in Palo Alto, Cali-
fornia, in 1939 to produce electronic test instruments, Hewlett-Packard, 
as HP was then known, grew to about 200 employees on the basis of 
military contracts during World War II. After the war, the company laid 
off most of the women who had been wartime production workers, 
bringing the employment level down to 111 in 1947. From that point on, 
HP’s year-end employment level rose continuously for 38 years, until 
it reached 84,000 people in 1985. Employment declined by 2 percent 
in 1986 and by 6 percent in 1990–1991, with the reductions achieved 
through the offer of early retirement packages and relocations (Clark 
1991; New York Times 1986; Ryan 1990). HP’s employment level then 
grew to 124,600 in 1998, before dropping to 84,400 in 1999 when the 
company spun off Agilent, which contained its noncomputer-related 
businesses.
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HP was able to sustain its no-layoff policy for more than half a 
century because, through continuous product innovation (see Packard 
1995, Appendix 2), it was able to increase its revenues in every year 
from 1949 through 2000 (adjusting for the 1999 Agilent divestiture). 
Moreover, under Hewlett and Packard’s leadership, the company avoid-
ed taking on long-term debt, which in the case of a downturn, could take 
employment decisions out of the company’s control. Frank Williams, 
HP’s manager of Corporate Personnel and Administration and Opera-
tions, said, “We try to operate the company in a manner that assures that 
everyone has a job” (Gutchess 1985b, p. 28). 
The company adjusted to slower-than-expected growth as well as 
(infrequent) month-to-month declines by the use of subcontracting and 
a system of short-time working that became known as the “nine-day 
fortnight.” First used for a few months in 1970 and then again for short 
periods in 1985 and 1992, the nine-day fortnight had every employ-
ee take off work every second Friday, with a 10 percent reduction in 
pay (Gutchess 1985b, p. 28; Mandel, Forest, and McWilliams 1992; 
McNerney 1996, p. 6; Moskowitz 1985; Packard 1995, pp. 133–134). 
HP also kept people employed by moving them around the organization 
to activities and locations in which more employees were needed. If a 
person did not want to move, he or she could get a voluntary severance 
package amounting to a half month’s pay for every year of service with 
a minimum of four months (McNerney 1996). The company maintained 
its no-layoff policy through the 1990s, not by guaranteeing jobs but by 
ensuring that employees who were no longer required in certain types 
of jobs and certain locations would have the opportunity to fi nd other 
employment within the company. 
In his 1995 autobiography, The HP Way, Packard (1995, p. 134) 
cautioned that the company’s employment policy did not represent “a 
commitment to providing absolute tenure status to our people.” Yet in 
1995 the company, with 105,200 employees, remained committed to its 
no-layoff policy at a time when most U.S. high-tech corporations had 
embraced “employability”—the notion that, by accumulating capabili-
ties, a person could move from company to company and even from one 
type of job to another type in a constantly changing labor market. In a 
1996 article in HR Focus, the human resources newsletter of the Ameri-
can Management Association, staff writer Donald McNerney (1996, p. 
6) contrasted HP’s ongoing “Old Economy” employment relations to 
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the new norm among high-tech companies: “Not every fi rm buys into 
the new social contract with its emphasis on job cuts, mobile employ-
ees, and incessant churn. Hewlett-Packard, for one, rejects it outright.” 
McNerney then quoted Tom Pierson, manager of HR planning, staffi ng, 
and relocations at HP’s Palo Alto headquarters, as saying,
I think [the employability doctrine] is just a rationalization for 
not being able to provide employment security . . . We feel very 
strongly about employment security. We still cherish careers [with 
the company] . . . We have a lot of our benefi t and employee pro-
grams geared around length of service… And we’ve structured our 
total compensation package in a way that says: The longer you’re 
here, the better off you are. (McNerney 1996, p. 6)
Pierson went on to argue that HP derived “a sizable return on invest-
ment” from employment security; the company could attract the best 
employees and keep turnover very low. After all, he observed: “[The 
HP Way] is Bill’s and Dave’s philosophy of how they started the com-
pany. They did not want to create a hire-and-fi re organization.” Clearly 
imbued with the spirit of Hewlett and Packard, Pierson concluded, “I 
have a real tough time wrapping my mind around the idea that, at the 
end of the day, I don’t owe you anything and you don’t owe me any-
thing. That’s not the way I want to run a company.”
Unlike IBM, which deliberately and dramatically made the tran-
sition to New Economy employment relations in the fi rst half of the 
1990s, HP sustained its commitment to employment security through 
the 1990s. That this commitment lasted as long as it did is testimony 
to the legacy of the HP Way, a corporate philosophy whose life at the 
company was probably prolonged by the 1995 publication of founder 
David Packard’s best-selling autobiography with this title.4 By the mid- 
2000s, however, HP, with 150,000 employees, had become what Pack-
ard would have called a “hire and fi re” company (see Wong 2006). 
As was the case at IBM, HP’s transition to NEBM, including the 
employment of a more mobile and fl exible labor force, was encour-
aged by a shift from proprietary to industry technology standards that 
had begun to take root in the early 1980s. In the 1980s and 1990s, HP 
found itself at the center of the microelectronics revolution not only 
because of its location in Palo Alto, where it acquired iconic status as 
the pioneering Silicon Valley fi rm, but also because of a business strat-
egy that focused increasingly on consumer-oriented computer prod-
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ucts and peripherals. In 1983 computer products (including computers, 
calculators, printers, supplies, services, and support) accounted for 51 
percent of HP’s revenues while electronic test and measurement equip-
ment—the business upon which HP had been founded—accounted for 
37 percent.
In 1984, with the PC revolution in full swing, HP made a strate-
gic decision to manufacture its computer products to comply with the 
open systems that had emerged in the IT industry (Beckman 1996; 
Deutschman 1994). As stated in HP’s 1984 Annual Report (Hewlett-
Packard 1985, p. 11), “Because it recognizes how critical networking 
is to improving productivity, HP supports an ‘open systems’ concept 
whereby computer makers design their systems so that computers can 
‘talk’ with those of other makers. It also supports industry standards 
that govern networks.”
When, as a critical step in its move to open systems, HP introduced 
the fi rst PC-compatible LaserJet printer in 1984, it had entered into 
an agreement, still in force in the 2000s, to purchase all of its printer 
engines from Canon. In the mid-2000s, Canon controlled more than 50 
percent of the global laser printer market by selling its machines under 
its own name as well as to HP on an OEM basis (Nikkei Weekly 2005). 
Based largely on this open systems strategy, HP’s revenues increased 
from $4.7 billion to $47.1 billion from 1983 to 1998, representing an 
expansion of 6.1 times in real dollars. HP achieved this sixfold increase 
in real revenues, moreover, with an expansion in employment of only 
1.7 times—from 72,000 to 142,600—with the result that sales per 
employee in 1998 dollars increased by 3.5 times, from $107,000 to 
$378,000. 
In building its competitive strategy around open systems, HP 
acquired a greater interest in employing a labor force with industry-
wide experience as distinct from one that had in-house experience in 
proprietary technology. HP’s major Route 128 rivals in the minicom-
puter industry—Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC), Wang Labora-
tories, and Data General—all continued to adhere to proprietary sys-
tems, and all ceased to exist in the 1990s. In 1984 DEC had $1,527 
million in minicomputer sales to HP’s $950 million (Chandler 2001, 
pp. 118–119). In the 1990s, however, DEC fell victim to competition 
from ever more powerful and functional open-systems computers, and 
in 1998 DEC was acquired by Compaq—a company that, by cloning 
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the IBM PC, had become the global leader in personal computers. What 
was left of DEC, a company that had a peak employment of 126,000 
people, ultimately became a part of HP with the HP-Compaq merger in 
2002. 
In 1999 HP spun off its noncomputer-related businesses—test and 
measurement instrumentation, medical electronic equipment, and ana-
lytical instrumentation—as Agilent Technologies. Combined, these 
businesses had $6.5 billion of HP’s $47.1 billion 1998 revenues and 
43,000 of HP’s 125,000 employees. Using a new business segment clas-
sifi cation system, HP reported that “imaging and printing systems” rep-
resented 43 percent of revenues and 63 percent of earnings from opera-
tions in 1999, and “computing systems” 40 percent of revenues and 27 
percent of earnings from operations. The only other important business 
segment (but one that HP was eager to expand) was IT services, with 15 
percent of revenues and 13 percent of earnings from operations. 
Although various types of computers, from handheld devices to 
engineering workstations, were important to HP’s growth in the 1980s 
and 1990s, printers and the ink cartridges to supply them were the main 
drivers of the company’s remarkable expansion. In 1995 HP had 61 per-
cent of the U.S. monochrome laser printer market, which featured high-
speed output, and 48 percent of the U.S. ink-jet printer market, which 
featured inexpensive machines for color printing (Business Wire 1996). 
In 2005 HP had about 50 percent of the “all-in-one” ink-jet printer mar-
ket, an important segment for HP not only because of its rapid growth 
but also because it did not have to share the profi ts from these machines 
with Canon (K.S. Brown 2005; Morrison 2005). 
HP’s dependence on printers and ink refi lls would be even greater 
in the second half of the 2000s if it had not been for the company’s 
merger with Compaq Computer in 2002. In 2007, imaging and printing 
generated 27 percent of total revenues and 43 percent of earnings from 
operations, while personal computer systems generated 34 percent of 
revenues but only 19 of earnings. HP has vied with Dell for world lead-
ership in PC sales, with HP having a 18.9 percent share and Dell a 15.4 
percent share in the fi rst quarter of 2008 (Gonsalves 2008). Meanwhile, 
HP managed to expand its IT services from 12 percent of total revenues 
and 14 percent of earnings in 2000 to 16 percent of total revenues and 
18 percent of earnings in 2007. That expansion took a great leap for-
ward in 2008 when HP acquired Electronic Data Systems (EDS). With 
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$22.1 billion in revenues and 139,500 employees in 2007, EDS was, 
after IBM, the second largest U.S. IT services company.
Selling consumer-oriented products in markets in which price 
competition is intense, HP is no longer the “engineers’ company” that 
Hewlett and Packard built. Like IBM, HP now allocates a much small-
er percentage of sales to R&D than in the past. In 2000–2007, R&D 
expenditures were only 4.9 percent of sales, reaching an all-time low 
of 2.8 percent in 2008, compared with annual averages of 10.3 percent 
in the 1980s and 8.2 percent in the 1990s. At the same time, HP has 
advanced to the top ranks in patenting. When it launched its PC-com-
patible printers in 1984, HP had 63 patents in the United States, which 
placed it not even in the top 100 among all organizations and far behind 
second-place IBM (608) and sixth-place Canon (430). By 2004 HP had 
climbed to fourth place before falling back to tenth in 2007 (IFI Patent 
Intelligence 2008). Many of HP’s patents are on its ink; the purpose 
of these ink patents is not only to improve product quality but also to 
block companies that cut into its revenues and profi ts by refi lling and 
refurbishing empty print cartridges. 
These changes in HP’s product-market strategy over the past 
two decades have had far-reaching consequences for the company’s 
employment relations. HP has no interest in making a commitment to 
provide careers within the company to the mass of its employees, as 
it did under OEBM. Another direct consequence of the move to open 
systems is that, since the mid-1980s, HP has been a leader among ICT 
companies in the outsourcing of employment to EMS providers. As in 
the case of IBM, HP’s initial relations with EMS providers during the 
1990s occurred when it transferred its manufacturing plants to them. 
The move to open systems facilitated the growth of EMS providers 
because now components became more modular, with standard inter-
faces for systems integration (Sturgeon 2002; Tully 1993). The transfer 
of manufacturing facilities from HP to EMS providers was integral to 
the process whereby HP transformed itself into a vertically specialized 
company that could generate extraordinarily high levels of sales per 
employee, reaching $608,000 in 2005–2007. 
The 1999 spinoff of Agilent Technologies marked the beginning of 
the end of the HP Way. A few months after the Agilent spinoff, HP hired 
a new CEO, Cara Carleton S. Fiorina, an apostle of the New Economy 
recruited from Lucent Technologies (Burrows and Elstrom 1999). In 
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her fi rst analyst briefi ng as HP CEO, Fiorina was critical of her pre-
decessors for failing to expand revenues fast enough and said that she 
was remedying the situation by dismissing sales representatives with 
poor records and revamping the compensation program (Fisher 1999). 
In November 2000 Fiorina altered HP’s performance ranking system by 
ordering that 5 percent rather than the previous 1 percent of employees 
receive the lowest ranking, thus increasing the number of people who 
would have diffi culty fi nding a new job within the company, should 
the positions in which they currently worked be eliminated (Poletti 
2001a). 
In early 2001, with economic recession setting in, HP announced 
that it would cut 1,700 marketing jobs and 3,000 of 14,000 manage-
ment positions (Bergstein 2001a). The company continued to adhere 
to the traditional policy that gave these employees the opportunity to 
fi nd another position within HP (Poletti 2001b). In late July, howev-
er—by which time 1,000 people whose jobs had been cut earlier in the 
year had left the company—HP announced that it would chop 6,000 
jobs, amounting to 6.5 percent of its global labor force (Kirby 2001; 
Riley 2001). With 10,700 jobs having been eliminated within just sev-
en months, displaced employees faced dim prospects of fi nding new 
positions within HP. When the announcement of 6,000 new layoffs 
was made, a company spokesperson commented, “Obviously people 
can’t be happy when business isn’t going well. But I think most people 
understand we are a business, and we have to do certain things to ensure 
our profi tability” (Riley 2001). While HP’s management never offi cial-
ly announced the demise of the HP Way, neither would it henceforth 
invoke it as the prevailing corporate philosophy.
Then, in September 2001, HP declared its intention to merge with 
Compaq Computer, the world’s second largest PC producer and larg-
est enterprise server producer, with a total of $33.6 billion in sales and 
63,700 employees. HP was number four in both product markets, with a 
total of $18.2 billion in revenues. Given the downturn in ICT markets in 
2001, it was clear that the merger of the two companies would entail a 
consolidation of operations that would mean a considerable loss of jobs. 
Indeed, it was the possibility of cost-savings through postcombination 
consolidation that made the merger fi nancially attractive. HP’s estimate 
for postmerger downsizing was 15,000 jobs (Bergstein 2001b). HP 
employees were subsequently told that any worker in the United States 
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who was not selected for a position in the merged company would be 
given nine weeks with pay to fi nd a new position within the company 
and, if unsuccessful, would then receive severance pay equal to a half-
month’s salary for every year of full-time service, with a minimum of 
four months and a maximum of 12 (Pimentel 2002a; San Francisco 
Chronicle 2002).
Sons of each of the company’s cofounders sought to block the 
merger. Walter Hewlett voiced his opposition as a member of the HP 
board on the grounds that “the combination would dramatically increase 
Hewlett-Packard’s exposure to the unattractive PC business and dilute 
current stockholders’ interest in Hewlett-Packard’s profi table printer 
business” (PR Newswire 2001). Hewlett was joined in opposing the 
merger by David Woodley Packard, who had been on the HP board 
until 1999, when he resigned to devote more time to his philanthropic 
foundation, the Packard Humanities Institute (Anders 1999). Packard’s 
objection had to do with the fact that the merger would inevitably result 
in mass layoffs. As he put it,
I am perfectly aware that HP has never guaranteed absolute ten-
ure status to its employees; but I also know that Bill and Dave 
never developed a premeditated business strategy that treated HP 
employees as expendable. This new approach seems likely to affect 
the confi dence and loyalty of the remaining employees. For over 
50 years, one of HP’s fundamental corporate objectives has been 
to provide long-term employment for its people. (Seipel 2001)
As the sole board member against the merger, Hewlett fi led a law-
suit in March 2002 in an attempt to block the deal. He argued that HP 
might have to lay off up to 24,000 employees after the merger rather 
than the announced fi gure of 15,000 (Seipel and Poletti 2002). In the 
end, a bare majority—51.4 percent—of HP’s shareholders voted for the 
merger.
One year after the merger, employment at HP had declined from 
153,500 to 141,400, the net result of 18,900 layoffs and 6,800 new 
hires (Takahashi 2003, 2004; see also Pimentel 2003). Fiorina stated 
that 16,600 of the terminations were “integration” layoffs; the other 
2,300, done in February–April 2003, could, she claimed, be construed 
as “business layoffs.” The low point for postmerger employment at HP 
was 139,800 in the summer of 2003, and the number of employees that 
HP reported at the end of fi scal 2003 was 142,000. 
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In early 2005 Fiorina was herself ousted from her job—with a $21.1 
million severance package—because she, reportedly, “failed to slash 
costs and boost revenue as quickly as directors had hoped” (Konrad 
2005). From the time of the merger with Compaq through 2006, HP 
laid off 45,000 employees, while hiring almost as many new employees 
(Wong 2006). The purpose of this “churn” was to reduce costs. 
In the process, U.S. employees as a proportion of HP’s worldwide 
employees declined from 48 percent in 2002 to 31 percent in 2007 (HP 
2008, pp. 16, 134). HP’s employment strategy has included substantial 
offshoring of production to China. HP had entered China in 1985 as part 
of the fi rst Sino–U.S. high-tech joint venture (Ke 1998). Toward the end 
of 2006, HP employed 5,000 people in China, up from 3,000 in 2003, 
with immediate openings for more than 1,000 more, of which one-quar-
ter would be R&D staff (Xinhua News Agency 2006). 
HP set up a subsidiary in India in 1989, but it was not until 2002 that 
the company launched its fi rst Indian research lab (Agence France-Press 
2002). HP employed about 2,200 people in India just before its merger 
with Compaq (Dataquest 2002, 2003). At the end of 2003, after making 
an Indian affi liate, Digital Globalsoft, a wholly owned subsidiary, HP 
found itself with more than 10,000 employees in India, making it the 
nation’s largest foreign employer, temporarily surpassing IBM (ZDNet 
UK 2003). By the end of 2006, HP had doubled that headcount to about 
20,000 employees in India, or about 13 percent of its global labor force 
(CMP TechWeb 2005). In May 2008 HP announced the acquisition of 
EDS, which included its Bangalore-based subsidiary, MphasiS, and its 
28,000 employees in India, potentially increasing HP employment in 
India to 59,000 (Kulkarni 2008). 
The EDS acquisition was followed, however, with the inevitable 
integration layoffs. In September 2008 HP announced that it would 
cut 24,600 jobs worldwide—7.7 percent of the HP/EDS global labor 
force—with about half of the workforce reductions occurring in the 
United States (Bailey 2008; Robertson 2008). By 2008 such massive 
terminations had become the new HP way.
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LUCENT’S FAILED TRANSITION TO NEBM
In 1999, at the height of the Internet boom, Lucent Technologies 
was the world’s largest telecommunications equipment company.5 
With reported revenues of $38.3 billion, net income of $3.5 billion, 
and 153,000 employees for the fi scal year ending September 30, 1999, 
Lucent was far larger and more profi table than Nortel, Alcatel, and 
Ericsson, its three major global competitors. In 2006, however, Lucent’s 
revenues were only $8.8 billion, and its employment level had dropped 
to 29,800. Both fi gures were lower than those of Lucent’s three main 
rivals, even though all four companies had gone through wrenching 
declines in the early 2000s as the Internet boom turned to bust. 
Indeed, Alcatel was almost twice the size of Lucent in terms of rev-
enues and employees when the merger that created Alcatel-Lucent took 
place in December 2006, and Lucent Technologies became a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Alcatel. Lucent CEO Patricia Russo was named 
CEO of Alcatel-Lucent, but she occupied her new position at Alcatel 
headquarters in Paris.
Lucent could trace its origins back to Cleveland, Ohio, in 1869, 
when Elisha Gray and Enos Barton launched a company that manu-
factured telegraph equipment for Western Union. In 1872 the fi rm was 
reorganized as Western Electric Manufacturing Company, with its 
headquarters in Chicago. In 1881 American Telephone and Telegraph 
acquired a controlling interest in Western Electric. Subsequently, as 
AT&T’s wholly owned subsidiary, Western Electric became its exclu-
sive manufacturer of telecommunications equipment. In 1913 AT&T 
became a regulated monopoly for the provision of telephone service in 
the United States, thus making Western Electric in effect a monopolist 
in the provision of telephone equipment and infrastructures. In 1970 
Western Electric had a peak employment of over 215,000 people, plac-
ing the company in seventh place among the largest employers in the 
Fortune 500.6 
In the 1970s AT&T was challenged by new entrants into the long-
distance business (in particular MCI) that demanded that AT&T provide 
them with access to its transmission infrastructure. In 1974 the U.S. 
Department of Justice launched an antitrust suit against AT&T, which 
resulted in the breakup of the Bell System on January 1, 1984. As we 
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have discussed, the breakup separated seven regional Bell operating 
companies, or RBOCs, from AT&T Corp., which now included within 
its internal organization Western Electric and Bell Labs as its AT&T 
Technologies division. AT&T became a competitive long-distance tele-
phone company but was excluded from entering local telephone mar-
kets, and the RBOCs continued to operate as regulated monopolies. 
The 1982 modifi cation of the 1956 consent decree that underlay the 
breakup of the Bell System, however, left AT&T free to enter the com-
puter industry. Toward that end, in a 1991 $7.4 billion hostile takeover, 
AT&T acquired NCR, a company that (as National Cash Register) itself 
dated back to 1884. 
In September 1995 AT&T announced the “trivestiture.” The direct 
impetus to the trivestiture was the pending passage of the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996, which would open up competition across all lines 
of business within the telecommunications industry. AT&T would now 
have a strong incentive to procure telecommunications equipment from 
suppliers other than its own manufacturing division, whereas AT&T’s 
competitors might be reluctant to place equipment orders with AT&T 
Technologies while it remained a captive manufacturing organization. 
Meanwhile AT&T had failed to integrate NCR into its operations. Giv-
en that AT&T would now be a focused telecommunications service pro-
vider, it made sense to spin off NCR along with Lucent Technologies.
Lucent’s IPO in April 1996 was the largest in U.S. history up to that 
time. Lucent executives were fond of saying that their company was 
a 127-year-old start-up that had well over $20 billion in annual sales. 
Running the company was Henry Schacht, an AT&T board member 
since 1981 who, in 1995 at the age of 60, had retired as chairman of 
Cummins Engine (Endlich 2004, chap. 3). Lucent’s president and COO 
was 46-year-old Rich McGinn, a veteran of two decades in the Bell 
System who, despite having only an undergraduate degree in history, 
had risen to be head of AT&T’s Network Systems group. It was gener-
ally recognized that McGinn was Schacht’s heir apparent (p. 32), and 
indeed, in October 1997, McGinn took over from Schacht as CEO. 
When McGinn became CEO, a press release quoted him as saying 
that he viewed “Lucent as a group of hot businesses, tightly focused on 
its customers, markets and competitors” (Business Wire 1997). These 
“hot businesses” consisted of four types: 1) core network products, 
including switching and access, optical networking, and wireless net-
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working; 2) support businesses, including microelectronics, business 
communications systems, and network products; 3) new opportunity 
businesses, including the intellectual property group, the new ventures 
group, and data networking systems; and 4) software services, includ-
ing communications software and global service provider business.
Lucent was able to take advantage of the Internet boom to increase 
its revenues at a compound rate of over 17 percent per year during the 
fi rst four years of its existence. The core of Lucent’s business in these 
years was its Systems for Network Operators division, which grew from 
$10.6 billion in revenues in 1995, when the company was still part of 
AT&T, to $23.6 billion, or 62 percent of revenues, just four years later. 
Most of Lucent’s growth came from its “incumbent advantage” in sup-
plying equipment to its traditional customers, AT&T and the RBOCs. 
During the latter half of the 1990s, these former Bell System service 
providers were buying equipment to provide multiple telephone lines 
to households and businesses to be used for dial-up Internet access 
across copper lines and increasing the capacity of local and regional 
networks to support escalating Internet traffi c. The growth potential of 
this incumbent advantage eventually reached its limits, largely because 
of the advent of broadband Internet access via coaxial television cables 
as well as asymmetric digital subscriber line (ADSL) technology. At 
this point, Lucent faced the challenge of diversifying its customer base 
to supply equipment to the many newer entrants among the wireless and 
wireline service providers who were not encumbered by the sunk costs 
of legacy systems.
Two “next generation” service providers, Winstar and Global Cross-
ing, that Lucent secured as customers in the late 1990s went bankrupt, 
and after 2000 Lucent remained heavily reliant on its traditional Bell 
System customers for revenues. In 2000, AT&T represented 10 percent 
of Lucent’s revenues and Verizon 13 percent. In 2004–2006, Lucent’s 
last three years of existence, Verizon’s share of total revenues was about 
28 percent. Lucent’s most important non-Bell customer was Sprint, an 
incumbent long-distance provider, for which Lucent built much of its 
wireless network beginning in 1996. Sprint accounted for 15 percent of 
Lucent revenues in 2003, 11 percent in 2004, and 12 percent in 2005.
In the late 1990s, Lucent made a push into foreign markets that 
increased sales outside the United States from $6.7 billion in 1997 to 
$12.2 billion in 1999, an increase from 26 percent to 32 percent of total 
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sales. Most of the increase in foreign revenues from 1997 to 1999/2000 
was in Service Provider Networks, although the Enterprise Networks 
group, which would be spun off as Avaya in 2000, and Microelectronics 
and Communications Technologies (MCT), which would be spun off 
as Agere in 2001, also generated substantial increases in foreign sales 
during the Internet boom.
From the start, Lucent Technologies emphasized the role that Bell 
Labs could play in its efforts to compete as an independent company. 
Indeed, “Bell Labs Innovation” was inscribed on the company’s logo. 
Under the system inherited from AT&T, Lucent’s competitive strength 
was the quality of its products. The company was weak, however, in 
cost and time-to-market. Given the rapidity of technological change 
from the mid-1990s, Lucent needed to transform “Bell Labs Innova-
tion” into commercial products at a much faster pace than in the past. 
Rapid technological change in optical networking, wireless com-
munications, and the “triple play” convergence of voice, data, and 
video during the second half of the 1990s led the major telecommu-
nications equipment companies to look to acquisitions to fi ll critical 
gaps in their product portfolios as well as to give them instant access 
to new customers bent on investing in next-generation technologies. As 
will be detailed in Chapter 6, during the latter half of the 1990s, Cisco 
Systems engaged in growth through acquisitions, using its stock as the 
combination currency. Lucent (as well as Nortel and, to a more lim-
ited extent, Alcatel) followed suit (Carpenter. Lazonick, and O’Sullivan 
2003). From 1998 to 2000, Lucent did 32 acquisitions valued at a total 
of $44.4 billion. Only 12 of these acquisitions were actually paid with 
Lucent’s stock, but they accounted for 95 percent of the value of all 
Lucent’s acquisitions and they absorbed 22.8 percent of Lucent’s out-
standing shares. (Lazonick and March 2008). Indeed, Lucent expended 
13.5 percent of its stock for just one acquisition, Ascend Communica-
tions, in January 1999. Ascend’s 1998 revenues (year ending September 
30) were $1,478 million, or 4.9 percent of Lucent’s, and it had shown a 
1998 loss of $20 million. 
Despite these acquisitions, Lucent failed to capitalize on the optical 
networking boom of 1998–2000. The company made all these acquisi-
tions in the heat of a speculative frenzy that would not, and could not, last. 
Capital expenditures in the U.S. telecommunications industry went from 
$49.9 billion in 1998 to $60.7 billion in 1999 and $85.4 billion in 2000 
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before falling to $77.5 billion in 2001 and $36.4 billion in 2002 (U.S. 
Census Bureau 2008c). In 2000 these expenditures focused on optical 
networking infrastructures and equipment. Nortel was much better posi-
tioned than Lucent to take advantage of this optical networking boom. 
In the second half of the 1990s, Nortel had been much more aggressive 
than Lucent in developing high-speed optical networking equipment, 
while Lucent had remained much too reliant on demand from AT&T, 
which had already invested in inferior fi ber optic cables incapable of 
supporting the dense wavelength-division multiplexing and OC-192 
switches that next-generation carriers were demanding in 2000.
The fi ve most expensive acquisitions in terms of cost per employee, 
given current stock valuations, were Chromatis Networks at $29.7 mil-
lion per employee (a total of $4.8 billion); Spring Tide, $10.1 million 
($1.3 billion); Nexabit, $7.4 million ($896 million); Ascend, $7.1 mil-
lion ($21.4 billion); and Ortel, $5.5 million ($3.0 billion). The Chro-
matis acquisition failed to generate a commercial product and was shut 
down in August 2001, 15 months after it was acquired, with a $3.7 
billion write-off. Spring Tide generated commercial products but was 
shut down in November 2002, with an impairment charge of $837 mil-
lion. In July 2000, a year after the Nexabit acquisition, its founder left 
Lucent and set up as a competitor across the street. In October 2002 
Lucent terminated the Nexabit product. Enriched by their shares of the 
$21.2 billion acquisition price, Ascend executives left in droves, many 
to start companies that competed with Lucent. Ortel became part of 
Agere, Lucent’s microelectronics group spun off in early 2001. A few 
months later, Agere recorded a $2.7 billion impairment charge for Ortel, 
and sold it for $25 million in early 2003.
All of these acquisitions were made using Lucent stock as the mode 
of payment, thus giving Lucent the option under the then-prevailing 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) rules of treating the 
acquisitions as “pooling of interests” mergers rather than purchases. 
Lucent took the pooling-of-interests option for Ascend and Nexabit as 
well as for Kenan Systems (acquired for $1.5 billion in stock in Janu-
ary 1999 and sold for $300 million in cash in December 2001) and 
International Network Services (acquired for $3.3 billion in stock in 
August 1999 and sold for an undisclosed amount, possibly about $75 
million, in July 2002). As a result, Lucent did not need to record the 
high acquisition valuations of these companies as assets on its balance 
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sheet, and thus avoided the need to amortize these outlays in future 
years, which would have had a depressing effect on stated earnings. 
In addition, when these acquisitions lost value, the pooling-of-interests 
method meant that Lucent was not required to write off the investments 
and thus incur stated losses.7 As a company based in Canada, Lucent’s 
competitor, Nortel, could not avail itself of the pooling-of-interests 
obfuscation, and hence had to record the loss of $12.4 billion in write-
downs on the four acquisitions that it made between January 2000 and 
February 2001. In July 2001, in the United States, FASB would outlaw 
the further use of pooling-of-interests methods of accounting for acqui-
sitions (FASB 2001).
The failure of these acquisitions contributed little, therefore, to 
Lucent’s stated losses of $14.1 billion in 2001 and $11.8 billion in 
2002. Accounting tricks, however, could not change the fact that by 
2001 Lucent had exhausted its incumbent advantage, the main source 
of its rapid growth from 1996 through 1999. With the RBOCs as its cus-
tomers, Lucent had benefi ted from the 8 percent average annual growth 
in the number of telephone copper access lines in the United States 
from 1996 to 2000. From 2001 on, however, with the rapidly increas-
ing adoption of coaxial cable and ADSL for Internet access, the number 
of telephone access lines actually declined and was 6 percent lower in 
2005 than it had been in 1996, the year in which Lucent had come into 
existence (FCC 2007, chaps. 2 and 7).
All of the leading telecommunications equipment companies expe-
rienced signifi cant declines in revenues, income, and employment in the 
Internet bust of 2001–2002. The fact that Nortel had been better posi-
tioned than Lucent to capture the booming optical networking market 
in 2000 only created for it greater exposure to the subsequent collapse 
of capital expenditures in the telecommunications industry (Carpen-
ter, Lazonick, and O’Sullivan 2003). The question now was whether a 
particular company would have the capabilities and fi nancial resources 
going forward to recover from the downturn and gain market share in 
the intensely competitive communications technology industry.
Like Nortel, where CEO John Roth was fi red in November 2001, but 
not before raking in $100 million in remuneration (91 percent in stock 
options) the previous year, Lucent’s decline was made much worse by 
the behavior of its top managers in 2000. Besides its ill-considered and 
costly acquisitions, Lucent’s subsequent performance was adversely 
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affected by its desperate attempt to meet Wall Street’s expectations for 
continued growth in 2000. It was a year in which the telecommunica-
tions industry was still booming. Lucent, however, lacked the optical 
networking capabilities to share in that growth. 
Lucent’s executives engaged in excessive “vendor fi nancing,” 
which entailed making loans to customers to purchase Lucent equip-
ment. It is a common practice in the telecommunications equipment 
industry for a vendor to secure business by offering to fi nance some of 
the purchase price of the equipment. The issue for the vendor is the risk 
of the loan going bad. In the Internet boom, with its young fi rms and 
unproven technologies, vendor fi nancing could become very risky. At 
the end of fi scal 2000, Lucent had entered into agreements with cus-
tomers to provide up to $8.1 billion in credit or loan guarantees. Lucent 
made provisions of what turned out to be bad debts to customers of $2.2 
billion in 2001 and $1.3 billion in 2002.
In early 2001 Lucent was investigated by the SEC for “channel stuff-
ing”—the booking of sales on shipped products preceded by private 
agreements with distributors that they did not have to pay for goods that 
they did not subsequently sell. More generally, there was great pres-
sure on Lucent executives in 2000 to book sales before they were con-
summated in an attempt to meet quarterly revenue and earnings targets 
(Endlich 2004, chap. 8). In November 2000, after CEO McGinn was 
ousted, Lucent revealed that it had improperly booked $679 million in 
revenue during the 2000 fi scal year (Jander 2000, 2001). While the SEC 
took no action on this particular admission, in October 2002 it served 
notice to Lucent of a possible civil lawsuit over improper accounting 
in 1999 and 2000 to infl ate its sales fi gures (Loomis 2003). In Novem-
ber 2000 the company was the target of two class action lawsuits from 
shareholders for misreporting its 2000 revenues and earnings (Johnson 
2000). With Lucent’s stock price in a free fall—in October 2002 it was 
just 1.5 percent of its value at its peak in December 1999—the number 
of lawsuits mounted, and in March 2003 the company agreed to an 
omnibus settlement of 54 separate lawsuits for a total of $420 million 
(PR Newswire 2003).
Lucent’s revenues fell from $33.8 billion in 2000 to $8.5 billion in 
2003, and the company booked losses for this three-year period total-
ing $26.8 billion. From 2000 to 2002, wireline revenues plummeted 
66 percent, from $18.7 billion to $6.4 billion, while wireless revenues 
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declined 21, percent from $6.8 billion to $5.4 billion. In the decline, the 
company shed assets and employees to stay afl oat. 
The fi rst major disposal came at the end of fi scal 2000, when Lucent 
spun off its enterprise networks division, with revenues of $7.6 billion 
and 30,000 employees, as Avaya. In December 2000 Lucent sold its 
Power Systems business to Tyco International for $2.5 billion in cash. In 
April 2001 much of MCT would be spun off as Agere, which had 2000 
external revenues of $3.1 billion and 16,500 employees worldwide. The 
IPO netted $3.3 billion for Agere, while the disposal left Lucent with a 
loss of $3.0 billion. In the fi rst quarter of 2002, Lucent sold its Optical 
Fiber Solutions business to Furukawa Electric for $2.3 billion (of which 
about $2.1 billion was in cash). 
In 2001, with revenues declining sharply from their 1999 peak, 
Lucent commenced a major downsizing program. By September 2002 
Lucent had reduced its employment by 79,000 people, or by 63 per-
cent of its labor force in 2000. The divestitures of the power business, 
fi ber optic cable business, and microelectronics removed almost 28,000 
people from the company. Most of remaining headcount reduction of 
51,000 came through voluntary and involuntary terminations, including 
an early retirement program offered to 8,500 management personnel 
(Lucent Technologies 2002, pp. 3–4, 56; Prencipe 2001). 
In addition, as a continuation of an outsourcing strategy begun in 
the boom but one that had become driven by the need to downsize in the 
decline, Lucent sold or leased some of its major manufacturing plants to 
contract manufacturers such as Solectron and Celestica. A prime exam-
ple is the fate of Lucent’s Merrimack Valley Works (MVW), located 
in North Andover, Massachusetts, about 30 miles north of Boston (see 
Lazonick, Fiddy, and Quimby 2002; Lazonick and Quimby 2007). 
MVW began operations in 1952 as the Western Electric factory that 
manufactured telecommunications transmission equipment for AT&T’s 
Bell System, and it moved to its North Andover site in 1956. With 1.8 
million square feet of manufacturing fl oor space, MVW had employed 
a peak of more than 10,000 people in the mid-1970s. In 1999–2000 
MVW employed 5,600 people in jobs that were viewed as among the 
best in Boston’s Route 128 high-tech region.
Among these employees were 250 engineers, as well as about 3,000 
production workers represented by the Communications Workers of 
America (CWA). During the Internet boom, in response to the demands 
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of rapid product development in the plant’s optical networking prod-
ucts, MVW had been upgrading the skills of many of its production 
workers to function as testers, the highest-skilled shop-fl oor occupa-
tion. When MVW could not generate suffi cient employees with the req-
uisite capabilities internally to fi ll the demand for testers, its HR people 
searched New England community colleges for technically qualifi ed 
recruits. With this combination of engineering and production capabili-
ties, Lucent designated MVW as the company’s “manufacturing center 
of excellence and global systems integration center” for optical net-
working products in June 2000 (Lucent Technologies 2000). 
When that announcement was made, no one at Lucent imagined that 
within three years more than 80 percent of MVW’s employees would 
be gone, with most of the layoffs occurring in 2001 and early 2002. 
In June 2002, with the telecommunications industry in a major slump, 
Lucent sold most of MVW’s manufacturing operations to a contract 
manufacturer, A-Plus (owned by Solectron), which agreed to employ 
about 550 people from MVW. Lucent retained a product development 
staff of about 2,000 employees at MVW. By April 2003 A-Plus had 
ceased operations, and Lucent’s MVW payroll was down to just over 
1,000 people. In September 2003 the MVW campus was sold for $13.9 
million to a local developer, with Lucent remaining as a tenant (Murray 
2003a). In June 2007 Alcatel-Lucent announced that it would close the 
North Andover operations, which by then employed 475 people, and 
move production to Italy (McCabe 2007a).8 Beginning in December 
2007, Alcatel-Lucent began laying off the remaining 290 CWA mem-
bers, with plans to transfer 190 managerial employees to the company’s 
research center in Westford, Massachusetts (McCabe 2007b). 
The CWA, which had represented some 3,000 workers at MVW as 
late as April 2001, had only 260 members employed by MVW in April 
2003 (Murray 2003b,c). In September 1999, across its U.S. plants, 
Lucent employed 46,818 union members representing 40 percent of its 
U.S. labor force. Lucent employed only 6,800 U.S. union members in 
September 2002 and 2,800 in September 2006. Adding in the 2,800 
union members at Avaya and the 26 U.S. union members at Agere, 
union-represented workers made up only 15 percent of the 38,199 U.S. 
employees of the three companies at the end of September 2006.9 
Disposals of assets and downsizing of employment, however, were 
not suffi cient to keep Lucent solvent. In the decline of 2001–2002, as 
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its fi nancial shortfalls mounted and its stock price plunged, Lucent was 
forced to go to the stock market as a source of fi nance, mainly because 
its downgraded bond rating made it impossible for the company to issue 
long-term debt. In August 2001 Lucent did a preferred stock issue that 
netted $1.83 billion (Lucent Technologies 2002, pp. 69–70), and in 
March 2002, when its bond rating had been cut for the fi fth time in 16 
months, it did a more complicated deal in which it set up a trust to issue 
preferred securities and then had the trust buy 7.75 percent convertible 
subordinated debentures from Lucent for a net cash infl ow of $1.75 bil-
lion (Lucent Technologies 2003, p. 37). 
The irony for a company like Lucent—and it applies to many other 
U.S. companies that experienced fi nancial diffi culties in the Internet 
bust—is that it could have used the speculative stock market of the New 
Economy boom to sell stock on the market to pay off debt or augment 
the corporate treasury (see Carpenter, Lazonick, and O’Sullivan 2003). 
After all, U.S. corporations had engaged in such refi nancing in the spec-
ulative boom of the late 1920s (O’Sullivan 2004), and, in more recent 
history, major Japanese corporations had sold massive amounts of stock 
in Japan’s “bubble economy” of the late 1980s (Lazonick 1999). Had it 
not been for this fi nancial behavior, the adverse impacts on these corpo-
rations of the subsequent downturns—in the United States in the early 
1930s and in Japan in the early 1990s—would have been more severe.
In the Internet boom, however, Lucent gave away the company’s 
overvalued stock to do New Economy acquisitions that often impressed 
the stock market but that were more often than not shuttered or sold 
off at a large loss within a year or two, in some cases with the acquisi-
tion never having produced a commercializable product. In desperately 
shedding plants and people to survive in the Internet bust, moreover, 
Lucent disposed of well-developed capabilities that would be needed to 
compete in the 2000s. The spinoff of its microelectronics unit as Agere 
meant that Lucent lost any strategic advantage that it could have obtained 
from its microelectronics acquisitions as well as from Bell Labs device 
research investments that the company had made. The spinoff of its 
enterprise networks division as Avaya deprived Lucent of capabilities 
that would have been critical for competing for lucrative business com-
munications services markets in the 2000s.
In accounting for fi scal 2006, its last year of operation as an inde-
pendent company, Lucent split its Integrated Networks Solutions (INS) 
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business into Multimedia Network Solutions (MNS) and Converged 
Core Solutions (CCS). This division refl ected Lucent’s responses to the 
challenges for the convergence of voice, data, and video in core trans-
mission systems on the one hand and optical networking on the other. 
MNS revenues grew from $1,498 million in 2005 to $1,677 million in 
2006, while CCS, once the backbone of Lucent’s business, continued 
its dramatic decline, falling from $1,215 million in 2004 to $600 mil-
lion in 2006. 
Since CCS represented Lucent’s “incumbent advantage,” its decline 
did not necessarily refl ect the company’s failure to make the transition 
to NEBM. On the contrary, as we have seen in the cases of IBM and 
HP, their successful transitions to NEBM entailed shedding, or at least 
downsizing, old businesses and growing new ones. Lucent’s problem in 
the 2000s was that it was unable to sustain revenue growth in those seg-
ments of the communications technology industry, most notably wire-
less communications, in which New Economy opportunities presented 
themselves. 
In the boom years of 1998–2000, wireless products made up 18 
percent of the Lucent’s revenues. During the fi rst half of the 2000s, as 
Lucent’s overall sales lagged behind those of its main rivals, it nev-
ertheless had considerable success in selling base stations, the central 
equipment for wireless infrastructures. From 2002 through 2005 Lucent 
steadily increased the number of installed base stations from 70,000 
to 140,000, of which 35,000 were 3G in 2002 and 90,000 were 3G in 
2005. All 20,000 base stations installed in 2005 were 3G.10
The problem was that all of the 3G base stations that Lucent installed 
were CDMA2000. Lucent failed to leverage the company’s expertise in 
CDMA technology “to establish a strong position” in UMTS networks, 
as had been the company’s expectation in 2002 (Lucent Technologies 
2003, p. 10).11 Lucent reported that it was conducting UMTS customer 
trials with Telefonica Spain, T-Mobile Germany, and AT&T Wireless in 
2003 and with Cingular, China Netcom, and China’s Ministry of Infor-
mation Industry in 2004. Subsequently Lucent’s reports were silent on 
the subject because the company had in fact failed completely in the 
commercialization of UMTS and, as a result, had lost out on sales to 
growing Asian and European markets. For example, the Chinese mar-
ket, which had become important for Lucent’s wireless products in the 
early 2000s, declined as a proportion of Lucent’s total revenues from 
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11 percent in 2003 to 10 percent in 2004 to 9 percent in 2005 and then 
to only 4 percent in 2006. The decline in the Chinese market accounted 
for more than three-quarters of Lucent’s $645 million decline in total 
revenues from 2005 to 2006.
Meanwhile in the 2000s, Lucent made its bottom line look better 
by adding “pension credits” to its income. As a “127-year-old start-
up,” Lucent had one of the biggest pension surpluses of any U.S. com-
pany, with additions to the surplus being generated year in and year 
out. Lucent’s management allocated these pension credits to various 
operations, thus augmenting the bottom line. From 1996 through 2006, 
Lucent was able to claim $9.1 billion in pension credits, without which 
its total net income over its 11 years of existence would have been 
−$21.9 billion rather than −$12.7 billion.
From 2002 through 2005, as the company failed to reemerge as a 
viable competitor, Lucent chairman and CEO Patricia Russo received 
$39.6 million in compensation, even though none of it was from exer-
cising stock options.12 At what would be Lucent’s last Annual General 
Meeting, in February 2006, two shareholders’ resolutions were passed 
against the opposition of management, one that linked executives’ 
stock-based pay to company performance and the other that preclud-
ed the company from basing performance pay for top executives on 
income fi gures that included the pension credit (Coughlin 2006; McKay 
2006). 
These rare triumphs of shareholder activism were, however, too 
little too late. On December 1, 2006, Lucent ceased to exist as an inde-
pendent company. In 2008, about two years after the formation of Alca-
tel-Lucent, the merger was going quite badly, with net income negative 
in 2007 and the fi rst half of 2008 (see Carpenter and Lazonick 2008; 
Hollinger et al. 2007; Keller 2008). In July 2008, Russo resigned as 
CEO, along with Alcatel-Lucent chairman Serge Tchuruk. Dragging 
down the French company, which had now become the world’s largest 
in communications equipment, was the need to integrate an American 
company that had been badly damaged in its attempt to adopt NEBM.
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SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN THE TRANSITION TO NEBM
Why were IBM and HP able to make successful transitions to NEBM, 
whereas Lucent was not? To succeed in global competition, a high-tech 
company must transform technology and access markets to generate 
higher-quality, lower-cost products than its rivals. In the 1990s, with 
the emergence of open technologies and deregulated markets, global 
competition became intense. As IT companies under OEBM, both IBM 
and HP had already competed in deregulated markets, but with propri-
etary systems. In the fi rst half of the 1980s, both these companies made 
strategic decisions to take the lead in the development of open systems, 
with IBM focusing on microcomputers and HP focusing on computer 
peripherals. By the end of the 1980s, IBM dominated the PC market 
while HP dominated the laser printer market. Over the course of the 
1990s, each of these companies then shed the proprietary technology 
businesses on which, under OEBM, they had been built, to focus on 
open systems businesses. Indeed, so successful was IBM in expanding 
its high-margin software business and its scalable service business that 
it decided to offl oad its now low-margin PCs in 2004.
In contrast, in its incarnations as Western Electric and a division of 
AT&T, Lucent Technologies had operated in highly regulated markets. 
Indeed, the impetus to the spinoff of Lucent from AT&T was the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, which opened up competition in telecom-
munications, with two standards for digital multiplexing over optical 
fi ber (SONET in North America and SDH in Europe) and two standards 
for 2G wireless transmission (CDMA in North America and GSM in 
Europe). Yet even in the boom years from 1996 to 1999, Lucent’s prime 
customers remained AT&T and the RBOCs, which continued to build 
out and upgrade their legacy networks. As a result, Lucent’s traditional 
business of supplying service providers with legacy wireline infrastruc-
ture, including network switches and copper access lines, remained 
central to its rapid growth. Meanwhile, in a telecommunications world 
characterized by rapid technological change, Bell Labs remained the 
global industry’s leading corporate research lab. Given its history as a 
regulated monopoly, however, Lucent lacked the organizational capa-
bilities to effect the rapid transformation of Bell Labs inventions into 
revenue-generating innovations. 
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At the peak of the Internet boom, Lucent tried to make up for these 
technological and market defi ciencies by using large proportions of its 
stock to make New Economy acquisitions and by providing highly risky 
vendor fi nancing to next-generation service providers. Indeed, Lucent’s 
top executives sought to use these acquisitions and contracts to impress 
the stock market, cooking the company’s books in the process to make 
Lucent’s growth look better than it actually was. Some of the acquisi-
tions did not yet have commercial products, and, most notably in the 
case of Ascend, the exorbitant price paid for a revenue-generating target 
led many key executives, and with them scores of technical and admin-
istrative personnel, to take their newfound wealth and walk out Lucent’s 
door. When the telecommunications markets collapsed in 2001–2002, 
Lucent found itself in fi nancial distress, and it lacked the resources to 
build revenues in the fast-growing wireless markets operating on differ-
ent 2G and, eventually, 3G standards in different parts of the world.
From the perspective of the prospects for sustainable prosperity, 
Lucent’s failure comes at a high cost for the U.S. economy. Bell Labs, 
the world’s greatest corporate research lab, now part of Alcatel-Lucent, 
no longer does fundamental research (Berman 2003; Brumfi el 2008). In 
an industry that continues to grow rapidly on a global scale, the United 
States has lost tens of thousands of high-quality jobs with little pros-
pect for their replacement, much less enhancement. A company that had 
excellent labor relations and in-house programs that enabled unionized 
shop-fl oor workers to upgrade their skill levels and in some cases even 
become university-educated engineers now, as Alcatel-Lucent, has a 
decimated union presence in the United States.
Even the successes of IBM and HP, however, come at a cost to the 
U.S. economy. The companies are the two largest ICT companies in 
the world, with long traditions of cutting-edge engineering, but neither 
company engages in basic research. In the 2000s both IBM and HP have 
had high and growing levels of employment, but most of these employ-
ees are based outside the United States. The trajectories of both com-
panies strongly suggest that the number of U.S.-based employees will 
continue to decline absolutely as well as in proportion to the worldwide 
total. Among U.S. employees of IBM and HP, the expectation of career 
employment is dead and has been replaced by considerable employ-
ment uncertainty and even employee churn. In the 2000s both IBM and 
HP have been profi ting immensely from their globalization strategies. 
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But, as we shall see in Chapter 6, their prime use of these profi ts has 
been to spend tens of billions of dollars repurchasing their own stock.
Notes
 1. IBM employment data for the United States by type of employment as well 
as gender, race, and ethnicity of employees from 1996 through 2007 can be 
viewed at http://www-03.ibm.com/employment/us/diverse/employment_data
.shtml (accessed July 6, 2009).
 2. As of 2007, IBM changed its segment classifi cation scheme so that one can no 
longer identify hardware sales.
 3. All of the annual reports, 10-K fi lings, and global citizenship reports cited in this 
volume can be found at the respective company’s Web site or at most business 
libraries.
 4. Packard, who had retired as HP’s chairman of the board in 1993, died in March 
1996. Cofounder William Hewlett, who retired as CEO of HP in 1978 and as vice
chairman of the board in 1987, died in January 2001. 
 5. The material in this section is based on my collaboration with Dr. Edward J. 
March, formerly director of Circuit Pack Engineering and Manufacturing, Opti-
cal Networking Group, Lucent Technologies, and currently visiting professor of 
engineering at Dartmouth College (see Lazonick and March 2008). I am grateful 
to Professor March for his permission to use the results of our joint work here.
 6. In 1970 AT&T itself employed 773,000 people but as a service company was not 
included in the Fortune 500 list of the largest industrial companies based in the 
United States. 
 7. For Cisco’s use of pooling-of-interests accounting for its acquisitions in the 1990s, 
see Donlan (2000). 
 8. For an analysis of what happened to the displaced MVW employees, based on 
training and reemployment data under a U.S. Department of Labor National 
Emergency Grant, see Lazonick and Quimby (2007). 
 9. In addition, Avaya added 2,970 union members outside of the United States as a 
result of its November 2004 acquisition of Tenovis Germany GmbH.
10. Starting in 2001, digital wireless telephony began to made the transition from 
2G (or second generation) technology, which has limited and slow data transmis-
sion capabilities, to 3G (or third generation) technology, which enables cell phone 
users to make use of the services provided by high-speed Internet.
11. Within 3G technology, CDMA2000 is a network standard that is dominant in 
North America, whereas UMTS (of which the most widely used air interface is 
W-CDMA) is a network standard that is dominant in Western Europe. In the fast-
growing Chinese market, both CDMA2000 and UMTS are employed, but in addi-
tion the Chinese government has supported the development of an indigenous 3G 
standard known as TD-SCDMA. 
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12. This is not to say that Russo did not have vested stock options that could eventu-
ally be exercised. Russo had been a career executive at AT&T/Lucent until she 
departed for a seven-month stint as president of Eastman Kodak in 2001. As an 
inducement to Russo to rejoin Lucent as CEO in 2002 and give up her unvested 
stock options at Eastman Kodak, she received 4.7 million stock options and 1.55 
million restricted stock units (Klayman 2002). She then received 1.54 percent of 
all options that Lucent awarded in 2003, 4.86 percent in 2004, and 4.53 percent in 
2005.
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4
Pensions and Unions 
in the New Economy
SECURITY THROUGH SENIORITY
The rise of NEBM and the demise of OEBM meant the end of 
employment relations based on careers with one company. In the post–
World War II decades, such employment relations provided the funda-
mental foundation for stable and equitable growth in the U.S. economy. 
A “back-loaded” defi ned-benefi t (DB) pension plan that rewarded years 
of service with the company ensured that the economic security enjoyed 
by “the organization man” would extend into one’s years of retirement 
as well. Given the cost of employee turnover in mass production indus-
tries as well as the presence of strong unions to protect the seniority 
rights of older workers, even so-called hourly workers could expect to 
spend a career with one company and have a DB pension at the end.
Since the 1980s, employer-sponsored DB pension plans have cov-
ered a steadily declining proportion of business-sector employees. In 
1980, 35 percent of business-sector wage and salary workers were 
active participants in DB plans insured by the U.S. government’s Pen-
sion Benefi t Guaranty Corporation. This proportion had fallen to 18 
percent by 2004 (the latest year for which data are available). Even 
though the size of the U.S. business-sector labor force increased by 48 
percent from 1980 to 2004, there were 6.6 million fewer workers active 
in an employer-sponsored DB plan in 2004 than in 1980 (Pension Ben-
efi t Guaranty Corporation 2007, Table S-33). 
From 1985 to 2007, however, the assets in defi ned-contribution 
(DC) plans increased from 54 percent to 149 percent of the assets in 
DB plans. Over the past two decades, Individual Retirement Accounts 
(IRAs)—that is, nonemployer pensions—have become increasingly 
important as a form of retirement savings, rising from 20 percent of 
combined DB and DC assets in 1985 to 82 percent in 2007. In March 
2008, 61 percent of all business-sector employees had access to one 
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or more employee-sponsored retirement plans, with 21 percent having 
access to a DB plan and 56 percent having access to a DC plan (U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics 2008a, Table 2). 
Those business-sector employees who are still covered by DB plans 
tend to obtain that benefi t by working for very large business corpora-
tions. Since the 1980s, about 80 percent of active participants in DB 
plans have been in single-employer plans, and the proportion of those 
in single-employer plans with 10,000 or more participants rose from 43 
percent in 1985 to 65 percent in 2006, while the proportion of those in 
such plans with 5,000–9,999 participants stayed steady at about 11 per-
cent (Pension Benefi t Guaranty Corporation 2007, Table S-30). In the 
plans with 10,000 or more participants, there were a total of 12.7 million 
people in 1985 and 22.3 million in 2006; in the plans with 5,000–9,999 
participants, there were 3.1 million in 1985 and 3.7 million in 2006. 
Access to DB plans is particularly dependent on an employee’s 
union status. In March 2008, 67 percent of union employees but only 16 
percent of nonunion employees had access to a DB plan, whereas DC 
plans were available to 50 percent of union employees and 57 percent 
of nonunion employees (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2008a, Table 
2). The proportion of the U.S. labor force that is unionized, however, 
has been in long-term decline. In 1983, 20.1 percent of employed wage 
and salary workers in the United States were union members, and in 
2007 only 12.1 percent were (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2008b). 
In 2007 the rate of union membership rose with age, ranging from 4.8 
percent of workers aged 16–24 to 16.1 percent of workers aged 55–64. 
It also differed markedly between the government sector, which had 
a rate of 35.9 percent, and the business sector, which had a rate of 7.5 
percent.
A fundamental objective of the industrial unions that emerged from 
the Great Depression and which were widespread in the post–World 
War II decades was the protection of the seniority of their members. 
Even in the “nonunion era” of the 1910s and 1920s, employers in mass-
production industries such as automobiles, consumer appliances, and 
steel recognized the high cost of turnover of the types of “semiskilled” 
workers who would in the 1930s become the bulwarks of the new 
industrial unionism. Even while, in the 1940s, employers successfully 
prevented these unions from having a voice in the running of the indus-
trial corporations, their interest in low turnover led them to accede to 
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union demands that collective bargaining contracts recognize a work-
er’s seniority as both a basis for rewarding experience with higher pay 
and a protection against layoffs, which would be done on a “last hired, 
fi rst fi red” basis (Lazonick 1990, chaps. 7 and 8).
The extension of DB pensions to members of industrial unions, 
therefore, served the interests of both employers and employees in the 
industrial corporations of the post–World War II decades. In those ICT 
companies in which, in the 2000s, industrial unionism still prevails 
(such as is the case at AT&T, Verizon, and Qwest), workers have been 
able to maintain access to DB plans. In the 2000s, however, most Old 
Economy ICT companies do not have unions, and, with the exception 
of the janitorial labor force, collective bargaining has been virtually 
nonexistent in New Economy companies. 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF PENSIONS IN ICT
Insofar as New Economy companies have offered pension plans, 
these plans have tended to be portable, refl ecting the labor market real-
ity of interfi rm mobility. As Table 4.1 shows, 15 of the top 20 New 
Economy ICT companies in 2005 (see Table 1.7) have had only DC 
plans for U.S. employees throughout their histories. Two others—EMC 
and Sanmina—found themselves with DB plans when they acquired 
other companies, but they immediately froze those plans on comple-
tion of the acquisitions. The NEBM, against which Old Economy ICT 
companies increasingly had to compete in the 1990s, was one in which 
DC pensions overwhelmingly became the norm.
Of the top 20 New Economy companies in 2005, only two, Intel, 
founded in 1968, and Computer Sciences, founded in 1959 (the oldest 
company on the list), have had traditional noncontributory DB plans. In 
the manner of its Old Economy Silicon Valley neighbor, Hewlett-Pack-
ard, Intel established a DB plan that was originally meant to supplement 
its deferred profi t-sharing scheme. One company on the New Economy 
list, SAIC, founded in 1969, was one of the largest employee-owned 
companies in the United States. In October 2006 SAIC did a $1.1 bil-
lion IPO, in part to enable its employees to sell their shares, which serve 
as their pensions, on the open market rather than to the company.1 
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Company Year founded U.S. pension plan Company 401(k) match
% of employee contribution 
that company matches
Maximum % of employee 
compensation matched
Dell 1984 401(k) 100 4
Microsoft 1975 401(k) 50 3
Intela 1968 DB
Cisco Systems 1984 401(k) 50 3
Computer Sciencesb 1959 DB
Applec 1977 401(k) 50–100 6
Oracled 1977 401(k) 50 6
Sanmina-SCIe 1980 401(k) — Discretionary
Sun Microsystems 1982 401(k) — 4
Solectron 1977 401(k) 50 Discretionary
EMCf 1979 401(k) Limited to $750/quarter 6
Amazon.com 1994 401(k) Since 2003, using stock Discretionary
SAICg 1969 ESOP/401(k) 50 6
EchoStar 1993 401(k) 50,  up to $1,000 Plus discretionary contribution
Jabil Circuit 1966 401(k) — Discretionary
Applied Materialsh 1967 401(k) “A percentage” Discretionary
Google 1998 401(k) Up to $2,200   
AMDi 1969 401(k) 50 6
Qualcomm 1985 401(k) “A portion” —
Yahoo!j 1995 401(k) 25 —
Table 4.1  U.S. Pension Plans in 2005 of the Top 20 New Economy Companies by Sales
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NOTE: Most of these companies have not provided postretirement medical benefi ts to their employees. In 1998 Intel began offering post-
retirement medical benefi ts in the form of dollar credits based on years of service. In 1999 Applied Materials began providing medical 
and vision benefi ts to retirees who are at least 55 and whose age plus years of service is at least 65 at the date of retirement, as well as 
coverage for a spouse or domestic partner until he or she becomes eligible for Medicare. Computer Sciences provided medical benefi ts 
and life insurance for employees until 1992. Blank = not applicable; — = not available. ESOP = employee stock ownership plan.
a Includes profi t-sharing retirement plan begun in 1979.
b In 1988, Computer Sciences replaced a DB plan with a DC plan for its principle subsidiary, Associated Credit Services.
c Percentage contribution depends on years of service.
d Percentage of employee contribution that company matches is from Oracle’s 2007 10-K.
e SCI had a noncontributory DB plan that was frozen when Sanmina acquired SCI in 2000. Unvested SCI employees were credited with 
years of service until vesting occurred but no additional benefi ts.
f Includes profi t-sharing plan from 1983, supplemented by 401(k) from 1991. In 1999 EMC acquired Data General and then froze its DB 
plan. 
g Company 401(k) match reported in 10-K for fi scal year ended January 31, 2007.
h Company match ranges from 20% after 2 years of service to 100% after 6 years.
i Company match was 50% of employee contributions to a maximum of 3% of compensation from 1992 to 1999.
j Employer contribution vests 33% per year of employment.
SOURCE: Company 10-K fi lings.
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In the mid-1980s, as shown in Table 4.2, all but one of the compa-
nies (or their predecessors) that would be in the top 20 Old Economy 
ICT companies in 2005 had traditional DB plans. The one exception 
was Comcast, which would acquire DB plans for union workers along 
with its purchase of Barden Cablevision in 1994 and AT&T Broadband 
in 2002. IAC was not in existence in 1985, but its predecessors, Para-
mount and MCA, had DB plans. In the 1990s and 2000s, however, these 
Old Economy companies found themselves competing against New 
Economy companies, the vast majority of which never contemplated 
the adoption of DB. 
How did the Old Economy companies respond? In 2005, as can be 
seen in Table 4.2, 12 companies still had DB plans for some or all of their 
existing employees, as distinct from new hires. At fi ve companies—HP, 
Qwest, TI, Lucent, and NCR—only employees with a certain level of 
seniority or those who had been employed with the company before a 
stipulated date remained eligible for DB. At Qwest, however, the cutoff 
date for DB applied only to salaried employees—all union members had 
DB. Similarly, only union members had DB at Verizon and Comcast, 
whereas at AT&T Inc. former SBC employees, both salaried and union, 
had DB, while former AT&T Corp. employees, also both salaried and 
union, had a cash-balance (CB) plan. Ten of the companies offered only 
401(k) plans to new hires. At 13 of the 20 Old Economy companies, 
only a 401(k) was on offer to salaried employees by 2005–2006. 
During the 1990s, the CB plan, in various forms, came to serve as 
a transitional type of pension plan between DB and DC. CB plans have 
three features that are attractive to younger workers: 1) they can be struc-
tured to increase the accrual of pension benefi ts to younger employees, 
although if the company’s total pension costs are to remain the same, 
this increase will be at the expense of the company’s older employees; 
2) they are portable, meaning that workers are not penalized by loss 
of vesting rights when they change employers; and 3) they are DB, 
with the company guaranteeing a specifi ed rate of return on the accrued 
cash balances of the individual employee. In the 1990s a number of 
Old Economy ICT companies with DB plans made the transition to CB 
plans because, in the new world of industry-wide technology standards 
and interfi rm mobility of high-tech personnel, they wanted to be able 
to attract younger workers with education and experience in new tech-
nologies. By the same token, they found it less benefi cial to retain older 
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workers who had the Old Economy expectation of lifelong employment 
with the company and tended to command higher pay. At the end of 
2004, four companies—IBM, BellSouth, EDS, and Xerox—offered all 
existing employees CB plans, along with 401(k) plans, although Xerox 
employees could also opt for a DB plan. 
IBM 
In the 1990s and 2000s, the transitions from traditional DB to CB to 
DC plans in these Old Economy ICT companies were integrally related 
to transformations in their employment relations that refl ected the adop-
tion of some or all of the elements of NEBM. IBM is the most important 
case in point. In ridding itself of lifelong employment, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, IBM also rid itself of its traditional DB plans. Indeed the 
transformation of IBM’s system of pension benefi ts in the 1990s and 
2000s was, as we shall see, integral to the company’s transition from 
OEBM to NEBM.
In 1989 IBM changed the vesting period for pension benefi ts from 
10 years of service to fi ve. Then in 1991 the company created a hybrid 
“Personal Retirement Plan” that included a CB feature to enable depart-
ing employees to take more pension benefi ts with them (Vosti 1992). 
In 1995, with IBM’s massive downsizing having been completed, the 
company implemented a “Pension Equity Plan” (PEP) that placed CB 
front and center in the retirement plans that the company offered. 
IBM’s PEP was structured to favor midcareer employees. Don-
ald Sauvigne, IBM’s director of retirement programs, explained that 
in adopting PEP, “we were responding to the different makeup of the 
workforce. The reality is that fewer people will be spending their entire 
careers at IBM” (Geisel 1995). At the same time, IBM enhanced its 
401(k) plan from a 30 percent company match on employee contribu-
tions up to 5 percent of pay to a 50 percent match on such contributions 
up to 6 percent of pay. At the beginning of 1995, when IBM had $28 bil-
lion in DB assets (including CB) and $7 billion in DC assets, Sauvigne 
stated that the company’s goal was to “rebalance our delivery system 
to further encourage employees to recognize the importance of their 
responsibility to themselves” (Rohrer 1995).
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Company Retirement plans in place, 1985a Retirement plan(s) in place, 2005–2006
IBM DB (92%); 401(k) (8%), 30% to 5%b Personal Pension (CB) Plan since 1999; 1/1/2005:  new hires 
not eligible for Personal Pension Plan, only 401(k), with match 
ranging from 10% for most senior employees to 6% for recent 
hires. 
HP Profi t-sharing DB (69%); supplemental DB 
(19%); 401(k) (12%), 33% to 12%
1/1/2006: no DB pension or medical benefi ts to new US hires; 
freeze on pension and medical benefi ts for employees without 
suffi cient seniority; increase 401(k) match to 6%.
Verizon 
Communicationsc
Bell Atlantic, NYNEX: Bell System DB 1/1/2006: new management hires not eligible for pension 
benefi ts; 6/30/2006: salaried employees no longer earn pension 
benefi ts or service toward company retiree medical subsidy; 
salaried with less than 13.5 years of service not eligible for 
company-subsidized retiree health care or retiree life insurance 
benefi ts; 7/1/2006: salaried employees receive increased 
company match on 401(k).
AT&T Inc. c SBC, Ameritech, Pacifi c Telesis, AT&T Corp.: 
Bell System DB; DC, 100% to 6%, for salaried 
employees
2005: SBC acquires AT&T Corp. and renames itself AT&T 
Inc.; SBC changes from CB to DB for salaried employees;  
AT& T Inc. changes back to DB for 55,000 salaried; AT&T 
Corp. keeps CB for both salaried and union workers (in 1998 
CWA had agreed to a CB favorable to members of all ages).
Motorola DB (30%); contributory 401(k)-sharing (70%) 1/1/2005: DB plan closed to new hires; profi t-sharing 
component of 401(k) terminated; new hires get 401(k) match 
of 67% to 6% compared with 50% to 6% for those hired 
previously.
Table 4.2  Retirement Plans in 1985 and 2005–2006 of the Top 20 Old Economy ICT Companies by Sales in 2005
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Sprint Nextel GTE-Sprint: for salaried employees, 401(k), 
50% to 6%, with extra 25% match based on 
company stock-price performance, with match in 
company stock; GTE, Southern Pacifi c, United 
Telecommunications: DB
12/31/2005: in wake of the merger with Nextel, Sprint DB 
plan amended to freeze benefi t accruals for current employees, 
except those designated to work for Embarq (a local telephone 
spinoff from Sprint) and Sprint employees who were unvested 
prior to August 2005—they will be permitted to accumulate 
the fi ve years of service credit needed for vesting, but pension 
accruals frozen after that; 1/1/2006: only Sprint Nextel pension 
plan is 401(k), 100% to 5%, no longer paid in company stock.
Comcast Noned AT&T Broadband DB for “some union groups” (12/31/2005: 
Comcast had 4,000 union members); 401(k), discretionary 
company match.
Bellsouthc Bell System DB CB (in 1998 CWA agreed to a CB favorable to members of all 
ages); 401(k), match determined annually.
Electronic Data 
Systems
General Motors division, 1984–1996: DB CB; 401(k).
Xerox DB with deferred profi t-sharing component Choice of DB or CB (in place since 1990); 401(k) 6 % match; 
03/14/2005: only 401(k) for new union hires.
Qwest 
Communicationse
Southern Pacifi c Railroade: DB DB for all union and salaried employees with 20 years 
of service by 12/31/2000 or service pension–eligible by 
12/31/2003; CB for all others, based on 3% of pay while 
employed plus investment return.
Texas Instruments DB (59%); profi t-sharing (37%); 401(k) (4%), 
invested in company stock
For employees as of 11/1997 who declined enhanced DC plan: 
DB plus DC, 50% to 4%.  For employees as of 11/30/1997 
who chose enhanced DC plan and employees hired 12/1/1997 
through 12/31/2003: DC, 2% of salary plus 100% to 4%. For 
employees hired after 12/31/2003: DC, 100% to 4%.
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Table 4.2  (continued)
Company Retirement plans in place 1985a Retirement plan(s) in place, 2005–2006
DirecTV Group GM Hughes Electronics as of 12/31/1985: DBf DB plans for “many of our employees” and those who opted to 
participate in a DB plan prior to 1991; 401(k).
First Data DB DC, matching and discretionary company contributions.
Alltel DB Noncontributory profi t-sharing DC plan and 401(k) for 
salaried employees, annual company contributions; DB plan 
frozen—no further accruals for salaried employees if under 
40 as of 12/31/2005 or if 40-plus and with at least 2 years of 
service as of 12/31/2010.
Lucent Technologiesc AT&T Technologies: Bell System DB; DC, 
100% to 6%, for salaried employees
CB for new hires; DB for employees on DB plan prior to 
1/1/1999; 401(k), discretionary company match.
Cox Communications DB; TRASOPg; PAYSOPh; 401(k), 25% to 5% DB, 401(k), 50% to 6%; 2005: Cox went private.
IAC/InterActiveCorp Paramount, MCA: DB 401(k), 50% to 3%.
NCR DB (86%); profi t-sharing (4%); 401(k) (11%), 
25% to 6%; PAYSOPh
2005: DC plan for all new hires and employees less than 40 
years old on and/or hired after August 31, 2004.
Freescale 
Semiconductor
Motorola: DB; contributory profi t-sharing 401(k).
NOTE: The term “salaried” is used to mean managerial employees, nonbargaining unit employees, nonunion employees, and unrepre-
sented employees.
a For IBM, HP, and Motorola, the italicized percentages in parentheses following different types of retirement plans represent assets in 
those plans as a proportion of total assets in 1986 (Pensions and Investment Age 1987); for TI, percentages are for 1987 (Pensions and 
Investment Age 1988); and for NCR, percentages are for 1988 (Pensions and Investment Age 1989).
b A term such as “30% to 5%” means that the company matches 30% of employee contributions up to 5% of the employee’s annual salary 
or wages.
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c With the breakup of the Bell System on January 1, 1984, AT&T Inc. and the seven RBOCS all had identical noncontributory DB plans 
with benefi ts based on years of service and average career earnings for managerial employees and a fl at benefi t per year for union 
employees. At the end of 1986, these DB plans represented 85–90% of the total retirement assets held by these companies.
d Comcast became an Old Economy company when it acquired AT&T Broadband (with a Bell System DB) in 2002.
e Denver-based Qwest Communications emerged in 1995 when privately owned Southern Pacifi c Telecommunications (SPT), a 1989 spin-
off from the Southern Pacifi c Railroad, was renamed after acquiring Dallas-based Qwest Communications in 1995. In 1985 the Santa Fe 
Southern Pacifi c Railroad had a DB plan for all employees.
f For salaried employees, years of service plus salary history for managers; for hourly employees, fl at amount per year of service plus 
supplement for retirement with 30 years of service before retirement age.
g Tax Reduction Act Employee Stock Ownership Plan. 
h Payroll-Based Employee Stock Ownership Plan.
SOURCE: Company 10-K fi lings as well as various news articles and press releases.
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That labor market logic was taken a major step further in 1999 
when IBM announced that it was adopting a new CB plan, dubbed a 
“Personal Pension Plan,” targeted at attracting younger, as distinct from 
midcareer, employees. Of the 141,000 people in IBM’s U.S. labor force 
in 1999, 60,000 had joined the company since 1993. The 1999 plan paid 
every employee an annual amount equal to 5 percent of his or her salary 
for that year plus annual interest (based on market rates) on accumu-
lated balances. IBM also moved to a similar type of CB plan for retiree 
health benefi ts (Geisel 1999). 
In a communication to employees announcing the change in the 
pension plan, IBM’s management wrote, “The fact that signifi cantly 
fewer people are staying with one company their full careers means 
that, more and more, people are looking for opportunities to contribute 
and be rewarded sooner in their careers” (Lewis 1999). IBM employees 
were also told that “competition in our industry for skilled, talented 
employees has never been more fi erce than it is today” (Frey 1999a). 
CEO Gerstner argued that “our old pension plan was created at a time 
when employees joined IBM for life. . . . [Now] we anticipate that only 
10% of our new hires are likely to reach 30 years of service with IBM.” 
Gerstner added that most of IBM’s competitors “do not provide a pen-
sion plan at all” (Schultz 2000).
IBM did permit some 30,000 employees who were within fi ve years 
of the 30 years of service required for retirement to remain on the tra-
ditional plan. The company also provided extra contributions to the CB 
plans of other employees age 45 or older. It was estimated, neverthe-
less, that these midcareer employees could lose 30 to 50 percent of their 
expected pensions (Lewis 1999; Lynn 1999). 
Suddenly some of the IBM employees who would bear these loss-
es became receptive to union organizing efforts, and three years later, 
5,000 of them had joined Alliance@IBM, an affi liate of the Communi-
cation Workers of America, or CWA (Pimentel 2002b). Moreover, fed-
eral legislators also became involved. IBM was the biggest employer 
in Vermont, and Bernard Sanders, the state’s lone member of the U.S. 
House of Representatives, charged that IBM’s CB plan violated fed-
eral laws against age discrimination (Anand 1999; Maury and Shoaf 
2001). Vermont Senator James Jeffords convinced IBM CEO Gerstner 
to permit those IBM employees who were at least 40 years old and had 
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at least 10 years of service—some 65,000 people—to remain on the 
traditional DB plan (Affl eck 2000; Kornblut 1999). 
The SEC blocked IBM management’s attempt to disallow a vote on 
the CB plan at the annual stockholders’ meeting, thus rejecting IBM’s 
claim that pension provision was a matter of ordinary business that did 
not require shareholder approval (Burns 2000). At annual stockhold-
ers’ meetings from 2000 through 2007, shareholder proposals were put 
forward espousing that (in the words of the proposal text used from 
2004 through 2007) “age discrimination in retirement policies will 
be ended by allowing all employees, regardless of age, to choose the 
promised pension and retirement medical insurance under the terms in 
effect before IBM adopted changes in 1995 and 1999.” Management, of 
course, strongly and consistently opposed the resolutions, which went 
down to defeat eight times running. In 2000 the proposal received 299.7 
million votes for and 755.4 million votes against, or 28.4 percent in 
favor, but thereafter the proposal failed to gain as much as 15 percent in 
favor (Affl eck 2000; Alterio 2007; Arditi 2004; Bergstein 2006a; Drury 
2005; Freund 2002; Fuscaldo 2001; Krishnan 2003). In 2007 there were 
103.6 million votes for and 798.0 votes against, or 11.5 percent in favor 
(IBM 2007). The proposal was not on the proxy statement for IBM’s 
2008 annual meeting of stockholders.
IBM employees also looked to the courts for remedies. In July 2003 
a federal district court judge ruled in favor of IBM employees in a class 
action lawsuit covering anyone who worked for IBM after December 
31, 1994. The lawsuit charged that changes in IBM pension plans dis-
criminated against older employees and hence violated ERISA (Tumul-
ty 2003). In September 2004 IBM agreed to a settlement consisting of 
$320 million that was not subject to appeal plus another $1.4 billion 
should it lose its appeals of the lower court’s decision (Dale 2004a,b; 
Wells 2004). In August 2006, however, on appeal, Judge Frank East-
erbrook ruled in favor of the company, arguing that the CB plan was 
age-neutral because in every year it credited all employees with pension 
benefi ts equal to 5 percent of their pay regardless of age (Boehner 2006; 
Schultz and Francis 2006). Thus Easterbook rejected the validity of the 
employees’ charge that the plan entailed age discrimination, in effect 
deeming as irrelevant the fact that the change from DB to CB reduced 
the amount of benefi ts that older employees would be able to accumu-
late compared with the preexisting traditional back-loaded DB plan. In 
Lazonick.indb   127 7/31/2009   8:42:50 AM
128   Lazonick
January 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court refused an employees’ petition 
for an appeal of the Easterbrook decision (Rugaber 2007).
IBM’s position has been that the changes in its pension plans have 
refl ected responses to changing labor and product market conditions 
(IBM 2006, p. 28). Indeed, it turned out that the adoption of CB was a 
fi rst step in the eventual elimination of DB plans of any kind. In Decem-
ber 2004, IBM had announced that new hires would not be eligible 
for the CB plan. Instead the company would offer them a 401(k) plan 
(Crenshaw 2004). Then, in January 2006, IBM announced that as of 
2008 it would freeze its existing CB plans (Bergstein 2006b; Crenshaw 
and Joyce 2006). Thereafter, the only employee pensions at IBM would 
be 401(k)s. 
UNIONS
The Bell System Legacy
In its purpose and outcome, the industrial unionism that became 
widespread in the United States in the late 1930s and the 1940s was 
fi rst and foremost about income security through employment fol-
lowed by what the unions call “deferred wages” in retirement (Brody 
1980; Ghilarducci 1992, chap. 3; Lazonick 1990, chaps. 8–10). Yet for 
decades after the rise of industrial unions, companies like IBM and HP 
demonstrated that, when sustained growth was combined with pater-
nalism, a corporation could offer tens of thousands or even hundreds 
of thousands of corporate employees of all ranks the realistic expecta-
tion of long-term income security through employment and retirement 
without union representation. Indeed, as shown in Table 4.3, among 
the top 20 Old Economy ICT companies in 2005, the only ones with a 
substantial union presence were those that had evolved out of the Bell 
System: Verizon, with 140,000 union members (62 percent of its total 
labor force); AT&T Inc., with 121,000 union members (53 percent); 
BellSouth, with 53,000 union members (60 percent); and Qwest Com-
munications, with 23,600 union members (60 percent). In 1999 Qwest, a 
nonunion company with 8,700 employees, had no choice but to become 
a unionized company after it engineered a successful hostile takeover 
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Table 4.3  Union Membership in the Top 20 Old Economy ICT 
Companies, 2005
Employees U.S. union membersa
IBM 329,373 None 
HP 150,000 None 
Verizon Communications 217,000 CWA 74,251; IBEW 65,600; 
(99,800)
 AT&T Inc. 228,350 CWA 108,547; IBEW 12,250
Motorola 69,000 None 
Sprint Nextel 79,900 CWA 3,500; IBEW 3,500; (7,000)
Comcast 80,000 CWA (4,000)
BellSouth 88,666 CWA 53,151
Electronic Data Systems 117,000 None 
Xerox 55,200 UNITE HERE 2,325; 
IAM and IUOE 225 
Qwest Communications 39,348 CWA 23,642; (23,000)
Texas Instruments 35,207 None 
DirecTV Group 9,200 None
First Data 33,000  CWA (1,100)
Alltel 21,373  CWA (1,387)
Lucent Technologies 30,500  CWA 2,708 (3,000)
Cox Communications 22,530 None 
IAC/InterActiveCorp 28,000 None 
NCR 28,200 None 
Freescale Semiconductor 22,700 None
NOTE: CWA, Communication Workers of America; IAM, International Association 
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers; IBEW, International Brotherhood of Electri-
cal Workers; IUOE, International Union of Operating Engineers; UAW, United Auto 
Workers; and UNITE HERE, merger of Union of Needletrades, Industrial, and Textile 
Employees and Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union.
a Figure in parenthesis is the number of union members given in the company’s 2005 
annual report. CWA fi gures for 2005 are from the union’s membership development 
report for December 2005. Given that Cingular was 60 percent owned by AT&T Inc. 
and 40 percent by BellSouth in 2005, the CWA fi gures of each of these parent com-
panies include these proportions of Cingular’s 21,469 CWA members in 2005. The 
AT&T Inc. and BellSouth employment data include Cingular employees. Note also 
that the 2005 union membership for AT&T Corp. includes 4,897 employees at the 
formerly independent Southern New England Telephone Company (SNET), which 
was acquired by SBC in 1998.
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2007); S&P Compustat database; Xerox 
(2006, p. 63); information supplied by the CWA.
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of US West, an RBOC with 70,800 employees, 36,000 of whom were 
CWA members (PR Newswire 1999a; Reuters News 1999a).2 At Lucent 
Technologies, unions represented 46 percent of 98,000 U.S. employees 
when the company was spun off from AT&T Corp. in 1996. As was 
shown in Chapter 3, however, by 2006 union members were only 15 
percent of a combined 38,000 U.S. employees at Lucent and its two 
major spinoffs, Avaya and Agere.
Since 1984 Verizon (with its origins in Bell Atlantic), AT&T Inc. 
(with its origins in SBC), and BellSouth (now part of AT&T Inc.) have 
been profi table, as was Qwest (as US West) until the 2000s. The tradi-
tional local wireline business has remained a very important source of 
revenues and profi ts for all these companies, although in the mid-2000s, 
AT&T Inc. and Qwest were far more dependent on wireline earnings 
than were the other two. Both Verizon and AT&T Inc. are now also 
leaders in the rapidly growing wireless segment of the U.S. telecom-
munications industry, and in 2005, for the fi rst time, Verizon’s wireless 
profi ts ($2.2 billion) surpassed its wireline profi ts ($1.9 billion). The 
directory (Yellow Pages) businesses of AT&T Inc., Verizon (spun off 
in 2006 as Idearc Media), and BellSouth, while relatively small, were 
always lucrative, with profi t margins typically at 30 percent or more. 
The wireline and directory businesses of these companies are the 
living legacies of their regulated monopoly status in the former Bell 
System. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and state 
public utility commissions regulate the return that RBOCs can obtain 
from their control of local telephone infrastructures. From 1984 through 
1989 the RBOCs, as local exchange carriers (LECs), were permitted a 
maximum rate of return on assets of 12 percent, lowered to 11.25 per-
cent in 1990. The following year the FCC changed the regulatory for-
mula to a price cap that, after adjusting for infl ation, annually lowered 
the maximum prices that LECs could charge by the expected rate of 
productivity growth (Arnold 1990; Kelly 1997). Companies that could 
exceed this expected rate, while maintaining quality of service, could 
capture additional profi ts. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 did not 
put an end to regulation of the local phone business, but it only required 
that, as a condition for the RBOCs to enter the long-distance markets, 
LECs had to make their local networks available at reasonable rental 
rates to any “competitive local exchange carrier” (CLEC) that might 
want to deliver local telephone service. 
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In 1989 AT&T Corp., whose long-distance service had previously 
been subject to a rate-of-return maximum of 12.2 percent, was placed 
under price cap regulation (Barry 1988; Starobin 1989). Unlike local 
telephone service, however, which the LECs still dominate, long-dis-
tance service became a highly competitive segment of the telecommu-
nications industry during the 1990s, rendering rate regulation irrelevant. 
By the 2000s the long-distance segment was subject to extreme price 
competition both from resellers of overabundant long-distance capac-
ity—the result of massive overinvestment in fi ber optic transmission 
cables by companies such as Qwest and Global Crossing during the 
Internet boom—and from wireless companies that provided nationwide 
access as part of their service plans.
Highly dependent on the long-distance segment, AT&T Corp. saw 
its stand-alone consumer long-distance revenues, already in decline at 
the end of the Internet boom, plunge from $14.0 billion in 2001 to $5.2 
billion in 2004, while its consumer bundled services revenues (based on 
local voice subscribers) only reached $2.7 billion from a very low base 
of $870 million three years earlier. From the perspective of the second 
half of the 2000s, two companies that emanated from the former Bell 
System came out on top—Verizon and AT&T Inc. They were able to 
build upon their regulated monopolies over local wireline exchanges 
and enter the expanding wireless industry without getting embroiled, as 
was the case with Qwest, AT&T Corp., and Lucent, in the speculative 
machinations of the late 1990s Internet boom.
The embeddedness of industrial unions in the Bell System in the 
decades prior to the breakup, and the ongoing regulation of the local 
wireline industry in the decades since, explain the high level of union-
ization that still prevails in this sector. At the end of 2005, Verizon, 
AT&T Inc., BellSouth, Qwest, and Cingular (now AT&T Mobility) 
together employed 573,000 people, almost 260,000 of whom (45 per-
cent) were CWA members and another estimated 77,850 of whom (14 
percent) were International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) 
members. The proportion of the potential labor force organized by the 
CWA in these companies was 94 percent at Verizon, 92 percent at AT&T 
Inc., 84 percent at BellSouth, 89 percent at Qwest, and 65 percent at 
Cingular.3 Total employment at the former Bell System telecommunica-
tions service providers was down substantially from the 776,000 people 
employed by these companies (including the then-independent AT&T 
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Corp. and AT&T Wireless) in 2001. Nevertheless, in the mid-2000s, 
these companies remained bastions of business-sector union organiza-
tion in the U.S. economy. 
On occasion, CWA and IBEW have been able to secure “no-layoff”
clauses in collective bargaining contracts with former Bell System 
companies, including with Pacifi c Telesis in 1986, NYNEX in 1994, 
Bell Atlantic in 1998 (followed by Verizon in 2000 and 2003), and SBC 
in 2004. That degree of employment security, however, has been the 
exception rather than the rule; both before the breakup of the Bell Sys-
tem and since, large-scale layoffs of union employees have been com-
mon at these companies. Nevertheless, seniority provisions in union 
contracts have meant that those union employees with the most years of 
service with a company have had, and continue to have, realistic expec-
tations of continuous employment until retirement age, at which point 
they can count on retirement incomes secured from collectively bar-
gained pensions. Notwithstanding the radical technological and orga-
nizational transformations that have taken place in the telecommunica-
tions industry since the mid-1990s, OEBM still prevailed at Verizon 
and AT&T Inc. in the latter half of the 2000s. 
In sum, the high and steady revenues that the RBOCs have derived 
from their ongoing control over regulated local telephone exchanges 
have enabled these companies to maintain high (even if declining) lev-
els of employment that in turn have provided employment security to 
large numbers of senior union members. In addition, the secure jobs 
available to union members are supported by two characteristics of 
RBOC employment that run counter to general employment trends in 
the ICT industries: 1) the RBOCs have not as a rule outsourced or off-
shored employment, and 2) RBOCs are not high-tech companies that 
employ mainly college-educated personnel. 
As part of the regulatory structure, state public utility commis-
sions have the right to demand that LECs maintain quality of service to 
their customers (Batt 1995, pp. 68–70). The companies must respond 
promptly and effectively to orders for new lines, repairs to existing 
lines, customer requests for modifi cations of service, and customer 
complaints. In-house control over the delivery of these services helps 
to assure high quality, as does the employment of a secure and experi-
enced labor force. 
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How local that control needs to be to assure adequate quality of 
service is, however, another question. For example, in 2002 BellSouth 
decided that it would consolidate its 75 call centers into 28 facilities in 
18 cities within the nine Southeastern states in which it operated, for a 
savings of $200 million over fi ve years. As a result, an estimated 650–
700 jobs would be lost (Bachman 2002). When BellSouth made the 
announcement, the Public Service Commissioner for North Louisiana 
objected to the fact that the consolidation would result in the loss of 103 
local call-center jobs, which would be moved to South Louisiana. But 
the North Louisiana regulators had no way of blocking the closure of the 
call centers and the local loss of jobs that it would entail (Baton Rouge 
Advocate 2002). At the same time, in contrast to the growing practice 
among U.S. companies in the 2000s of outsourcing and offshoring call 
centers to low-wage areas of the world, in undertaking this large-scale 
consolidation, BellSouth was keeping call center jobs directly under its 
control and in the United States.
Also favoring the continued employment of union members at 
RBOCs is the fact that their revenue-generating activities are not high 
tech. To deliver telecommunications services, an RBOC needs a dedi-
cated and trained labor force for sales, installation, repair, and customer 
support. It does not need scientists and engineers to research and devel-
op new products. Indeed, as part of the postbreakup regulatory struc-
ture, the RBOCs were not permitted to design, fabricate, or assemble 
telecommunications products and equipment (Hearn 1991). Upgrades 
to the existing infrastructure and equipment are also done by the equip-
ment suppliers. 
In the old Bell System, basic research was carried out by Bell Labs 
and product development by Western Electric, both of which became the 
core of AT&T Technologies after the 1984 breakup and then of Lucent 
Technologies after the 1996 trivestiture. No longer having access to 
AT&T R&D after the breakup, the seven RBOCs set up a new coop-
erative research organization, Bellcore, located in New Jersey about 
11 miles from the main Bell Labs campus, to serve their needs. Bell-
core began with a $1 billion annual budget and 7,500 employees, about 
4,500 of whom were scientists and technicians reassigned from Bell 
Labs (Berg 1985). From 1988 on, NYNEX, SBC, and US West estab-
lished their own in-house research facilities to better absorb Bellcore 
innovations (Amparano 1988; Stroud 1988). In 1996, however, with the 
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Telecommunications Act opening up the possibility of interfi rm com-
petition among the RBOCs themselves in long-distance and wireless 
markets, the RBOCS agreed to sell Bellcore to SAIC (Cauley 1996; 
Horwitt 1996). Bellcore was later renamed Telcordia, and in 2005 was 
sold to a private equity group. Meanwhile AT&T Inc. (SBC), Verizon 
(Bell Atlantic), BellSouth, and Qwest did not try to maintain advanced 
technological capabilities, and since 1996 have recorded no expendi-
tures for R&D. 
Although the RBOCs have not employed scientists and engineers, 
they have employed large numbers of managerial personnel. Batt 
(1996, p. 60) has shown that, for the whole Bell System, excluding Bell 
Labs, the proportion of total employees who were managers rose from 
13.7 percent in 1950 to 29.4 percent in 1980. Under the old Bell Sys-
tem, AT&T and its operating companies were expansive bureaucracies 
in which managerial personnel viewed themselves as public service 
employees. After the breakup, each of the former Bell companies began 
to restructure its organization to be better suited to the regulatory and 
competitive environment that each of them faced, given the resources 
that they had inherited from the Bell System. For example, AT&T and 
PacTel both downsized their labor forces signifi cantly in the late 1980s 
while BellSouth, after reducing the size of its labor force by almost 4 
percent in its fi rst two years as an independent company, expanded it by 
more than 10 percent from 1986 through 1990. 
In the fi rst half of the 1990s, however, all eight former Bell com-
panies downsized signifi cantly, each one laying off large numbers of 
salaried managers as well as unionized workers. The recession of 1990–
1992 was widely known as a white-collar recession, with U.S. corpora-
tions in general downsizing their salaried workforces to an extent that 
had no precedent in the post–World War II decades. The recessionary 
conditions, however, had little impact on the RBOCs, given their regu-
lated rates and the relatively stable demand for local telephone service 
over the business cycle. Of much more importance in the downsizing 
decisions of the RBOCs was the move in 1991 to price-cap regulation, 
which meant that the RBOCs could reap the extra profi ts derived from 
a leaner labor force. As company-level research by Batt (1995, 1996, 
1999, 2001) has shown, by the early 1990s, RBOC lower and middle 
level managers were working longer and harder, pressured by their 
superiors and fearful of termination.
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Reinforcing this corporate response to the new regulatory mecha-
nism was the fact that, beyond their salaries, the remuneration of top 
executives of AT&T and the RBOCs depended in part on annual bonuses 
and in part on gains from the exercise of stock options. For annual bonus 
awards, annual profi tability was ostensibly the main performance crite-
rion. In addition, in the latter half of the 1980s, for the fi rst time, some 
of the remuneration of the top executives of the former Bell companies 
took the form of stock options (AT&T Corp. 1984; Maremont 1984). 
For paying attention to profi ts and stock prices, the top executives 
of AT&T and the RBOCs were very well paid. For example, during 
the years 1992–1995, John L. Clendenin, chairman and CEO of Bell-
South, received average annual compensation of $1,656,000, including 
averages of $659,000 in salary, $810,000 in bonuses, and $175,000 in 
gains from the exercise of stock options. These were the components of 
his annual pay. In addition, Clendenin received an annual average over 
these four years of $843,000 in long-term incentive pay, based on long-
run profi tability and stock price performance, and another $482,000 
under a deferred compensation plan. In total, Clendenin’s pay averaged 
$2,981,000 per year. Then there was, of course, an extremely generous 
pension awaiting him on retirement. 
A prime way in which Clendenin and the other BellSouth top 
executives (who received smaller but nonetheless substantial rewards 
under these various pay categories) earned their keep in the fi rst half 
of the 1990s was by reducing the number of people that their company 
employed. Early-retirement programs that made use of the company’s 
pension plans were central to BellSouth’s downsizing efforts. After the 
breakup, Bellsouth was the largest RBOC in terms of both sales and 
employees, just ahead of NYNEX. After trimming its labor force in 
1985, in part through an early-retirement program, the company steadi-
ly increased both revenues and employment through 1990. From the 
end of 1990 to the end of 1996, however, BellSouth reduced its labor 
force from 101,945 to 81,241, even as its sales rose from $14.3 bil-
lion in 1990 ($17.2 billion in 1996 dollars) to $19.0 billion in 1996. 
With its management staff at about 29,000 out of 101,000 employees, 
in November 1990 and then again in May 1991, BellSouth announced 
that it would eliminate 3,000 management positions through early-
retirement programs (Chester 1990; Husted 1991; Main 1991). In three 
previous early-retirement programs, including the one in 1985, about 
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4,000 managers had left the company (Elmore 1987a,b). The 1990 offer, 
for which BellSouth managers with 30 years of service or more were 
eligible, was taken by 1,146 people. The 1991 early-retirement offer 
came two months after the company announced that it would consoli-
date the headquarters of its two largest operating units, Southern Bell, 
with 46,000 employees, and South Central Bell, with 31,000 (Poole 
1991). This time the company lowered the age and years-of-service 
thresholds for eligibility for the program, and another 3,100 managers 
took early retirement (PR Newswire 1991).
The downsizing of BellSouth, however, had just begun. In Novem-
ber 1992 the company announced that it would reduce its headcount 
by 8,000 by the end of 1996 through attrition, layoffs, and retirement 
offers targeted at individuals, but not through a company-wide early-
retirement program as in the past (Ramirez 1992). BellSouth raised the 
total downsizing target through 1996 to more than 10,000 in 1993 and 
to as many as 16,000 in 1995, or 17 percent of employment at the end of 
1992 (Guarisco 1995; McCash 1993). Indeed, at the end of 1996, Bell-
South employed 81,241 people, 15,871 fewer than four years earlier.
Along the way, BellSouth also changed its pension plan for manag-
ers. In 1993, with the targeted reduction of 8,000 managers in process, 
BellSouth became the fi rst RBOC to adopt a CB plan (BellSouth 1994, 
p. 50; Williams 1995; Wyatt 1996). Applicable only to nonrepresent-
ed workers, the BellSouth CB may have helped the company recruit 
younger salaried personnel, but given the downsizing context in which 
the plan was introduced, that was not its main purpose. Rather, with 
the stock of older managers eligible for early retirement having been 
substantially depleted by the departures under the 1990 and 1991 pro-
grams, BellSouth wanted to create an incentive to quit the company for 
midcareer managers who lacked the years of service to be eligible for 
early retirement. When the BellSouth CB went into effect in July 1993, 
the company employed 25,000 managers with an average age of 44 and 
average years with the company of 24 (Wyatt 1996). 
In introducing the CB plan, BellSouth had a provision that employ-
ees who resigned before June 30, 1996, could have their choice of 
receiving the greater of two amounts: the CB account balance or the 
present value of an annuity (Anand 1994). The older managers who 
remained at BellSouth did not complain about the adoption of the CB 
plan because the percentage of pay credited to an employee’s account 
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increased from 3 percent to 8 percent with years of service, and employ-
ees who retired from the company before the end of 2005 would have 
their choice of the greater of the benefi ts under the CB plan or the tradi-
tional DB plan (Wyatt 1996). 
BellSouth would be the fi rst of six RBOCs to move to a CB plan, 
followed by Ameritech in 1995, Bell Atlantic and Pacifi c Telesis in 
1996, and SBC and US West in 1997. All of these CB plans were for 
managerial personnel only; the RBOCs continued to bargain with the 
unions on DB plans. Among the original seven RBOCS, only NYNEX 
did not make the transition from DB to some form of CB for manag-
ers as an independent company (Williams 1997). After NYNEX was 
merged into Bell Atlantic in 1997, however, its managers also had a CB 
plan (Bell Atlantic 1997, p. 38). 
The feature of BellSouth’s plan that linked the company’s annu-
al percentage contribution to not only an employee’s age but also his 
or her pay made this CB pension a “hybrid”; in a “pure” CB, such as 
IBM’s 1999 plan, the company’s percentage contribution is age-neutral, 
which, as we have seen, means that older employees who were on a 
traditional DB will see a reduction in their benefi ts. Earlier in the 1990s, 
as in the case of IBM, a number of companies that wanted to make the 
transition to CB adopted a PEP that distributed the accrual of benefi ts 
more evenly across workers at different stages of their careers. 
Such was the case with the Ameritech CB plan, adopted in May 
2005. Top management’s motivation in introducing the PEP was not 
downsizing, as was the case with BellSouth’s CB plan; Ameritech 
employment had already reached a low point at the end of 1994. Rather, 
Ameritech’s PEP had the dual purpose of making its pension attractive 
to younger managers and reducing the incentive for older managers, 
under the back-loaded traditional DB plan, to stay with the company 
until they reached the “cliff” of dramatically increased benefi ts—i.e., 
when the age and service requirements of the pension were met. As 
Tim Meginnes, Ameritech’s retirement plans manager, put it, “Benefi t 
values increase steadily [with age under the PEP]. By smoothing out 
the cliff, employees’ decisions on whether or not to stay can be made 
without focusing on an artifi cial milestone” (Geisel 1995). Gary Simko, 
director of Bell Atlantic Benefi ts Planning and Human Resource Com-
munication, explained his company’s change from DB to a hybrid CB 
at the beginning of 1996: “The telecommunications industry is under-
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going immense change. Yet, our retirement benefi ts were designed 
years ago in a very predictable business climate when many employees 
spent most of their careers with one company. We needed to meet the 
needs of mobile employees, who make frequent moves from employer 
to employer” (M2 Presswire 1995).
As already mentioned, the new CB plans implemented by the 
RBOCs applied only to managerial personnel. They were apparently 
the “mobile employees” whose “needs” to “make frequent moves from 
employer to employer” a company like Bell Atlantic was so willing to 
assist. The fact is that top management of these companies introduced 
and implemented the new pension plans for their own strategic pur-
poses, to the gain of some employees and the loss of others. As a group, 
“managers”—that is, salaried personnel—had no means of bargaining 
collectively with top management over the extent and distribution of 
the gains and losses that accompanied a change in pension plans. 
Under certain economic conditions, however, managerial person-
nel might fi nd a CB plan to be very advantageous. Such was the case 
at AT&T Corp., which adopted a CB plan for managers at the begin-
ning of 1998. In late January, AT&T’s chairman and CEO, C. Michael 
Armstrong, who had come to the company the previous November with 
a mandate for cutting costs, announced that over the coming year the 
company would eliminate 15,000 to 18,000 jobs, 10,000 to 11,000 of 
which would be achieved through pension incentives to managers under 
what was called the Voluntary Retirement Incentive Program (VRIP). 
The expectation was that the managerial ranks would be reduced by 25 
percent (Burlingame and Gulotta 1998; Ribbing 1998). Indeed, as the 
designers of the VRIP put it, AT&T had adopted the CB plan specifi -
cally “to expose a broader group of people to an early retirement incen-
tive program” (Burlingame and Gulotta 1998).
AT&T offered the VRIP to 43,000 AT&T managers. Older workers 
could get a 20 percent increase in their pension benefi ts. Eligibility for 
lifetime health benefi ts required that one’s age plus years of service 
added up to 65, whereas previously it had been 75 (May 1998a). Up to 
certain limits, the pension benefi ts could be taken in a lump sum. 
About 17,000 managers opted for the VRIP, an uptake that sur-
passed what AT&T’s top management had hoped to achieve. The high 
response rate was attributable to both the value of the VRIP offer and 
the ease with which a departing AT&T manager could expect to land 
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another well-paying job in the boom conditions of 1998. To avoid los-
ing key people in key areas, top management had put limits on the num-
ber of people in specifi c departments who could be offered the VRIP. 
As a result of these restrictions, AT&T turned down 1,700 applications. 
For not being given the opportunity to quit their jobs, these people sub-
sequently fi led a lawsuit against AT&T, but it was thrown out of court 
(May 1998b, 1999). 
By the end of 1998, 14,700 of the 15,300 VRIP managers had 
already left AT&T, with the remaining 600 leaving in early 1999. The 
company paid out a total of $4.6 billion in lump sum settlements, an 
average of over $300,000 per VRIP recipient (AT&T Corp. 1999, p. 
64). AT&T’s management pension fund could afford this cash fl ow; at 
the end of 1997, it had a surplus of more than $12.5 billion. 
With pension money so plentiful, even the unions jumped on the 
CB bandwagon. In mid-1988, the CWA and IBEW negotiated a con-
tract that included a CB plan. With about 50,000 union employees at 
AT&T, this CB was thought to have been the largest ever to cover union 
members (Business Insurance 1998). 
In 1999, as a result of the negative reaction on the part of IBM 
employees to the company’s new CB plan, the United States Senate 
Committee on Health, Education, and Pensions held hearings on hybrid 
pension plans. There to give testimony was Morton Bahr, president of 
the CWA. Bahr (1999) said that his experience with the issue of the 
conversion of DB to CB went back to 1992 when, late in the negotia-
tion process, AT&T had proposed a CB plan (Brown 1992). Lacking a 
good understanding of the attributes of such a plan, the union rejected 
the proposal. Then in 1995 AT&T had once again proposed a CB plan 
in union negotiations, but it was rejected by the CWA because it would 
harm older workers. 
In 1998, however, AT&T was willing to remedy this problem. 
According to Bahr (1999), “our agreement increased the value of pen-
sion benefi ts for employees at every stage of their careers.” Now union 
members had the benefi t of “pension portability in case of downsiz-
ing or change in career plans.” At the same time, as of June 30, 1998, 
retiring union members with 15 years or more of service with AT&T 
could choose to receive benefi ts based on either a traditional DB plan, 
enhanced by 7 percent immediately and another 8 percent by 2000, or 
a CB plan (Business Insurance 1998; Fulman 1998). It is not clear how 
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many union members took advantage of the negotiated CB plan to leave 
AT&T, but at the end of 1998, the company employed 42,036 CWA 
workers, down from 48,787 a year earlier. The number of CWA mem-
bers employed at AT&T continued to decline steadily over the subse-
quent years, falling to 14,920 in 2004. At that point, AT&T Corp., the 
parent company of the old Bell System, was taken over by one of its 
former regional subsidiaries, SBC, and became AT&T Inc.
Other Unionized Old Economy Companies
Beyond the legacy of the CWA and the IBEW from the old Bell 
System, only two other top 20 Old Economy ICT companies in 2005 
(Table 1.6) had a history of signifi cant union representation—NCR and 
Xerox. These two cases illustrate the limits of union power in a world of 
changing technology and global competition. They also show the ways 
in which business strategy can confront (NCR) or engage (Xerox) the 
collective organization of employees in the construction of a company’s 
business model.
Although NCR was a nonunion company in 2005, such was not 
always the case. Founded as National Cash Register in Dayton, Ohio, in 
1884, NCR was a pioneer in welfare capitalism, and, unlike Old Econo-
my ICT companies such as IBM, HP, Motorola, and TI, it had had a long 
history of unionization. In 1901 a strike shut down NCR’s factory in 
Dayton, and 2,000 workers walked off the job (Chicago Daily Tribune 
1901). That strike would be the last to take place at NCR for 67 years. 
NCR continued to engage in collective bargaining, and under the 
National Labor Relations Act from the late 1930s the NCR Employ-
ees Independent Union became the workers’ representative at NCR’s 
Dayton plant (Stark 1940). In the early 1950s, with 33,000 employ-
ees, NCR, still based primarily in Dayton, was 60 percent unionized 
(Monthly Labor Review 1965). By 1968, NCR’s employment level had 
reached 91,000, and at the end of the next year it would attain an all-time 
peak of 102,000. The Dayton plant alone had 14,863 union members in 
1968, when workers on piece-rates staged a strike after being informed 
by the union that only workers on hourly rates had gained in recent pay 
negotiations (New York Times 1968). Sanctioned by the union, the strike 
lasted a week and led to negotiations over not only wage rates but also 
retirement pay and vacations.
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The 1968 strike, however, marked the beginning of the end for the 
workers at the Dayton plant and ultimately for unions at NCR. In 1971, 
NCR’s 17,000 union members (18 percent of the company’s 95,000 
total employees) opted for representation by the United Auto Workers 
(UAW) instead of the NCR Employees Independent Union. In the 1970s, 
however, NCR made the transition from a company that manufactured 
electromechanical business machines to one that made digital electron-
ic business machines (Anderson 1991; Rosenbloom 2000). In the pro-
cess, as an early example of the runaway shop, which was to become 
widespread among U.S. companies in the 1980s and beyond, NCR built 
its new electronics facilities in places other than Dayton, employing a 
nonunion labor force, and ran down its unionized operations. 
The Dayton plant had employed 15,700 factory workers in 1969, but 
by 1977 it had only 850, most of them low-paid assemblers (Anderson 
1991, pp. 192–194; BusinessWeek 1977; Rosenbloom 2000, p. 1098). In 
contrast, by the mid-1970s NCR employed 18,000 fi eld engineers—25 
percent of its labor force—to market its electronic business machines 
(Rosenbloom 2000, p. 1099). In 2000, the 70 remaining UAW workers 
at NCR, most of them making $10 per hour and having an average of 
17.4 years of service to the company, lost their jobs when NCR out-
sourced their work, which was in shipping, receiving, building mainte-
nance, and food service (Dayton Daily News 2000).
Unlike the NCR experience, unions have survived to the present at 
Xerox, although with neither the membership nor the infl uence that they 
once had. Xerox had been founded in 1906 in Rochester, New York, as 
the Haloid Company, which, based on its development of the “xerog-
raphy” process for photocopying, changed its name to Haloid Xerox in 
1958 and then to Xerox in 1961. It grew from $37 million in revenues 
in 1960 to $1.7 billion a decade later. At that point Xerox controlled 
96 percent of the market for photocopiers. The Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers (ACW) had organized Haloid in 1937 and, at the beginning of 
1960, represented 586 Haloid Xerox workers out of a company total of 
1,894 employees. With the success of Xerox in the 1960s, membership 
in ACW Local 14A, based at the Webster, New York, plant near Roch-
ester, multiplied. Throughout the 1970s, the ACW, which became the 
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU) in 1976, 
had more than 4,500 union members at Webster and 5,500–6,000 at all 
of Xerox’s U.S. operations. 
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During the early 1980s, Xerox went through a major reorganiza-
tion in which the company emulated Japanese practices, such as rapid 
product development, rationalization of supplier relationships, and 
statistical quality control (BusinessWeek 1984; Jacobson and Hillkirk 
1986; Prokesch 1985). In the process, ACTWU and Xerox management 
became engaged in cooperative efforts to generate innovation, enhance 
productivity, and save jobs at the Webster plant. The framework for these 
efforts had its origins in 1980, when, as part of the collective bargaining 
agreement, Xerox management and ACTWU established a Joint Com-
pany–Union Employee Involvement Committee “to investigate and 
pursue opportunities for enhancing employees’ work satisfaction and 
productivity” (Pace and Argona 1989).4 The agreement covered 5,000 
union employees in three locations, most of them at the Webster plant. 
The implementation of Employee Involvement (EI) entailed the forma-
tion and training of problem-solving teams (PSTs), each composed of 
six or seven union members and a supervisor. By the mid-1980s, the 
Webster plant had 150 PSTs.
In August 1981 Xerox announced that it would be outsourcing up 
to 200 blue-collar jobs in the Webster wire harness assembly plant to 
Mexico for an annual savings of $3 million (Costanza 1989; Pace and 
Argona 1989; Washington Post 1982). The union asked for the forma-
tion of a study team that could determine whether cost-savings could be 
achieved that would enable wire harness assembly to remain in Web-
ster. The study team came up with $4.2 million in cost reductions that 
kept the jobs at home. Subsequently, union-management cooperation at 
Xerox became a textbook case of the role of EI from the shop fl oor up in 
sustaining the competitive advantage of blue-collar jobs in a high-wage 
economy (Cutcher-Gershenfeld 1991, 1992; Jacobson 1988; Lazes et 
al. 1991; Pace and Kelly 1998; Swoboda 1992). In 1989, for example, 
EI and ACTWU received credit for helping Xerox win the Malcolm 
Baldrige National Quality Award (Holusha 1989; PR Newswire 1989).
At the same time as the union was cooperating in EI programs, 
however, Xerox was downsizing its labor force, and blue-collar, along 
with salaried and contract, employees constantly faced the threat of job 
loss. As a condition for its continued participation in the EI program, 
the union demanded that employment security be made part of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. The 1984 contract provided the 3,300 
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members of Local 14A a guarantee of no layoffs for economic reasons 
during the three-year life of the pact. In return, the union agreed to 
the containment of wage growth, a reduction in some benefi ts, stricter 
absenteeism control measures, and a replication of the wire harness 
study in any type of work in which management deemed the Webster 
plant to be uncompetitive (Pace and Argona 1989). Subsequent union 
contracts in 1986, 1989, and 1992 renewed the guarantee of employ-
ment security for three years each, while the 1994 contract (negotiated 
a year early), covering 6,200 workers, renewed it for seven years. 
During this period, however, the infl uence of the union at Xerox 
declined. The ACTWU represented 3,850 employees at the Webster 
plant in 1994 but only 1,955 in 2002, when the Union of Needletrades, 
Industrial and Textile Employees, or UNITE—the result of the 1995 
merger of the ACTWU with the International Ladies Garment Workers 
Union—concluded its next contract with Xerox. When UNITE HERE—
the product of the 2004 merger of UNITE with the Hotel Employees 
and Restaurant Employees International Union—signed the recently 
expired four-year contract in March 2005, it covered 1,517 employees, 
or not quite 25 percent of the number covered 11 years before. 
With its incentive for outsourcing vastly increased in the 2000s, 
Xerox’s management decided that the study-team arrangement had 
become a relic of the Old Economy. In the collective bargaining agree-
ment signed in 2002, the union got the same employment earnings guar-
antees as in the 1994 contract along with a package of wage increases, 
improvements in medical and dental coverage, and an increase in the 
company contribution to 401(k) accounts. What the union lost, how-
ever, was the right to form joint study teams to seek ways of keeping 
work in the plant that would otherwise be outsourced. 
When that contract came up for renewal in March 2005, the study-
team arrangement was not even a subject of collective bargaining. The 
new contract did stipulate, however, that workers at the Webster plant 
would continue to do fi nal assembly and testing of specifi c Xerox print-
ers, copiers, and digital presses. The one concession that the union had 
to make was that any new union hires would not be eligible to receive 
the choice between the DB and the CB plan that had been available to 
existing employees since 1990. Instead the new hires would be offered 
a 401(k) plan with the 6 percent company match (Tyler 2005). Given 
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the union’s employment trajectory at Webster since the early 1990s, 
however, it is unlikely that, going forward, there will be many new hires 
to whom the new pension regime will apply.
THE ABSENCE OF UNIONS IN NEBM
Organized labor in the United States has never been strong among 
the types of college-educated professional, technical, and administrative 
(PTA) employees who, with the automation and offshoring of operative 
and clerical work, constitute an increasing majority of employees at 
ICT fi rms. The most signifi cant example of PTA unionism in the United 
States is the Society of Professional Engineering Employees in Aero-
space (SPEEA), which has almost 24,000 members and has represented 
engineers and technicians at Boeing (founded in Seattle in 1916) in col-
lective bargaining for more than six decades. Indeed, in 2000 SPEEA 
staged the largest white-collar strike in U.S. history against Boeing, with 
wages and health benefi ts at issue (Morrow 2000a,b). Organizing PTA 
workers is, however, especially diffi cult in the New Economy, where, 
to use Albert Hirschman’s (1970) terms, employees have depended on 
“exit” via the labor market rather than “voice” via union representation 
to exercise infl uence over their conditions of work and pay.5 
Silicon Valley, as the birthplace of NEBM, has always been an anti-
union environment. In 1985, when the Silicon Valley semiconductor 
industry was beset by Japanese competition, Gordon Moore of Intel 
was quoted as saying, “Our industry changes so rapidly, and the nature 
of the jobs changes continuously. I think [the lack of unionization] has 
served the industry well” (Malone 1985). Similarly, in his book, Spin-
off, Charles Sporck (2001, p. 271), CEO of National Semiconductor 
and a major fi gure in the semiconductor industry, contends that “unions 
have a way of evolving into extremely stubborn obstacles to innovation. 
We were constantly changing assignments around to make best use of 
individual talents and skills. It would have been impossible to move 
ahead with the rapidly developing technology of semiconductors in an 
organization hampered by union formalities.” 
Whether or not one accepts these judgments by Silicon Valley’s top 
executives on the incompatibility of unions with NEBM, the fact is, as 
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Sporck (2001, p. 271) put it, “no semiconductor facility in Silicon Val-
ley was ever unionized.” In the mid-1970s, the UAW had gotten as far 
as a representation ballot at one of Intel’s plants, but four out of fi ve eli-
gible employees rejected the union (Jackson 1997, chap. 16). Attempts 
by U.S. unions to organize Silicon Valley employees in the mid-1980s 
came to naught (Miller 1984; Sawyer 1984).6 
The most notable attempt to organize U.S. high-tech employees in 
the 1990s stemmed from Microsoft’s practice of employing contingent 
workers (Van Jaarsveld 2004). In 1990 the Internal Revenue Service 
had ruled that Microsoft had been misclassifying regular employees 
as independent contractors to exclude them from benefi ts such as the 
employee stock purchase plan and savings plan. In 1992 these work-
ers launched a class action lawsuit (Vizcaino v. Microsoft) which was 
fi nally settled in December 2000 with a payment from Microsoft of $97 
million. 
The lawsuit mobilized contingent workers at Microsoft to form, in 
1998, the Washington Alliance of Technology Workers (WashTech), a 
union that affi liated with the CWA.7 While WashTech has been unsuc-
cessful in gaining union recognition at Microsoft or any other employ-
er, it has wielded a certain amount of political infl uence in Washington 
State and has participated in CWA training initiatives (Van Jaarsveld 
2004, pp. 373–379). In 2000 WashTech came to the aid of customer 
service representatives who had been laid off at Amazon.com and was 
reportedly able to pressure the company into granting them better sev-
erance packages (Wilson and Blain 2001). Also affi liated with CWA is 
Alliance@IBM, formed in 1999 in response to IBM’s adoption of a CB 
pension plan, which signifi cantly reduced the pension benefi ts of older 
IBM employees (Frey 1999b; PR Newswire 1999b). 
In Silicon Valley, the only occupational group that has won collec-
tive bargaining agreements has been janitors. In 1992 Hewlett-Packard 
agreed to employ a janitorial contractor whose employees were rep-
resented by the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) (U.S. 
Newswire 1992). By 1996 an SEIU offi cial announced that “every major 
high-tech company is cleaned by a union janitorial company except for 
Intel” (Holmes 1996). By the end of the decade, amid the affl uence 
of the high-tech boom, there was a general acceptance among Silicon 
Valley’s high-tech employers that the people, most of them Hispanic 
immigrants, who cleaned their facilities needed collective bargaining to 
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bolster their meager pay. Even Intel, which remained adamantly non-
union, paid its janitors at the union rate (Kirby 2000). 
As for the college-educated members of the ICT labor force, their 
power vis-à-vis employers has resided in individual mobility in the 
labor market rather than in collective bargaining at the place of work. 
For many ICT employees, the power of individual labor mobility served 
them well in the Internet boom of the late 1990s, especially when they 
entered into employment at companies with generous stock-option 
plans. Recall from Chapter 2 the enormous average gains of employees 
at companies like Microsoft and Cisco in the Internet boom. It has been 
claimed, quite plausibly, that the Internet boom created 10,000 stock-
option millionaires at Microsoft alone (Harden 2003).8
In the 2000s, however, the U.S. ICT labor market has changed in 
ways that have greatly diminished the power of individual mobility, 
especially for educated and experienced high-tech workers in their 40s 
and 50s. As we shall see in the next chapter, even college-educated 
members of the U.S. ICT labor force now face competition from large 
and growing supplies of highly qualifi ed but much less expensive high-
tech labor in developing nations, especially India and China. Yet in 
a dynamic industry whose continued, and generally rapid, growth is 
based on innovation, heightened global labor-market competition need 
not necessarily mean a paucity of stable and remunerative jobs for edu-
cated and experienced high-tech employees in the United States. The 
problem, as I show in Chapter 6, is that the top executives of leading 
high-tech companies that have been profi ting handsomely from global-
ization have been far more interested in allocating corporate resources 
to boost their companies’ stock prices, and thereby their own compen-
sation, than in creating or even maintaining stable and remunerative 
employment opportunities for high-tech workers in the United States. 
Notes
 1. Although about 19 percent of SAIC’s common shares were fl oated in the IPO, 
employees retained 98 percent of SAIC’s voting rights (Cowan 2006). 
 2. Qwest had emerged in 1994 through the combination of a telecommunications 
subsidiary of Southern Pacifi c Rail and Qwest Communications, which had built 
a digital microwave system in the southwest (Business Wire 1994).
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 3. At the end of July 2008, CWA membership was as follows: Verizon, 59,825 
(74,251 in 2005); AT&T Inc., 161,342 (161,698 in 2005, including BellSouth and 
Cingular union members); and Qwest, 18,415 (23,642 in 2005). In addition, there 
were 1,747 at Idearc, the 2006 spinoff of Verizon’s Yellow Pages business, and 
869 at Dex Media, the 2002 spinoff of Qwest’s Yellow Pages business. I am grate-
ful to Debbie Goldman and Beatriz Woods of CWA for making these membership 
data available to me.
 4. Larry Pace and Dominick Argona were internal consultants to the employee 
involvement initiative, and Argona was also manager of the employee involve-
ment function within the human resources department. Anthony Costanza was the 
shop chairman of ACTWU Local 14A from 1981 to 1986 and was subsequently 
international vice president of ACTWU.
 5. For the problems of unionism in the “boundaryless workplace,” see Stone 
(2004).
 6. For a history of attempts to organize workers in high-tech industries in Silicon 
Valley, see Bacon (2006).
 7. See WashTech (2008). For useful works that focus on the roles of contingent 
employment and fl exible labor markets in Silicon Valley, see Benner (2002) and 
Hyde (2003).
 8. For the distribution of stock options at Cisco in 1999, see O’Reilly and Pfeffer 
(2000).
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5
Globalization of the 
High-Tech Labor Force
OFFSHORING
By the 2000s, employment relations in U.S. ICT industries had 
changed dramatically from those that had prevailed into the 1980s. The 
interfi rm mobility of labor, facilitated by industry standards as opposed 
to proprietary standards, and the vertical specialization of the value 
chain, including the outsourcing of manufacturing activity, set the stage 
for a vast globalization of the high-tech labor force. In the fi rst half 
of the 2000s, “offshoring” entered the American lexicon as U.S.-based 
companies moved large numbers of jobs overseas, with India and Chi-
na as prime locations. Many of the engineering and programming jobs 
that have been offshored in the 2000s are ones that observers of U.S. 
high-tech industry thought could not be done abroad. The development 
of sophisticated products and processes generally requires interactive 
learning that is both collective and cumulative. Workers engaged in 
interactive learning have to be in close communication with one another. 
With the United States at the center of the ICT revolution, the assump-
tion was that these jobs could not be relocated to low-wage developing 
countries. 
Indeed, precisely because the United States dominates ICT, it is 
the place to which people come from around the world for ICT-related 
higher education and work experience. Why would many of the best ICT 
jobs be migrating to India and China if Indian and Chinese people are 
migrating to the United States to study and work in ICT? The answer to 
this question is important for understanding the impact of globalization 
on the economic insecurity of high-tech workers in the United States in 
the 2000s. The demise of career employment with one company would 
be much less of a source of insecurity for U.S. high-tech workers if the 
U.S.-based companies that are globalizing were creating more and bet-
ter jobs at home. 
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In fact, many major U.S.-based ICT companies that have been 
expanding their worldwide employment in the 2000s have been reduc-
ing employment in the United States. From 2001 to 2007, IBM increased 
its worldwide employment by 21 percent, from 319,867 to 386,558, but 
its U.S. employment fell by 17 percent, from 152,195 to 126,804. Simi-
larly, from 2002 to 2007, HP’s worldwide employment expanded by 22 
percent, from 141,000 to 172,000, but its U.S. employment fell by 21 
percent, from 67,350 to 53,519. In 2007 Intel’s worldwide employment 
of 85,187 was 2 percent higher than in 2001, but its U.S. employment 
of 46,186 was 15 percent lower.1 
Some U.S.-based companies that have increased U.S. employ-
ment in the 2000s have expanded non-U.S. employment at a faster rate. 
Microsoft doubled its U.S. employment from 27,000 in 2000 to 55,000 
in 2008, but the U.S. share of worldwide employment fell from 69 per-
cent to 60 percent. Cisco Systems increased its U.S. employment from 
25,000 in 2000 to 37,400 in 2008, but the U.S. share of worldwide 
employment fell from 74 percent to 57 percent.2 
Offshoring by U.S. high-tech companies is by no means new. For 
decades U.S. ICT companies have been routinely offshoring production 
activities, usually through foreign direct investment (FDI). Previously 
offshoring had been driven mainly by the search for low-wage labor 
to perform relatively low-skill work. New in the 2000s was the extent 
to which offshoring represented a search for low-wage labor to per-
form relatively high-skill work. In the 2000s U.S. ICT companies have 
been able to access an abundance of such labor in developing countries, 
especially India and China. 
Since the 1960s the development strategies of national govern-
ments and indigenous businesses in Asian nations have interacted with 
the investment strategies of U.S.-based ICT companies as well as U.S. 
immigration policy to generate a global labor supply. This process has 
entailed fl ows of U.S. capital to Asian labor as well as fl ows of Asian 
labor to U.S. capital. As a result, new possibilities to pursue high-tech 
careers, and thereby develop productive capabilities, have opened up to 
vast numbers of individuals in Asian nations. Many found the relevant 
educational programs and work experience in their home countries. But 
many gained access to education and experience by following global 
career paths that included study and work abroad, especially in the 
United States. 
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For Asian nations in the process of development, these global career 
paths have posed a danger of “brain drain”—the career path could come 
to an end in the United States (or another advanced economy) rather 
than in the country where the individual had been born and raised. For 
nations such as South Korea, Taiwan, China, and India, however, which 
have experienced brain drain at certain stages of their development, 
the education and experience that their nationals received in the United 
States created valuable “human capital” that could potentially be lured 
back home. A major challenge for these Asian nations has been the cre-
ation of domestic employment opportunities, through a combination 
of FDI, strategic government initiatives, and the growth of indigenous 
businesses, to enable the career paths of global nationals to be followed 
back home, thus transforming a potential “brain drain” into an actual 
“brain gain.”
EDUCATION AND GROWTH IN ASIA
Between 1970 and 2000, real GDP per capita increased 7.5 times 
in South Korea, 5.4 times in Taiwan, 4.7 in Singapore, and 3.7 in Hong 
Kong. In the process these four nations became known as the “Tiger 
economies.” During this period, Japan, starting from a much higher 
base than the four Tigers, saw its real GDP per capita rise 2.2 times, 
while the United States saw its rise 1.9 times. Over these three decades, 
Japan’s GDP per capita increased from 35 percent to 75 percent of that 
of the United States, South Korea’s from 13 percent to 51 percent, Tai-
wan’s from 20 percent to 59 percent, Singapore’s from 30 percent to 
79 percent, and Hong Kong’s from 38 percent to 76 percent (Maddison 
2007). The increases in wages that these higher levels of GDP per capita 
both permitted and refl ected did not undermine the competitive advan-
tage of Japan or the Tiger economies in ICT. On the contrary, by further 
mobilizing the skills and efforts of the indigenous labor force as well as 
increasing the extent of domestic product markets that enjoyed a degree 
of protection, rising wages were integral to the dynamics of economic 
growth.
These cases of rapid growth entailed active and purposeful govern-
ment initiatives to build communications and educational infrastructures 
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and to develop domestic high-tech knowledge bases. National and local 
governments also provided subsidies to business enterprises, both for-
eign and domestically owned, to make use of these infrastructures and 
knowledge bases to generate products that could ultimately be competi-
tive at home and abroad (e.g., Amsden 1989; Amsden and Chu 2003; 
Branscomb and Choi 1996; Breznitz 2007; Ernst 2002; Hobday 1995; 
Jomo, Fulker, and Rasiah 1999; Kim 1997a; Lazonick 2007c; Lu 2000; 
Mathews and Cho 2000; Saxenian 2006; Wade 1990). These govern-
ment and business investments in high-tech capabilities created large 
numbers of indigenous high-tech employment opportunities. Insofar as 
these investments generated higher productivity than previously, they 
contributed to the economic growth of the nation. In general, a por-
tion of these productivity gains accrued as higher returns to labor, thus 
eliminating to some extent the low-wage advantage that the nation may 
have had. Given the presence of other lower wage nations in the pro-
cess of developing their productive capabilities, economic growth that 
results in higher wages creates an imperative to “upgrade” employment 
opportunities by moving into higher value-added activities. As part of 
a dynamic national investment strategy, the emergence of ever more 
remunerative high-tech employment opportunities may be both cause 
and effect of sustained economic growth. 
The most fundamental, and expensive, expenditure of a govern-
ment that seeks to support economic development is investment in a 
system of primary, secondary, and tertiary education. In the case of 
Japan, investments in education that began in the late nineteenth cen-
tury laid the foundations for the nation’s economic transformation from 
the 1950s on. Because of laws dating back to 1886 that made primary 
education universally free and compulsory, 98 percent of all Japanese 
school-age children went to primary school by 1909 (Koike and Inoki 
1990, pp. 227–228). Japan also developed a system of higher educa-
tion from the late nineteenth century onward that sent its graduates into 
industry (Yonekawa 1984). Additionally, starting in the late nineteenth 
century, Japanese companies engaged in the practice of sending uni-
versity-educated employees abroad for extended periods of time to 
learn about Western technology (Fukasaku 1992; Matsumoto 1999). Of 
utmost importance to Japan’s post–World War II development was the 
fact that Japanese industrial enterprises had made university-educated 
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engineers integral to their managerial organizations for decades (Mori-
kawa 2001, pp. 62–63). 
These investments in education meant that only 2.4 percent of 
Japan’s population aged 15 and over had no schooling in 1960, and 
that on average Japan’s population had 7.8 years of schooling (the U.S. 
fi gures were 2.0 percent with no schooling and an average of 8.5 years 
of schooling). By contrast, in 1960 the no-schooling proportion of the 
population was 42.8 percent for South Korea, 37.3 percent for Taiwan, 
46.2 percent for Singapore, and 19.7 percent for Hong Kong; the aver-
age years of schooling were between about 4 and 5 in all of the coun-
tries (Barro and Lee 2000). A major challenge that faced the would-be 
Tigers, and other Asian nations such as Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philip-
pines, and Thailand, was to transform their national educational sys-
tems into foundations for industrial development.
South Korea dramatically transformed its educational system after 
1960. The average years of schooling of South Korea’s population aged 
15 and over rose from 7.9 years in 1980 to 10.8 in 2000, surpassing 
Japan’s 2000 fi gure of 9.5 and not far behind the U.S. fi gure of 12.0. By 
the late 1990s, South Korea had the highest number of PhDs per capita 
of any country in the world (Kim and Leslie 1998, p. 154).
India—a nation with 680 million people aged 15 or over in 2000 
compared with South Korea’s 37 million—has not experienced such 
a dramatic transformation of its mass education system. In 1960 the 
population aged 15 and over included 72.2 percent with no schooling 
and had on average 1.7 years of schooling. By 2000 India’s no-school-
ing fi gure remained high (43.9 percent), and the average for years of 
schooling was only 5.1. With one-sixth of the world’s population in the 
fi rst half of the 2000s, India had over one-third of the world’s illiterates 
(EFA Global Monitoring Report 2007, pp. 276, 278, 284–287). 
Yet, at the same time, India has become a leading source for sup-
plying engineers and programmers to the global ICT labor force. The 
stage was set by government investments made in the 1950s and 1960s, 
of which the decision to create Institutes of Technology, modeled on the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, stands out (Bassett 2005; Sebaly 
1972). The fi rst Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) was founded at 
Kharagpur, West Bengal, in 1952 (Bassett 2005; Shenkman 1954, p. 
28). A 1959 Act of Parliament established IIT Kanpur, which became 
the leading technological institute in India. From 1962 to 1972, IIT Kan-
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pur received assistance from the Kanpur Indo-American Programme 
(KIAP), through which a consortium of nine U.S. universities assisted 
in setting up research laboratories and academic curricula. 
In the late 1960s, India was second only to the United States in the 
number of students in universities, even though the number of univer-
sity students in India was extremely low on a per capita basis (Ilchman 
1969, p. 783). Notwithstanding the important contribution of the IITs to 
the creation of an elite corps of engineering graduates, Indian graduates 
were more numerous in the natural sciences. India’s 1,907,944 bache-
lor’s degrees in natural sciences from 1975 to 1990 represented more 
than 97 percent of the U.S. total, and by the late 1980s India was grant-
ing more such degrees annually than the United States. India’s output 
of undergraduate engineers was less prodigious but nonetheless signifi -
cant, rising from 35 percent to 45 percent of the annual number of U.S. 
engineering graduates from 1975 to 1990 (National Science Foundation 
1993, Appendix Table A-3). 
China, by contrast, focused much more on producing engineers than 
natural scientists. The total Chinese output of undergraduate engineers 
for the period from 1982 to 1990 (the period for which Chinese data 
are available) exceeded the 1975–1990 totals of Japan by 29 percent, 
the United States by 35 percent, and the combined numbers of Taiwan, 
South Korea, and India by 72 percent. From 1975 to 1990, South Korea 
quadrupled its annual output of engineering bachelor’s degrees, while 
those of Taiwan and India both doubled. Between 1990 and 2000, India 
increased its total enrollments in engineering from 258,284 to 576,649 
(Government of India 2002, 2003) while China increased the number of 
undergraduate engineering degrees awarded from 114,620 to 212,905 
and South Korea from 28,071 to 56,508. Perhaps more signifi cantly, in 
the fi rst four years of the 2000s, China more than doubled its undergrad-
uate engineering degrees, awarding 442,463 in 2004. Over the same 
period South Korea increased its undergraduate engineering degrees 
to 70,034 (National Science Board 2004, Appendix Table 2-34; 2008, 
Appendix Table 2-38). 
Table 5.1 shows the number of science and engineering doctor-
ates awarded per 100,000 in population aged 25–34 years for the most 
recent year available in fi ve leading Asian countries and the United 
States. While, by this measure, the United States outstrips the fi ve Asian 
nations in the physical and biological sciences, it lags behind South 
Lazonick.indb   154 7/31/2009   8:42:52 AM
Globalization of the High-Tech Labor Force   155
Korea, Japan, and Taiwan in engineering. At a much lower level of doc-
torates per capita, China and India are about even in the sciences, but 
China is far ahead of India in engineering. 
The U.S. fi gures, however, include large proportions of people, 
especially from Asia, who were not U.S. citizens or permanent resi-
dents. Already in the period from 1964 to 1970, there were an average 
of 25,656 foreign engineering students on nonimmigrant visas study-
ing in the United States, of whom 18.6 percent were from China and 
Taiwan, 16.2 percent from India, and 2.5 percent from South Korea. 
In 2003–2004, of the 279,076 foreign graduate students in the United 
States, 66.0 percent were from Asia, with 22.6 percent of the total from 
India, 18.2 percent from China, 8.9 percent from South Korea, and 5.4 
percent from Taiwan (Institute of International Education 2005). In 
2005 foreign citizens on temporary visas earned 43.6 percent of the 
engineering master’s degrees awarded in the United States, compared 
with 33.9 percent in 1995 and 38.2 percent in 2000, and they also earned 
58.6 percent of the engineering doctoral degrees, compared with 42.1 
percent in 1995 and 46.0 percent in 2000. In 2005, in mathematics and 
statistics, foreign citizens on temporary visas earned 38.6 percent of 
the master’s degrees and 50.0 percent of the doctoral degrees, while in 
computer sciences, these fi gures were 42.0 percent and 52.7 percent, 
respectively (National Science Board 2008, Appendix Tables 2-30 and 
2-32). In 2007, among graduate students in the United States on tem-
Country Year






China 2004 10.1 3.1 5.5
India 2003 4.6 3.3 0.6
Japan 2005 41.3 8.3 21.1
South Korea 2004 44.0 9.8 25.4
Taiwan 2005 37.0 7.2 20.2
United States 2006 66.2 25.1 14.6
Table 5.1  Doctoral Degrees Awarded per 100,000 Population, Aged 25–
34, Most Recent Available Year, for Selected Asian Countries 
and the United States
SOURCE: National Science Board (2008, Appendix Table 2-40); population statistics 
from U.S. Census Bureau (2008d).
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porary visas, Indian and Chinese students represented 44.0 percent and 
20.3 percent, respectively, in engineering, 10.5 percent and 41.5 percent 
in mathematics, and 55.2 percent and 15.0 percent in computer sciences 
(Appendix Table 2-24). 
In 2002–2005, of all non-U.S. citizens who received U.S. engineer-
ing doctorates, 46 percent had “defi nite plans to stay” in the United 
States after graduation, compared with 51 percent in 1998–2001. The 
proportion of Chinese with these intentions was 56 percent and that of 
Indians was 63 percent, compared with 62 and 70 percent in 1998–2001 
(National Science Board 2008, Appendix Table 2-33). The greater ease 
with which graduates on temporary visas were able to secure green 
cards from the late 1990s may also have been a factor in keeping these 
numbers high (Vaughan 2003). Insofar as foreign university graduates 
stayed in the United States to pursue careers, they became part of their 
home country’s brain drain.
BRAIN DRAIN
An investment in high-tech education can only make an immediate 
contribution to the growth of a developing nation if there are employ-
ment opportunities in the domestic economy that can make productive 
use of the educated labor. Employment experience in turn augments 
the productive capabilities of the domestic labor force, especially in 
industries that make use of sophisticated technologies. The problem of 
high-tech brain drain occurs when a developing nation invests in the 
education of scientists and engineers, but the most attractive employ-
ment opportunities for these university graduates are abroad rather than 
at home.
The science and engineering brain drain was a major problem in the 
1960s and 1970s for the developing Asian economies (Adams 1968; 
Fortney 1970; Pernia 1976; Van der Kroef 1968). In the late 1960s, Asia 
surpassed Europe as the main source of scientists and engineers coming 
to the United States from abroad (Schmeck 1973). The United States 
stood accused of taking the best that the newly industrializing countries 
had to offer, thus building U.S. high-tech capabilities at the expense of 
economies that could ill afford it.
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Encouraging the Asian brain drain was the U.S. Immigration and 
Naturalization Law of 1965 that abolished the national quota system in 
favor of preference to people whose skills could be “especially advanta-
geous” to the United States (Fortney 1970, p. 217). Of the 41,652 pro-
fessional, technical, and kindred workers who immigrated to the United 
States in 1967, engineers, at almost 21 percent of the total, represented 
the largest single group. In 1966 the 4,921 new immigrant engineers 
were equivalent to 9.5 percent of the new graduates of U.S. engineering 
institutions (p. 219). Fortney (p. 218) summed up the change: “The old 
law discriminated severely against all residents of ‘coloured’ countries, 
especially those of Asia. Immigrants from Asia in the professional, tech-
nical, and kindred worker category more than doubled between 1965 
and 1966 (2,078 to 5,628) and again between 1966 and 1967 (5,628 to 
12,282).” 
Over 30,000 college graduates went abroad from Taiwan between 
1956 and 1972, with only 2,586 returning (Ho 1975, p. 40). Nearly 60 
percent of those who left Taiwan had science or engineering educa-
tions, and they tended to be the best students, thus exacerbating that 
nation’s loss. In the 1950s and 1960s, South Korea also had a serious 
brain drain. In the period between 1953 and 1972, 10,412 students, 
5,376 of whom were in science and engineering, requested permission 
from the Korean Ministry of Education to study in the United States, 
and more than 90 percent did not return after graduation (Yoon 1992, 
p. 6). Between 1974 and 1988, the number of immigrant scientists and 
engineers as a proportion of all scientists and engineers in the United 
States increased from 5.8 percent to 10.5 percent, with the fi ve leading 
sources being India, the UK, Taiwan, Poland, and China (Arnst 1991; 
North 1995, p. 6). 
The Immigration Act of 1990 increased the annual number of 
employment-based visas that could be issued (including family mem-
bers) from 54,000 to 140,000. The “employment-based preferences” 
(EBP) class represented 11.6 percent of the immigrants admitted from 
1996 to 2000 and 15.7 percent from 2001 to 2004, notwithstanding a 
large but temporary decline in EBP admissions in 2003. From 1996 
through 2004, 454,000 Indians received green cards, 190,000 of whom 
were EBP admissions. Indians received 8.4 percent of the EBP visas 
in 1996, but that rose to an average of 24.7 percent from 2002 to 2004 
before falling to 12.3 percent in 2007 (Immigration and Naturalization 
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Service 1999, 2000, 2002a,b, 2003; U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security 2003a, 2004a, 2006a,b, 2007, 2008). Before 1998, China had 
been the largest recipient, with 13.9 percent in 1996 and 15.4 percent in 
1997, but that fell to 6.8 percent by 2007.
H-1B and L-1 nonimmigrant work visas have also been of great 
importance in enabling the fl ow of educated Asians to the United States 
for high-tech employment. India has been the top nation in terms of 
numbers of H-1B visas issued since 1993, when it surpassed the Phil-
ippines (U.S. Department of State 2009). From 2000 to 2003, Indians 
received 57.0 percent of the 547,000 initial H-1B visas and 48.0 percent 
of the 457,000 continuing visas issued (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security 2003b, 2004b, 2006c). China was a distant second with 9.5 
percent of the initial and 7.7 percent of the continuing visas. Over the 
13-year period from 1997 to 2009, Indians received 43.5 percent of all 
H-1B visas issued, followed by the British and Chinese, each with 5.5 
percent. 
Indians have also been the leading recipients of L-1 visas since 
2000, when they surpassed both the Japanese and the British. Tradition-
ally it has been multinational companies (MNCs) based in advanced 
nations that have dominated the L-1 visa category. The proportion of 
L-1 visas that went to Indians climbed dramatically from 4.5 percent 
in 1997 to 43.8 percent in 2006 (U.S. Department of State 2009). The 
next closest in 2006 were the British with 8.7 percent, the Japanese 
with 7.0 percent, and the Germans with 4.2 percent. Indians, therefore, 
have become the leading source of both immigrant and nonimmigrant 
entrants to the United States in search of work as well as education.
H-1B visas are predominantly high-tech visas. For FY2000–2003, 
98 percent of H-1B visas were issued to people with at least bachelor’s 
degrees. In FY2003, 50 percent had bachelor’s degrees, 31 percent mas-
ter’s degrees, 12 percent doctorates, and 6 percent professional degrees. 
At 39 percent of the total, the largest occupational category among visa 
holders was “computer-related,” followed by “architecture, engineer-
ing, and surveying” (12 percent), “education” (11 percent), and “medi-
cine and health” (11 percent) (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
2003b, 2004b, 2006c).
Under the Immigration Act of 1990, which amended earlier legis-
lation, an H-1B visa is issued for an initial period of three years, with 
the possibility of reapplying for extension for another three years. H-1B 
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visa holders can apply for permanent resident (i.e., immigrant) status, 
and employers of H-1B visa holders often sponsor the nonimmigrant for 
permanent resident status. Under the American Competitiveness for the 
21st Century Act of 1998, H-1B visa holders can obtain one-year exten-
sions while waiting to become permanent residents, prompting some 
to contend that H-1B is a “preimmigrant” rather than “nonimmigrant” 
program. In 2001 more than 228,000 nonimmigrant visa holders became 
permanent residents (Vaughan 2003). Alternatively, former H-1B visa 
holders who have been out of the United States for at least one year can 
take a job with a new H-1B visa, valid for three years, again with the 
possibility of a further three-year extension (Yale-Loehr 2003a).
Created in 1970, the L-1 visa category enables an MNC, whether 
U.S. or non-U.S., to bring foreign employees from abroad to work for 
the company or an affi liate in the United States. The sponsoring fi rm 
must have employed an “intracompany transferee” continuously for 
one year in the previous three years “in a managerial or executive posi-
tion or in a position where she gained specialized knowledge” (Yale-
Loehr 2003b). Executives and managers enter on an L-1A visa and can 
work in the United States for up to seven years, whereas employees 
with specialized knowledge enter on an L-1B visa and can work for up 
to fi ve years. 
There is no limit to the number of L-1 visas that can be issued. Such 
was also the case with H-1 visas prior to the Immigration Act of 1990.3 
During the 1980s H-1 visas began to be widely used. The number of H-1 
visas issued doubled from about 10,000 in 1969 to 20,000 in 1979 and 
then climbed to almost 49,000 in 1989 (Lowell 2000, p. 3). In October 
1990, prior to the passage of the 1990 Immigration Act, Electronics 
Weekly (1990) reported that “U.S. electronics companies are worried 
about proposed changes in U.S. immigration laws that will limit the 
number of foreign staff they can hire. U.S. electronics companies rely 
heavily on electronics engineers and other skilled staff from abroad.” 
The British magazine Computing warned, “Jobs for thousands of 
UK programmers/analysts threatened by immigration bill limiting work 
visas.” The article quoted Charles Sporck, CEO of National Semicon-
ductor, as saying that in some parts of his company “at least a third of 
the staff are from overseas,” and also cited a Microsoft representative as 
saying his company relied heavily on foreign programmers (Foremski 
1990).
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Then as now, the issue of whether or not there was a high-tech 
“labor shortage” was a highly politicized issue (see U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives 1990). In the late 1980s, a National Science Foundation 
prediction of an impending shortage of scientists and engineers bol-
stered high-tech industry’s demand for an accommodating policy for 
employment-based immigrant visas and H-1B and L-1 nonimmigrant 
visas (see Weinstein 1998). In the Congressional hearings that preceded 
the Immigration Act of 1990, labor economist Vernon Briggs advo-
cated limits on the availability of high-tech visas. “I believe strongly 
that labor shortages are wonderful, and we should never do anything to 
eliminate that pressure,” he said, “because it is forcing us to ask all the 
right questions about education and health, antidiscrimination policy, 
all the right policies are in place” (U.S. House of Representatives 1990, 
p. 298; quoted in Weinstein 1998).
Michael Teitelbaum, a demographer serving as a program offi -
cer at the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, argued against legislation that 
would succumb to declarations by business interests that they faced 
critical labor shortages. “What many employers and non-experts call 
‘labor shortages,’” he said, “are really mismatches between the skills 
needed and those being provided by U.S. educational systems; hence 
the focus should be on educational and on-the-job training systems, to 
make them relate more effectively to labor demands, as do those in Ger-
many and Japan” (U.S. House of Representatives 1990, p. 572; see also 
Teitelbaum 1996).
In the ultimate passage of the Immigration Act of 1990, however, 
business interests prevailed. The bill that was enacted set the annual 
cap of initial H-1B visas at 65,000, about 16,000 more than the number 
issued in 1989, rather than the 25,000 cap that labor interests had been 
advocating. The change was infl uenced by lobbying efforts from the 
business community (e.g., see Szabo 1989). Upon his election as pres-
ident of the American Immigration Lawyers Association in 1988, H. 
Ronald Klesko declared, “This will be the year of business immigration. 
We will focus on creating a business immigration coalition composed 
of business leaders, chambers of commerce, human resource groups, 
corporate counsels, state development agency leaders and the immigra-
tion bar” (PR Newswire 1988). In November 1990, on the eve of the 
signing of the new Immigration Act by President George H.W. Bush, 
Harris N. Miller, coordinator of the Business Immigration Coalition, 
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representing 250 companies and business associations formed to lobby 
for the new bill, told a New York Times reporter, “We’re very concerned 
about shortages of skilled people, particularly in the sciences and engi-
neering, computer science and mathematics” (DePalma 1990). In 1991, 
with the Immigration Act in place, Miller remarked, “We were success-
ful because we refashioned the debate from the jobs displacement issue, 
where we always lost, to the competitive issue” (Lee 1991).
To the present, Miller has remained a key fi gure in lobbying for the 
free fl ow of the global ICT labor force into the United States. In 1995 
Miller became president of the Information Technology Association of 
America (ITAA), a position he retained until 2006, when he quit to 
stage an unsuccessful campaign for the Democratic nomination in Vir-
ginia as a candidate for the U.S. Senate. As a leading trade association 
for the ICT industries, ITAA was in the forefront of lobbying efforts 
that resulted in securing the American Competitiveness and Workforce 
Improvement Act of 1998. This legislation raised the annual H-1B cap 
to 115,000 initial visas in fi scal years 1999 and 2000.4 The American 
Competitiveness for the 21st Century Act of 2000 raised the annual cap 
to 195,000 initial visas in FY2001–2003. As of October 1, 2003, the 
annual cap of 65,000 was restored, but with an extra 20,000 visas avail-
able to foreign-born professionals who have an advanced degree from a 
U.S. institution of higher education (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services 2005).5 
In 2007 and 2008, Congress debated an increase in the H-1B cap. 
Any changes in the H-1B cap, however, would now have to be enacted 
as part of comprehensive immigration reform, legislation that includes 
a process for legalizing the status of illegal immigrants, almost all of 
whom are poorly educated and low-paid. In effect, high-tech business 
interests found their efforts to have the H-1B cap raised stalled by the 
failure in Congress to secure the votes for reform of illegal immigration 
laws.
Advocating the H-1B increase was Compete America, an associa-
tion that among its 16 company members includes Analog Devices, 
Cisco Systems, Google, HP, Intel, International Rectifi er, Microsoft, 
Motorola, National Semiconductor, Oracle, Qualcomm, and TI (Com-
pete America 2008). In congressional hearings in 2007, Bill Gates of 
Microsoft argued the case for more H-1Bs as follows:
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Unfortunately, America’s immigration policies are driving away 
the world’s best and brightest precisely when we need them most. 
The terrible shortfall in our visa supply for the highly skilled stems 
not from security concerns, but from visa policies that have not 
been updated in over a decade and a half. We live in a different 
economy now. Simply put: It makes no sense to tell well-trained, 
highly skilled individuals—many of whom are educated at our top 
colleges and universities—that the United States does not welcome 
or value them. For too many foreign students and professionals, 
however, our immigration policies send precisely this message. 
(Elstrom 2007) 
An argument against raising the H-1B cap came from information 
released by two U.S. Senators, Charles Grassley of Iowa and Richard 
Durbin of Illinois, which showed that Indian IT services companies rep-
resented four of the top fi ve and 10 of the top 20 users of H-1B visas 
in 2006.6 The top four India-based companies—Infosys Technologies, 
Wipro, Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), and Satyam Computer Ser-
vices—held a combined total of 14,836 H-1B visas. In 2007 H-1B visas 
were more widely distributed, but Infosys still led the list of successful 
applicants with 4,559 petitions approved, and Wipro was second with 
2,567, Satyam third with 1,396, and TCS sixth with 797—a four-com-
pany total of 9,319. These companies were also large-scale users of L-1 
visas, with TCS leading with 4,887 visas in 2006. Cognizant Technol-
ogy Solutions, a New Jersey–based spinoff of Dun and Bradstreet that 
employs about three-quarters of its workforce in India, was the second 
largest user of L-1 visas in 2006 and the sixth largest user of H-1B visas 
(Press Trust of India 2007). Indeed, almost all of the U.S.-based ICT 
fi rms that employ large numbers of nonimmigrants on H-1B and L-1 
visas in the United States have signifi cant numbers of employees in 
India as well.
THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF U.S. FDI IN STEMMING THE 
ASIAN BRAIN DRAIN
Over the last four decades of the twentieth century, the career paths 
of vast numbers of well-educated people from around the world, espe-
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cially Asia, took them to the United States for specialized education and 
specialty occupations. The challenge facing the developing nations that 
experienced this brain drain was to create employment opportunities 
that could bring these people, with their enhanced capabilities, back 
home, or, alternatively, to create employment opportunities at home so 
that educated individuals would not need to go abroad to develop their 
capabilities and establish a high-tech career. 
Historically, a key source of these employment opportunities in the 
nations of Asia occurred starting in the 1960s, when U.S. microelec-
tronics companies offshored semiconductor assembly operations. As 
we have seen in Chapter 2, subsequent to the invention of the transistor 
at Bell Labs in 1947, and with the support of Cold War military spend-
ing, an array of U.S. companies, including Western Electric, Raytheon, 
GE, RCA, Westinghouse, IBM, TI, Motorola, and, after 1957, Fairchild 
Semiconductor, made the United States the center of the global semi-
conductor industry (Tilton 1971). From the late 1950s on, however, 
U.S. companies began to feel competitive pressure in the production 
of transistors from the Japanese, who had successfully transferred 
the technology from the United States (Flamm 1985, p. 70). By the 
early 1960s, U.S. semiconductor manufacturers began to consider the 
option of doing labor-intensive assembly work in low-wage offshore 
locations.
In his memoir, Charles Sporck (2001, p. 95), who had been head of 
manufacturing at Fairchild Semiconductor from 1961 to 1967 before 
becoming CEO of National Semiconductor, recalled how Fairchild had 
pioneered offshoring the assembly of transistors to Asia in the early 
1960s: “Fairchild’s establishment of a Hong Kong facility in 1963 was 
the fi rst Southeast Asian manufacturing venture of any American semi-
conductor company. The plant provided an immediate cost advantage in 
both direct labor and overhead, and overnight it challenged the wisdom 
of most investments in assembly automation by TI, Motorola and oth-
ers. In fact, we started a trend toward assembly plants in Southeast Asia 
that was adopted by many other companies as time went by.” 
By 1971 a United Nations research report stated, “Every estab-
lished United States semiconductor fi rm appears to be engaged in some 
offshore assembly” (Chang 1971, p. 17). The report listed 33 offshore 
facilities established from 1963 to 1971 by 22 different U.S. semicon-
ductor companies. Eight of these companies, with 16 offshore plants 
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among them, were based in Silicon Valley (pp. 19–20). After 1972, 
Malaysia became a favored location for semiconductor assembly, with 
HP and Intel being among the fi rst to open plants in the new Free Trade 
Zone in Penang. In 1974 Malaysia hosted 11 U.S.-owned semiconduc-
tor facilities, South Korea nine, Hong Kong eight, Taiwan three, and 
the rest of Asia six, and there were 15 U.S. facilities in Latin American 
countries, primarily Mexico (Davis and Hatano 1985, p. 129).
By 1970 almost all of the assembly work in semiconductors that 
still remained in the United States was automated. But rapid changes 
in technology that rendered automated processes obsolete combined 
with the availability of hard-working, low-wage labor favored the use 
of labor-intensive methods in a number of developing countries. By the 
fi rst half of the 1980s, U.S.-based merchant producers did 80 percent 
of their semiconductor assembly offshore, and much of the assembly 
operations that remained in the United States were for military purposes 
(Davis and Hatano 1985, p. 129).
U.S. tariff policy facilitated the offshoring movement. Sections 
806.30 and 807 of the Tariff Schedule of the United States permitted 
goods that had been exported from the United States for foreign assem-
bly to be imported with duty charged only on the value added abroad. 
In 1967 dollars, “806/807” imports of semiconductors to the United 
States increased from $130 million in 1969 (accounting for 95 percent 
of all semiconductor imports into the United States) to $2,267 million 
in 1979 (79 percent) to $3,368 million in 1983 (69 percent) (Flamm 
1985, p. 74).
As late as 1974, Mexico was the most important single national 
location for 806/807 semiconductor exports, but its share eroded sharp-
ly after 1975 (Flamm 1985, p. 76). In 1970 the average hourly wage for 
semiconductor assembly in Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea 
was less than one-tenth that in the United States, and about half that in 
Mexico (Chang 1971, p. 27; Sharpston 1975, p. 105). The relatively high 
value and low weight of semiconductor products meant that the prox-
imity of Mexico to the United States did not offer an appreciable trans-
portation advantage over an Asian location (Davis and Hatano 1985, 
p. 129; Flamm 1985; Moxon 1974, pp. 35–36). Within Asia during the 
1970s and early 1980s, there was a marked shift of 806/807 activity 
from Hong Kong to Malaysia and the Philippines, while South Korea 
and Singapore sustained substantial market shares. In 1985 there were 
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63 U.S. semiconductor plants in Asia, employing just under 100,000 
people (Henderson 1989, pp. 54, 59; Scott 1987, pp. 145, 147). 
Although the impetus to offshore chip assembly was the search for 
low-wage labor, the lowest-wage Asian locations, such as Indonesia and 
Thailand, did not dominate. Other considerations, most notably politi-
cal stability and the productivity of labor, entered into plant location. 
In 1967, for example, James Stokes, the head of Signetics Korea, was 
quoted as saying, “If we had been looking only for cheap wages, we 
could have gone to Africa” (New York Times 1967). George Needham, 
director of Motorola’s assembly plant on the outskirts of Seoul, told 
plant visitors in 1970 that a Korean female worker could be taught to 
assemble semiconductors in two weeks less than her American counter-
part. “The girls here are more motivated,” Needham was quoted as say-
ing. “Life is tough in this country. These people really need this work.” 
He claimed that production costs in South Korea were one-tenth of 
those in a similar Motorola plant in Phoenix, Arizona, the headquarters 
of the company’s semiconductor operations (Shabecoff 1970, p. 57).
In the 1960s and 1970s, however, South Korea and many other 
Asian nations had more to offer MNCs than just low-wage, hard-work-
ing female labor for assembly operations. Of great signifi cance for the 
persistence of these offshored investments even as wage levels rose 
was the fact that when, in the 1960s and 1970s, foreign semiconduc-
tor companies employed relatively low-wage (female) labor to perform 
low-skill production jobs, they could fi nd relatively low-wage (male) 
labor to perform high-skill engineering and managerial jobs. By the 
mid-1980s, all of these Asian economies were on the way to transform-
ing themselves from relatively low-wage to relatively high-wage econ-
omies. The availability of an indigenous supply of high-skill labor was 
critical for upgrading productive capabilities so that the ICT industries 
of these nations, and the offshored facilities, could remain competitive 
in a higher wage environment.
The importance of this high-skill labor, even in the early 1960s, is 
evident in Charles Sporck’s follow-up to his statement, quoted above, 
about Fairchild’s 1963 entry into Hong Kong in search of low-wage 
assembly workers. “Although we went to Hong Kong for direct labor 
savings, we found that we could hire engineers and other overhead 
people at dramatically lower costs as well,” he said. “In many cases, 
they had been educated and trained in the United States and they were 
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highly capable technicians and supervisors. Their availability and their 
overall caliber made the decision to go offshore immediately success-
ful” (Sporck 2001, p. 95).
The fact that qualifi ed indigenous engineers were available to the 
U.S. semiconductor companies when they offshored their assembly 
operations in the 1960s and 1970s is of great importance for understand-
ing what the World Bank (1993) would call, with considerable mystifi -
cation, “the East Asian miracle.” The type of economic transformations 
that occurred in Asia depended on the availability of both a highly edu-
cated, high-tech labor force and employment opportunities that would 
enable the members of this labor force to contribute to the growth pro-
cess. The transformations in productive capabilities that occurred in 
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia from the 
1970s onwards and in the world’s two most populous nations, India and 
China, from the 1980s onwards were the results of the interaction of the 
investment strategies of developmental states, innovative enterprises, 
and educated individuals in the pursuit of high-tech careers.
SOUTH KOREA’S REVERSAL OF THE BRAIN DRAIN
In its 1993 report on the development of Asia’s human resources in 
science and technology, the National Science Foundation (1993, p. 1) 
stated, “Asian countries with high technology economies will compete 
with the United States for the Asian-born graduates of U.S. universi-
ties. Though Asian scientists and engineers will continue to contribute 
to the U.S. labor force, more will probably return to Asia.” South Korea 
in particular was very aggressive from the late 1960s onwards in the 
implementation of various policies designed to reverse the brain drain. 
In his study of the process, Bang-Soon Yoon (1992, p. 5) argued that 
“the Korean model of RBD [reverse brain drain] is without precedent 
in the world and has been highly successful. . . . Brain drain is no longer 
considered a social problem by [Korean] policy-makers.” 
How was such a reversal achieved? By the 1990s the successful 
development of South Korea and Taiwan in the ICT industries had cre-
ated employment opportunities that entailed suffi ciently high salaries 
and suffi ciently challenging jobs to lure back large numbers of nationals 
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who had acquired high-tech education and experience abroad. In the 
well-documented case of Taiwan, this amounted to an annual average 
of more than 6,000 people from 1993 to 1996 (Saxenian and Hsu 2001, 
pp. 905–906). As a dynamic historical process, the reversal of the brain 
drain was an effect as well as a cause of successful industrial develop-
ment. It could not have occurred but for the investment strategies of 
developmental states and innovative enterprises that had upgraded the 
quality of higher education and employment opportunities available to 
indigenous high-tech labor since the 1960s and 1970s. 
Foreign Direct Investment
From the outset, MNCs that had come to South Korea and Taiwan 
in search of low-wage labor for labor-intensive assembly operations in 
the 1960s and 1970s created a demand for university-educated labor. 
Over time, as these companies invested in higher value-added activities, 
the high-end employment opportunities increased. Encouraged by this 
transfer of technology through FDI, national governments made invest-
ments in research institutes and graduate programs to build an indige-
nous knowledge base. These institutes and programs, which themselves 
generated attractive domestic high-tech employment opportunities, in 
turn supported the emergence of indigenous Korean and Taiwanese 
companies as world-class competitors. In many cases, highly educated 
and very experienced Koreans or Taiwanese who had been pursuing 
successful careers in the United States played key roles in building 
indigenous research institutes and companies (for the case of Taiwan, 
see Saxenian 2006, chaps. 4 and 5). The vast majority of the employees 
of these indigenous companies were, however, homegrown.
Among the pioneering U.S. MNCs in South Korea, Motorola made 
the most signifi cant contribution to reversing the brain drain (Lee 1998). 
Motorola trained a group of 50 Korean engineers to start up Motorola 
Korea (MK) in 1967 with a total employment of 300 people. By 1972 
MK was Korea’s largest electronics company, both in terms of sales and 
exports (Bloom 1992, p. 38). Two years later MK had 5,000 employees, 
including two-thirds of the original 50 Korean engineers (Behrman and 
Wallender 1976, pp. 267, 299). As Behrman and Wallender (p. 270) 
put it in their detailed case study of the transfer of technology within 
Motorola to MK, the Korean subsidiary “is run virtually by Korean 
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engineer-managers, since all manufacturing units are under Koreans 
and the only American is the general manager, who has a fi nancial 
background. . . . The Korean managers have almost all been ‘promoted 
from within’ as the company expanded, and nearly all are in their early 
thirties and have been given such responsibility because of their educa-
tion and abilities.”7 
Automation reduced MK’s headcount to 3,800 in 1988, including 
about 2,100 employees in its semiconductor operations. In December 
1988, in the midst of labor demands for better pay and work conditions 
that marked South Korea’s transition from its “newly industrializing” 
stage, MK closed its plant after a group of workers, carrying cans of 
gasoline, had occupied a computer room and threatened to set them-
selves on fi re (Reuters News 1988). A nonunion company around the 
world, Motorola had agreed to recognize the union but had balked at 
some of the union demands. The plant was reopened within a week 
(Electronic Buyers’ News 1989).
In May 1989, a BusinessWeek article asked, “Is the era of cheap 
Asian labor over?” and answered that “rising wages and union strife are 
sending some companies packing” (Yang and Nakarmi 1989). Among 
the U.S. chip companies, National Semiconductor, in the midst of ratio-
nalizing its global capacity, closed down its Korean facility, laying off 
250 employees (Clark 1990; Electronic World News 1989). Motorola, 
however, never considered leaving South Korea, in part because it was 
building a major presence there in wireless communications. As of the 
end of 1993, MK employed 2,500 people and had shipped $3.2 billion 
in electronics products since it had opened in 1967 (Business Korea 
1994). 
In 1996 MK began construction of a state-of-the-art manufacturing 
complex for wireless products and semiconductor packaging at Paju, 
40 kilometers north of Seoul (Korea Economic Weekly 1999). Then, 
in 1998, in the wake of the Asian fi nancial crisis, Motorola pledged to 
invest $300 million in South Korea over the next three years. The fi rst 
stage of this new investment package was a software design center at 
its Paju chip plant that began operations with 50 Korean software pro-
grammers (Korea Herald 1998).
In 1999, as part of its global strategy to outsource manufacturing, 
Motorola sold the Paju plant, which had 880 employees, along with 
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another Motorola facility in Taiwan, to Advanced Semiconductor 
Engineering (ASE), a Taiwanese company. Despite the sale, Motorola 
remained committed to South Korea; by that time, semiconductors rep-
resented only 30 percent of Motorola’s business in Korea, and in any 
case MK had a long-term supply agreement with ASE (Flannery 1999; 
Korea Economic Weekly 1999; Korea Times 1999).
In 2004 Motorola spun off its entire semiconductor product division 
as Freescale Semiconductor. As an independent company, Freescale had 
plants in Hong Kong and Malaysia but no Korean operation. In May 
2005, however, Freescale announced that, attracted by Korea’s exper-
tise in mobile technology, it would open an R&D center in Seoul, with 
six engineers. Freescale was not the only U.S. semiconductor company 
navigating back to South Korea in search of high-skill labor for high-
end work. National Semiconductor, absent from the country since 1989 
when it closed its assembly facility in the midst of labor unrest, came 
back to South Korea in 2005 to launch both a design center and an R&D 
center (Wohn 2005). 
In the 2000s, there is no question that South Korea has the research 
capability to serve the high end of the high-tech market. Not only has 
the brain drain been reversed, but with MNCs now locating in South 
Korea to access highly skilled ICT labor, it can no longer be taken for 
granted that the center of the world of high-end work is the United 
States, or even Japan. Beginning in the second half of the 1960s, as 
we have seen, MNCs in search of low-wage labor played a critical role 
in beginning the reversal process by offering Korean engineers and 
managers opportunities to accumulate ICT experience while staying at 
home. In the process they transferred considerable technology to, and 
developed considerable capability in, South Korea. 
Repatriation
The investments that permitted the economic transformation of 
South Korea did not come, however, from MNCs alone. Building on 
the capabilities that FDI brought to South Korea, as well as on the capa-
bilities of Koreans who had been studying and working abroad, the 
Korean government and indigenous businesses made the investments 
in ICT that transformed South Korea into a leading “career path” loca-
tion. Of particular importance, more in terms of quality than quantity, 
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was the repatriation of Korean scientists and engineers who had worked 
abroad. 
In 1968 some 2,000 Korean scientists and engineers lived abroad 
(Kim and Leslie 1998, p. 168). The very existence of these expatriates 
presented an opportunity for South Korea to build indigenous high-tech 
capabilities if only the brain drain could be reversed. Since the latter 
half of the 1960s, the Korean government saw the creation of an indus-
trial research complex as a way to lure back some of those expatri-
ate Koreans so that they could contribute to the development of South 
Korea’s knowledge base (Bloom 1992, p. 54; Yoon 1992). Specifi cally, 
the desire by South Korea’s policymakers to transform the nation’s 
brain drain into its brain gain served as both opportunity and impetus 
in the establishment of two seminal knowledge-creating institutions, 
the Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) and the Korea 
Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST).
KIST came into being in 1966 after the U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development (USAID) funded a team of U.S. scientists to visit 
South Korea in May 1965 to offer advice on the formation of a nation-
al institute for scientifi c research. Headed by Donald Hornig, scien-
tifi c advisor to President Lyndon Johnson, the team included James 
Fisk, president of Bell Labs, and Bertram Thomas, president of Bat-
telle Memorial Institute (Bloom 1992, p. 54; Kim and Leslie 1998, pp. 
159–161). These discussions led KIST to opt for the Battelle contract 
research model, which entailed ongoing interaction with industry, rather 
than the Bell scientifi c research model. The U.S. government provided 
substantial initial funding, including a $3.1 million contract to Battelle 
to provide technical advice. 
In 1967 the Korean government ensured KIST’s autonomy in 
research and management and its fi nancial stability through special leg-
islation, the Assistance Act of the Korea Institute of Science and Tech-
nology (Yoon 1992, pp. 16–17). The same year saw the creation of the 
Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) (Bloom 1992, p. 54). A 
1975 MOST document described KIST as “the bridge between domes-
tic industry and advanced technologies of foreign countries” (quoted in 
Kim and Leslie 1998, p. 161).
In conducting a search for its fi rst scientists and engineers, KIST’s 
ideal profi le was someone with an undergraduate degree from Seoul 
National University, plus a graduate degree and fi ve years of work expe-
Lazonick.indb   170 7/31/2009   8:42:53 AM
Globalization of the High-Tech Labor Force   171
rience abroad. In its fi rst year, 1969, KIST had 494 employees, of whom 
18 were repatriated scientists and engineers (14 with doctorates) (Yoon 
1992, pp. 13–14). To attract key personnel from abroad, KIST paid high 
salaries and offered perquisites such as relocation expenses, free hous-
ing, and education expenses for children. Such compensation packages 
subsequently became the norm in government repatriation initiatives 
(Yoon 1992, pp. 14–16). By 1975, out of a total of 984 employees, 
KIST had 137 repatriates, 69 of whom had returned permanently to 
Korea (Yoon 1992, p. 13). 
During the 1970s there was a proliferation of government research 
institutes in South Korea, some of them spinoffs of specialist depart-
ments of KIST (Lee, Bae, and Lee 1991). The Korea Institute of Elec-
tronics Technology (KIET) emerged in 1976 to conduct research into 
semiconductor design, processes, and systems. At the head of each of 
KIET’s three research divisions was a Korean with research experience 
in the U.S. semiconductor industry (Bloom 1992, p. 56; Mathews and 
Cho 2000, p. 118).8 In a joint venture with the Silicon Valley chipmaker 
VLSI Technology, KIET put in place Korea’s fi rst VLSI (very-large-
scale integration) pilot wafer-fabrication plant in 1978, and launched a 
fully operational 16K DRAM (dynamic random access memory) fabri-
cation plant by 1979 (Mathews and Cho 2000, p. 118). 
Overall, from 1968 through 1980, MOST-sponsored repatriation 
programs brought back home 130 overseas Koreans on a permanent 
basis and 182 on a temporary basis to public R&D institutes (Yoon 
1992, p. 10). The repatriates brought knowledge, experience, connec-
tions, and leadership to South Korea. Given the rapid growth in demand 
for scientists, engineers, and technicians in South Korea from the late 
1970s on, however, the vast majority of those employed by the public 
research institutes had to be homegrown. 
The number of researchers in South Korea grew from 14,749 in 
1978 (0.40 researchers per 1,000 population) to 18,434 in 1980 (0.48) 
and to 28,448 in 1982 (0.72). The government’s share in R&D expen-
ditures constituted 49 percent of the total in 1978 and 52 percent in 
1980, before falling to 41 percent in 1982 as business enterprises began 
to invest heavily in their own R&D (Arnold 1988, p. 439).9 Govern-
ment investments in indigenous R&D capability demanded comple-
mentary investments in indigenous academic institutions to generate a 
homegrown supply of high-tech labor. Analogous to KIST, the keystone 
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educational investment was the founding of the Korea Advanced Insti-
tute of Science (KAIS), the nation’s fi rst specialized graduate school 
of science and engineering, in February 1971. KAIS admitted its fi rst 
master’s students in 1973, its fi rst doctoral students in 1975, and its fi rst 
undergraduate students in 1986.10 Along the way, KAIS became KAIST 
when KIST and KAIS were merged at the end of 1980. The name of 
the academic institution remained KAIST when the two organizations 
demerged in 1989 as KAIST (the former KAIS) moved its campus 100 
miles south of Seoul to become the centerpiece of Taedok Science Town 
(Kim and Leslie 1998, pp. 178–180).
KAIS was the brainchild of a 30-year-old Korean physicist, KunMo 
Chung, working in the United States (Kim and Leslie 1998). In Octo-
ber 1969 Chung submitted a document titled “The Establishment of a 
New Graduate School of Applied Science and Technology in Korea” 
to John A. Hannah, head of USAID and Chung’s former thesis advi-
sor at Michigan State University. Hannah handed off the proposal to 
USAID’s Korean division, which forwarded it to the Korean Economic 
Planning Board (Kim and Leslie 1998, p. 165). The board in turn inter-
ested MOST in the concept, and in April MOST invited Chung to Korea 
to present his plan to key political leaders. With President Chung-Hee 
Park’s support, by July 1970 KAIS had won legislative approval. 
As with KIST, USAID provided fi nancial assistance and advice. 
To bring KAIS to fruition, Lee DuBridge, Science Advisor to Presi-
dent Nixon, appointed a fi ve-man committee of engineering educators 
headed by Frederick Terman, provost of Stanford University and the 
academic visionary behind the emergence of Silicon Valley. Among the 
other committee members were two of Terman’s protégés and Chung 
(Kim and Leslie 1998, p. 167). In writing his original proposal for 
KAIS, Chung had been infl uenced by a recent report by Terman on the 
reform of engineering education in New York State (Kim and Leslie 
1998, pp. 165–169). In effect, therefore, from conception to founding, 
KAIS refl ected Terman’s ideas, including a “Steeples of Excellence” 
strategy to provide outstanding graduate education in a few high-prior-
ity fi elds (Kim and Leslie 1998, p. 168).
The government provided all KAIST students with tuition, room 
and board, a stipend, and a conversion of the normally compulsory 
three years of military service into three years of work in a government 
research facility subsequent to receiving their master’s degrees (Kim 
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and Leslie 1998, p. 169). From its inception through 1996, KAIST 
awarded a total of 3,108 bachelor’s degrees, 9,566 master’s degrees, 
and 2,647 doctoral degrees. Of the master’s recipients, 43 percent went 
into industry, 17 percent to government research institutes, and an esti-
mated 34 percent into advanced training. Of the doctoral recipients, 45 
percent went into industry, 27 percent to government research institutes, 
and 26 percent into academic positions (Kim and Leslie 1998, p. 174). 
Indigenous Innovation
By the 1990s there were plenty of good employment opportunities 
for these graduates in South Korea, not only with MNCs such as MK 
or government research institutes such as KIST, but also, and indeed 
primarily, with Korean chaebol such as Samsung, Hyundai, and LG 
(Lucky-Goldstar), which through indigenous innovation had trans-
formed knowledge from abroad into world-leading products in a num-
ber of high-technology sectors. In no Korean industry was this transfor-
mation as dramatic as in semiconductors. In 1980 semiconductors rep-
resented 2.5 percent of Korea’s production and 2.5 percent of exports; 
in 1990 they represented 7.3 percent of production and 7.0 percent of 
exports (Byun 1994, p. 709). 
In semiconductors, no Korean company was as successful as Sam-
sung. With $20.5 billion in revenues and 7.5 percent of the market, 
Samsung was the world’s second-leading supplier of semiconductors in 
2007, behind Intel ($33.8 billion) and ahead of Toshiba and TI ($11.8 
billion each) (Gartner 2008). Samsung is the world leader in the fl ash 
memory market and shares the world lead in the DRAM market with 
South Korea’s Hynix Semiconductor, formerly Hyundai Electronics.
Samsung entered the semiconductor industry in 1975 when it 
bought Korea Semiconductor Company (KSC), a just-launched semi-
conductor fi rm that had run into fi nancial trouble. The founder of KSC, 
Ki-Dong Kang, a Korean-American PhD who had worked in semicon-
ductor design at Motorola, now provided Samsung with his knowledge. 
Samsung also took over the assets of an abortive transistor joint ven-
ture between Goldstar and National Semiconductor (Mathews and Cho 
2000, p. 116). Thus, in 1975 Samsung acquired the capability to fab-
ricate wafers and produce LSI (large-scale integration) chips for con-
sumer electronics products just as the Korean government promulgated 
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a six-year plan to promote the semiconductor industry (Kim 1997b, p. 
88). 
In 1982 Samsung started its Semiconductor R&D Laboratory to 
reverse-engineer semiconductors from Japan and the United States. At 
the same time Samsung organized a task force to formulate a strategy 
for entering into the production of VLSI chips. After six months of 
information-gathering and analysis, the team spent a month on a fact-
fi nding trip to the United States, where it especially sought advice from 
Korean-Americans with semiconductor expertise. The major semicon-
ductor companies in the United States had already rebuffed Samsung’s 
requests to license 64K DRAM technology, so the task force identifi ed 
smaller companies strapped for cash that would make the technology 
available. One such company was Micron Technology, founded by for-
mer TI engineers in 1978, which had just generated its fi rst revenues 
from its new fabrication facility in Idaho in 1982 (Spaeth 1984). As 
part of the deal, Samsung sent its engineers to Micron for training. Sub-
sequently, in 1985 Samsung was also able to buy an advanced high-
speed MOS (metal-oxide-silicon) process for $2.1 million from Zytrex, 
a 1983 Silicon Valley start-up that had just gone bankrupt (Chira 1985; 
Pollack 1985b). 
In 1983 Samsung announced a massive investment in designing and 
producing 64K VLSI chips. As the biggest chaebol in South Korea, 
Samsung was able to fund the investments in semiconductors from 
earnings from other divisions. It was also able to avail itself of govern-
ment subsidies. The product development process involved two parallel 
groups. One was in Silicon Valley and employed 300 American engi-
neers led by fi ve Korean-Americans with PhDs and design experience 
at major U.S. chip companies. The other was in South Korea, and it 
was led by two Korean-American scientists who had developed 64K 
DRAMs at U.S. companies as well as by Korean engineers who had 
run Samsung’s LSI operations and received VLSI training at Samsung’s 
U.S. technology suppliers. Samsung’s Silicon Valley unit also trained 
the company’s Korean engineers as part of the process of transferring 
technology from the United States to South Korea (Byun 1994, p. 711; 
Kim 1997b, pp. 89–93).
When Samsung released its 64K DRAM in 1984, it lagged behind 
the United States chipmakers by 40 months and the Japanese by 18 
months. Samsung repeated this product development process for its 
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256K chip released in 1985, further reducing the technology gap with 
the United States and Japan, as it continued to do with the 1M DRAM 
in 1987, the 4M in 1989, and the 16M in 1992, at which point it had 
caught up (Byun 1994, p. 713).
Between 1980 and 1994 the company’s sales soared from 2.5 billion 
to 115.2 billion won (the South Korean currency). In the process Sam-
sung Electronics increased its R&D as a proportion of sales from 2.1 
percent in 1980 to 6.2 percent in 1994. In 1980 the company employed 
690 R&D staff, who produced only 18 local patent applications, four 
local patent awards, and no foreign patent applications or awards in 
that year. By 1994 the company had 8,919 R&D staff who could claim 
credit for 2,802 local applications, 1,413 local awards, 1,478 foreign 
applications, and 752 foreign awards. The generation of one local pat-
ent award for Samsung Electronics required 116.8 R&D staff in 1985, 
10.4 in 1990, and 6.3 in 1994, while the generation of one foreign pat-
ent award required 992.5 R&D staff in 1985, 52.2 in 1990, and 11.9 in 
1994 (Kim 1997b, p. 95).
As a result of the employment opportunities that Samsung and other 
leading chaebol such as Hyundai and LG had created, by the late 1980s 
the brain drain had been reversed. Indeed, in 1989 a Wall Street Jour-
nal article titled “Costly Exports” announced, “Reverse ‘Brain Drain’ 
Helps Asia but Robs U.S. of Scarce Talent—Korea in Particular Ben-
efi ts as Scientists Return to Take Top Jobs” (Yoder 1989). The Kore-
ans now took a very different view of the estimated 6,000 scientists 
and engineers in the United States than they would have two decades 
before. To wit, the article quoted Chin Hai Sool, a director general at 
Korea’s Ministry of Science and Technology, as saying that Koreans in 
the United States “have become a precious resource for us.”
In sharp contrast to the Korean perspective was that coming from 
those concerned with the implications of the reverse brain drain for the 
supply of scientists and engineers in the United States. “‘We’ve been 
counting on foreign graduates to stay here and fi ll our needs because we 
haven’t been fi lling our own needs for a long time,’ says Betty Vetter, 
executive director of the Commission on Professionals in Science and 
Technology, in Washington. ‘There’s nobody to replace these people.’” 
(quoted in Yoder 1989).
By the early 1990s South Korea had developed to a stage at which 
it could quickly tap this “precious resource.” Of the 13,878 foreign sci-
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ence and engineering doctorate recipients with temporary visas from 
U.S. universities in 1990–1991, almost 56 percent were from China 
(2,779), South Korea (1,912), Taiwan (1,824), or India (1,235). In 1995, 
47 percent of the 1990–1991 recipients were working in the United 
States, including 88 percent of the Chinese, 79 percent of the Indians, 
and 42 percent of the Taiwanese, but only 11 percent of the Koreans—a 
proportion even lower than the 13 percent of the 227 Japanese doctoral 
recipients (Johnson and Regets 1998). 
MALAYSIA’S FDI-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT
Not all of the Asian nations that have built up signifi cant ICT capa-
bilities since the 1960s have been able to engage in indigenous innova-
tion in the manner of South Korea (for the case of Taiwan, see Breznitz 
2007, chap. 3; Mathews 1997; Saxenian 2006, chaps. 4 and 5). Malay-
sia in particular has become a world center for electronics manufactur-
ing over the past three decades based on FDI. From 2003 to 2007, the 
Malaysian economy grew at about 5.5 percent per year, with electronics 
dominating its manufacturing base and exports (see Index Mundi 2008; 
more generally, see Best 2001, chap. 6). The fact that Malaysia has 
prospered on the basis of FDI implies that MNCs have been successful-
ly upgrading their productive capabilities there, thus making it possible 
to pay employees higher wages and still remain globally competitive. 
And indeed, such has been the case.
Since the 1960s, U.S. MNCs have employed nationals rather than 
expatriates in host countries. Data from the early 1980s on employ-
ment in the Bayan Lepas Free Trade Zone (BLFTZ) in Penang confi rm 
the overwhelming reliance of MNCs on indigenous labor at all levels 
of the local organization. In 1982, 27 electronics/electrical factories 
employed a total of 24,446 people, of whom 5,389 (22 percent) were 
male and 6,625 (27 percent) were nonfactory workers. Only 34 of these 
employees were expatriates. For the BLFTZ as a whole, there were 
226 expatriates out of 52,073 employees, representing 0.43 percent of 
the total, 1.16 percent of males, and 1.55 percent of nonfactory work-
ers (Salih and Young 1987, p. 184). Given the small absolute number 
of expatriates—just 1.26 per electronics/electrical factory in 1982—the 
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indigenization of the labor force at the MNCs obviously extended high 
up the organizational hierarchy. A survey done in the mid-1990s found 
that National Semiconductor’s only expatriate in Penang was the man-
aging director. Texas Instruments (2,800 employees) and Motorola 
(4,000 employees) each had only three expatriate managers in Malaysia 
(Ismail 1999, pp. 27–28).
Intel’s history in Malaysia from the early 1970s to the present illus-
trates the upgrading of indigenous capabilities by a U.S. MNC in the 
semiconductor industry. Intel was one of the fi rst semiconductor manu-
facturers to offshore to the BLFTZ when Malaysia launched it in 1972, 
and as the company itself was only founded in 1968, the Penang facility 
was Intel’s fi rst offshore plant. In 1974 Intel employed about 1,000 peo-
ple in Penang (Wall Street Journal 1974b) and about 2,000 a decade later. 
Over the next 10 years, Intel’s Penang production tripled, but its labor 
force remained at about 2,000 because of automation of labor-intensive 
assembly processes. In 1980 engineers had represented only one out of 
40 Intel employees in Penang, but by 1994, one in six employees was 
an engineer (Ismail 1999, p. 27; Zachary 1994). Over time Malaysia 
became Intel’s main source of expertise on assembly operations. In the 
mid-1980s, when Intel was setting up its assembly line in its automated 
chip factory in Chandler, Arizona, it brought in its Malaysian experts 
from Penang as consultants (Dreyfack and Port 1986). In 1990, when 
Intel set up a design optimization lab at the Penang facility, it sent 10 
engineers to Silicon Valley for training. At that time, Intel announced 
that it would continue to invest in automation in Penang, with the goal 
of attaining zero-defect production (Dennis 1990). 
In July 1992 Intel decided to shift its entire microcontroller design, 
manufacturing, and marketing operations out of the Chandler facility to 
its Penang plant, a move that Lai Pin Yong, Intel Malaysia’s managing 
director, called a milestone for the local electronics industry. “This is 
the fi rst time in Malaysia,” Yong said, “that a multinational is giving its 
offshore plant total responsibility of an important product.” As a result, 
Intel Malaysia expected to add another 50 engineers to the 300 that it 
already employed (Electronic Times 1992a). In preparation, a team of 30 
Malaysians had been receiving training in the United States and Japan 
for two to three years. When the Intel Penang Design Centre opened in 
November 1992, it was said to be the fi rst of its kind in Southeast Asia 
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(Leow 1992; see also Ismail 1999, pp. 32–33). 
In 2003, with US$2.3 billion invested in Malaysia since 1972, Intel 
Malaysia employed about 1,000 Malaysians in R&D and had secured 
21 U.S. patents. In August 2003 Intel added to its Malaysian R&D capa-
bilities by opening a design and development center, with a focus on 
manufacturing processes and packaging technology for Intel’s various 
products. On a visit to Penang in August 2003 to open the new center, 
Intel CEO Craig Barrett (as paraphrased by a Business Times report-
er) commended “the Malaysian Government and business leaders for 
their work in stimulating IT research and innovation through university 
research grants and efforts to strengthen education programmes,” while 
warning that “a critical factor to the impact of Intel’s investment hinged 
on the continued availability of talent to sustain design and develop-
ment efforts locally” (Business Times 2003). 
In December 2005, with almost 10,000 employees (about 10 per-
cent of its global labor force) at fi ve sites in Malaysia, Intel announced 
plans to invest $230 million in a 2,000-person assembly and test site, 
along with a design and development center, in Kulim (Ismail 2005; 
Yee 2005). On the occasion of this investment, Craig Barrett, who had 
become Intel’s chairman in May of that year, stated, “Intel is working 
with the Education Ministry to help grow Malaysia’s globally competi-
tive ICT workforce. Through the Intel Teach to the Future programme, 
we have trained more than 30,000 Malaysian teachers to use technology 
to improve student learning. 
“Effectively integrating technology into the classrooms,” Barrett 
continued, “opens up new and exciting learning opportunities, giving 
young people the knowledge and skills to compete in an increasingly 
complex world” (Ismail 2005).
EVOLUTION OF IT SERVICES IN INDIA
In the wake of a Memorandum of Agreement on high-technology 
transfers from the United States to India, signed after years of negotia-
tion in May 1985, the Indian Department of Electronics announced its 
intention to build “technology parks” that would permit foreign com-
panies to be wholly owned for the purpose of developing and exporting 
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large-scale software systems (Tenorio 1985). In June 1985, TI began 
exploratory talks with the Indian government about establishing a soft-
ware development center in Bangalore. Two key conditions for TI were 
100 percent ownership of the facility and permission to connect to an 
internal global communications network (Mitchell 1986). The Indian 
government acceded to both demands.
In the mid-1980s, TI was a global company with an Asian presence 
in Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia. It was, however, like other 
U.S. semiconductor companies, facing a major competitive challenge 
from the Japanese in commodity memory chips. TI’s future lay in cus-
tom chips, particularly ASICs (application specifi c integrated circuits) 
and VLSI (Mitchell 1986). These products called for substantial soft-
ware programming, using computer-aided design. 
Robert Rozeboom, vice president of TI’s semiconductor group 
design automation department, told a reporter in August 1985 that TI 
had “started to look at India seriously in 1984 as a potential site for soft-
ware development for our computer-aided design. Software develop-
ment is critical to our semiconductor operations. India has such a strong 
educational system in the sciences and it has such a large number of 
graduates who are underemployed, it became an obvious choice for us” 
(United Press International 1985). The U.S.-India technology transfer 
agreement created an opening for TI to locate a software development 
center in India. It was a small investment for TI—$5 million out of total 
1986 capital expenditures of $446 million. 
TI India employed 16 engineers and programmers when it began 
operations in 1986. This number increased to 85 in 1990, 275 in 1995, 
500 in 2000, 1,300 in 2005, and 1,800 in 2007, which was almost 6 
percent of TI’s worldwide labor force (Indo-Asian News Service 2007). 
All of these employees in India were engaged in R&D, and all were 
Indian. 
In 1997 an article in Electronic Engineering Times called TI India 
“a dream company for local engineers” (Bindra 1997). A report issued 
in 2003, when TI India topped “India’s fi rst ever list of Top 25 Great 
Places to Work,” stated, “TI India, a subsidiary of TI Inc, employs 832 
people in a single site in India. It has eight women at senior manage-
ment level. Staff turnover is at seven percent. The company has 170 
employees who have completed fi ve years with the company. It has 18 
employees who are over 44 years of age” (Business World 2003).
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About 75 percent of TI India’s employees were working on digital 
signal processing (DSP) chips, used in cell phones, modems, MP3 play-
ers, digital still cameras, and Voice over Internet Protocol phones (Busi-
ness Line 2002). In DSP, the mainstay of TI’s overall semiconductor 
business, TI India had become, according to a company press release, 
“the research base for its parent company.” By the end of 2003, TI India 
had garnered 225 U.S. patents (Rai 2003). 
Almost two decades after it had been the fi rst MNC to locate in 
Bangalore, TI was not alone in viewing India as a prime location for 
software programming and R&D (see Mitra 2007). By 1992, 30 other 
MNCs, including Motorola and IBM, had set up software programming 
facilities in Bangalore (O’Reilly 1992). IBM, which had left India in 
1978 over issues of foreign ownership, returned in 1992 after India’s 
1991 liberalization reforms (Chatterjee 1994; Tarrant 1991; Tripathi 
1992). HP set up a subsidiary in India in 1989 but waited until 2002 
to launch its fi rst Indian research lab (Agence France-Press 2002). In 
April 2004 AMD announced a $5 million investment in a micropro-
cessor design center that would employ 120 chip designers and devel-
opment engineers by the end of 2005 (Sharma 2004). In the fi rst half 
of 2005, both Intel and Microsoft set up advanced research centers in 
Bangalore (Dudley 2004; Subramanyam 2005). In October, as part of 
a $1.1 billion expansion in India over three years, Cisco broke ground 
on a $50 million, one-million-square-foot R&D campus in Bangalore 
that would double to 3,000 the number of people on Cisco payrolls in 
India (CMP TechWeb 2005). A month later, Cisco’s rival, Juniper Net-
works, announced a new $8.5 million development center in Bangalore 
that would increase its employment in India from 325 to 675 (Business 
Standard 2005). In December Intel said that it would spend $1 billion in 
India over the coming years, including $800 million on education and 
community programs and the remainder primarily for the expansion of 
its R&D center in Bangalore (Computer Reseller News 2005).
By the mid-2000s, however, the growth of indigenous IT enterpris-
es made Indians far less reliant on MNCs for high-tech employment 
than in the past. For the year ending March 31, 2008, the fi ve leading 
Indian IT companies—Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), Wipro, Info-
sys, Satyam, and HCL Technologies—generated a total of $18.7 billion 
in revenues and employed a total of 368,000 people worldwide, up from 
a combined $2.4 billion in revenues and 46,000 employees in 2001.11 
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TCS is the largest of these fi ve companies, with $5.7 billion in rev-
enues in fi scal 2007 (year ending March 31, 2008). Based in Mumbai as 
part of Tata Group, India’s largest industrial conglomerate, TCS began 
supplying offshore IT services in 1968. Besides engaging in software 
development in India, during the 1980s TCS became a leading “body 
shop,” sending engineers and programmers to do projects abroad (Head 
1989).TCS increased its employment from 2,000 people in 1991 to 
16,800 in 2001. Employment has soared in the 2000s, reaching 111,407 
in March 2008, and the company planned to add 30,000–50,000 people 
over the next year (Dow Jones International News 2008). More than 
90 percent of TCS employees are Indian nationals (TCS 2008, pp. 32–
33). The company generates 56 percent of its global revenues in North 
America, 29 percent in Europe, and 9 percent in India.  
Following TCS are Wipro and Infosys, both based in Bangalore, 
with revenues for the year ending March 31, 2008, of $4.9 billion and 
$4.2 billion, respectively. H.M. Hasham Premji founded Wipro (an 
abbreviation of Western Indian Vegetable Products) in 1946 as a vendor 
of cooking oil. He died in 1966, but his son Azim, just short of receiving 
his undergraduate degree in electrical engineering at Stanford Univer-
sity, returned to India to run the business. Wipro entered the computer 
business in the late 1970s after IBM left the country rather than submit 
to government regulations that required 60 percent Indian ownership 
of foreign affi liates. Subsequently Wipro expanded into IT services 
and software. In 1992 the company had 1,640 employees (Economist 
1991). Ten years later, Wipro employed more than 14,000 people, and 
by March 2008 it employed 82,122.
Infosys Technologies was founded as a software development 
company in 1981 by N.R. Narayana Murthy, the company’s CEO until 
2002, and six other software engineers, including Nandan M. Nilekani, 
the current CEO. Murthy had an undergraduate engineering degree 
from the University of Mysore and a master’s degree in electrical engi-
neering from IIT Kanpur, while Nilekani had an undergraduate degree 
in electrical engineering from IIT Mumbai. During its fi rst decade, 
the company gained a reputation for high-quality offshore design and 
development for companies such as GE, DEC, Reebok, and Nestlé. 
In 1992 Infosys employed more than 300 software engineers (Zintner 
1993). The company grew to 5,389 employees in 2001 and then surged 
to 52,715 employees in March 2006, 72,241 in March 2007, and 91,187 
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in March 2008. Almost 75 percent of the new hires in this period were 
beginning their careers. The average age of these “Infoscions,” about 93 
percent of whom are described as “software professionals,” is 26 years 
old (Infosys 2008, pp. 5, 132, 135). 
INDIGENOUS INNOVATION IN CHINA
Whereas India’s emergence as a force in the world of ICT has been 
focused mainly on IT services, China’s development path has been 
much more diverse. In entering a full range of industries with different 
levels of skill, China has had the advantage over India of a much more 
extensive system of mass education, as shown in Table 5.2. Note that 
India had a much higher proportion of the population who had complet-
ed postsecondary education in both 1980 and 2000, although in each of 
the nations, the group that attained this level of education represented 
an elite. At the university level, as we have seen, an important differ-
ence between China and India in the 1980s was that China emphasized 
undergraduate degrees in engineering while India emphasized under-
graduate degrees in science. In terms of the supply of college-educated 
personnel, therefore, China was much better positioned than India in 
the 1990s to absorb technology from the advanced nations and adapt it 
to indigenous industrial uses.
In the 1980s and 1990s, to unleash these productive capabilities to 
support industrial development, China quite deliberately transformed 
the relation between its science and technology (S&T) infrastructure 
and high-tech enterprises that competed for growing commercial mar-
kets. China had developed considerable S&T capability under the cen-
tral planning system prior to the economic reforms in the late 1970s 
(Conroy 1992; Gu 1999; Sigurdson 1980; Suttmeier 1975). Until the 
1980s, however, the evolution of the S&T infrastructure was driven 
exclusively by government demand, much of it for military purposes. A 
prime task of the reform process was to transfer national S&T resources 
to businesses that could innovate in producing goods for commercial 
markets.
The transformed S&T infrastructure consisted of national pro-
grams, ranging from basic research to industrial R&D, and public 
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research institutes that interacted with industrial enterprises to develop 
technologies for domestic and, increasingly, international product mar-
kets. It included National Key Laboratories for basic research, National 
Engineering Centers for applied research, and Corporate R&D Centers 
and Experimental Zones for New Technology Industries for the com-
mercialization of technology (Gu 1999). What turned this S&T infra-
structure into a “national system of innovation” in the 1980s and 1990s 
was the emergence of highly autonomous business enterprises that were 
successful in the commercialization of technology. The most notable 
successes occurred in ICT. The institutionalization of organizational 
relations among government institutes and business enterprises not 
only permitted China to develop new productive capabilities but also 
ensured that these capabilities would be utilized to meet new demands 
for industrial application.
The importance of ICT to China’s development in the late twen-
tieth and early twenty-fi rst centuries is clear in the trade data. During 
the 1990s and into the 2000s, China became both a major exporter and 
major importer of electronic offi ce machines, IT products, and telecom-
munications products, as world trade in electronics became increas-
ingly based on a vertically specialized international division of labor 
(Amighini 2004). In 1992 China had about 2 percent of world trade 
in offi ce machines, less than 1 percent in IT products, and 2 percent in 
China India
Highest level of educational attainment 1980 2000 1980 2000
No schooling 44.9 20.9 72.5 44.5
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Average years of school 3.6 5.7 2.7 4.8
Table 5.2  Highest Levels of Educational Attainment, Percentage of 
the Population 25 Years Old and Over, China and India, 1980 
and 2000
a % who completed level in parentheses.
SOURCE: Barro and Lee (2000).
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telecom products. In these different ICT groupings, China lagged far 
behind nations such as the United States, Japan, Germany, Singapore, 
and Hong Kong. By 2003, however, China had become the world’s 
leading exporter in all of these groupings, with 18 percent of world 
trade in offi ce machines, 18 percent in IT products, and 11 percent in 
telecom products (pp. 207–208). 
ICT fi gures especially prominently in China’s trade relations with 
the United States. U.S. exports of advanced technology products (ATP) 
to China increased from $5.5 billion (representing 2.4 percent of all 
U.S. ATP exports) in 2000 to $20.3 billion (7.4 percent) in 2007.12 
Meanwhile U.S. ATP imports from China rose from $10.7 billion in 
2000 (5.5 percent of all U.S. ATP imports) to $88.0 billion in 2007 (26.9 
percent). In 2003 U.S. ATP imports from China surpassed those from 
Japan, and by 2007 ATP imports from China were more than three times 
those from Japan. U.S. ATP exports to China exceeded those to Japan 
by 2.6 percent in 2007, after being 8.7 percent lower the year before.
U.S. ATP imports from China are highly concentrated in ICT, while 
U.S. ATP exports to China are spread across a wider range of indus-
trial sectors. In 2007, 88.5 percent of U.S. ATP imports from China 
were classifi ed in the information and communications grouping, with 
another 9.3 percent in the optoelectronics and electronics groupings. Of 
U.S. ATP exports to China in 2007, aerospace made up 35.4 percent, 
electronics 32.3 percent, information and communications 16.5 percent, 
fl exible manufacturing 7.1 percent, and life sciences 5.5 percent.
As was the case in the analyses of the development of South Korea, 
Malaysia, and India, a key to understanding China’s progress in ICT 
is the dynamic interaction among investments by the Chinese govern-
ment, indigenous enterprise, and MNCs in the development of produc-
tive capabilities. A pioneer in carrying out this type of research for the 
case of China was the late Qiwen Lu, with whom I collaborated closely 
(see Foreword to Lu 2000; Lazonick 2004b; Lu and Lazonick 2001). 
In his book, China’s Leap into the Information Age, Lu (2000) did in-
depth case studies of the evolution of four leading indigenous computer 
companies: Stone, Legend, Founder, and Great Wall. Lu documented 
the transfer of technological capabilities developed within the S&T 
infrastructure to indigenous business enterprises and the transformation 
of these capabilities by these enterprises, often in collaboration with 
MNCs, into innovative products. 
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In May 2005, one of these companies, Lenovo—known as Legend 
Group Limited until a year earlier—acquired IBM’s PC operations for 
$1.75 billion, with the right to use the IBM name on its products for fi ve 
years.13 IBM retained an 18.9 percent stake in Lenovo (reduced to 4.7 
percent by July 2008), which it viewed as benefi cial to its own expan-
sion plans in China. For its part, Lenovo located its headquarters in the 
United States along with most of the design and development work 
(Poletti 2004). 
In 2004, prior to the deal with IBM, Lenovo had already been Chi-
na’s largest PC producer, with a 25.1 percent market share, followed 
by Founder with 9.9 percent, Tsinghua Tongfang with 7.8 percent, Dell 
with 7.2 percent, and IBM with 5.1 percent (Associated Press News-
wires 2005). With $3.0 billion in revenues and 11,400 employees in 
fi scal 2004, Lenovo took control of a loss-making division of IBM that, 
nevertheless, had $9 billion in revenues and 10,000 employees, about 
40 percent of whom were working in China. With the IBM acquisition, 
Lenovo became, after Dell and HP, the third-largest PC maker in the 
world, with a 7.2 percent global market share. It also increased its share 
of the Chinese PC market to over 33 percent (Industry Updates 2006). 
In 2007 Lenovo was fourth in global PC shipments, with a 7.5 percent 
share, having been surpassed by the Taiwanese fi rm Acer, which had 
acquired the U.S. company Gateway (Deffree 2008). During fi scal year 
2008, Lenovo had revenues of $16.4 billion and before-tax profi ts of 
$513 million, and it employed 23,100 people worldwide as of March 
31, 2008.
The history of Legend/Lenovo, as analyzed by Lu (2000, chap. 3), 
exemplifi es the ways in which the complementarity between indige-
nous enterprises and MNCs has become ever more important to China’s 
development. The rapidly expanding U.S. trade with China in advanced 
technology refl ects in part imports from and exports to the United 
States by U.S. MNCs, such as Cisco, Dell, HP, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, 
Motorola, Oracle, and Sun Microsystems, that have offshored to China. 
Some of these companies, for example Dell in computers, have com-
peted for Chinese markets with indigenous companies such as Lenovo 
and Founder. U.S. ICT companies have also set up shop in free trade 
zones, such as the Pudong district in Shanghai, from which they have 
produced for export, employing highly qualifi ed but still relatively low-
cost Chinese ICT labor. U.S. ICT companies have also been prominent 
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in joint ventures with Chinese companies, often as a means of devel-
oping relations with Chinese businesses and governments that will 
yield new investment opportunities and product markets in the future. 
Increasingly in areas such as chip manufacture and packaged software 
in which U.S. ICT companies still have distinct competitive advantag-
es, these companies are investing in new facilities in China to supply 
inputs to Chinese ICT companies that are growing rapidly by serving 
the burgeoning Chinese domestic markets. 
Intel is a prime example of a world leader in ICT that began to 
make signifi cant investments in China in the last half of the 1990s 
and that has accelerated its direct investment in China in the 2000s. 
Intel’s fi rst major business deal with China came in late 1984 when 
it sold the Chinese government 1,000 microcomputers with the Intel 
8088 processor (Wall Street Journal 1984). Less than a year later, Intel 
opened up a two-person marketing offi ce in Beijing, run by William 
Huo, a 25-year-old Taiwan-born American with a Princeton degree in 
electrical engineering and computer science. Sales agreements still had 
to be approved at Intel’s Far East headquarters in Hong Kong. Under 
the auspices of China’s State Education Commission, Huo’s job was 
to set up microprocessor development labs at 100 Chinese universi-
ties, where engineers would be taught how to program Intel processors 
(Sabin 1986).
When, in June 1986, Li Tieying, the Minister of Electronics Industry, 
came to Palo Alto as the fi rst Chinese offi cial to attend a trade meeting 
of the U.S. semiconductor industry, he complained that, despite many 
visits by U.S. executives to China, there had thus far been no foreign 
investments in chip manufacturing. The major problem, he was told, 
was China’s unwillingness to protect intellectual property (Electronics 
Weekly 1987). In addition, COCOM—the Coordinating Committee for 
Multilateral Export Controls—had embargoed the exports of military-
related technology, including advanced semiconductors, to Communist 
regimes (Bozman 1990; Parker 1994a,b).
In September 1988, however, Motorola launched the fi rst semicon-
ductor facility in China that was established as a wholly owned ven-
ture. At the time, Intel was among a number of chip companies said 
to be contemplating similar investments. It appeared that Intel would 
make its fi rst move into Chinese production in 1991, when it reportedly 
entered into a joint venture with the state-owned China Electronics Cor-
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poration (CEC), the nation’s largest electronics enterprise group, and 
the Hongkong Corporation to produce microprocessors for the Chinese 
market (Xinhua News Agency 1991).
In September of the following year the Intel head offi ce instructed 
Intel Technology Malaysia to enter into negotiations with the Chinese 
authorities about opening a semiconductor plant in China (Electronic 
Times 1992b). In March 1994 Intel signed a contract with CEC whereby 
CEC would promote Intel’s products as the standard PC architecture in 
China, while Huajing Electronics, a CEC subsidiary and China’s largest 
semiconductor producer, would assemble and test Intel 386SX micro-
processors and Intel microcontrollers (Johns 1994; Kehoe 1994). 
In September 1994 Intel supported this initiative by launching a 
wholly owned subsidiary, Intel Architecture Development Limited 
(IADL) in Shanghai. With 25 Chinese engineers initially, IADL would 
develop software that would make PCs, and Intel chips, more appli-
cable to Chinese needs (Riley 1994; Shanghai Star 1994). A month later 
IADL signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Jitong Commu-
nications, a key ICT vendor attached to the Ministry of Electronics, to 
exhibit and sell Intel products (Electronic Times 1994).
Enabling Intel’s more aggressive stance toward selling its more 
advanced products in China was the end of the Cold War and the dis-
banding in March 1994 of COCOM. Included among the products 
that had been embargoed by COCOM was Intel’s Pentium chip. In 
December 1994 Intel held seminars in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, 
Chengdu, and Xian to reveal, in the words of a Reuters reporter, “the 
Pentium’s sensitive operational guts to Chinese software developers” 
(Parker 1994b).
On his trip to Shanghai to launch IADL, Andrew Grove, Intel’s 
CEO, announced that the company was exploring the possibility of 
opening up a wholly owned chip factory in China (Pei 1994), and by 
the following June plans for such a plant had been hatched (Newsbytes 
1995). One report on the project noted that “Intel is planning to pull 
out its expatriates as soon as possible in view of installing Chinese in 
key executive positions. Hence, management training is expected to 
become a priority for the American company” (ESP Report on Engi-
neering Construction and Operations in the Developing World 1995).
Run by Intel Technology (China) Company Limited and located in 
Shanghai’s Pudong Development Zone, the facility went into operation 
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at the beginning of 1998, assembling and testing fl ash memory chips 
for export. The plant quickly became the largest exporter among MNCs 
in Pudong and had 800 employees by 2000. Construction was under-
way to increase Intel’s Shanghai factory space from 120,000 to 500,000 
square meters (Asia Pulse 2000), and by the time the expansion came 
on line, Intel had spent about $500 million on it (AsiaPort Daily News 
2001). In 2004 Intel had three assembly and test facilities in Shanghai 
with 2,000 people on their payrolls out of a total of 2,400 Intel China 
employees across the country (Heim 2004). 
In 1997 Intel had moved its regional sales functions from Hong 
Kong to Beijing to better position itself to tap into China’s growing 
market opportunities (LaPedus 1997). The following year, also in Bei-
jing, the company set up Intel China Research Center (ICRC), its fi rst 
research facility in the Asia-Pacifi c region. According to Intel’s Web 
site, the mission of ICRC is to “empower the future of the digital world 
through research and platform innovations, and drive strategic technol-
ogy collaborations with Chinese government, academia and industry” 
(Intel 2008a). 
One such collaboration, begun in 1999, was with Legend Holdings 
to expand the use of the Internet in China. Legend was the fi rst Chinese 
PC maker to which Intel supplied chips; the two companies had been 
working together closely since the mid-1990s, with Intel pushing Leg-
end to increase the power of its PCs. Indeed, in 1998 Legend ceremoni-
ously presented its millionth PC to Intel CEO Andrew Grove (O’Neill 
1998). Now the two companies would work together to upgrade the 
speed of computer terminals as well as the capacity and applications 
of servers in China’s broadband network (Reuters News 1999b). They 
took the collaboration further when, in 2003, they opened the Intel-
Lenovo Technology Advancement Center in Beijing for home network-
ing and security applications (Xinhua Financial Network 2003). Nev-
ertheless, less than a year later, Lenovo announced that it would use 
microprocessors from AMD, Intel’s longtime rival, in two of its new 
consumer PCs (Asia in Focus 2004). At the time Lenovo said that it was 
not considering using AMD chips for commercial PCs and servers. In 
2006, however, Lenovo did just that as it used AMD microprocessors in 
PCs designed for businesses (Evers 2006). 
In 2000 Intel placed IADL (now called Intel Architecture Labs), 
ICRC, and other Intel support centers under the umbrella of Intel China 
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Labs (Asiainfo Daily China News 2000; Hou 2000). By the mid 2000s, 
Intel was involved in a wide variety of government, academic, and 
industrial collaborations, many of them focused on wireless technology. 
In June 2005 the company created the $200 million Intel Capital China 
Technology Fund to invest in Chinese technology companies in areas 
related to Intel’s strategic interests (Business Wire 2005). In September 
2005 Intel launched Asia-Pacifi c Research and Development Limited in 
Shanghai’s Zizhu Science Park, with prospective employment of 1,000 
people by the end of 2006 (M2 Presswire 2005). In January 2006, Intel 
China established an “Innovation Alliance,” initially with 22 Chinese 
high-tech companies including 10 computer manufacturers and 12 soft-
ware vendors and content providers. The innovation alliance, open to 
all Chinese ICT companies, would be used by Intel to offer member 
enterprises technical support and consulting services related to market 
surveys, product design, and application software (China Industry Dai-
ly News 2006).
In 2001 Intel had 90 percent of the Chinese microprocessor market 
(Young and Lin 2006). In 2002 the Chinese market became Intel’s sec-
ond largest, trailing only the United States (Young 2003). During the 
2000s China has been the company’s fastest growing market, notwith-
standing the fact that it has lost signifi cant market share to AMD. In 
2004 Intel’s China market share had fallen to 74 percent, down 16 points 
from 2001, while AMD’s increased from 5 percent to 18 percent over 
the same period (Young and Lin 2006). In 2007 AMD became the leader 
in microprocessors in China, with over a 50 percent share (China Daily 
2007).
In an interview in Beijing in 2004, Craig Barrett, Intel’s CEO, pro-
nounced that people in China “are capable of doing any engineering job, 
any software job, and managerial job that people in the U.S. are capable 
of doing” (Heim 2004). In 2005 Intel employed more than 5,000 peo-
ple in China, about 5 percent of its global labor force and a doubling 
of the Chinese employment level from 2004 (Wallace 2005). Most of 
these people worked in Intel’s four assembly and test factories—three 
in Shanghai and a fourth in Chengdu, in the southwestern province of 
Sichuan, which began operations in December 2005. In March 2005, 
Intel announced that it would build a second plant in Chengdu to come 
on line in 2007 (AFX International Focus 2005).
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As in Malaysia, virtually all of the people who Intel employs in Chi-
na are homegrown. An article published in 2006 in the Wall Street Jour-
nal provides an excellent description of how, in Chengdu—a low-cost 
location but one with little history of high-tech manufacturing—Intel 
recruited and trained, in collaboration with local universities, a labor 
force for its fi rst chip plant, and was in the process of doing the same 
for the second one (Ramstad and Juying 2006). The article also noted 
that with the completion of the second Chengdu plant, “the company 
has said it will build its next factory in yet another place where no other 
chip manufacturing exists: Vietnam.”14
GLOBAL LABOR FLOWS AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT
I began this chapter by asking, “With so many educated people 
coming from Asia to the United States for further graduate study and 
work experience, why are so many high-tech jobs going from the United 
States to the places from which these people are coming?” The answer 
is that the fl ows of people from East to West and jobs from West to 
East are complementary movements in the globalization of the high-
tech labor force as a dynamically evolving process. At an early stage 
of development, people go from East to West for graduate education 
and work experience through which they can build careers in a way not 
possible at home. Meanwhile jobs go from West to East in search of 
low-wage but nevertheless productive labor. Over time, through MNC 
investment in higher value-added activities, the quality of the indig-
enous labor force improves. As living standards rise in the East, some 
of its expatriates, now more educated and experienced from their time 
in the West, are lured back home. Indeed some of them will make the 
return trip to the East as employees of the companies for which they 
had worked in the West. If and when indigenous companies emerge 
in the East as global players, the need to go abroad for education and 
experience will be further reduced, while many of the most educated 
and experienced expatriates working in the West will come back home 
to assume leadership posts.
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Focusing mainly on Asian entrepreneurs who have spent time start-
ing or managing companies in Silicon Valley, Saxenian (2006, pp. 18–
21) has characterized these fl ows as “brain circulation,” an apt charac-
terization for the global career paths that increasing numbers of Asians 
are pursuing. As these “brains” circulate, their capabilities accumulate. 
What I have outlined in this chapter are the historical forces, beyond 
the desire of talented individuals to pursue challenging and rewarding 
careers, that created the global ICT labor force and that have enabled 
nations such as South Korea, Taiwan, India, and China to reap the 
returns on national investments in education by bringing large num-
bers of educated and experienced people back home. More important 
quantitatively, the growth dynamic that has been set in motion in these 
nations has generated domestic employment opportunities that are suf-
fi ciently challenging and rewarding that it is increasingly unnecessary 
for ambitious college graduates to go abroad to pursue careers.
These historical forces cannot be understood as “market forces.” 
Rather, as I have illustrated, their essence resides in a triad of invest-
ment strategies of MNCs engaged in FDI, national governments that 
construct indigenous S&T infrastructures, and indigenous companies 
that build on the investment strategies of foreign companies and domes-
tic governments to become world-class competitors in their own right. 
This triad takes as its historical starting point the existence of a national 
education system that created a highly educated labor supply in advance 
of domestic employment demand. In the absence of jobs at home, mar-
ket forces, aided by changes in U.S. immigration policy, directed this 
labor abroad, with brain drain as the result. By means of the investment 
triad, nations such as South Korea and Taiwan in effect confronted these 
market forces and helped to generate a dynamic of indigenous job cre-
ation that reversed the brain drain and transformed expatriate scientists 
and engineers from wasted investments into valuable resources. China 
and India are now doing the same.
The particular cases that I have examined reveal distinctive devel-
opment paths, depending on the relation over time of investment by 
foreign and indigenous enterprises. In the cases of Motorola in South 
Korea, Intel in Malaysia, and TI in India, U.S.-based MNCs invested 
early and then upgraded and expanded their investments over substantial 
periods of time. In addition, great emphasis was placed on the almost 
exclusive employment of indigenous engineers and managers in each 
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case, creating some of the fi rst attractive opportunities for nationals to 
pursue high-tech careers at home. 
In the case of South Korea, indigenous investments by government 
and business have driven the development of domestic high-tech capa-
bilities since the late 1980s. Samsung in particular has emerged as a 
world leader in ICT. In the 2000s these indigenous investments are cre-
ating new opportunities for high-end investment by MNCs in South 
Korea, including new investments by a company, Motorola, that has 
been doing business there for more than 40 years. In contrast, in the 
absence of leading indigenous ICT companies, Malaysia’s growth still 
remains highly dependent on the upgrading strategies of MNCs such as 
Intel, with scant impetus for indigenous innovation.
For U.S. high-tech MNCs, the inducement to invest in India was 
never low-wage, low-skill labor. What fi rst attracted TI to India in 
the mid-1980s was the availability of highly educated engineers and 
programmers who also happened to have relatively low wages. Over 
time TI expanded and upgraded its Indian operations, employing larger 
numbers of educated workers to design increasingly complex products. 
Two decades after TI came to Bangalore, India is experiencing a growth 
dynamic in which, with both skill levels and wages rising, indigenous 
companies such as TCS, Wipro, and Infosys are taking the lead, and in 
which MNCs continue to be attracted to India more for the high quality 
of its ICT labor supply than for its low cost. 
A similar process of indigenous innovation has been taking place in 
China, but with the difference being that indigenous Chinese companies 
such as Lenovo and Founder, the leading Chinese electronic publishing 
company (Lu 2000, chap.4; Lu and Lazonick 2001), have emerged to 
serve the growing Chinese consumer and business markets, drawing 
upon the capital goods expertise of MNCs such as Intel, TI, Motor-
ola, and HP to develop higher-quality, lower-cost products. Lenovo 
and Founder are prime examples of indigenous companies that have 
become leading competitors not only in China but also internationally. 
In the communications technology sector, Huawei Technologies and 
ZTE are doing the same (Feng and Zhang 2008). Although there are 
large numbers of Chinese ICT employees who have acquired higher 
education and work experience in the United States, the vast majority 
have been receiving that education and experience in China. 
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Given the growth dynamic that has taken hold in these nations, 
sheer size ensures that Indians and Chinese will dominate the expan-
sion of the global ICT labor supply. Combined, the population of India 
and China is 33 times that of South Korea and Taiwan. India and China 
have rapidly growing home markets that both provide domestic demand 
for the products of indigenous companies and give their governments 
leverage with MNCs in gaining access to advanced technology as a 
condition for FDI. While India and China offer indigenous scientists 
and engineers rapidly expanding employment opportunities at home, 
vast numbers of their educated populations are studying and work-
ing abroad. Aided by the liberalization of U.S. immigration policy, the 
global career path is much more of a “mass” phenomenon for Indian 
and Chinese scientists and engineers than it has been for the Koreans 
and Taiwanese. History tells us that more and more Indian and Chinese 
high-tech labor, following global career paths, will migrate back to the 
places whence they came. The globalization of the high-tech labor force 
and the sustained development of India and China have gone, and will 
continue to go, hand in hand.
What are the implications of the globalization of the ICT labor force 
for employment opportunities in a high-wage country such as the Unit-
ed States? “Offshoring” has been a major political issue in the United 
States in the 2000s (see Hira and Hira 2005) precisely because of the 
globalization of the ICT labor force, whose evolution I have just ana-
lyzed. Responding to a reporter who in late 2003 asked what job pros-
pects in Silicon Valley would look like in three years, the ever-quotable 
Craig Barrett stated, “Companies can still form in Silicon Valley and be 
competitive around the world, It’s just that they are not going to create 
jobs in Silicon Valley” (Merritt 2004). In 2004 Barrett had this to say: 
As CEO of Intel, my allegiance is to the shareholders of Intel and 
to the success of the company. We go after the most cost-effective 
resources around the world, no matter where they are. [However,] 
as an American citizen, I would have to be worried about whether 
jobs that are created are created outside the U.S. . . . As a citizen, I 
see all these resources and I think this puts my country in danger. 
(Heim 2004)
Subsequently Barrett served as a member of the U.S. National Acad-
emy of Sciences’ Committee on Prospering in the Global Economy of 
the 21st Century (CPGE), which delved into defi ciencies in the devel-
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opment of science and engineering capabilities in the United States 
(CPGE 2007). Notwithstanding his obvious concern about these prob-
lems from a public policy perspective, on a radio talk show in February 
2006 Barrett remarked, “Companies like Intel can do perfectly well in 
the global marketplace without hiring a single U.S. employee.”15
Notes
 1. These data are drawn from the companies’ global citizenship reports, available on 
their Web sites.
 2. These data are drawn from 10-K fi lings.
 3.  The H-1 visa for foreigners of “distinguished merit and ability” became known as 
the H-1B visa when a special category of H-1A visas was created for registered 
nurses under the Immigration Nursing Relief Act of 1989 (Mailman and Yale-
Loehr 2003).
 4. The relevant fi scal year runs from October 1 to September 30.
 5. Of the 65,000 visas that can be issued annually, 6,800 are set aside for Chile and 
Singapore under the terms of U.S. trade agreements with those countries. If any of 
these 6,800 visas are unused, they are added to the next year’s visa cap.
 6. This information is available at Senator Grassley’s Web site at http://grassley
.senate.gov/issues/upload/03072008.pdf.
 7. Behrman and Wallender (1976, pp. 300–302) provide details on the internal career 
paths followed by managers of the manufacturing units between 1967 and 1974.
 8. In 1985 KIET merged with the Korea Electrotechnology and Telecommunications 
Research Institute to become the Electronics and Telecommunications Research 
Institute (ETRI).
 9. Over this four-year period, total Korean R&D expenditures tripled while GNP 
more than doubled, with R&D expenditure as a proportion of GNP rising from 
0.67 to 0.95 (Arnold 1988).
 10. See the KAIST Web site: http://www.kaist.edu/as_intro/as_nt_facts/as_ft_gnr/as_
ft_gnr.html. There is also an English link to an overview of KAIST at http://www
.kaist.edu/edu.html. The undergraduates went to Korea Institute of Technology, 
which merged with KAIST in 1989.
 11. The end of the fi scal year is March 31 for Infosys, Satyam, TCS, and Wipro, and 
June 30 for HCL. Note that given the accounting fraud scandal at Satyam that 
came to light in January 2009, the Satyam revenue and employment fi gures may 
be overstated.
 12. ATP trade data are available from the U.S. Census Bureau (2008e).
 13. For a study of the evolution of Lenovo that is complementary to the earlier study 
by Lu (2000, chap. 3), see Xie and White (2004).
 14. See also Hopfner (2007). Intel’s $1 billion plant in Ho Chi Minh City, with a 
capacity for 600 million chip sets per year, was slated to begin production in Sep-
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tember 2009 with 500 engineers, increasing to 1,000 by the end of 2009. After a 
three-year ramp-up, Intel expects to employ 4,000 at the Vietnam plant. 
 15. Craig Barrett, interviewed by Tom Ashbrook, On Point, WBUR, February 11, 
2006. 
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The Quest for Shareholder Value
NEBM AND THE STOCK MARKET
The globalization of the ICT labor force need not necessarily create 
employment problems for members of the U.S. ICT labor force. A nation 
such as the United States is in a prime position to both contribute to and 
gain from globalization. With taxpayers’ money, the U.S. government 
has supported, and continues to support, the building of the world’s 
most formidable high-tech knowledge base. The United States has, and 
will continue to have, the world’s leading universities for research and 
education in science and technology. Based in the United States are 
many of the world’s most powerful high-tech companies. In the 2000s 
these high-tech companies have in general been very profi table, in part 
because of their ability to take advantage of the opportunities opened 
up by globalization. As the rest of the world develops, a combination 
of government investments in the knowledge base and business invest-
ments in innovative products and processes should be able to create 
employment opportunities in high-value-added activities that can make 
full use of the productivity and creativity of the U.S. high-tech labor 
force. 
But what happens if the ideology prevails that only the private sec-
tor makes productive contributions to economic growth, thus undermin-
ing the longstanding developmental role of government in the United 
States? And what happens if the ideology prevails that the primary if 
not sole purpose of the so-called private sector is to create value for 
shareholders, thus distributing corporate resources to those participants 
in the corporate economy who (as I will show in this chapter) contribute 
least? Indeed, what happens if the executives who run these corpora-
tions fi nd that by allocating resources in ways that purportedly “maxi-
mize shareholder value,” they can become superrich even as many of 
the well-educated and experienced people who have worked long and 
hard for these companies face employment insecurity and the erosion of 
their accumulated human capital? 
Lazonick.indb   197 7/31/2009   8:42:55 AM
198   Lazonick
“What happens?” has happened. We see it in the explosion, and 
reexplosion, of top executive pay, which has been a topic of socioeco-
nomic conversation for the past three decades. We see it in the Bush 
administration’s tax cuts for the rich through the Jobs and Growth Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, a piece of legislation that in its very 
title promised that a reduction of the dividends and capital gains tax 
rates to 15 percent would redound to the benefi t of the U.S. economy 
as a whole. We see it in the trillions of dollars of stock repurchases that 
U.S. companies have done in the 2000s in an effort to jack up their 
stock prices. And we see it in the decline of the middle class, including 
educated and experienced men and women in their 40s, 50s, and 60s 
whose careers were supposed to lift them into the upper middle class 
or beyond.
The underlying economic ideology that has supported this mode 
of resource allocation is the argument—now taken as a law of nature 
within the U.S. business community—that maximizing shareholder 
value results in superior economic performance. It is an ideology that 
came to the fore in the 1980s as overextended Old Economy com-
panies restructured in the face of new global competition (Lazonick 
and O’Sullivan 2000a). In doing so, these corporations shifted from a 
“retain and reinvest” resource allocation regime, in which they retained 
corporate employees in career jobs and reinvested corporate revenues 
in new products and processes, to a “downsize and distribute” regime, 
in which they downsized their labor forces and distributed corporate 
revenues to shareholders to an unprecedented extent in the forms of not 
only cash dividends but also stock buybacks. 
If Old Economy downsize-and-distribute had been the only alloca-
tion regime in town, the sustainability of this mode of allocating cor-
porate revenues would have reached its limits in the early 1990s—as 
indeed seemed to be the case in the white-collar recession of the early 
1990s and the jobless recovery that followed. The longest stock market 
boom in U.S. history could not have been sustained if it had depended 
solely, or even primarily, on the downsizing of the labor force and the 
distribution of corporate revenues to shareholders. Over the long run, 
the superior performance of the corporation, as refl ected ultimately in a 
sustained upward movement of its stock price, requires innovation.
Fortunately for the growth of the U.S. economy, there was another 
allocation regime being practiced in the emerging New Economy. It 
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was a variation of the retain-and-reinvest regime that had been in force 
in the Old Economy, with the major difference in the 1980s and 1990s 
being that New Economy companies retained almost all of their profi ts 
to invest in corporate growth, often not even paying cash dividends. 
These companies did not, however, retain their labor forces in systems 
of career employment. Rather, for the economic and technological rea-
sons that I have explained in this book, NEBM favored the employment 
of younger workers, using fl exible employment arrangements.
The performance of New Economy companies in the 1980s and the 
1990s gave Americans reason to believe in the possibility of sustain-
able prosperity. As we have seen, during these decades U.S. households 
became more dependent on the stock market as a source of income, espe-
cially for the retirement years. Given this dependency, the notion that 
business corporations should maximize shareholder value sounded like a 
slogan that was good for people’s wealth. It was the rise and consolida-
tion of NEBM in the most innovative sectors of the economy that ensured 
the ultimate triumph of this ideology of corporate resource allocation. 
Not only did New Economy innovation sustain the stock market 
boom in the 1980s and 1990s but it also, as I showed in Chapter 2, fos-
tered a mode of business organization in which the stock market played 
a number of central functions in mobilizing capital and labor as well as 
in enabling the growth of the fi rm. A highly liquid stock market was an 
inducement for venture capital to invest in highly uncertain products 
and processes. To help ensure a high level of returns from these invest-
ments, the high-tech lobby, representing the AeA and the NVCA, has 
led the successful fi ght for a lower tax regime in the name of innovative 
enterprise since the late 1970s. The stock market also made possible, in 
the form of broad-based employee stock option plans, the key mode of 
remuneration that New Economy start-ups used to attract professional, 
technical, and administrative employees away from secure employment 
at established Old Economy companies. Having thus mobilized capital 
and labor, a high-tech start-up then sought to develop a product that 
would enable it to do an IPO. Once listed on the stock market, New 
Economy companies reinvested their earnings in the growth of the fi rm. 
When successful, their stock prices rose, thus making their stock a more 
valuable “currency” for not only attracting and retaining employees but 
also acquiring other, typically even younger, technology fi rms without 
expending cash.
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That was the story of the 1980s and 1990s. That is not the case in 
the 2000s. The leading New Economy companies, as well as companies 
such as HP and IBM that successfully made the transition to NEBM, 
have ample productive capabilities. The allocation of resources in these 
companies no longer, however, follows a retain-and-reinvest regime, 
even of the NEBM variety. Rather, these companies, now considered 
mature, are in the forefront of a mode of corporate resource allocation 
that focuses on buying back their own outstanding shares for the sake 
of supporting their stock prices. As I will show in this chapter and the 
next, it is the American middle class that is paying the price (see also 
Lazonick 2008c,d).
MAXIMIZING SHAREHOLDER VALUE
In all of the richest economies, business corporations are reposito-
ries of large, and in many cases vast, quantities of resources over which 
corporate managers, rather than markets, exercise allocative control. 
Indeed, it can be argued that corporate control, as distinct from mar-
ket control, of resource allocation represented the defi ning institutional 
characteristic of twentieth-century capitalist economies (Chandler 
1977, 1990). Whereas the conventional theory of the market economy 
maintains that markets should allocate resources to achieve superior 
economic performance, the actual pervasiveness of corporate control 
over resource allocation demands a theory of the ways in which corpo-
rate governance affects economic performance.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the argument that maximizing share-
holder value results in superior economic performance came to domi-
nate the corporate governance debates. This shareholder-value perspec-
tive represents an attempt to construct a theory of corporate governance 
that is consistent with the neoclassical theory of the market economy. 
Like the theory of the market economy, however, the shareholder-value 
perspective lacks a theory of innovative enterprise (see Lazonick 2003b, 
2006; O’Sullivan 2000a). As a result, the shareholder-value perspec-
tive on corporate governance fails to comprehend how and under what 
conditions the corporate allocation of resources supports investment in 
innovation at the level of the business enterprise and contributes to the 
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achievement of stable and equitable growth at the level of the economy 
as a whole.
For adherents of the theory of the market economy, “market imper-
fections”—for example, “asset specifi city” in the work of Oliver Wil-
liamson (1985, 1996)—necessitate managerial control over the alloca-
tion of resources, thus creating an “agency problem” for those “prin-
cipals” who have made investments in the fi rm. The agency problem 
derives from two limitations, one cognitive and the other behavioral, on 
the human ability to make allocative decisions. The cognitive limitation 
is “hidden information” (also known as “adverse selection” or “bounded 
rationality”) which prevents investors from knowing a priori whether 
the managers whom they have employed as their agents are good or 
bad resource allocators. The behavioral limitation is “hidden action” 
(also known as “moral hazard” or “opportunism”) which refl ects the 
proclivity, inherent in an individualistic society, of managers as agents 
to use their positions as resource allocators to pursue their own self-
interests and not necessarily the interests of the fi rm’s principals. These 
managers may allocate corporate resources to build their own personal 
empires regardless of whether the investments that they make and the 
people whom they employ generate suffi cient profi ts for the fi rm. They 
may hoard surplus cash or near-liquid assets within the corporation, 
thus maintaining control over uninvested resources, rather than distrib-
uting these extra revenues to shareholders. Or they may simply use their 
control over resource allocation to line their own pockets. According 
to agency theory, in the absence of corporate governance institutions 
that promote the maximization of shareholder value, one should expect 
managerial control to result in the ineffi cient allocation of resources.
The manifestation of a movement toward the more effi cient alloca-
tion of resources, it is argued, is a higher return to shareholders. But 
why is it shareholders for whom value should be maximized? Why not 
create more value for creditors by making their fi nancial investments 
more secure, or for employees by paying them higher wages and ben-
efi ts, or for communities in which the corporations operate by generat-
ing more corporate tax revenues? Neoclassical fi nancial theorists argue 
that among all the stakeholders in the business corporation only share-
holders are “residual claimants.” The amount of returns that sharehold-
ers receive depends on what is left over after other stakeholders—all 
of whom, it is argued, have guaranteed contractual claims—have been 
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paid for their productive contributions to the fi rm. If the fi rm incurs a 
loss, the return to shareholders is negative, and vice versa. 
By this argument, shareholders are the only stakeholders who 
have an incentive to bear the risk of investing in productive resources 
that may result in superior economic performance (O’Sullivan 2000b, 
2002). As residual claimants, moreover, shareholders are the only stake-
holders who have an interest in monitoring managers to ensure that 
they allocate resources effi ciently. Furthermore, by selling and buying 
corporate shares on the stock market, public shareholders, it is argued, 
are the participants in the economy who are best situated to reallocate 
resources to more effi cient uses. The agency problem—the fact that 
public shareholders, as the (purported) principals who bear risk, are 
obliged to leave the corporate allocation of resources under the control 
of managers as their “agents”—poses a constant threat to the effi cient 
allocation of resources. 
Within the shareholder-value paradigm, the stock market represents 
the corporate governance institution through which the agency problem 
can be resolved and the effi cient allocation of the economy’s resources 
can be achieved. Specifi cally, the stock market can function as a “mar-
ket for corporate control” that enables shareholders to “disgorge”—to 
use Michael Jensen’s evocative term—the “free cash fl ow.” As Jensen 
(1986, p. 323), a leading academic proponent of maximizing sharehold-
er value, put it in a seminal 1986 article,
Free cash fl ow is cash fl ow in excess of that required to fund all 
projects that have positive net present values when discounted at 
the relevant cost of capital. Confl icts of interest between share-
holders and managers over payout policies are especially severe 
when the organization generates substantial free cash fl ow. The 
problem is how to motivate managers to disgorge the cash rath-
er than investing it at below cost or wasting it on organization 
ineffi ciencies.
How can those managers who control the allocation of corporate 
resources be motivated, or coerced, to distribute cash to shareholders? 
If a company does not maximize shareholder value, shareholders can 
sell their shares and reallocate the proceeds to what they deem to be 
more effi cient uses. The sale of shares depresses that company’s stock 
price, which in turn facilitates a takeover by shareholders who can put 
in place managers who are willing to distribute the free cash fl ow to 
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shareholders in the forms of higher dividends and/or stock repurchases. 
Better yet, as Jensen (1986, p. 324) argued in the midst of the 1980s 
corporate takeover movement, let corporate raiders use this “market 
for corporate control” for debt-fi nanced takeovers, thus enabling share-
holders to transform their corporate equities into corporate bonds. Cor-
porate managers would then be “bonded” to distribute the “free cash 
fl ow” in the form of interest rather than dividends. Additionally, as 
Jensen and Murphy (1990), among others, contended, the maximiza-
tion of shareholder value could be achieved by giving corporate man-
agers stock-based compensation, such as stock options, to align their 
own self-interests with those of shareholders. Then, even without the 
threat of a takeover, these managers would have a personal incentive 
to maximize shareholder value by investing corporate revenues only in 
those “projects that have positive net present values when discounted at 
the relevant cost of capital” (Jensen 1986, p. 323) and distributing the 
remainder of corporate revenues to shareholders in the forms of divi-
dends and/or stock repurchases.
A CRITIQUE OF THE SHAREHOLDER-VALUE 
PERSPECTIVE
During the 1980s and 1990s, maximizing shareholder value became 
the dominant ideology for corporate governance in the United States, 
and through a variety of institutional channels gained acceptance around 
the world. Top managers of U.S. industrial corporations became ardent 
advocates of this perspective; quite apart from their ideological predis-
positions, the reality of their stock-based compensation enticed them to 
maximize shareholder value (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000a; see also 
Chapter 2). The long stock market boom of the 1980s and 1990s com-
bined with the remuneration decisions of corporate boards to create this 
bonanza for corporate executives. During the decade of the 1970s, the 
stock market had languished, and infl ation had eroded dividend yields. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, however, as shown in Chapter 1 (see Table 
1.2), high real yields on corporate stock characterized the U.S. corpo-
rate economy. 
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These high yields came mainly from stock-price appreciation as 
distinct from dividend yields, which were low in the 1990s despite high 
payout ratios. The form of yield is important to the mode of sharehold-
ing. A dividend yield provides the shareholder with an income by hold-
ing the stock, and hence promotes stable shareholding. A price yield, 
in contrast, can only be reaped if the shareholder sells his or her stock. 
When executives, or any other employees, exercise their stock options, 
they have an interest in selling the stock to lock in the gains. (Other-
wise, unless they are at the end of the typical 10-year exercise period, 
they would have delayed the exercise of the options.) High price yields 
and high levels of executive stock-based compensation, therefore, go 
hand in hand.
It should be noted that, as a whole, U.S. corporations were not 
skimping on dividends in the 1980s and 1990s. It is simply that when 
a company’s stock price increases, its dividend yield—the amount of 
dividends paid out as a percentage of the stock price—will fall unless 
the amount of dividends increases proportionately. In the 1980s divi-
dends paid out by U.S. corporations increased by an annual average of 
10.8 percent, while after-tax corporate profi ts increased by an annual 
average of 8.7 percent. In the 1990s these fi gures were 8.0 percent for 
dividends (including an absolute decline in dividends of 4.0 percent in 
1999, the fi rst decline since 1975) and 8.1 percent for profi ts. The pay-
out ratio—the amount of dividends as a percentage of after-tax corpo-
rate profi ts (with inventory evaluation and capital consumption adjust-
ments)—averaged 48.4 percent in the 1980s and 56.5 percent in the 
1990s compared with 38.8 percent in the 1960s and 41.3 percent in the 
1970s. From 2000 to 2007, the payout ratio was 60.5 percent, including 
a record 66.2 percent in 2007. During the fi rst three quarters of 2008, 
the payout ratio shot up even higher, to 73.3 percent (U.S. Congress 
2009, Table B-90). 
High stock yields refl ected a combination of three distinct forces at 
work in the U.S. corporate economy in the 1980s and 1990s: 1) manipu-
lation of the distribution of income in favor of shareholders, especially 
by older corporations, through a combination of downsizing of the labor 
force and increased distributions to shareholders in the forms of cash 
dividends and stock repurchases; 2) innovation, especially by newer 
technology companies, that boosted earnings per share; and 3) specula-
tion by stock market investors, encouraged, initially at least, by stock 
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price increases due to the combination of manipulation and innovation. 
An understanding of these three determinants of stock-price move-
ments is essential for a critical evaluation of the claim that maximizing 
shareholder value results in superior economic performance. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, older companies, many with their origins in 
the late nineteenth century, engaged in a process of redistributing cor-
porate revenues from labor incomes to capital incomes. Engaging in a 
downsize-and-distribute allocation regime, these companies downsized 
their labor forces and increased the distribution of corporate revenues 
to shareholders (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000a). As indicated earlier, 
this allocation regime represented a reversal of the retain-and-reinvest 
regime that had characterized these companies in the post–World War 
II decades. Companies had retained corporate revenues for reinvest-
ment in organization and technology, expanding their labor forces in 
the process. Coming into the 1980s, employees—both managerial per-
sonnel and shop-fl oor workers—had expectations, based on over three 
decades of experience of a retain-and-reinvest regime, of long-term 
employment with these corporations (Lazonick 2004a, 2007e). Down-
sizing augmented the so-called free cash fl ow that could be distributed 
to shareholders. In the early and mid-1980s, this redistribution of cor-
porate revenues often occurred through debt-fi nanced hostile takeovers, 
which were favored by the proponents of the “market for corporate con-
trol.” Posttakeover downsizing facilitated the servicing and retirement 
of the massive debt that a company had taken on (Blair 1993; Shleifer 
and Summers 1988). 
Since the mid-1980s, the distribution of corporate revenues to share-
holders increasingly has taken the form of corporate stock repurchases. 
As shown in Figure 6.1, net equity issues of nonfi nancial business cor-
porations as well as commercial banks and insurance companies, taken 
as a group, were negative in every year from 1994 through 2007. In the 
Internet boom years of 1997–2000, the extent of this “negative cash 
function” of the stock market increased markedly as many companies 
sought to use repurchases to augment the positive impact of stock-mar-
ket speculation on stock prices. Measured in 2007 dollars, net equity 
issues for nonfi nancial corporations, banks, and insurers combined bot-
tomed out at about −$300 billion in 1998 before rising to −$49 billion 
in 2003, the highest level in real terms since 1993. Since then, however, 
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net equity issues have plunged to unprecedented negative levels, reach-
ing −$896 billion in 2007 (Figure 6.1). 
This “disgorging” of the corporate cash fl ow manifests a decisive 
triumph of agency theory and its shareholder-value ideology in the 
determination of corporate resource allocation. Later, we shall look 
directly at the role of stock buybacks among the companies included in 
the S&P 500 Index in driving these massive distributions to sharehold-
ers. And then, by considering stock repurchases by leading ICT com-
panies, I shall raise the question of whether the cash fl ow that has thus 
been disgorged has really been “free.” 
By creating new value, innovation also boosted company stock 
prices. In contrast, manipulation transferred value from labor incomes 
to capital incomes, raising the stock price as, for example, workers were 
laid off and wages and benefi ts were reduced, with no new value being 
created. During the 1980s and 1990s, newer technology companies 
such as Intel, Microsoft, Oracle, Sun Microsystems, and Cisco Systems 
experienced signifi cant growth in both revenues and employment by 
Figure 6.1  Net Corporate Equity Issues (billions of 2007 dollars) in the 
United States by Nonfi nancial Corporate Business and by 
Selected Financial Sectors, 1980–2007
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means of a retain-and-reinvest allocation regime; they retained corpo-
rate revenues, paying little if any dividends (although most of them did 
some stock repurchases during the 1990s), and reinvested earnings in 
innovative products and processes. In general, both the revenues and 
employment levels of these companies grew over this period, especial-
ly during the 1990s, and these companies were highly profi table (see 
Lazonick 2007b). Steadily rising stock prices refl ected the realization 
of the gains of innovative enterprise by these companies.
Sophisticated stock market investors recognized that the combina-
tion of manipulation and innovation provided a real foundation for stock 
price increases and speculated on further upward movements. Other, 
less knowledgeable investors followed suit. From the fourth quarter of 
1985 to the third quarter of 1987, and then more signifi cantly from the 
fi rst quarter of 1995 to the third quarter of 2000, speculation became an 
increasingly important factor in the rise of stock prices. Professional 
insiders, within corporations and on Wall Street, encouraged and gen-
erally gained from this speculation because of the existence of a long 
queue of unprofessional outsiders who bought shares at infl ated pric-
es, implicitly assuming that “greater fools” than themselves remained 
ready to buy the overpriced shares on the market. At some point, how-
ever, the greatest fools were left holding these shares, as happened in 
the fourth quarter of 1987 and, more profoundly, in the fourth quarter 
of 2000 when stock prices fell precipitously. With the continued fall in 
stock prices in 2001, the speculation that helped to sustain the longest 
bull run in U.S. stock market history was put to rest.
The “behavioral” school in fi nancial economics has recognized 
the importance of stock market speculation as a determinant of stock 
prices, but it has not in general embraced the greater fools perspective. 
For example, in a best-selling book published at the height of the Inter-
net boom, fi nancial economist Robert Shiller (2000) characterized the 
stock market bubble as “irrational exuberance.” Shiller (p. 18) made the 
assumption that all players in the stock market, professionals and non-
professionals, have access to the same information, implying that irra-
tional exuberance is a general phenomenon among stock-market inves-
tors. Yet the assumption is contradicted by widespread use of inside 
information by professionals, as revealed in stock-fraud investigations 
in the aftermath of the Internet crash as well as in documents produced 
in numerous class action lawsuits by shareholders who bought shares 
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and allegedly lost money because of false information provided by pro-
fessional insiders. Investigations by the SEC have revealed the wide-
spread corporate practices of backdating executive stock option awards 
to dates at which prices were lower and granting stock options to execu-
tives just ahead of good news announcements that could be expected to 
boost the company’s stock price, both of which served to increase the 
gains of corporate executives from stock options (Forelle and Bandler 
2006; Lie 2005). Insofar as insiders have the incentive and ability to 
manipulate stock market prices in these ways for their own personal 
gain, their exuberance is anything but irrational. 
Under the heading “Cultural Changes Favoring Business Success 
or the Appearance Thereof,” Shiller (2000, pp. 22–24) recognized, but 
in my view understated, the incentive that top corporate executives, as 
the ultimate professional insiders, had to contribute to speculation, giv-
en the importance of stock-based compensation to their pay packages. 
Ironically, after the crash, Michael Jensen chastised corporate execu-
tives for failing to say “no” to Wall Street, as, spurred on by the prospect 
of greater stock-based compensation, they had taken actions during the 
boom for the purpose of infl ating stock prices (Fuller and Jensen 2002). 
Corporate insiders had much to gain, moreover, from the volatile stock 
market, not only as prices rose but also as they fell; while the outsiders 
continued to buy, the insiders sold (e.g., see Gimein et al. 2002).
Especially in high-tech companies, it was not only top executives 
who stood to gain from an ebullient stock market. As I have shown in 
Chapter 2, by the 1980s and 1990s broad-based employee stock option 
plans had become widespread among newer technology companies, and 
by the late 1990s had diffused to many older corporations, not only in 
the United States but also abroad, that competed for this highly mobile 
labor (Carpenter, Lazonick, and O’Sullivan 2003; Glimstedt, Lazonick, 
and Xie 2006). Although top executives continued to get highly dis-
proportionate shares of the stock options that a company allocated, a 
broad base of the high-tech labor force, especially in high-tech indus-
tries, acquired a direct interest in corporate policies aimed at maximiz-
ing shareholder value.
But did this fi nancial behavior lead to a more effi cient allocation of 
resources in the economy, as the shareholder-value proponents claim? 
There are a number of fl aws in agency theory’s analysis of the relation 
between corporate governance and economic performance. These fl aws 
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have to do with three things: 1) a failure to explain how, historically, 
corporations came to control the allocation of signifi cant amounts of the 
economy’s resources; 2) the measure of free cash fl ow; and 3) the claim 
that only shareholders have “residual claimant” status. These fl aws 
stem from the fact that agency theory, like the neoclassical theory of 
the market economy in which it is rooted, lacks a theory of innovative 
enterprise. These fl aws are, moreover, amply exposed by the history 
of the industrial corporation in the United States, the national context 
in which agency theory evolved and in which it is thought to be most 
applicable. 
Agency theory makes an argument for taking resources out of the 
control of ineffi cient managers without explaining how, historically, 
corporations came to possess the vast amounts of resources over which 
these managers could exercise allocative control. As far back as the 
fi rst decades of the twentieth century, the separation of share owner-
ship from managerial control characterized U.S. industrial corporations 
(Berle and Means 1932). This separation occurred because the growth 
of innovative companies demanded that control over the strategic allo-
cation of resources to transform technologies and access new markets 
be placed in the hands of salaried professionals who understood the 
investment requirements of the particular lines of business in which 
the enterprise competed. At the same time, the listing of a company on 
a public stock exchange enabled the original owner-entrepreneurs to 
sell their stock to the shareholding public, and, thereby enriched, they 
were able to retire from their positions as top executives. The departing 
owner-entrepreneurs left control in the hands of senior salaried pro-
fessionals, most of whom had been recruited decades earlier to help 
to build the enterprises. The resultant disappearance of family owners 
from positions of strategic control enabled the younger generation of 
salaried professionals to view the particular corporations that employed 
them as ones in which, through dedicated work effort over the course of 
a career, they could potentially rise to the ranks of top management. 
With salaried managers exercising strategic control, innovative 
managerial corporations emerged as dominant in their industries dur-
ing the fi rst decades of the century (Chandler 1977, 1990). During the 
post–World War II decades, and especially during the 1960s conglom-
erate movement, however, many of these industrial corporations grew 
to be too big to be managed effectively (Lazonick 2004a). Top manag-
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ers responsible for corporate resource allocation became segmented, 
behaviorally and cognitively, from the organizations that would have to 
implement these strategies. Behaviorally, they came to see themselves 
as occupants of the corporate throne rather than as members of the 
corporate organization, and they became obsessed by the size of their 
own remuneration (e.g., see Crystal 1991; Patton 1988). Cognitively, 
the expansion of the corporation into a multitude of businesses made it 
increasingly diffi cult for top management to understand the particular 
investment requirements of any of them. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, moreover, many of these U.S. corporations 
faced intense foreign competition, especially from innovative Japanese 
corporations (which also, it should be noted, were characterized by a 
separation of share ownership from managerial control). An innovative 
response required governance institutions that would reintegrate U.S. 
strategic decision makers with the business organizations over which 
they exercised allocative control. Instead, with their strategic decision 
makers guided by the ideology of maximizing shareholder value and 
rewarded with stock options, what these established corporations got 
were managers who had a strong personal interest in boosting their com-
panies’ stock prices, even if the stock-price increase was accomplished 
by a redistribution of corporate revenues from labor incomes to capital 
incomes and even if the quest for stock-price increases undermined the 
productive capabilities that these companies had accumulated from the 
past (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000a).
Agency theory also does not address how, at the time when innova-
tive investments are made, one can judge whether managers are allo-
cating resources ineffi ciently. Any strategic manager who allocates 
resources to an innovative strategy faces technological, market, and 
competitive uncertainty. Technological uncertainty exists because the 
fi rm may be incapable of developing the higher quality processes and 
products envisaged in its innovative investment strategy. Market uncer-
tainty exists because, even if the fi rm succeeds in its development effort, 
future reductions in product prices and increases in factor prices may 
lower the returns that can be generated by the investments. Finally, even 
if a fi rm overcomes technological and market uncertainty, it still faces 
competitive uncertainty: the possibility that an innovative competitor 
will have invested in a strategy that generates an even higher-quality, 
lower-cost product that enables it to win market share. 
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One can state, as Jensen did, that the fi rm should only invest in 
“projects that have positive net present values when discounted at the 
relevant cost of capital.” But, quite apart from the problem of defi ning 
the “relevant cost of capital,” anyone who contends that, when com-
mitting resources to an innovative investment strategy, one can foresee 
the stream of future earnings required for the calculation of net present 
value knows nothing about the innovation process. It is far more plausi-
ble to argue that if corporate managers really sought to maximize share-
holder value according to this formula, they would never contemplate 
investing in innovative projects, given their highly uncertain returns 
(Baldwin and Clark 1992). 
Addressing the third point, it is simply not the case, as agency theory 
assumes, that all the fi rm’s participants other than shareholders receive 
contractually guaranteed returns according to their productive contribu-
tions. The argument that shareholders are the sole residual claimants is 
a deduction from the theory of the market economy. It does not, how-
ever, accord with the reality of the innovative enterprise. The argument 
that a party to a transaction receives contractually guaranteed returns 
may hold when, in an open, competitive market, one fi rm purchases 
a physical commodity as a productive input from another fi rm. But, 
as I elaborate on below, one cannot assume contractually guaranteed 
returns when the inputs are made available to business enterprises by 
the state. Nor can one make this assumption when the inputs are made 
available to the business enterprise in the form of the labor services of 
employees. Finally, once one recognizes that the innovative enterprise 
cannot be understood as a “nexus of contracts,” one can ask whether 
public shareholders actually perform the risk-bearing function that the 
proponents of agency theory claim.
Given its investments in productive resources, the state has residual 
claimant status. Any realistic account of economic development must 
take into account the joint role of the state in 1) making infrastructural 
investments that, given the required levels of fi nancial commitment and 
the inherent uncertainty of economic outcomes, business enterprises 
would not have made on their own; and 2) providing business enterpris-
es with subsidies that encourage investment in innovation. In terms of 
investment in new knowledge with applications to industry, the United 
States was the world’s foremost developmental state over the course of 
the twentieth century. As a prime example, it is impossible to explain 
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U.S. dominance in computers, microelectronics, software, and data 
communications without recognizing the role of government in making 
seminal investments that developed new knowledge and infrastructural 
investments that facilitated the diffusion of that knowledge (e.g., see 
Abbate 2000; National Research Council 1999). Nor can one explain 
U.S. dominance in biotechnology without recognizing the persistent 
investments of the National Institutes of Health in the knowledge base 
and the government subsidies provided to companies through legislation 
such as the Orphan Drug Act of 1983 (see Lazonick and Tulum 2008).
The U.S. government has made investments to augment the pro-
ductive power of the nation through federal, corporate, and university 
research labs that have generated new knowledge, as well as through 
educational institutions that have developed the capabilities of the 
future labor force. Business enterprises have made ample use of this 
knowledge and capability. Although these business enterprises may pay 
fees for these services—for example, the salary of an engineer whose 
education was supported in whole or in part by state funds—one would 
be hard put to show that there exists a nexus of contracts that guarantees 
the state a return on these investments for the productive contributions 
that the outputs of these investments make to the enterprises that use 
them. In effect, in funding these investments, the state (or more correct-
ly, its body of taxpayers) has borne the risk that the nation’s business 
enterprises would further develop and utilize these productive capabili-
ties in ways that would ultimately redound to the benefi t of the nation, 
but with the return to the nation in no way contractually guaranteed. 
In addition, the U.S. government has often provided cash subsi-
dies to business enterprises to develop new products and processes, or 
even to start new fi rms. Sometimes these subsidies have been built into 
the rates that fi rms in particular industries could charge as regulated 
monopolies. For selected industries, tariff protection has provided fi rms 
with the time to develop higher-quality, lower-cost products. The public 
has funded these subsidies through current taxes, by borrowing against 
the future, or by making consumers pay higher product prices for cur-
rent goods and services than would have otherwise prevailed. By defi -
nition, a subsidy lies beyond the realm of a market-mediated contract 
and is, in fact, defi ned as “a grant paid by a government to an enterprise 
that benefi ts the public” (Dictionary.com 2008). Multitudes of business 
enterprises have benefi ted from these subsidies without having to enter 
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into contracts with the public bodies that have granted them to remit a 
guaranteed return from the productive investments that the subsidies 
have helped to fi nance. 
Similar to the government, workers can also fi nd themselves in the 
position of having made investments in their own productive capabili-
ties which they supply to fi rms without a guaranteed contractual return. 
In an important contribution to the corporate governance debate, Mar-
garet Blair (1995) argued that, alongside a fi rm’s shareholders, workers 
should be accorded residual claimant status because they make invest-
ments in “fi rm-specifi c” human capital at one point in time with the 
expectation—but without a contractual guarantee—of reaping returns 
on those investments over the course of their careers. Moreover, insofar 
as their human capital is indeed fi rm-specifi c, these workers are depen-
dent on their current employer for generating returns on their invest-
ments. A lack of interfi rm labor mobility means that the worker bears 
some of the risk of the return on the fi rm’s productive investments, and 
hence can be considered a residual claimant. Blair goes on to argue 
that if one assumes, as the shareholder-value proponents do, that only 
shareholders bear risk and have residual claimant status, there will be 
an underinvestment in human capital to the detriment of not only work-
ers but the economy as a whole.
For those concerned about the propensity of U.S. corporations to 
downsize-and-distribute, Blair’s focus on investments in fi rm-specifi c 
human capital provides a stakeholder theory of the fi rm in which work-
ers as well as shareholders should be viewed as principals for whose 
benefi t the fi rm should be run. However, a corporate executive intent 
on downsizing his labor force could logically argue that the productive 
capabilities of workers in, say, their 50s who had made investments in 
fi rm-specifi c human capital earlier in their careers have now become old 
because of competition from equally adept but more energetic younger 
workers or, alternatively, have become obsolete because of technologi-
cal change. The executive could then argue that, in making investments 
in fi rm-specifi c human capital in the past, these (now) older workers 
had taken on the risk-bearing function, and, like any risk-bearing inves-
tor, must accept the possibility that their investments would at some 
point lose their market value. 
The workers could respond by arguing that the corporate execu-
tive is wrong—their accumulated capabilities are not old or obsolete, 
Lazonick.indb   213 7/31/2009   8:42:57 AM
214   Lazonick
but rather, given a correct understanding of technological, market, and 
competitive conditions in the industry, remain critical to the innovation 
process. They might even, as principals, accuse the executive (as their 
agent) of acting opportunistically, perhaps because he has stock options 
that align his interests with shareholders. They might claim that what 
the proposed downsizing actually entails is a redistribution of income 
from labor to capital rather than a restructuring of the workforce for the 
purpose of innovation. Clearly, even from the workers’ point of view, 
agency theory’s concerns with hidden information and hidden action 
on the part of managers are relevant. The problem is that agency theory 
provides no guide to analyzing whether or not the executive is in fact 
acting innovatively or opportunistically, because agency theory, like 
neoclassical economic theory more generally, has no theory of innova-
tive enterprise.
Investments that can result in innovation require the strategic allo-
cation of productive resources to particular processes to transform 
particular productive inputs into higher-quality, lower-cost products 
than those goods or services that were previously available at prevail-
ing factor prices. Investment in innovation is a direct investment that 
involves, fi rst and foremost, a strategic confrontation with technologi-
cal, market, and competitive uncertainty. Those who have the abilities 
and incentives to allocate resources to innovation must decide, in the 
face of uncertainty, what types of investments have the potential to 
generate higher-quality, lower-cost products. Then they must mobilize 
committed fi nance to sustain the innovation process until it generates 
the higher-quality, lower-cost products that permit fi nancial returns 
(Lazonick 2006). 
What role do public shareholders play in this innovation process? 
Do they confront uncertainty by strategically allocating resources to 
innovative investments? No. As portfolio investors, they diversify 
their fi nancial holdings across the outstanding shares of existing fi rms 
to minimize risk. They do so, moreover, with limited liability, which 
means that they are under no legal obligation to make further invest-
ments of “good” money to support previous investments that have gone 
bad. Indeed, even for these previous investments, the existence of a 
highly liquid stock market enables public shareholders to cut their loss-
es instantaneously by selling their shares—what has long been called 
the “Wall Street walk.”
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Without this ability to exit an investment easily, public shareholders 
would not be willing to hold shares of companies, the assets of which 
they exercise no direct allocative control over. It is the liquidity of a 
public shareholder’s portfolio investment that differentiates it from a 
direct investment, and indeed distinguishes the public shareholder from 
a private shareholder who, for lack of liquidity of his or her shares, 
must remain committed to his or her direct investment until it gener-
ates fi nancial returns. The modern corporation entails a fundamental 
transformation in the character of private property, as Berle and Means 
(1932) recognized. As property owners, public shareholders own trad-
able shares in a company that has invested in real assets; they do not 
own the assets themselves. 
Indeed, the fundamental role of the stock market in the United 
States in the twentieth century was to transform illiquid claims into liq-
uid claims on the basis of investments that had already been made, and 
thereby separate share ownership from managerial control. Business 
corporations sometimes do use the stock market as a source of fi nance 
for new investments, although the cash function has been most common 
in periods of stock market speculation, when the lure for public share-
holders to allocate resources to new issues has been the prospect of 
quickly “fl ipping” their shares to make a rapid, speculative return (see 
Lazonick and Tulum 2008; O’Sullivan 2004). Public shareholders want 
fi nancial liquidity; investments in innovation require fi nancial commit-
ment. It is only by ignoring the role of innovation in the economy, and 
the necessary role of insider control in the strategic allocation of corpo-
rate resources to innovation, that agency theory can argue that superior 
economic performance can be achieved by maximizing the value of 
those actors in the corporate economy who are the ultimate outsiders to 
the innovation process.
THE FIVE FUNCTIONS OF THE STOCK MARKET AND 
INNOVATIVE ENTERPRISE
A business enterprise seeks to transform productive resources into 
goods and services that can be sold to generate revenues. A theory of 
the fi rm, therefore, must, at a minimum, provide explanations for how 
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this productive transformation occurs and how revenues are obtained. 
Further, if such a theory purports to capture the essential reality of a 
modern capitalist economy, it must explain how, in competing for the 
same product markets, some fi rms are able to gain sustained competi-
tive advantage over others. For a perspective on corporate governance 
to have any claim to relevance for understanding how a fi rm achieves 
superior economic performance, it must be rooted in a theory of inno-
vative enterprise (for elaborations, see Lazonick 2006; Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan 2000b; O’Sullivan 2000a).
The innovation process is uncertain, collective, and cumulative. As a 
result, innovative enterprise requires strategy, organization, and fi nance 
(Lazonick 2006; O’Sullivan 2000a). The role of strategy is to confront 
uncertainty by allocating resources to investments that, by developing 
human and physical capabilities, can enable the fi rm to compete for 
specifi c product markets. The role of organization is to transform tech-
nologies and access markets to generate products that buyers want at 
prices that they are willing and able to pay. The role of fi nance is to 
sustain the accumulation of capabilities from the time at which invest-
ments in productive resources are made to the time at which fi nancial 
returns are generated through the sale of products. 
Innovation is a social process supported in certain times and plac-
es by what I call “social conditions of innovative enterprise.” Three 
distinct but interrelated social conditions—strategic control, organiza-
tional integration, and fi nancial commitment—can transform strategy, 
fi nance, and organization into social processes that result in innovation. 
The social conditions of innovative enterprise manifest themselves as 
social relations that, embedded in the business enterprise, are central to 
the performance of the fi rm. 
Strategic control gives decision makers the power to allocate the 
fi rm’s resources to confront the technological, market, and competitive 
uncertainties that are inherent in the innovation process. For innovation 
to occur, those who occupy strategic decision-making positions must 
have both the abilities and incentives to allocate resources to innova-
tive investment strategies. Their abilities to do so will depend on their 
knowledge of how the current innovative capabilities of the organiza-
tion over which they exercise allocative control can be enhanced by 
strategic investments in new, typically complementary, capabilities. 
Their incentives to do so will depend on the alignment of their personal 
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interests with the interests of the business organization in attaining and 
sustaining its competitive advantage. 
Those who exercise strategic control must be capable of under-
standing the technological, market, and competitive characteristics of 
the industries in which their fi rms are competing as well as the learn-
ing capabilities of the business organizations upon which they rely 
to implement their innovative investment strategies. This integration 
of strategic decision makers into the business organization can break 
down because the fi rm overextends itself by expanding into too many 
lines of business, as happened in the U.S. conglomerate movement of 
the 1960s. Those who exercise strategic control may no longer under-
stand the organizational and technological requirements of the innova-
tion process. If so, the corporate governance challenge is to fi nd ways of 
reintegrating strategic decision making with the learning organization. 
The social condition that can make an organization innovative is 
organizational integration, which is a set of relations that creates incen-
tives for people to apply their skills and efforts to generate higher-qual-
ity, lower-cost products than had previously been available. To devel-
op high-quality products, participants in the innovation process must 
engage in organizational learning. The more this learning is collective 
and cumulative, the higher the fi xed costs of the learning process. If 
investments in organizational learning are to be a source of competitive 
advantage rather than disadvantage, the enterprise must generate suf-
fi cient sales to transform the high fi xed costs of these investments into 
low unit costs (Lazonick 2006). Modes of compensation (in the forms 
of promotion, remuneration, and benefi ts) are important instruments for 
integrating individuals into the organization. To generate innovation, 
however, a mode of compensation cannot simply manage the labor mar-
ket by attracting and retaining employees. It must be part of a reward 
system that manages the productive processes that are the essence of 
innovation. Most importantly, the compensation system must motivate 
employees to engage in collective learning and to ensure a high level of 
utilization of the resultant productive capabilities. 
The social condition that enables fi nance to support the innovation 
process is fi nancial commitment, a set of relations that ensures the allo-
cation of funds to sustain the cumulative innovation process until it can 
generate fi nancial returns. What is often called “patient” capital enables 
the capabilities that derive from organizational learning to cumulate over 
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time, notwithstanding the inherent uncertainty that the innovation proc-
ess entails. Strategic control over internal revenues is the foundation of 
fi nancial commitment. The size and duration of investments in innovation 
that are required may demand that such “inside capital” be supplemented 
by external sources of fi nance such as stock issues, bond issues, or bank 
debt. In different times and places, depending on varying institutional 
arrangements, different types of external fi nance may be more or less 
committed to sustaining the innovation process (Lazonick 2007d).
Control over internal funds, leveraged if need be by external funds, 
enables corporate executives to commit to innovative investment strate-
gies of large size and long duration. Given the uncertain character of the 
innovation process, the full extent of fi nancial commitment required to 
generate higher-quality, lower-cost products is not known at the outset 
of an investment strategy but only unfolds over time. There will be 
cases in which corporate executives squander corporate resources on 
ill-conceived investment strategies, as agency theorists contend. Given 
the cumulative character of the innovation process, however, an invest-
ment strategy that at any point in time entails costs without generating 
returns may turn out to be successful at a later point in time. The corpo-
rate governance challenge is to evaluate the often-escalating demands 
of corporate executives for fi nancial commitment so that innovation is 
not nipped in the bud, while ensuring that good money is not thrown 
after bad.
Of central importance to the accumulation and transformation of 
capabilities in knowledge-intensive industries is the skill base in which 
the fi rm invests in pursuing its innovative strategy. Within the fi rm, dif-
ferent functional specialties and hierarchical responsibilities character-
ize the division of labor and defi ne the fi rm’s skill base. In the effort to 
generate collective and cumulative learning, those who exercise stra-
tegic control can choose how to structure the skill base, including how 
employees move around and up the enterprise’s functional and hier-
archical division of labor over the course of their careers. At the same 
time, however, the organization of the skill base will be constrained by 
both the particular learning requirements of the industrial activities in 
which the fi rm has chosen to compete and the alternative employment 
opportunities of the personnel whom the fi rm wants to employ. 
The innovative enterprise requires that those who exercise strategic 
control be able to recognize the competitive strengths and weaknesses 
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of their fi rm’s existing skill base and, hence, the changes in that skill 
base that will be necessary to mount an innovative response to competi-
tive challenges. These strategic decision makers must also be able to 
mobilize committed fi nance to sustain investment in the skill base until 
it can generate higher-quality, lower-cost products than were previously 
available. To build the types of organizations that can generate innova-
tion, corporate governance institutions must concern themselves with 
fi nancial commitment and strategic control.
What, then, is the role of the stock market in the innovative enter-
prise? Does it support or undermine the innovation process? How does 
the stock market infl uence strategic control, organizational integration, 
and fi nancial commitment? A research agenda that seeks answers to 
these questions must consider the ways in which a business enterprise 
actually makes use of the stock market. 
For the business enterprise, the stock market can perform fi ve dis-
tinct functions, which I have labeled alliteratively as 1) creation, 2) 
control, 3) combination, 4) compensation, and 5) cash (Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan 2004). 
• Creation. By providing a means to transform privately owned 
shares in a company into tradable securities, and thus facilitating 
the exit of fi nanciers from further participation in the new fi rms 
that they have funded, the stock market can encourage a fl ow of 
fi nance into venture creation. By providing the prospect of fi nan-
cial liquidity at a later point in time, therefore, the stock market 
can induce fi nancial commitment at an earlier point in time.
• Control. By enabling the selling and buying of shares, the stock 
market can affect the concentration or fragmentation of sharehold-
ing in a corporation, thus infl uencing the relation between owner-
ship of corporate assets and control over the allocation of cor-
porate resources. The stock market can therefore infl uence who 
exercises strategic control over corporate resource allocation.
• Combination. By giving corporate stock the status of an exchange 
currency, the stock market enables a corporation to tender its own 
stock, rather than cash, as a form of payment in mergers and ac-
quisitions (M&A). The stock market can therefore infl uence the 
fi nancial conditions that enable one company to gain strategic 
control over the resources of another company.
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• Compensation. By giving corporate stock the status of an ex-
change currency, the stock market enables a corporation to use 
its own stock, most typically in the form of stock options, as 
a form of compensation that can attract, retain, motivate, and 
reward employees. The stock market can therefore serve as a 
means of organizational integration.
• Cash. By providing liquidity to investments in a company while 
also limiting the liability of the owners of shares for the invest-
ments they make, the stock market increases the sources from 
which a company can raise cash that can be used to fund capital 
expenditures, pay off debt, cover operating expenses, or augment 
the corporate treasury. The stock market can therefore function 
directly as a source of fi nancial commitment.
The functions of the stock market have changed dramatically from 
OEBM, which prevailed among U.S. industrial corporations in the 
post–World War II decades, to NEBM, which evolved out of the Sili-
con Valley microelectronics industry of the 1960s and has consolidated 
its position as the predominant high-tech business model over the last 
decade or so (Carpenter, Lazonick, and O’Sullivan 2003; Lazonick 
2007b,c,e; Lazonick and Tulum 2008; O’Sullivan 2004, 2007, forth-
coming). For each of the fi ve functions of the stock market, let us look 
at these transformations in the dominant U.S. business model.
Creation
The creation function of the stock market can support innovation 
by inducing investors to commit fi nancial resources to highly uncertain 
new ventures with no immediate prospect of a fi nancial return. The stock 
market enables equity holders to exit from their investments through an 
IPO. The number of venture-backed IPOs in the United States aver-
aged 112 per year for 1987–1992, 180 for 1993–1998, 267 at the peak 
of the Internet boom in 1999–2000, and 55 for 2001–2007. Of these 
venture-backed IPOs, ICT accounted for 36 percent for 1987–1992, 50 
percent for 1993–1998, 81 percent for 1999–2000, and 44 percent for 
2001–2007.1 
Alternatively, equity holders can sell the fi rm in which they have 
invested to an established company in an M&A deal. The number of 
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venture-backed M&A deals in the United States averaged 27 per year 
for 1987–1992, 118 for 1993–1998, 289 for 1999–2000, and 357 for 
2001–2007. Of these venture-backed M&A deals, ICT accounted for 
49 percent for 1987–1992, 60 percent for 1993–1998, 73 percent for 
1999–2000, and 78 percent for 2001–2007. Although a well-developed 
stock market is not a necessary condition for such a deal, the presence 
of an active IPO market tends to raise the sale price because equity 
holders also have the possibility of exiting via an IPO. A stock-market 
listing by the established company also provides the acquirer with the 
option to make the purchase with its tradable (and hence liquid) stock 
rather than with cash.
Since the 1960s the creation function of the stock market has served 
as a powerful inducement for venture capitalists to back high-tech start-
ups. Well over two-thirds of the world’s venture capital is invested in 
the United States. California’s Silicon Valley is the world’s leading dis-
trict for venture capital, with 38 percent of the value of investments 
and 31 percent of the number of deals in the United States over the 
period from 2001 to 2007 (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008b). The pri-
macy of Silicon Valley in venture capital dates back to the 1960s and 
early 1970s when, as recounted in Chapter 2, it became involved in a 
proliferation of microelectronics start-ups. In 1973 the founding of the 
NVCA, with its main base in Silicon Valley, signaled that venture capi-
tal had emerged as an industry in its own right (Lazonick 2007b). 
It has been most advantageous for new ventures to do IPOs during 
periods of rampant stock market speculation: in the late 1920s, when 
aviation issues were hot; in the early 1960s, when electronics yielded 
glamor stocks; in the early 1980s, when microelectronics and biotech-
nology issues were the rage; and in the late 1990s, when the Internet rev-
olution generated the dot.com boom (Cassidy 2002; O’Sullivan 2007). 
During such periods, the prospect of a quick and lucrative IPO or M&A 
deal has generated too much of an inducement to venture creation, at 
the ultimate expense of the speculating public. The dot.com boom of 
the late 1990s was particularly problematic because of the extent to 
which U.S. households had become active participants in the highly 
liquid stock markets. Subsequent investigations by the New York State 
Attorney General and the SEC documented the extent to which Wall 
Street investment banks, as insiders, had privileged access to the new 
shares issued in IPOs and then quickly sold them to lock in gains, as 
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outsiders clamored to buy the stocks once they became traded on the 
stock market (e.g., see Chaffi n 2002a,b; Moore 2002; Teather 2002; 
Vickers and France 2002). 
Speculation in dot.coms and other Internet-related new ventures 
resulted in a redistribution of income from the investing public as out-
siders, be they day traders or unknowing households, who played the 
role of “greater fools” to Wall Street as insiders. In addition, on the 
supply side, such speculation caused problems for the accumulation of 
innovative capabilities. At technology start-ups, more effort was often 
devoted to getting to an IPO than to developing a commercializable 
product. Speculation could also disrupt the innovation process at estab-
lished high-tech companies when key technical and administrative per-
sonnel jumped ship to join start-ups as well as when top executives of 
established companies acquired technology start-ups in an attempt to 
convince the investing public that their companies had become New 
Economy and hence were worthy of higher stock prices (Carpenter, 
Lazonick, and O’Sullivan 2003; Lazonick and March 2008). 
Control
The integration of ownership and control in a new venture provides 
a powerful incentive for those who have an equity stake in the fi rm to 
succeed. These equity holders include not only founder-entrepreneurs 
and venture capitalists (who typically play an active role in determining 
the strategic direction of the company) but also employees who have 
equity stakes either in the form of shares or stock options. The stakes of 
these equity holders generally become much more valuable when the 
fi rm is able to do an IPO or M&A deal.
When a privately held company is acquired, asset ownership is sep-
arated from managerial control, although the former owner-managers 
of the company that is sold may stay on with the acquirer as executives 
and will often have equity stakes in the acquirer as a result of the sale. 
An IPO also inherently entails a degree of separation of ownership and 
control, with the extent of the separation depending on the dilution of 
the original stakes of the founder-entrepreneurs and venture capitalists 
both before and after going public, as well as on whether they retain 
their positions of strategic control. It is common for owner-managers of 
U.S. high-tech companies who have had their equity stakes diluted to a 
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small minority share to stay on in positions of strategic control after an 
IPO. But now they cannot assume that they, or their descendants, will 
retain these positions by virtue of majority ownership. In most cases, 
after a generation—and often much sooner—strategic control passes 
to salaried managers who have never held substantial equity in the 
company.2
For those companies in which there remains an integration of own-
ership and control, the use of a company’s stock as combination and 
compensation currencies will generally result in substantial dilution of 
the stakes of founders over time. Nevertheless, in younger companies, 
many founders who still maintain active roles in their companies owe 
the enormity of their wealth to the stock market. In addition, many top 
executives who occupy their positions of control solely as professional 
managers have accumulated considerable wealth by virtue of the stock-
based compensation that their boards of directors have lavished on 
them. From their personal standpoint, these owners and managers have 
no reason to cast doubt on the ideology that the maximization of share-
holder value benefi ts not only their corporations but also the economy 
and even the society in which they operate.
From the shareholder-value perspective, the separation of owner-
ship and control poses the fundamental agency problem. But the notion 
that salaried managers will as agents rather than principals have a natu-
ral propensity to misallocate corporate resources begs the question of 
how, given the ubiquity of the separation of ownership and control, the 
U.S. corporate enterprise drove the development of the U.S. economy 
during the twentieth century (see Lazonick 1992). Moreover, it is incor-
rect to assume that the solution to the supposed agency problem is to 
give salaried executives an equity stake in the publicly traded corpo-
ration by, for example, granting them stock options. A volatile stock 
market provides these executives with ample opportunities to gain for 
themselves by selling their shares even when these gains are not war-
ranted by the productive or competitive performance of the company. 
The likelihood of such an event is all the greater if, as is generally 
the case in United States, the realization of gains from stock option 
grants does not depend on the superior performance of the company’s 
stock over a sustained period of time relative to the performance of the 
industry in which the company competes. Moreover, especially when 
the stock market is highly speculative, as was the case in the late 1990s, 
Lazonick.indb   223 7/31/2009   8:42:58 AM
224   Lazonick
or when corporate profi ts have been high, as was the case in the mid-
2000s, there are ample opportunities for those who exercise strategic 
control to allocate corporate resources in ways that infl uence stock-
price movements for their own personal gain. Stock repurchases, which 
I discuss in some detail below, represent one such mode of resource 
allocation. 
There are many ways to govern the behavior of corporate execu-
tives to ensure that they take actions that enhance the productive and 
competitive performance of their companies, but giving them U.S.-style 
stock-based compensation is not, in my view, one of them. Indeed, as 
mentioned earlier, in the wake of the bursting of the Internet bubble, 
the excesses of the late 1990s even brought a critique of overvalued 
equities from Michael Jensen, who throughout the 1980s and 1990s had 
been the chief academic cheerleader for maximizing shareholder value. 
Jensen had argued in particular for the need to increase the stock-based 
pay of top executives to align their interests with those of shareholders 
(Jensen and Murphy 1990). In “Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a 
Stop to the Earnings Game,” Fuller and Jensen (2002) exhort CEOs to 
resist the demands of Wall Street fi nancial analysts for companies to 
report higher earnings to justify higher stock prices. They blame corpo-
rate executives for collaborating with Wall Street in the overvaluation 
of their companies’ shares, with a resultant misallocation of resources. 
As one of their two examples (the other being Enron), Fuller and Jensen 
(p. 44) fi nd fault with the telecommunications equipment company 
Nortel Networks for spending more than $32 billion from 1997 to 2001 
on acquisitions, purchased mainly with overvalued stock instead of 
cash, that subsequently had to be written off or shut down. Encouraging 
Nortel’s top management in this behavior, Fuller and Jensen recognize, 
was “the incentive to maintain the value of managerial and employee 
stock options” (p. 44).
Combination
When one company acquires another, it has to account for the value 
of the acquisition on its balance sheet. In the last half of the twentieth 
century, many U.S. companies treated acquisitions as “pooling of inter-
ests,” an accounting method that enabled the acquirer to put the book 
value of the acquisition on its balance sheet, and thus avoid recording 
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goodwill—the difference between market value and book value—as 
an intangible asset. By not having to amortize goodwill, the acquirer 
would show higher earnings on its profi t-and-loss statement over sub-
sequent years than if it had recorded the acquisition at its actual pur-
chase price. The prevailing notion among corporate executives was that 
higher reported earnings would result in higher stock prices.
During the conglomerate boom of the 1960s, many pooling-of-inter-
ests acquisitions were made with debt or with a combination of securi-
ties and cash (Brooks 1973, pp. 160–161; Editors of Fortune 1970). 
In 1970, in response to abuses of pooling-of-interests accounting dur-
ing the conglomeration era, the Accounting Principles Board (replaced 
in 1973 by the Financial Accounting Standards Board [FASB]), ruled, 
among other things, that only acquisitions made entirely with common 
stock could use pooling of interests (Wallman, Wallman, and Aronow 
1999, p. 26; more generally, Rayburn and Powers 1991; Seligman 
1995, pp. 419–429). The Internet boom of the latter half of the 1990s 
raised the value of shares relative to cash, thus making stock a relatively 
more attractive combination currency. In the boom, pooling-of-inter-
ests accounting encouraged established companies to bid for relatively 
young companies, many of which were revenueless start-ups with low 
book values. 
The use of stock instead of cash as an acquisition currency became 
much more prevalent in the United States in the late 1990s than it had 
been during the late 1980s. Rappaport and Sirower (1999, pp. 147–148) 
argued, “What is striking about acquisitions in the 1990s, however, is 
the way they’re being paid for. In 1988, nearly 60% of the value of 
large deals—those over $100 million—was paid for entirely in cash. 
Less than 2% was paid for in stock. But just ten years later, the profi le 
is almost reversed: 50% of the value of all large deals in 1998 was paid 
for entirely in stock, and only 17% was paid for entirely in cash.” The 
collapse of stock prices that occurred in late 2000 and the fi rst half of 
2001 led to widespread criticism of pooling of interests, and the FASB 
banned the further use of this method of accounting for acquisitions in 
July 2001 (FASB 2001).
The use of stock to make acquisitions was particularly popular 
among ICT companies in the late 1990s, when the speculative boom 
provided them with a private currency that appeared to be more valu-
able than cash. As Steven Ballmer, then president of Microsoft, put it 
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in an interview in early 1998 (quoted in Cusumano and Yoffi e 1998, p. 
302),
We’ve had to step up and either make or not make big investments 
on Internet time. Like WebTV. Like Hotmail. Some of them, I 
think, will prove smart. Maybe some of them won’t prove smart. 
But they’re not huge decisions. We have a currency [with our stock 
price] that makes them relatively small decisions. These deals 
[WebTV and Hotmail] were both done for stock. I still think it’s 
real money, whatever it is—$400 million or so per acquisition. But 
I can stop and say, “OK, that’s half of one percent of Microsoft.” 
That’s probably a reasonable insurance policy to pay.
No company has made such systematic use of its stock as an acqui-
sition currency as Cisco Systems. Founded in Silicon Valley in 1984, 
Cisco did its IPO in 1990, a year in which it had $70 million in revenues 
and 254 employees. Over the course of the 1990s Cisco came to domi-
nate the Internet router market, reaching revenues $18.9 billion in fi scal 
2000, with a year-end total of 34,000 employees. From 1993 through 
fi scal 2003, the company did 81 acquisitions for $38.1 billion, 98 per-
cent of which was paid in stock. 
From November 2003 through September 2008, however, Cisco 
did another 50 acquisitions for more than $15 billion, almost entirely 
in cash, with stock constituting partial payment in only two of these 
acquisitions. Why did Cisco reverse its practice of using stock as an 
acquisition currency? The outlawing of pooling-of-interests account-
ing in July 2001 meant that an all-stock acquisition could no longer 
serve to infl ate future reported earnings. Cisco had made ample use of 
this accounting device when it was permitted (Donlan 2000). Yet this 
explanation of Cisco’s shift from stock to cash as the dominant com-
bination currency is clearly only a partial one since the company made 
10 all-stock acquisitions between July 2001 and March 2003 when the 
new FASB ruling was in place. At best the ruling made Cisco indiffer-
ent, from an accounting point of view, to the question of whether to use 
cash or stock in acquisitions. In fact, Cisco’s stock price was generally 
higher from November 2003 to December 2004 than it had been from 
July 2001 to October 2003, which, all other things being equal, should 
have encouraged the use of stock rather than cash for acquisitions—just 
the opposite of what Cisco actually did. 
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What probably tilted Cisco toward the use of cash were the facts 
that it had current assets of more than $14 billion on its balance sheet 
in fi scal 2004 and that, given its massive stock repurchase program, 
the use of stock to acquire companies would have just increased the 
number of shares it would then have had to repurchase to reduce dilu-
tion to a desired level (see Domis 2003). Cisco also paid much less on 
a per-employee basis for its cash acquisitions than it had paid for its 
stock-based acquisitions, refl ecting perhaps a preference by the owners 
of the acquired fi rms for cash rather than volatile stock that might lose 
its value. 
In late 2005 Cisco agreed to pay $6.9 billion for Scientifi c-Atlanta, 
a Georgia-based home-entertainment company with 7,500 employees. 
To complete the acquisition, in early 2006 Cisco did a $6.5 billion bond 
issue, the fi rst time in its history that it had ever issued debt, and indeed 
the largest debt debut ever by a U.S. company. Cisco claimed that it had 
its cash tied up abroad (Aubin 2006). Cisco would not have wanted to 
pay U.S. taxes on repatriated profi ts. At the same time, Cisco wanted 
to preserve its U.S. cash for, as is discussed below, its massive annual 
stock repurchases.
Cisco became well known for its ability to integrate its acquisitions 
into its organization and for a relatively low level of employee turn-
over (Mayer and Kenney 2004; O’Reilly and Pfeffer 2000). During the 
1990s, however, not all ICT companies used their stock as an acquisi-
tion currency as effectively as Cisco Systems. As shown in detail else-
where (see Carpenter, Lazonick, and O’Sullivan 2003; Lazonick and 
March 2008; and Chapter 3 of this book), at the height of the Internet 
boom, in an effort to emulate the Cisco strategy, Lucent Technologies 
and Nortel Networks used billions of dollars worth of overvalued stock 
to acquire technology companies that brought little in real value to the 
acquirer. Nevertheless, in the fervor of the Internet boom, these acqui-
sitions were hailed as the future of ICT and in the short run helped to 
boost the acquirer’s stock price. At both Lucent and Nortel, the CEOs 
who approved these acquisitions made enormous gains from stock-
based compensation and bonuses before being ousted as it became evi-
dent in the downturn that their New Economy behavior had brought 
their Old Economy companies to the brink of bankruptcy.
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Compensation
As discussed in Chapter 2, from the 1950s on, executive stock 
options became a widespread mode of compensation in U.S. industrial 
corporations. In the 1960s, a very different type of fi rm began to make 
use of stock options for a very different purpose. High-tech start-ups 
began to use stock options to lure nonexecutive professional, technical, 
and administrative employees away from secure employment at estab-
lished companies. As we have seen in Chapter 2, the use of nonexecu-
tive stock options became particularly widespread in New Economy 
ICT companies.  
The widespread distribution of the gains from stock options within 
a company serves to legitimize the enormous sums that top executives 
derive from this mode of employee compensation. The data that I pre-
sented in Chapter 2 suggest that, despite the sluggish stock market of the 
fi rst half of the 2000s, the ability of these top executives to reap these 
rewards remained intact. It would appear that the same cannot be said 
for the average New Economy employee. In the 1980s and 1990s these 
nonexecutive employees in effect traded employment security in the Old 
Economy corporation for stock-based remuneration in the New Econo-
my corporation. In the 2000s they have faced the insecurity of NEBM, 
exacerbated by the globalization of the ICT labor force (see Chapter 5), 
but with the gains from stock options much harder to come by. 
Cash
If there is a conventional wisdom about the function of the stock 
market in the corporate economy, it is that fi rms issue stock to raise 
cash for investment in productive resources. This view of the main 
function of the stock market serves to support the ideology that public 
shareholders are risk bearers who fi nance economic growth without a 
guaranteed contractual return and hence have residual claimant status. 
Over the course of the twentieth century, however, the stock market 
was only a relatively minor source of cash for companies. Moreover, 
even when, as in the boom of the late 1920s, established companies 
sold large amounts of overpriced stock, they typically did so to take 
advantage of the speculative market to restructure their balance sheets 
rather than to make new investments (see O’Sullivan 2004). As a result 
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of this fi nancial restructuring, these companies were better positioned 
to withstand the subsequent stock market crash and downturn in eco-
nomic activity.
In contrast, in the Internet boom of the late 1990s, it tended to be 
new ventures that took advantage of the speculative stock market to 
raise huge sums through initial and secondary public offerings that 
could then be used to fund investment in productive resources. A dra-
matic example is Sycamore Networks, an optical networking company 
founded in February 1998 in Massachusetts’ Route 128 corridor by two 
men who had already built up and sold a highly successful data equip-
ment company, Cascade. With one customer (whose top executives 
were given “friends and family” stock options in Sycamore), previous 
year revenues of $11 million, losses of $19 million, and 155 employ-
ees, Sycamore did its IPO in October 1999, raising $284 million for 
less than 10 percent of its outstanding shares (Bulkeley 1999; Carpen-
ter, Lazonick, and O’Sullivan 2003; Warner 2000). In December 1999 
Sycamore ranked one-hundred-seventeenth in market capitalization in 
the United States, just behind Emerson Electric, a company that was 
founded in 1890 and that had revenues of $14.3 billion and 117,000 
employees! Sycamore then did a secondary offering in March 2000, at 
the very apex of the boom, with its stock at $150, netting another $1.2 
billion for the corporate treasury. At the same time, top executives and 
board members of Sycamore sold a portion of their own stock holdings 
for $726 million (Gimein et al. 2002). 
In effect, those who speculated in Sycamore’s stock permitted the 
company’s top executives and venture capitalists to gain huge returns 
from the company before what remained a start-up had gotten off the 
ground. The company did show a profi t of $20.4 million in 2000, but 
from 2001 through 2008 (fi scal year ending July 31) rung up losses of 
$829 million. On September 27, 2001, Sycamore’s stock price fell to 
$3.29, down from $107 a year earlier, and a year later it had fallen fur-
ther, to $2.36. Since then, the stock price has fl uctuated between $2.30 
(October 9, 2002) and $6.29 (January 16, 2004), and on October 10, 
2008, it stood at $2.70. Nevertheless, the extent of its fund-raising at 
the peak of the speculative boom plus some astute fi nancial investments 
meant that, as of July 31, 2008, Sycamore was still sitting on $821 mil-
lion in cash and short-term investments, down from $908 million a year 
earlier (Sycamore Networks 2008).3
Lazonick.indb   229 7/31/2009   8:42:58 AM
230   Lazonick
Less speculative and more productive among New Economy ICT 
companies in the 1980s and 1990s was Nextel’s 1999 stock offering 
of $2.4 billion as part of an externally fi nanced “war chest” to fund its 
expansion in mobile phones (Knight 1999). Founded in 1987 as Fleet 
Call, a radio dispatch company, Nextel Communications had revenues 
of $3.3 billion and 15,000 employees in 1999, but it had sustained losses 
of $4.6 billion over the previous years. Indeed, the company was in the 
red in every year from 1990 through 2001, for a total loss of more than 
$9.2 billion. Nextel, however, steadily increased its revenues, and the 
company showed a $1.9 billion profi t in 2002. By 2004 Nextel was one-
hundred-fi fty-seventh on the Fortune 500 list, with revenues of $13.4 
billion, net income of $3.0 billion, and 19,000 employees. In 2005 Nex-
tel merged with Sprint in a $35 billion deal.
Some New Economy start-ups of the 1980s and 1990s that expe-
rienced rapid growth in the 1990s had little if any resort to the stock 
market as a source of funds. For example, the only public stock issue 
that Cisco Systems has ever done was for $48 million when it went pub-
lic in 1990. In that year the company had $70 million in revenues, net 
cash from operating activities of $10 million, and capital expenditures 
of $4 million. Subsequently, until its 2005 bond issue of $6.5 billion to 
acquire Scientifi c-Atlanta, Cisco relied entirely on internally generated 
funds to fi nance its growth. From 1991 through 2008 (fi scal year ending 
July 26), Cisco received payments totaling $18.3 billion for its shares, 
but these were sales to employees exercising their stock options and 
doing employee stock purchases, not public stock market issues.
Indeed, in the 2000s, Cisco has become a supplier of funds to the 
stock market rather than vice versa. Cisco did its fi rst stock repurchases 
in 1995–1997 for a total of $508 million. Then, as speculators boosted 
Cisco’s stock price from $8.51 on December 12, 1997, to $80.06 on 
March 27, 2000 (at which point the 16-year-old enterprise had the high-
est market capitalization of any company in the world), there was no 
reason for Cisco to do buybacks.4 Over the next 30 months, however, 
Cisco’s stock price plummeted so that on October 8, 2002, at $8.60, it 
was just 1 percent higher than it had been on December 12, 1997. In an 
effort to support its stock price, Cisco repurchased $1.9 billion worth of 
shares in 2002, $6.0 billion in 2003, $9.1 billion in 2004, $10.2 billion 
in 2005, $8.3 billion in 2006, $7.7 billion in 2007, and $10.4 billion in 
2008, for a total of $53.6 billion over the seven years. A highly profi t-
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able company during these years, Cisco’s stock price rose to a high of 
$34.08 on November 6, 2007, but fell to as low as $14.47 on November 
20, 2008. 
Cisco’s expenditures on stock buybacks over the period 2002–2008 
were almost double its expenditures of $27.0 billion on R&D. Over 
these seven years, buybacks were 144 percent of Cisco’s net after-tax 
income. While Cisco remains an innovative and highly profi table com-
pany, one might hypothesize that Cisco’s stock price was primarily 
driven by innovation from 1990 through 1997, by speculation and its 
collapse from 1998 through 2002, and by manipulation in the form of 
buybacks from 2003 through 2008 (see Chapter 7). 
In the 2000s Cisco’s fi nancial behavior was typical of the largest 
U.S. companies, including those that, like Cisco, compete in high-tech 
industries. The overall trend of the “cash” function in major U.S. busi-
ness corporations has been to give money to the stock market, not get 
money from it. For the 292 companies in the S&P 500 Index in January 
2008 that were publicly traded in 1981, repurchases as a proportion of 
net income reached a local peak in 1987 when many companies sought 
to support their stock prices after the market crash in October of that 
year. Repurchases by these 292 companies rose sharply from 1995 on 
and surpassed dividends for the fi rst time in 1997 (Dittmar and Dittmar 
2004). On average, each of the 500 companies in the S&P 500 Index 
in January 2008 expended $513 million on cash dividends and $1,184 
million on stock repurchases in 2007. In recent years stock repurchases 
have played a leading role as a manipulative mode of resource alloca-
tion that supports stock prices. 
Figure 6.2 shows the payout ratios and mean payout levels for the 
459 companies in the S&P 500 Index in January 2008 that were public-
ly traded in 1997.5 Figure 6.2 includes such New Economy companies 
as Microsoft, Oracle, Cisco, and Dell, which were either not publicly 
listed or not in existence in 1980, but which have been big repurchasers 
of their own stock. Many New Economy companies (for example, Cis-
co, Dell, and Oracle) pay no dividends. Over the 11-year period shown 
in the fi gure, these 453 companies distributed a total of $1.7 trillion in 
cash dividends, an average of $3.8 billion per company, and spent $2.5 
trillion on repurchases, an average of $5.5 billion per company. In 2007, 
as shown in Figure 6.2, these companies averaged $553 million in divi-
dend payments and $1,194 million in stock repurchases. Combined, the 
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500 companies in the S&P 500 Index in January 2008 repurchased $486 
billion of their own stock in 2006 and $592 billion in 2007.
What kinds of companies are the largest repurchasers? Table 6.1 
lists the top 50 repurchasers for the period of 2000–2007 among com-
panies in the S&P 500 stock-market index for January 2008. From 2000 
to 2003, the 50 top repurchasers for the years 2000–2007 averaged $1.8 
billion–$1.9 billion in buybacks per year, but this expenditure steadily 
climbed to $6.0 billion in 2007. As can be seen, these 50 companies are 
distributed across a variety of industries, including 15 companies (in 
italicized type) in fi nancial services (which includes life and property 
insurance), 10 companies (in bold type) in ICT, 4 companies in pharma-
ceuticals, and 3 companies in petroleum refi ning.
Figure 6.2  Ratios of Cash Dividends and Stock Repurchases to 
Net Income and Mean Dividend Payments and Stock 
Repurchases among the S&P 500, 1997–2007
NOTE: Data for 453 corporations in the S&P 500 Index in January 2008 that were pub-
licly traded in 1997. RP = repurchases, TD = total dividends (common and preferred), 
and NI = net income (after tax with inventory evaluation and capital consumption 
adjustments).
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As shown in Table 6.2, 19 of the top 50 distributed more cash to 
shareholders in the form of stock buybacks than they generated in 
net after-tax income from 2000 to 2007, while another 7 companies 
repurchased stock equivalent to between 90 and 99 percent of their net 
income. The combined payouts for repurchases and dividends exceeded 
net income at 23 of the top 50 companies in this same period and were 
between 90 and 99 percent of net income at another 9 companies. From 
2000 to 2007, repurchase payouts were greater than net income at 5 of 
the 10 ICT companies among the top repurchasers, while repurchase 
and dividend payouts were greater than net income at another 3.
How does the allocation of resources to stock repurchases affect the 
allocation of resources to other corporate objectives, including innova-
tive investments that could result in higher-quality, lower-cost products? 
Given their technological, market, and competitive characteristics, the 
different industries represented in Table 6.1 raise different issues for 
business and government policy. In this discussion, I confi ne myself to 
the ICT industries whose major companies are well-represented among 
the largest repurchasers.6
Nine of the top 50, shown in bold in Table 6.2, had R&D expendi-
tures that exceeded 10 percent of sales and hence can be classifi ed as 
“high-tech.” Five of these companies—Microsoft, Cisco, Intel, Oracle, 
and TI—are in ICT, with the other four in pharmaceuticals. Repurchase 
payouts exceeded R&D expenditures at all of these companies, as well 
as at the other fi ve ICT companies—IBM, HP, Dell, AT&T Inc., and 
Comcast—whose R&D expenditures were under 10 percent of sales. 
The case of Microsoft, which distributed 143 percent of its 2000–
2007 net income to shareholders, is instructive in revealing how execu-
tives at even the most dominant high-tech companies have succumbed 
to demands from Wall Street that they use their earnings to boost stock 
prices. In June 2004, with a dividend yield of just 0.6 percent on its 
stock, Microsoft’s corporate treasury was bursting with $56 billion in 
cash and short-term investments, and the balance sheet showed no debt. 
The highly profi table company, moreover, had generated almost $16 
billion in cash fl ow in the previous year. Given these conditions, in 
mid-2004 Wall Street began to exert pressure on Microsoft to increase 
its distributions to shareholders and increase its stock price. A Gold-
man Sachs report by its software analyst suggested that, by borrowing 
$30 billion and using $70 billion in cash balances, Microsoft could do 
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1 Exxon Mobil Petroleum refi ning 2 29,558 31,822 108,304
2 Microsoft Computer software 44 19,207 27,575 81,747
3 IBM Information technology services 15 8,022 18,828 62,318
4 Bank Of America Commercial banks 9 13,660 3,790 55,674
5 Pfi zer Pharmaceuticals 47 6,979 9,994 50,132
6 General Electric Diversifi ed fi nancials 6 10,512 14,913 48,263
7 Cisco Systems Network/communications equipment 71 8,295 7,681 43,129
8 Intel Semiconductors/electronic components 60 4,593 2,788 41,575
9 Citigroup Commercial banks 8 7,125 663 37,141
10 Procter & Gamble Household & personal products 23 16,830 5,578 36,324
11 Hewlett-Packard Computers, offi ce equipment 14 7,779 10,887 33,721
12 Goldman Sachs Securities 201 7,817 8,956 30,186
13 Johnson & Johnson Pharmaceuticals 35 6,722 5,607 26,694
14 Dell Computers, offi ce equipment 34 3,026 3,026 25,545
15 Time Warner Entertainment 49 13,660 6,231 25,165
16 Oracle Computer software 137 2,067 3,937 23,939
17 Wells Fargo Commercial banks 41 1,965 7,418 23,243
18 AT&T Inc. Telecommunications 10 2,678 10,390 21,628
19 JPMorgan Chase Commercial banks 12 3,938 8,178 21,248
20 Merrill Lynch Securities 30 9,088 5,272 21,028
21 PepsiCo Food, consumer products 59 3,010 4,312 20,704
22 UnitedHealth Group Health care: insurance & managed care 25 2,345 6,599 20,678
Table 6.1  Top 50 Repurchasers of Stock, 2000–2007, among Corporations in the S&P 500 Index in January 2008
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23 Amgen Pharmaceuticals 173 2,000 5,100 20,361
24 Wal-Mart Stores General merchandisers 1 3,580 1,718 19,633
25 Morgan Stanley Securities 21 3,376 3,753 19,050
26 Chevron Petroleum refi ning 3 5,033 7,036 18,815
27 Altria Group Tobacco 61 1,254 0 18,213
28 Walt Disney Entertainment 67 6,898 6,923 17,815
29 American Express Diversifi ed fi nancials 75 4,093 3,572 17,643
30 United Parcel Service Mail, package, freight delivery 46 2,460 2,639 17,374
31 Lehman Brothers Securities 37 2,678 2,605 16,672
32 CBS Entertainment 181 6 3,351 16,519
33 Home Depot Specialty retailers 22 3,040 6,684 16,388
34 Texas Instruments Semiconductors/electronic components 185 5,302 4,886 16,296
35 Merck Pharmaceuticals 101 1,002 1,430 15,984
36 Wachovia Commercial banks 38 4,513 1,196 15,664
37 3M Miscellaneous 100 2,351 3,239 13,521
38 Washington Mutual Savings institutions 97 3,039 3,497 13,271
39 McDonald’s Food services 106 2,959 3,943 12,878
40 Boeing Aerospace and defense 27 1,698 2,775 12,876
41 Allstate Insurance: property & casualty 64 1,770 3,606 12,334
42 US Bancorp Commercial banks 122 2,798 1,983 12,313
43 Anheuser-Busch Beverages 149 746 2,707 11,909
44 WellPoint Health care: insurance & managed care 33 5,439 6,151 11,591
45 Prudential Financial Insurance: life, health 74 2,512 3,000 10,889
46 Coca-Cola Beverages 83 2,416 1,838 10,589
47 Kimberly-Clark Household & personal products 136 762 2,813 10,002
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48 ConocoPhillips Petroleum refi ning 5 925 7,001 9,850
49 Comcast Telecommunications 79 2,347 3,102 9,489
50 Cigna Health care: insurance & managed care 141 2,765 1,185 9,434
Table 6.1  (continued)
NOTE: RP = repurchases of common and preferred stock. Bold indicates ICT companies, and italics indicate fi nancial services companies. 
Data are for the 2007 fi scal year of the companies.
SOURCE: S&P Compustat database, 2000–2006; company 10-K fi lings, 2007; Fortune (2008).
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1 Exxon Mobil 47 29 75 0.3 5.1
2 Microsoft 80 63 143 15.9 29.1
3 IBM 99 16 115 5.6 8.7
4 Bank Of America 55 49 104 0.0 9.4
5 Pfi zer 76 61 137 17.9 14.8
6 General Electric 35 50 85 1.7 4.2
7 Cisco Systems 151 0 151 16.2 22.8
8 Intel 93 18 110 14.4 15.8
9 Citigroup 31 36 68 0.0 4.4
10 Procter & Gamble 80 44 124 3.1 8.7
11 Hewlett-Packard 128 33 160 4.7 5.8
12 Goldman Sachs 72 8 80 0.0 8.8
13 Johnson & Johnson 39 37 76 12.6 7.6
14 Dell 136 0 136 1.0 8.4
15 Time Warner −56 −4 −60 0.4 8.4
16 Oracle 92 0 92 12.4 28.4
17 Wells Fargo 46 43 89 0.0 7.9
18 AT&T Inc. 25 65 90 0.1 4.8
19 JPMorgan Chase 36 51 87 0.0 3.9
20 Merrill Lynch 56 17 74 0.0 6.0
21 PepsiCo 64 35 99 0.2 8.8
22 UnitedHealth Group 95 1 95 0.0 4.3
23 Amgen 126 0 126 27.6 27.7
24 Wal−Mart Stores 31 20 51 0.0 1.2
25 Morgan Stanley 46 23 69 0.0 4.6
26 Chevron 17 35 52 0.2 1.5
27 Altria Group 26 56 82 1.1 3.4
28 Walt Disney 92 27 118 0.0 7.6
29 American Express 69 18 87 0.0 8.3
30 United Parcel Service 64 34 99 0.0 5.8
31 Lehman Brothers 92 10 102 0.0 6.9
32 CBS −70 −9 −78 0.0 10.3
33 Home Depot 54 16 70 0.0 5.1
34 Texas Instruments 108 10 119 16.3 17.7
35 Merck 34 53 87 11.1 6.3
Table 6.2  Payout Ratios and R&D Intensity Compared with Repurchases 
Intensity for the Top 50 Repurchasers of Stock, 2000–2007, 
among Corporations in the S&P 500 Index in January 2008
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a $100 billion stock repurchase (Bishop 2004). A month later, in July 
2004, the Microsoft board approved a $30 billion repurchase plan to 
take place over four years, a doubling of the dividend from $0.16 per 
annum to $0.08 quarterly, and a special one-time dividend that, at $3 
per share (over 12 percent of the current share price), totaled $32.64 
billion. 
The company press release that announced these distributions 
assured the public that “this payout will not affect Microsoft’s commit-
ment to research and development to fuel growth in the years ahead” 
(Microsoft 2004). In support of this commitment, it quoted Chairman 
Gates: “We see incredible potential for our innovation to help busi-
nesses, individuals and governments around the world accomplish their 
goals, and we will continue to be one of the top innovators in our indus-
try—as evidenced by the fact that we will fi le for more than 3,000 pat-













36 Wachovia 44 55 100 0.0 6.0
37 3M 58 43 101 6.3 8.8
38 Washington Mutual 62 51 113 0.0 8.3
39 McDonald’s 64 30 94 0.0 8.8
40 Boeing 69 33 102 4.1 2.9
41 Allstate 55 26 81 0.0 4.7
42 US Bancorp 44 53 98 0.0 9.9
43 Anheuser−Busch 69 37 106 0.0 10.3
44 WellPoint 99 0 99 0.0 5.0
45 Prudential Financial 75 16 90 0.0 4.6
46 Coca−Cola 30 53 83 0.0 5.9
47 Kimberly−Clark 62 43 105 1.7 8.2
48 ConocoPhillips 17 18 35 0.1 1.2
49 Comcast 112 0 112 0.0 6.4
50 Cigna 133 13 147 0.0 6.6
Table 6.2  (continued)
NOTE: RP = repurchases of common and preferred stock, TD = common and preferred 
cash dividends, NI = net after-tax income, and R&D = research and development 
expenditure. Bold indicates companies with R&D expenditures that exceeded 10 per-
cent of sales.
SOURCE: S&P Compustat database, 2000–2006; company 10-K fi lings, 2007.
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will continue to make major investments across all our businesses and 
maintain our position as a leading innovator in the industry, but we can 
now also provide up to $75 billion in total value to shareholders over 
the next four years.” 
Just over a year and a half later, on April 27, 2006, Microsoft 
announced that it would be making major new technology investments, 
including a large-scale commitment of resources to its online business 
to confront Google and Yahoo!. The company predicted earnings per 
share of $1.36 to $1.41 for fi scal 2007, well below the expectations of 
Wall Street analysts of $1.57. Rick Sherland, the same Goldman Sachs 
analyst who had previously encouraged Microsoft to do a $100 billion 
repurchase, was not pleased with the Microsoft announcement: “It’s 
bad to surprise the Street. It’s harmful to the stock because investors 
are looking for the rewards of this big product cycle next year fl owing 
through to earnings” (quoted in Romano 2006). The next day Micro-
soft’s stock price fell by more than 11 percent, reducing the company’s 
market capitalization by some $30 billion. The stock price continued to 
decline during most of May, amid criticism from Wall Street’s top-rated 
software analysts that Microsoft was a mature fi rm that had attracted 
“value investors” who wanted returns from dividends and buybacks. An 
article from Bloomberg News (Bass 2006a) quoted Richard Pzena, head 
of an investment company that held 14.3 million Microsoft shares, as 
saying, “They are not managing the business with an acknowledgment 
the shareholders have changed. People expecting 25 percent annual 
growth don’t own the stock anymore.”
On May 31 Ballmer defended the company’s “big, bold bets” on 
Internet technology at a conference at Sanford C. Bernstein & Com-
pany, the Wall Street investment research fi rm (Bass 2006b). Wall 
Street remained critical of Microsoft’s technology strategy (New York 
Times 2006).7 Microsoft’s stock price, which had trended downward 
during May but had moved upward in the days before the Bernstein 
conference, resumed its decline, reaching a low on June 13 at almost 
21 percent down from its level on April 27. Finally, on July 20, Micro-
soft announced that it was accelerating by two years the completion 
of its $30 billion buyback program. At the same time, Microsoft also 
announced a plan to repurchase another $20 billion in stock from 2007 
to 2011. Over the next four days, Microsoft’s stock price rose by almost 
7 percent.
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The Microsoft example illustrates the pressure that Wall Street can 
exert on even the most powerful high-tech company to allocate its cash 
fl ow to “create” shareholder value. Wall Street’s argument is that Micro-
soft is now a mature company that has lost its innovative capability, at 
least relative to the start-ups that the U.S. economy is adept at spawn-
ing. As a mature company, the analysts argue, Microsoft should dis-
gorge its cash fl ow to shareholders. As far as these “old” New Economy 
companies are concerned, the Wall Street consensus is that what I call 
manipulation, not innovation, should be driving the stock market.
Should U.S. high-tech companies be allocating more of their fi nan-
cial resources to R&D rather than stock repurchases? During the 2000s, 
the Semiconductor Industry Association and its leading company, Intel, 
have been lobbying the U.S. government to spend more on nanotech-
nology research (Electronic News 2005). Yet on its Web site, Intel touts 
the cumulative $63.2 billion in stock repurchases that it has done since 
1990 (Intel 2008b). Given that companies like Intel have benefi ted 
greatly from government investments in the high-tech knowledge base 
in the past, why should not a portion of Intel’s buyback expenditures 
be devoted instead to supporting the U.S. national nanotechnology 
research effort?8
Since the 1980s U.S. corporate executives have embraced the ide-
ology that the performance of their companies and the economy are 
best served by the maximization of shareholder value. It is an ideology 
that, among other things, says that any attempt by the government to 
interfere in the allocation of resources can only undermine economic 
performance. In practice, what shareholder ideology has meant for cor-
porate resource allocation is that, when companies reap more profi ts, 
they spend a substantial proportion of them on stock repurchases in an 
effort to boost their stock prices.
There are many alternative ways that corporate executives could 
productively allocate these massive amounts of resources. They could 
use these funds to sustain the employment of experienced employees 
who currently are being let go, sometimes to be hired back at lower 
wages as contractors. Such expenditures should not be make-work but 
rather should refl ect innovative thinking on the part of corporate execu-
tives as to how the productive resources available to the fi rm can be uti-
lized to generate higher-quality, lower-cost goods and services. Money 
spent on buybacks could be allocated to provide much-needed public 
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services in the communities in which the companies have grown up. 
Or, as already indicated, instead of doing buybacks, companies could 
pay higher taxes to support government initiatives to invest in the tech-
nologies of the future. In short, rather than a “take the money and run” 
approach pursued through stock repurchases and stock-option exercis-
es, corporate executives could allocate resources to support sustainable 
prosperity.
WHY DO COMPANIES REPURCHASE THEIR OWN STOCK?
Toward the beginning of this chapter, I critiqued the ideology of 
maximizing shareholder value. Shareholders are not the only class of 
participants in the corporation who make investments without a con-
tractually guaranteed return. Indeed, given the ease with which a public 
shareholder can create and sever her relation with any particular compa-
ny by simply buying and selling shares, it can be questioned whether the 
investments that she makes contribute to the development and utiliza-
tion of the company’s productive resources, and if so how. I have argued 
that, to answer this question, we need a theory of innovative enterprise 
on the basis of which we can analyze the productive functions that the 
stock market actually performs in the publicly traded corporation. 
The most obvious way in which the public shareholder can con-
tribute to the development and utilization of a company’s productive 
capabilities is by providing the company with cash that it can use to 
invest in such capabilities. Yet the evidence suggests that, in the U.S. 
case at least, the stock market has been a relatively unimportant source 
of cash for corporate investment, except possibly in periods of ram-
pant stock market speculation. In biotechnology, for example, at certain 
points since 1980, through IPOs, young companies that are still years 
away from developing a commercial product and that face fundamental 
uncertainty about whether these products will ever emerge have been 
able to raise substantial cash from the stock market for investment in 
drug development (Lazonick and Tulum 2008). For more mature com-
panies, however, the stock market has become a “use” rather than a 
“source” of funds as stock repurchases have become a systematic and 
widespread feature of corporate resource allocation.
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Why do companies repurchase their own stock?9 The agency theory 
argument is that these distributions to shareholders represent “free cash 
fl ow.” The notion that corporations should distribute the free cash fl ow 
to shareholders is central to the agency theory argument that the econo-
my is run more effi ciently when corporate executives seek to maximize 
shareholder value. The massive stock repurchases that have character-
ized the 2000s manifest the triumph of this shareholder value ideology.
Ideology apart, there are problems with the free cash fl ow argument 
for the allocation of corporate resources. Given technological, mar-
ket, and competitive uncertainty, we cannot expect that even the most 
informed corporate decision maker will be able to make a reasonably 
accurate forecast of the company’s stream of earnings over a period as 
short as, say, fi ve years. Yet without such an accurate forecast, one can-
not determine, at any point in time, the extent to which the cash fl ow 
available is in fact free. As the recent subprime mortgage debacle illus-
trates, a series of profi table years can give way to a period of losses dur-
ing which the cash fl ow that seemed to be free can suddenly be sorely 
needed. 
Even if one could accept a forecast of a future stream of earnings 
as being reasonably accurate, the determination of the relevant cost of 
capital with which to derive the present value of those earnings is a sub-
jective measure set by those who make allocation decisions. Given that 
top executives, with their stock-based compensation, stand to gain from 
repurchases, we can expect that they will tend to set the relevant cost 
of capital high, thus biasing their decisions against making investments 
in productive capabilities for an uncertain future and hence designating 
a larger proportion of the company’s cash fl ow as free. In contrast, if 
corporate decision makers were to recognize, and choose to confront, 
the technological, market, and competitive uncertainties inherent in 
the innovation process, they would understand the need to conserve 
the company’s cash fl ow to respond to such fundamental exigencies as 
changes in technology, fl uctuations in market demand, and the rise of 
new competitors.
A corporate executive who rejects agency theory and accepts inno-
vation theory might want to argue that her company does buybacks so 
that its stock will be attractive as a combination and compensation cur-
rency, which in turn will support the accumulation of innovative capa-
bilities. There are, however, problems with such an argument.10
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When stock is used as a combination currency to acquire other com-
panies, there is no doubt that a company with a soaring stock price will 
have a competitive edge. But that soaring stock price will tend to be 
the result of innovation or speculation rather than manipulation through 
stock repurchases. As we have seen for the case of Cisco Systems, it is 
likely that companies that are doing large-scale stock repurchases will 
refrain from using stock as a combination currency. Otherwise, all other 
things being equal, stock repurchases would have to be even greater to 
offset dilution from stock-based acquisitions.
Companies often state explicitly in their fi nancial statements that 
they are doing stock repurchases to offset dilution from their stock 
option programs.11 Even from a shareholder-value perspective, the 
economic rationale for this argument is not clear. If a company that 
seeks to maximize shareholder value deems it worthwhile to partially 
remunerate employees with stock options, it should see that remunera-
tion as adding to rather than subtracting from earnings per share. True, 
these additions to earnings per share may only accrue in years to come, 
but then, from the shareholder-value perspective, the issue is simply 
one of whether remuneration in the form of stock options (or any other 
mode of compensation) is expected to yield positive net present value 
of future earnings at the appropriate discount rate. 
From the perspective of innovation theory, employees are supposed 
to reap the rewards from stock options in future years, when the compa-
ny’s stock price has risen as the innovative investments of the company 
generate profi ts. Given the prospects of a rising stock price, innova-
tive companies can make use of employee stock options as a form of 
remuneration to attract, retain, motivate, and recognize employees.12 
Systematic stock repurchases, such as those that Intel advertises on its 
Web site, may aid this remuneration strategy by convincing employees 
that the company is committed to keeping its stock price high and on 
the rise. Alternatively, however, employees who understand the invest-
ment requirements of innovative enterprise may take the view that, in 
allocating resources to stock repurchases, the company has foregone 
critical investments in innovation required to make it competitive in the 
future. If so, they may see systematic repurchases as a sign that it is time 
to cash in their vested options and leave the company. Objectively, the 
critical question (for both academic researchers and long-term corpo-
rate employees) is whether a company can use its cash fl ow to do repur-
Lazonick.indb   243 7/31/2009   8:43:00 AM
244   Lazonick
chases and boost stock prices today without undermining the fi nancial 
commitment that, particularly in highly competitive global industries, 
is required to fund innovation for tomorrow.
Top executives often simply argue that, in doing stock repurchases, 
they, as corporate decision makers, are “signaling” confi dence that their 
company’s stock price will rise over the long term (Louis and White 
2007; Vermaelen 2005, chap. 3). Yet, from a fi nancial point of view, 
such an investment would only make sense if one could expect that at 
some point in the future when speculation has resulted in an overvalued 
stock the corporation would turn from being a purchaser to a seller of its 
own stock. Otherwise, corporate executives are taking the position that 
their stock can never be overvalued, even in a highly speculative boom. 
According to the “signaling” argument, we should have seen massive 
sales of corporate stock in the speculative boom of the late 1990s, as was 
the case with U.S. industrial corporations in the speculative boom of the 
late 1920s. Instead, in the boom of the late 1990s, corporate executives, 
as personal investors, sold their own stock to reap speculative gains 
(often to the tune of tens of millions, and in some cases even hundreds 
of millions, of dollars). Yet, if anything, these same corporate execu-
tives, as corporate decision makers, used corporate funds to repurchase 
shares, thus attempting to push speculative stock prices even higher, to 
their own personal gain. Given the extent to which stock repurchases 
have become a systematic mode of corporate resource allocation, and 
given the extent to which through this manipulation of their corpora-
tion’s stock price top executives have enriched themselves personally 
in the process, there is every reason to believe that, in the absence of 
legislation that restricts both stock repurchases and gains from stock 
options, executive behavior that places personal interests ahead of cor-
porate interests will continue in the future.13
Stock repurchases are, in my view, central to a massive redistribu-
tion process that in the United States has made the rich even richer at 
the expense of stable and equitable economic growth. It is a process that 
received ample encouragement from the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2003, which reduced tax rates on dividends from 
38.6 percent (the top tax on ordinary income) to 15 percent and on capi-
tal gains (including of course those derived from selling stock) from 20 
percent to 15 percent (McNamee and Scherreik 2003). Despite the fact 
that the 2003 act reduced the tax on dividends even more than the tax 
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on capital gains, since 2002, as we have seen, U.S. corporations have 
increased stock repurchases even more than they have increased divi-
dends (Blouin, Raedy, and Shackleford 2007).14 
The main reason, in my view, is that repurchases tend to boost stock 
prices, which in turn increases the returns from stock options (see Fenn 
and Liang 2001; Grullon and Ikenberry 2000, pp. 41–42; Hsieh and 
Wang 2006; Jolls 1998; Kahle 2002; Weisbenner 2000).15 As I have 
shown for the case of leading ICT companies in Table 2.4, the gains 
from stock options of the people at the top of the corporation are typi-
cally hundreds of times, and often thousands of times, the average gains 
per employee in their company. Certainly, as in the late 1990s, when 
the stock market moved up rapidly, millions of nonexecutive employ-
ees who held stock options benefi ted, and at companies like Cisco 
and Microsoft smaller numbers of nonexecutive employees benefi ted 
immensely. For many if not most nonexecutive employees, however, 
the gains from stock options were ephemeral, as the decline of the early 
2000s was followed by the jobless recovery of 2003 in which the accel-
eration of offshoring played an important role. 
There has been virtually no public policy debate in the United 
States over the practice of buybacks, its acceleration in recent years, 
or the implications for both the distribution of income and economic 
growth. In the summer of 2008, however, changes seemed to be afoot. 
On July 31, 2008, after Exxon Mobil—by far the largest repurchaser of 
stock (see Table 6.1)—had announced record second quarter profi ts of 
$11.7 billion and stock buybacks of $8.8 billion, prominent congres-
sional Democrats took aim at stock repurchases by the big oil compa-
nies (Menendez 2008).16 Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) was quoted 
as saying, “They [the big oil companies] tell us they want to do more 
domestic production. They tell us they need to drill offshore. They tell 
us that they can fi nd oil on the mainland. And what do they do with 
their profi ts? They buy back stock, simply to increase their share price” 
(Hays and Ivanovich 2008).
As we have seen, it is not only the oil companies that are doing 
multibillion dollar buybacks. The practice pervades the U.S. economy. 
Are top executives who spend much of their time and energy thinking 
about how to manipulate the stock market through stock repurchases 
devoting suffi cient time and energy to thinking about how to confront 
the technological, market, and competitive uncertainties with which, 
Lazonick.indb   245 7/31/2009   8:43:00 AM
246   Lazonick
in a globalized economy, even the most powerful companies must be 
concerned? 
From a public policy perspective, should the people who exercise 
strategic control over the corporate allocation of resources have such 
overwhelming personal incentives to allocate resources for the sole pur-
pose of boosting their companies’ stock prices? Should high-tech com-
panies be doing massive and systematic repurchases while appealing to 
the government to fi nance investment in the technologies of the future? 
Should companies that make high profi ts by charging high oil prices or 
high drug prices be using these profi ts to make massive and systematic 
buybacks instead of spending more on discovering oil and developing 
drugs? Or should the prices that these oil and drug companies charge 
be regulated along with a prohibition on stock repurchases? As in the 
cases of the Wall Street banks, should the government be in the business 
of bailing out companies that run into trouble when these companies 
would be better positioned to bail themselves out but for the massive 
and systematic repurchases that they have done in recent years? 
To ask these questions is to raise the larger public policy issue of 
how many resources should go into propping up the stock market, and 
indeed, the questions of why the stock market has become so central to 
the operation of the U.S. economy and whether, if we wish to have sus-
tainable prosperity, it should remain so. A vital fi rst step in addressing 
these questions is to jettison the ideology that maximizing shareholder 
value leads to the highest common good. The rejection of the ideology 
of shareholder value is, in my view, a prerequisite for the formulation 
and implementation of the policies for sustainable prosperity that I shall 
discuss in the concluding chapter of this book.
Notes
 1. Venture-backed IPO and M&A data are from Thomson Financial Venture Xperts. 
See also Lazonick (2007d, pp. 1001–1004). 
 2. For documentation of the separation of ownership and control in the Old Economy 
and New Economy ICT companies in Tables 1.6 and 1.7, see Lazonick (2007d, pp. 
1008–1009).
 3. In 2005 Sycamore showed a gain from the sale of investments of $467 million, 
increasing its cash and near-cash on hand from $45 million at the end of fi scal 
2004 to $508 million at the end of fi scal 2005 (Sycamore Networks 2006, pp. 
24–25). 
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 4. In any case, given Cisco’s pace of acquisitions for 1998–2000 and the extent to 
which it used the pooling-of-interests method to account for their cost, Cisco was 
prevented from doing buybacks because of an SEC rule that prohibited stock repur-
chases within six months of a pooling-of-interests acquisition (McCarthy 1999, p. 
94). FASB outlawed pooling-of-interests accounting in July 2001, and the Cisco 
board authorized a $3 billion stock repurchase on September 13, 2001 (Nguyen 
2001). The press viewed the Cisco buyback plan as a patriotic move to prevent 
a collapse of stock prices when the stock market reopened on September 17 after 
being closed for four sessions in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (e.g., Rapo-
port 2001). Indeed, the SEC relaxed the rules on the timing of buybacks during a 
stock-trading session to encourage companies to repurchase their shares when the 
stock market reopened (Gordon 2001). Following Cisco’s lead, many companies 
responded by announcing buyback programs (see Reuters News 2001).
 5. For each company, I treat the fi scal year as the calendar year in which its fi scal 
year ends. For example, I regard the $7.691 billion in stock repurchases that Wal-
Mart did in its fi scal year ending on January 31, 2008, as having been made in 
2008, and the $1.718 billion that it did in the fi scal year ending on January 31, 
2007, as having been made in 2007. 
 6. Currently I am engaged in statistical research that seeks to identify the industry- 
and fi rm-level determinants of stock repurchases across the S&P 500 companies 
as well as case-study research to assess the impacts of stock repurchases on the 
productive capabilities of the companies that make them. For a preliminary dis-
cussion of the implications of stock buybacks for the oil, fi nancial services, and 
pharmaceutical industries, see Lazonick (2008d).
 7. The full text of the Bernstein and Co. conference is available from Factiva, includ-
ing Ballmer’s complete remarks (Voxant FD Wire 2006).
 8. A similar type of question can be asked of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. The 
four pharmaceutical companies in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 are among those that argue 
that they need to charge higher drug prices in the United States than in other parts 
of the world to fund R&D. Yet, as can be seen in Table 6.2, these companies have 
used substantial proportions of their earnings to do repurchases (Lazonick 2008c; 
Lazonick and Tulum 2008).
 9. For alternative hypotheses posed by the considerable academic literature on the 
topic, see Dittmar (2000); Jun, Jung, and Walking (2008); and Kahle (2002).
 10. For an in-depth analysis, in the context of the Internet boom and bust of the late 
1990s and early 2000s, of the conditions under which the use of stock as a combi-
nation and compensation currency can support or undermine the innovation pro-
cess, see Carpenter, Lazonick, and O’Sullivan (2003).
 11. Through fi scal year 2004, Dell stated explicitly that the purpose of its share repur-
chase program was “to manage the dilution resulting from shares issued under 
Dell’s equity compensation plans” (Dell 2005, p. 23). In 2005 and 2006, however, 
the company stated that the purposes of repurchases were “both to distribute cash 
to shareholders and to manage dilution resulting from shares issued under Dell’s 
equity compensation plan” (Dell 2006, p. 16; Dell 2007, p. 18). Similarly, prior 
to 2001 Sun explicitly tied repurchases to stock-based compensation plans, but 
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in 2001 the fi rm introduced “a new opportunistic stock repurchase program to 
acquire shares in the open market at any time” (Sun Microsystems 2004, p. 84). 
Of the value of shares that Sun repurchased in 2001, 2002, and 2003, 47 percent, 
25 percent, and 100 percent, respectively, were bought under the opportunistic 
plan. HP has stated that it repurchases shares “to manage the dilution created by 
shares issued under employee stock plans as well as to repurchase shares oppor-
tunistically” (HP 2006, p. 30). In fact, for most of the ICT companies in Table 
2.1, the number of shares repurchased was well in excess of the number of stock 
options exercised over the period 2000–2007; at IBM this ratio was 4.32, at Texas 
Instruments 3.26, HP 2.80, Intel 2.78, Oracle 2.59, Cisco Systems 2.14, Dell 1.89, 
Motorola 1.67, Microsoft 1.36, Sun Microsystems 1.34, AMD 0.10, and Lucent 
(for 2000–2006) 0.00.
 12. For an in-depth analysis of the attraction, retention, motivation, and recognition 
functions of employee stock options, and the labor-market conditions under which 
they might perform different functions, see Glimstedt, Lazonick, and Xie (2006).
 13. Many countries do not permit stock repurchases (Grullon and Michaely 2002, 
p. 1677). Indeed, until 1982 in the United States, the SEC had at times viewed 
stock repurchases as a manipulation of a company’s stock price. As Grullon and 
Michaely (p. 1649) put it, “Until 1982, there were no explicit rules directly regu-
lating share repurchase activity in the United States. This situation exposed repur-
chasing fi rms to the risk of triggering an SEC investigation and being charged with 
illegal market manipulation.” In that year, however, as part of the general deregu-
lation of fi nancial institutions that had been taking place since the late 1970s, the 
SEC “made it easier for companies to buy back their shares on the open market 
without fear of SEC stock-manipulation charges” (Hudson 1982). Specifi cally, 
under Rule 10b-18, the SEC assured companies that manipulation charges would 
not be fi led if each day’s open-market repurchases were not greater than 25 per-
cent of the stock’s average daily trading volume (Grullon and Michaely 2002, pp. 
1676–1682; McCarthy 1999).
 14. Also slowing the growth of dividends relative to repurchases is the fact that inso-
far as a company that pays dividends reduces its shares outstanding through repur-
chases, it automatically reduces the total amount of dividends that it pays out.
 15. An article in the Journal of Applied Financial Economics (Billett and Xue 2007) 
titled “Share Repurchases and the Need for External Finance” opens with the 
statement, “One of the best-documented fi ndings in the corporate fi nance litera-
ture is that stock prices go up when companies announce their intent to buy back 
shares” (p. 42).
 16. Senator Schumer fi rst raised the issue in January 2006 in reaction to the fact that 
Exxon Mobil had spent more on repurchases than on development and exploration 
in the previous year. Schumer was quoted as saying “the federal government has 
a responsibility to make sure that these companies continue to innovate instead of 
just profi ting from the status quo” (Piller 2006). Representative Ed Markey (D-
MA) took up the issue in May 2008, when he was quoted as saying “Big Oil is 
spending their profi ts to prop up their stock price rather than on discovering and 
delivering alternatives to $4 gas” (Souder 2008).
Lazonick.indb   248 7/31/2009   8:43:00 AM
249
7
Prospects for Sustainable Prosperity
“MARKET FORCES” ARE NOT NATURAL PHENOMENA
Driven by the microelectronics revolution, the United States has 
been a highly innovative economy over the past three decades. The 
resultant economic growth, however, has been unstable, and the distri-
bution of income has become signifi cantly more unequal. In this book, 
I have shown that the change from OEBM to NEBM in the ICT indus-
tries has contributed to this instability and inequity. Gone is the collec-
tive security that the corporatist OEBM once offered its employees. In 
its place is a far more individualized relation between employer and 
employee. The employment and incomes of even the most highly edu-
cated members of the U.S. labor force are now much more susceptible 
to the pressures and vagaries of “market forces” than they were a few 
decades ago. In particular, as I have shown in Chapters 5 and 6, global 
labor markets and national fi nancial markets now exert preponderant 
infl uences on the conditions of high-tech employment in the United 
States.
In the regulation of the employment relation, market forces are not 
natural phenomena. Rather the policies and decisions of corporations 
and governments shape how and in whose interests capital and labor 
markets function (Lazonick 1991, 2003b). Since the late 1970s corpo-
rate strategies and government policies in the United States have com-
bined to defi ne the ways in which NEBM allocates resources, employs 
labor, and fi nances investments. Given the political will, government 
legislation can proscribe those corporate strategies that result in insta-
bility and inequity and can enable those corporate strategies that pro-
mote sustainable prosperity. 
When U.S. corporate executives systematically offshore as much 
productive activity as possible to lower-wage regions of the world, they 
will argue that the forces of market competition compel them to do so. 
Yet, in making these decisions, these executives are generally unac-
countable to current U.S.-based employees who have helped to build 
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the organizations that are capable of globalization, and they rarely con-
sult with these employees—as, for example, they once did at Xerox (see 
Chapter 4)—about alternative strategies for maintaining and extending 
the competitiveness of the company. Indeed, the United States is unique 
among the advanced economies in according so little voice or protec-
tion to incumbent labor in this regard. 
When U.S. corporate executives systematically allocate billions of 
dollars to stock repurchases, they argue that the stock market requires 
them to do so. Yet, in the 2000s, the powerful corporations that have 
the fi nancial resources to engage in this practice are actually using their 
fi nancial might to manipulate the stock market—to the direct benefi t of 
those executives who make resource-allocation decisions. Armed with 
the ideology of maximizing shareholder value, U.S. corporate execu-
tives who control the allocation of their companies’ resources now sim-
ply take it for granted that they are responsible to shareholders alone.
The U.S. federal government has played a signifi cant role in aiding 
and abetting the modes of resource allocation that prevail under NEBM. 
It continues to devote tax revenues to fund the nation’s high-tech knowl-
edge base, but it demands little if any accountability from so-called pri-
vate enterprises about how or for whose benefi t this knowledge base is 
used. If the top executives of U.S. corporations that have benefi ted from 
government largesse in the past now say they have to offshore jobs to 
remain competitive, then the U.S. government will not stand in the way 
or demand a quid pro quo. Through its immigration legislation, the U.S. 
government has accommodated, until recently at least, the demands of 
the high-tech lobby for more nonimmigrant work visas, while provid-
ing little in the way of effective oversight of the use, and abuse, of these 
visas. In failing to intervene to regulate the remuneration of corporate 
executives, the U.S. government has been a party to an unwarranted and 
unseemly, and many would say obscene, explosion in top executive pay 
that the United States has witnessed over the past three decades. 
U.S. corporate executives claim that they have a fi duciary respon-
sibility to maximize shareholder value—a perspective that, as I have 
shown in Chapter 6, fails to address the conditions under which busi-
ness enterprises are in fact innovative. Yet, even as corporate executives 
spout this ideology and enrich themselves in the process, they are far 
from shy in appealing to the U.S. government for increased spending on 
knowledge creation and lower burdens of taxation to keep “America” 
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competitive. Nor, in the fi nancial meltdown of 2008, have these cor-
porate executives had any problem in invoking their responsibility to 
shareholders to justify the excessive remuneration that they received 
for mismanaging companies that, at a great cost to the public, ultimately 
failed. For example, Richard S. Fuld, CEO of Lehman Brothers, told the 
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee in October 2008 
that the $300 million in remuneration he admitted to having received 
since 2000 was bestowed upon him by “a compensation committee that 
spent a tremendous amount of time making sure that the interests of the 
executives and the employees were aligned with shareholders” (Davis 
2008). 
A nation needs innovation to generate economic growth. When, 
however, corporate executives use stock-based compensation to skew 
the distribution of income in their favor, and when they decide to ter-
minate the employment of qualifi ed people even as the company is 
reaping the returns on its past investments in innovation in which these 
very people participated, then it may well be that many U.S. citizens 
will lose, even as the companies for which they work, or used to work, 
remain highly profi table. Moreover, as I have suggested in Chapter 6, as 
we stand at the end of the fi rst decade of the twenty-fi rst century, it may 
well be that corporate adherence to the goal of maximizing shareholder 
value is undermining the innovative capabilities of some of America’s 
most successful business enterprises.
Earning a living in the United States has never been easy for those 
who are poorly educated and lack work experience. In the 2000s, how-
ever, even well-educated Americans with substantial work experience 
face far greater employment insecurity than they did in the past. In 
documenting the instability and inequity inherent in NEBM, I am not 
advocating a return to OEBM. There is a need, however, to recognize 
the collective functions that OEBM performed in providing security in 
employment and retirement to a signifi cant proportion of the U.S. labor 
force. The fact that, in the Old Economy, U.S. business corporations 
performed these functions greatly reduced the need for the government 
to be directly involved in ensuring stable and equitable growth. Indeed, 
I would argue that because business corporations performed these col-
lective functions for such a substantial portion of the population by the 
1960s, the U.S. government could contemplate launching a “War on 
Poverty” to upgrade the employment prospects of those segments of 
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the U.S. population for whom business corporations did not provide 
economic security. In a variety of ways, OEBM provided a foundation, 
including a consensus among an economic elite, for the government to 
intervene in the economy to deal with problems of instability and ineq-
uity. With the decline of OEBM, and its replacement by NEBM, from 
where will such a new consensus come?
THE LIMITED ROLE OF THE STOCK MARKET IN THE 
OLD ECONOMY
An understanding of the historical context in which OEBM per-
formed these collective functions in the post–World War II decades is 
critical for analyzing both the power of OEBM to provide a foundation 
for stable and equitable growth and its ultimate limits. The historical 
context was marked by the following:
• government spending on World War II which resuscitated the 
U.S. economy in the fi rst half of the 1940s, thus lifting the United 
States out of the Great Depression, which spanned the 1930s; 
• the U.S. government’s enormous investment in the high-tech 
knowledge base after World War II in the context of the Cold 
War, including national research efforts and a system of higher 
education to disseminate this knowledge; 
• the existence of powerful corporate research labs, many of them 
dating back to the beginning of the twentieth century, that could 
absorb and further develop that knowledge; and 
• a progressive tax regime that enabled the U.S. government to 
intervene both to bolster the corporate foundations of sustain-
able prosperity and, when pushed by social movements, to try to 
spread the gains of prosperity through equal opportunity to those 
segments of the population that the corporate economy was leav-
ing behind.
The provision of career employment with one company under-
pinned OEBM’s contribution to stable and equitable growth in the U.S. 
economy. Oligopolistic market positions and proprietary technology 
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strategies enabled and encouraged Old Economy corporations to offer 
career employment to their personnel. The presence in many Old Econ-
omy companies of industrial unions with their emphasis on employ-
ment security reinforced this corporate commitment to “the organi-
zation man.” For managers and workers, a clear manifestation of the 
expectation of career employment with one company was the inclusion, 
as integral to the employment relation, of a nonportable DB pension 
plan that rewarded longevity.
In the New Economy, pensions, along with much else, are heavily 
dependent on the performance of the stock market. In historical retro-
spect, a major reason why OEBM was able to contribute to stable and 
equitable growth was the limited role of the stock market, in its creation, 
control, combination, compensation, and cash functions, in the opera-
tions of its constituent corporations. In OEBM the prime role of the 
stock market was to separate share ownership and managerial control, a 
key social condition for the managerial revolution that permitted expe-
rienced salaried employees to run established companies and rendered 
dispersed public shareholders powerless to intervene in the corporate 
allocation of resources. By facilitating the separation of ownership 
and control, this “noncontrol” function of the stock market promoted 
stable and equitable economic growth under OEBM in the immediate 
post–World War II decades. That record stands quite in contrast to the 
destabilizing infl uence of the shareholder-value-driven “market for cor-
porate control” that sought to unwind OEBM in the 1980s by “disgorg-
ing” corporate cash fl ows that were allegedly “free” (Lazonick 1992).
Under OEBM, as a rule, even established companies with listed 
shares did not make use of the stock market to fund new investment in 
productive assets. The period in which the stock market was an impor-
tant source of cash under OEBM was during the speculative boom 
of the late 1920s, when corporations sold stock at infl ated prices to 
strengthen their balance sheets by paying off debt or building up their 
cash reserves—quite the opposite of what U.S. industrial corporations 
did in the Internet boom at the end of the twentieth century (Carpenter, 
Lazonick, and O’Sullivan 2003; O’Sullivan 2004). 
In the era of OEBM, it was only in the context of the “hot issues” 
market in the late 1950s and early 1960s that the over-the-counter 
(OTC) markets began to perform the creation function of the stock 
market by inducing investment in start-ups (O’Sullivan 2007). In his-
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torical perspective, this speculative boom provided a glimpse into the 
role that new-venture IPOs would come to play in NEBM. Indeed the 
appearance of hot issues on the OTC markets triggered the SEC’s Spe-
cial Study of the Securities Markets (SEC 1963) which resulted eight 
years later in the formation of NASDAQ (Ingebretsen 2002, chap. 4; 
O’Sullivan, forthcoming). 
In the 1950s and 1960s, as we have seen, the stock market also 
began to perform a compensation function under OEBM, but only for 
top executives—a special privilege designed for tax avoidance that 
opened up this use of corporate stock to public criticism. In historical 
retrospect, we can see the introduction of executive stock options as the 
fi rst stage in the opportunistic separation of the rewards of top execu-
tives from the pay structures of the organizations over which they exer-
cised strategic control. The next stage in segmenting the interests of top 
executives from the organizations that they headed came in the 1960s 
when many of these top executives built corporate empires through 
conglomeration, a movement that made OEBM unstable as corpora-
tions diversifi ed into too many unrelated lines of business to be man-
aged effectively. Here too, as in the case of executive stock options, 
corporate stock performed a major function—what I have called the 
“combination” function—under OEBM, but one that contributed to 
instability and inequity in the economy and eventually contributed to 
the demise of OEBM. 
In both its compensation and combination functions, therefore, 
the stock market under OEBM fostered a separation in major corpora-
tions between the strategic allocation of resources and the processes of 
organizational learning. Yet the integration of strategy and learning is 
a sine qua non of innovative enterprise (Lazonick 2004a, 2006, 2007a; 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000b; O’Sullivan 2000a,b). This separa-
tion of strategy and learning rendered the U.S. industrial corporation 
vulnerable to innovative competitors from abroad. During the 1970s 
and continuing in the 1980s, U.S. companies found that they were los-
ing competitive advantage to foreign corporations in a number of key 
industries in which U.S. manufacturers had been the world’s leading 
producers. Foreign companies had been able through licensing agree-
ments, multinational investments, and military contracts to gain access 
to the U.S. knowledge base. Given their highly integrated skill bases, 
Japanese companies were the most adept among foreign competitors 
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at absorbing this knowledge and improving upon it through a process 
of indigenous innovation. It is of signifi cance that the business model 
that enabled Japanese companies to outcompete their U.S. counterparts 
entailed more highly collectivized forms of OEBM that, through the 
institutions of cross-shareholding, lifetime employment, and main-bank 
lending, permitted the superior development and utilization of technol-
ogy (Lazonick 1998, 1999, 2005).
THE STOCK MARKET IN NEBM: FROM INNOVATION TO 
SPECULATION TO MANIPULATION
The rise of NEBM in the 1960s and 1970s was only minimally infl u-
enced by the transformation that was taking place at the same time in 
the Japanese industrial economy. Nevertheless, in the 1980s and 1990s, 
NEBM emerged as, in effect, the U.S. response to Japanese competi-
tion. As was shown in Chapter 2, the U.S. stock market supported the 
reallocation of capital and labor from OEBM to NEBM through its cre-
ation and compensation functions, while it supported the rapid growth 
of young high-tech fi rms through its combination function. 
Through its creation and compensation functions, the stock market 
reallocated capital and labor from Old Economy wealth holders to New 
Economy start-ups. The existence of a highly liquid stock market with 
lax listing requirements—namely, NASDAQ—enhanced the prospect 
of an early and successful IPO and thereby induced venture capital to 
invest in high-tech start-ups. As shown in Chapter 2, venture capital 
played a central role in the reallocation of resources from OEBM to 
NEBM by enabling start-ups to tap entrepreneurship and knowledge 
that may have otherwise remained locked up in established corpora-
tions. If venture capital reallocated fi nancial resources from the Old 
Economy to the New Economy, stock options played a complemen-
tary role in the reallocation of labor. The stock market enabled high-
tech start-ups to offer stock options to well-educated personnel as an 
inducement for them to forgo secure employment with established Old 
Economy companies. These stock options could become valuable with 
an IPO or an M&A deal with a listed company. Once a new venture 
had done an IPO, the combination function then became important for 
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the growth of New Economy fi rms, as epitomized by Cisco’s growth-
through-acquisition strategy, discussed in Chapter 6. 
In the 1990s the creation, compensation, and combination functions 
of the stock market were central to the expansion of NEBM. Entre-
preneurs, venture capitalists, and high-tech employees could claim that 
they were contributing their resources to an innovative economy and 
reaping the rewards for these contributions through their stock hold-
ings. At the same time, however, the augmented role of the stock market 
in NEBM has rendered U.S. economic growth both unstable and ineq-
uitable since the 1980s. While the stock market can facilitate the real-
location of capital and labor to innovative start-ups, it can also enable 
speculation, which engenders instability, and manipulation, which 
engenders inequity.
In the late 1990s the U.S. stock market became highly speculative 
indeed, as the public discovered the existence of highly innovative New 
Economy fi rms and then began making bets on many dot.com start-ups 
that had little in the way of innovative capability. The extent of the spec-
ulative bubble is displayed in Figure 7.1. The rise and fall of the NAS-
DAQ Composite Index between 1998 and 2001 makes the movements 
of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), which includes Intel and 
Microsoft as the NASDAQ representatives among its 30 stocks, and the 
S&P 500 Index look like mere blips. Between March 1998 and March 
2000, the NASDAQ Composite Index of more than 3,000 stocks rose 
by 149 percent, compared with 21 percent for the DJIA and 36 percent 
for the S&P 500. 
This speculative bubble followed a long period since the early 1980s 
in which stock-price movements were driven much more by a combi-
nation of manipulation, as Old Economy companies restructured their 
organizations and balance sheets, and innovation, as New Economy 
companies pumped back virtually all of their earnings into enterprise 
growth. In the 2000s, however, as I have shown in Chapter 6, manipula-
tion reemerged with a vengeance as a driver of stock-price movements, 
with stock buybacks as the main manipulative mechanism.
One of the high-fl iers on NASDAQ in the late 1990s was Cisco 
Systems. In October 1998, Charles O’Reilly (1998, p. 1), a professor 
at Stanford Business School, published a case that began with the sen-
tence, “Cisco is a $6 billion high technology stealth company, large-
ly unknown to the general public.” Just 17 months later this “largely 
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unknown” company sported the highest market capitalization in the 
world. In May 2000, Thomas Donlan (2000, p. 34), a Barron’s editor, 
calculated that to justify its stock price, which stood at 190 times earn-
ings, Cisco would have to increase its 1999 profi ts of $2.5 billion to 
$2.5 trillion by 2010!
Cisco remains highly successful in the 2000s, but given a relative 
absence of speculation, it has required massive stock repurchases to 
prop up its stock price. Figure 7.2, Panel A, depicts the movement of 
Cisco’s stock price as having passed through an innovation stage from 
1990 to 1998 characterized by reinvestment of most of its earnings,1 
followed by a speculation stage from 1998 to 2000 in which market 
exuberance drove up its stock price at an extremely rapid rate, and then 
a manipulation stage in the 2000s in which buybacks (as detailed in 
Chapter 6) supported the price of the company’s stock. 
Figure 7.1  DJIA, S&P 500, and NASDAQ Composite Indices, July 1986–













































NOTE: The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) consists of 30 stocks, of which 28 
are listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and 2 on NASDAQ. The S&P 
500 Index consists of 500 stocks, of which 85 percent are NYSE and 15 percent NAS-
DAQ. The NASDAQ Composite Index consists of 3,113 stocks.
SOURCE: Yahoo! Finance, http://fi nance.yahoo.com, Historical Prices, monthly data.
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Panel A of Figure 7.2 also shows the stock-price movements of Intel 
and Microsoft, which when charted on the Cisco scale give the appear-
ance of having been fl at in the Internet boom. But, as Panel B shows, 
they too experienced stock-price movements that refl ect the innovation, 
speculation, and manipulation phases. And the main mode of manipu-
lation is, again, stock buybacks. These three companies, mainstays 
of the U.S. ICT industries, together spent $113 billion on R&D from 
2000 through 2007. Over those years, however, these three also spent 
$164 billion on stock buybacks. In fi scal 2008, Cisco (year ended July 
26) spent $10.4 billion on stock repurchases and $5.1 billion on R&D, 
Microsoft (year ended June 30) $12.5 billion on repurchases and $11.6 
billion on R&D, and Intel (year ended December 31) $7.1 billion on 
repurchases and $5.4 billion on R&D.2
As we have seen, these companies are leaders of a larger trend that 
saw the 500 companies that are included in the S&P 500 Index spend 
well over $2 trillion to buy back their own stock in the fi rst eight years 
of the twenty-fi rst century. These buybacks are a measure of the grip that 
shareholder-value ideology has on corporate America, and hence on the 
ways in which fi nancial resources are allocated in the U.S. economy. 
The shareholder-value perspective that I critiqued in Chapter 6 provides 
a simplistic answer to a complex problem: how to reward stakeholders 
so that their contributions raise living standards and provide economic 
gains that can be shared equitably. In the 2000s, the problem has not 
been addressed, and instability and inequity are the result.
THE RISE OF ECONOMIC INSECURITY
The result of this redistributive quest for shareholder value in the 
U.S. ICT industries has been growing economic insecurity for the U.S. 
ICT labor force. High-tech personnel already found themselves vul-
nerable to changes in markets, technology, and enterprise strategies 
because of the end of career employment in the 1990s. In its place was 
substituted interfi rm labor mobility, especially in the “high velocity” 
labor markets of Silicon Valley (Benner 2002; Hyde 2003).
For many ICT employees, the power of individual labor mobil-
ity served them well in the Internet boom of the late 1990s, especially 
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Figure 7.2  Stock-Price Movements for (Panel A) Cisco Systems (March 
1990–October 2008) and Intel and Microsoft (July 1986–
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when they entered into employment at companies with generous stock-
option plans (see Chapter 2). The growth of NEBM, culminating in 
the tight labor markets of the late 1990s, and the very real and often 
realized possibilities for substantial gains from stock options, inured 
high-tech employees to an employment system in which their career 
prospects would be dependent on interfi rm labor mobility rather than 
on the movement up and around the hierarchy of one company. By the 
beginning of the 2000s, the expectation of such career employment 
with one company had disappeared in U.S. ICT industries.
It was inherent in the transition from OEBM to NEBM in the 1990s 
that older members of the ICT labor force faced much greater insecu-
rity than they had in the past. Career employment with one company 
typically meant that one’s salary rose with length of tenure and that 
the accrual of the value of traditional DB pensions was much greater 
toward the end of one’s career. The position of older high-tech work-
ers became much more vulnerable in the 2000s. The deterioration in 
employment conditions that faced high-tech labor in the fi rst half of the 
2000s extended beyond the downturn in economic activity in 2001–
2002. Unemployment rates among engineers and programmers rose in 
the “jobless recovery” that began in late 2002 (Hira 2003; IEEE-USA 
2004a,b; Khatiwada and Sum 2004). 
A major part of the explanation for the jobless recovery in ICT was 
the acceleration of offshoring of ICT jobs from the United States in the 
early 2000s (Groshen and Potter 2003; Houseman 2007), with India 
and China as the favored locations. There is a need for reliable data on 
the extent and locations of offshoring, the proportion of offshored jobs 
that are high skill, and the impacts of offshoring on employment in the 
United States and the performance of the U.S. economy as a whole.3 
Data collected by the Semiconductor Industry Association on engineers 
employed by large- and medium-sized U.S.-based semiconductor fi rms 
show that offshored positions accounted for 12.3 percent of 56,995 
employees in 1997, 20.8 percent of 96,093 employees in 2000, and 
33.7 percent of 125,360 employees in 2005. While the number of U.S.-
based engineers at these fi rms declined from 76,129 in 2000 to 66,851 
in 2004 before rising sharply to 83,167 in 2005, the number of offshore 
engineers rose steadily from 19,964 in 2000 to 42,193 in 2005 (Brown 
and Linden 2008a, p. 5).4 It appears that most of this increase in off-
shore employment has been at semiconductor manufacturing facilities 
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in China and chip design centers in India (Brown and Linden 2008a; 
see also Ernst 2005). 
What is clear is that, in the 2000s, U.S. companies have been able 
to access growing supplies of high-tech labor in India and China with 
the capabilities to perform increasingly sophisticated work that had 
previously been done in the United States (Chapter 5). Moreover, as 
we have also seen, U.S.-based companies can access this labor in the 
United States through nonimmigrant H-1B and L-1 visas. The H-1B 
program has come under heavy criticism from those who see the infl ux 
of nonimmigrant labor into the United States as subverting the remu-
neration and work conditions of permanent members of the U.S. labor 
force (Matloff 2004). 
In principle, employers are supposed to pay workers on H-1B visas 
“at least the local prevailing wage or the actual wage level paid by the 
employer to others with similar experience and qualifi cations, whichev-
er is higher.” The law also stipulates that an employer can only engage 
someone on an H-1B visa, if such employment “will not adversely 
affect the working conditions of workers similarly employed” (U.S. 
Department of Labor 2007). In practice, it is diffi cult to ensure the pres-
ervation of these labor conditions since there is little if any enforcement 
of compliance on the part of the employer.5 
Even when the employer complies with the letter of the law, more-
over, the H-1B worker is not in the same position of power vis-à-vis her 
employer as a U.S. citizen or permanent resident. Under NEBM, the 
power of the employee resides in her ability to switch jobs. An H-1B 
worker can only leave her employer and remain in the United States if 
she can fi nd another employer with a vacant H-1B visa who is ready to 
hire her. An employer may use his leverage over H-1B employees to 
demand that they be reassigned to different geographic locations within 
the United States that regular members of the U.S. labor force might 
be unwilling to accept. The dependency of the H-1B worker on her 
employer will be even greater, moreover, when the employer has spon-
sored the employee for U.S. permanent residency, the acquisition of 
which may be a long, drawn-out process (Chakravartty 2006).
Recall from Chapter 5 that the annual new H-1B visa cap was 
65,000 through 1998, 115,000 in 1999 and 2000, and 195,000 in 2001 
through 2003, before reverting back to 65,000 in 2004, plus an addition-
al 20,000 for foreigners with a graduate degree from a U.S. university. 
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There has been an excess demand for these 85,000 visas since 2004, 
and high-tech employers have been clamoring for a substantial increase 
in the cap that would alleviate, so they claim, a shortage of high-tech 
labor in the United States. The Comprehensive Immigration Reform 
Bill that was passed in the Senate in May 2006 would have raised the 
H-1B cap to 115,000 and instituted an automatic increase of 20,000 
per year whenever the previous year’s quota was reached.6 In 2007 and 
2008, however, legislative approval for an increase was stalled in the 
House of Representatives, not over the H-1B question, but rather over 
the treatment of illegal foreign entrants to the U.S. labor force.
ICT employers argue that more H-1B visas are needed because there 
is a shortage of high-tech labor in the United States. Absent a remedy 
that includes an expansion of the H-1B visa program in the short run 
and an upgrading of the U.S. K–12 education system in the long run, 
they warn of a deterioration of innovative capabilities in the United 
States and a further acceleration of offshoring of high-tech jobs.
In an infl uential op-ed piece, Bill Gates (2007) said that the U.S. 
schooling system had to be improved to enable “young Americans [to] 
enter the workforce with the math, science and problem-solving skills 
they need to succeed in the knowledge economy.” He cited a 2003 report 
that found that U.S. high school students ranked twenty-fourth out of 
29 developed economies in math scores.7 Gates called upon business 
and government to work together to improve the delivery of science 
and math education in the U.S. K–12 system. He also counseled that 
the United States should make it “easier for foreign-born scientists and 
engineers to work for U.S. companies.” Indeed, the shortage of com-
puter science graduates in the United States had reached, Gates argued, 
a “crisis point.” He called for an increase in the quota of H-1B visas 
as well as a faster and simpler process for acquiring permanent resi-
dency. Given that foreigners constitute half of the doctoral candidates 
in computer sciences in the United States, an important impact of these 
changes would be to increase the number of foreign graduates from 
U.S. universities who remain in the United States after completion of 
their studies. 
Not surprisingly, the United States branch of the Institute of Electri-
cal and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), which “promotes the careers and 
public-policy interests of more than 220,000 engineers, scientists and 
allied professionals” (IEEE-USA 2006a) is far from enthusiastic about 
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changes in immigration law that would expand the supply of high-tech 
workers in the United States. After the U.S. Senate passed the Compre-
hensive Reform Bill in May 2006, IEEE-USA President Ralph W. Wyn-
drum, Jr., commented, “The bill opens the spigot on numerous skilled 
visa categories. The question is how many high-tech workers can the 
United States absorb annually without driving up unemployment and 
driving down wages?” (IEEE–Cedar Rapids Section 2006). 
There is considerable debate over whether a shortage or a surplus 
of high-tech labor exists in the United States in the 2000s (Gordon 
2007). Responding generally to claims of crisis in the reproduction and 
expansion of the STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathemat-
ics) workforce in the United States, a 2004 study by the RAND Cor-
poration for the U.S. Offi ce for Science and Technology Policy and the 
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation argued that “many of these claims of short-
falls are suspect or are based on metrics that must be taken in context” 
(Kelly et al. 2004, p. 5).8 Writing during the jobless recovery of 2003, 
Michael S. Teitelbaum (2004, p. 13), a demographer and program direc-
tor (now vice president) at the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, observed: 
“The profound irony of many such claims [of labor shortage] is the 
disjuncture between practice in the scientifi c and engineering profes-
sions—in which accurate empirical evidence and careful analyses are 
essential—and that among promoters of ‘shortage’ claims in the public 
sphere, where the analytical rigor is often, to be kind, quite weak.” 
Rhetoric of crises aside, given rapid changes in technology and the 
high degree of specialization of high-tech workers, these two very dif-
ferent perspectives on the adequacy of the supply of high-tech person-
nel in the United States are two sides of an age-related coin. In any 
market for skilled labor, there may be at any point in time a labor mar-
ket “mismatch” between the skill set of the extant supply of high-tech 
employees and the demand for new skills inherent in new high-tech 
jobs (see Levy and Murnane 1992; Morris and Western 1999; Powell 
and Snellman 2004). For members of the ICT labor force generally, 
one’s age may have an inverse relation to the relevance of one’s learned 
skills to meet new demands for ICT labor. If companies are systemati-
cally employing younger workers, ostensibly with up-to-date skills, and 
systematically laying off older workers, ostensibly with obsolete skills, 
it is quite possible that there will exist, simultaneously, a shortage of the 
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new workers that companies want to hire and a surplus of the old work-
ers that companies have decided to fi re.
Such a scenario is entirely consistent with everything we know 
about the transition from OEBM to NEBM. A key characteristic of 
NEBM is a lack of commitment by companies to career employment. 
Under NEBM, companies continue to value the productivity that ema-
nates from the experience of many of their existing employees, and, for 
employees, the prospect of promotion within the organizational hier-
archy still can serve as a powerful inducement for supplying more and 
better effort in making productive contributions to the fi rm. At the same 
time, however, under NEBM there are no institutional constraints to 
terminating some employees even as, or often because, the company 
seeks to take advantage of new profi table opportunities that result from 
changes in its industry’s technological, market, and competitive condi-
tions. When such opportunities present themselves—and in the fast-
changing, globalizing ICT industries such events are regular and con-
tinuous phenomena—the company will be apt to replace older workers 
with younger workers. 
One need only look at the transformation in employment relations 
at IBM between 1990 and 1994, as I have done in Chapter 3, to see how 
older employees could be made redundant as the company restructured 
with a bias toward hiring younger employees. A central purpose of 
IBM’s massive restructuring in the 1990s was to rid itself of its decades-
old system of lifelong employment. Indeed, about 3,500 IBM employ-
ees fi led a class action lawsuit against the Internal Revenue Service in 
1994, claiming that IBM should not have withheld taxes on their sever-
ance pay, since these awards represented a legal settlement obtained in 
return for signing an agreement in which they waived their right to sue 
IBM for age discrimination (DeBare 1997; Ramstad 1994b,c; see also 
Associated Press 1994; Raleigh News and Observer 1996). As we have 
seen in Chapter 4, in 1995 and 1999 IBM made fundamental changes 
in its pension system for the expressed purpose of making the company 
more attractive to younger employees. In the process, many midcareer 
IBM employees who were not able to remain on the traditional DB plan 
experienced substantial reductions in their expected pensions. 
Given its size, reputation, and central position in the ICT industries, 
IBM’s transformation from OEBM to NEBM marked a fundamental 
juncture in the transition from employment security to employment 
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insecurity in the U.S. corporate economy. Indeed, in line with the IBM 
experience, for the period of 1992–1997, Abowd and his coauthors 
(2007) found a general shift in U.S. employment from older experi-
enced workers to younger skilled workers related to the adoption of 
computer technologies. Using Current Population Survey data, Schultze 
(1999, pp. 10–11) discovered that “middle-aged and older men, for 
whatever reason, are not staying as long with their employers as they 
once did.” He goes on to show, moreover, that the job displacement rate 
for white-collar workers relative to blue-collar workers rose substan-
tially in the 1980s and 1990s, starting at 33 percent in 1981–1982 and 
rising to about 80 percent in the 1990s.
In late 1998, as the Internet boom gained momentum and as Con-
gress stood ready to increase the H-1B visa cap from 65,000 to 115,000, 
the IEEE-USA published its “MisFortune 500”—”a parody of Fortune 
magazine’s annual listing of top profi t-making companies,” accord-
ing to the Web site www.misfortune500.org, which posted letters from 
hundreds of experienced engineers who had lost their jobs and could 
not fi nd work as engineers during the boom (PR Newswire 1998).9 In 
IEEE-USA surveys of unemployed engineers, age was listed as the pri-
mary barrier to getting a new job by 67 percent of respondents in 2004 
and 72 percent in 2006 (IEEE-USA 2006b).10
While anecdotal information abounds on the displacement of senior 
ICT personnel in the 1990s and 2000s (e.g., see Hira 2007), there 
remains a defi ciency of systematic research on this phenomenon. For 
example, HP’s “churning” of its labor force in the 2000s, subsequent 
to the merger with Compaq, presumably reduced the average age of 
employees (Wong 2006). It would be of interest to know how older 
employees fared relative to younger employees when thousands of 
positions were eliminated in the aftermath of the merger. In the absence 
of fi rm evidence, it is also debatable whether the displacement of older 
workers in favor of younger workers refl ects the need of companies to 
employ people with different skills sets or simply a way to save money 
by getting rid of long-time employees who have traditionally received 
a pay premium for their seniority. The substitution of younger for old-
er personnel for the purpose of cost reduction and not for the purpose 
of skill acquisition is particularly likely when the change in the age-
composition of employment is achieved through offshoring to lower-
wage regions. 
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In their book on “turbulence” in employment, which compares the 
fi nancial services, retail food, semiconductor, software, and trucking 
industries, Brown, Haltiwanger, and Lane (2006, p. 108) suggest that 
both factors may be at work in ICT, thus posing a double whammy for 
older, higher-paid employees. They fi nd that the most common career 
path in semiconductors is the “job switcher,” who works for two dif-
ferent companies, and the most common career path in software is the 
“job hopper,” who works for more than two companies (pp. 84–86). 
For personnel at all levels of education in these industries, workers who 
change jobs more earn less (see also C. Brown 2005; Brown and Lin-
den 2008b). Based on intensive research on the U.S. semiconductor 
industry, Brown and Linden (p. 22) have concluded that “the labor mar-
ket situation is especially diffi cult for older engineers, who face rapid 
skill obsolescence….When companies claim they face a shortage of 
engineers, they usually mean that they face a shortage of young, rela-
tively inexpensive engineers with the latest skills, even when they have 
a queue of experienced engineers who want retraining.”
More research is needed on what skills older employees actually 
lack in an NEBM setting. Under NEBM, companies want to retain 
workers who have, or are willing to learn, the requisite skills, and who, 
in a highly competitive environment with “time to market” as a key 
to profi tability, are willing to work long and hard. At a company like 
Microsoft, for example, software programming is a highly collective 
and cumulative process in which the generation of a faster, better, and 
cheaper product depends on the integration of the work of hundreds of 
individual contributors (Cusumano 2000). A high level of productiv-
ity at a company like Microsoft depends on a relatively low level of 
labor turnover, which in turn refl ects a relatively high level of depen-
dence of a particular employee on his or her current employer for remu-
nerative work. The greater the available labor supply, the greater this 
dependence.
Long work hours are the norm under NEBM. High-tech workers 
at New Economy companies are generally salaried workers who are 
exempt from the requirement under the Fair Labor Standards Act that 
companies pay them overtime at one-and-a-half times the hourly rate 
when they work more than 40 hours a week. Exempt workers may fi nd 
themselves working very long hours with little if any increase in remu-
neration. For Internet bloggers, a particularly well-known example of 
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such work conditions in ICT was that of an Electronic Arts (EA) soft-
ware engineer whose spouse (female, as it turned out) posted an anony-
mous open letter on LiveJournal in November 2004 titled “EA: The 
Human Story.”11 Her complaint was that, under a permanent “crunch” 
to meet video-game publishing deadlines, EA compelled game develop-
ers like her spouse to work 85-hour weeks: “9am to 10pm—seven days 
a week—with the occasional Saturday evening off for good behavior (at 
6:30 pm).” For working these long hours, game developers received no 
overtime pay, extra time off, or sick days. 
Within a month of publication of the open letter, more than 4,000 
people had posted comments on LiveJournal, almost all in support of 
the “EA Spouse,” with many advising that EA employees should join a 
union. As it happened, under California law, many of the game devel-
opers had a claim to overtime pay. EA agreed to the settlement of two 
class action lawsuits for overtime pay, one by its graphic designers for 
$15.6 million in October 2005 and the other by its programmers for 
$14.9 million in April 2006. In both cases, EA then transformed those 
of its employees who were nonexempt under the California law into 
hourly employees who would henceforth be paid time-and-a-half for 
overtime hours. As part of this change, EA gave these workers a one-
time grant of EA stock but ruled them ineligible for EA stock options 
(Maragos 2005; Jenkins 2006).
It will be remembered from Chapter 3 that in 1958 IBM sought to 
“blur the distinction between white-collar and blue-collar workers” (to 
repeat the words of CEO Thomas Watson, Jr.) by paying all 89,000 of 
its employees on a salaried basis. Almost a half-century later, in early 
2006, with IBM operating on the basis of a totally different business 
model, systems administrators, network technicians and other technical 
staff throughout the United States launched a class action lawsuit against 
IBM for “depriving its employees who install, maintain, and support 
computer software and hardware by unlawfully characterizing them as 
‘exempt’ from state and federal labor law protections” (Business Wire 
2006a,b). In November 2006, IBM settled the lawsuit with a payment of 
$65 million, but without admitting any wrongdoing or liability (Konrad 
2006). Then, in January 2008, IBM announced that 7,600 technical-sup-
port workers would be reclassifi ed as nonexempt, and that their base pay 
for a 40-hour work week would be cut by 15 percent because they would 
now be eligible for overtime pay (Bergstein 2008).
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Meanwhile, as we have also seen, from 2000 through 2007 IBM 
increased its worldwide employment by more than 72,000 people while 
cutting its U.S. employment by almost 27,000. Nevertheless, insofar as 
high-tech companies like IBM, Microsoft, Intel, and Cisco still employ 
people in the United States, their executives want to fi nd labor in abun-
dant supply in this country. ICT executives lobby the U.S. government 
for an expansion in the H-1B visa program not simply, or even pri-
marily, because the availability of more high-tech workers will help 
to keep down wage costs. If these companies want to lower their wage 
bills, they can offshore more routine activities to India or China, as 
indeed they have done and will continue to do. For work that is kept in 
the United States, however, the problem for ICT companies is not the 
wages of labor but rather the productivity of labor. 
Labor productivity depends on effort as well as skill, and tight labor 
markets reduce the power of employers to demand that their employees 
deliver high levels of work effort (see Lazonick 1990). An exclusive 
focus on wage rates as the equilibrating mechanism in the labor market 
misunderstands the nature of the problem from an employer’s point of 
view, especially in a high-wage, high-skill sector of the economy. The 
key issue for ICT employers operating in the United States is not the 
level of remuneration per se but the lack of control over the work effort 
of a highly mobile labor force. Employees at these companies—well 
aware that changes in corporate strategy could bring a career within 
a particular company to an end, and supported by a labor market that 
encourages interfi rm mobility—are on the lookout for employment 
opportunities with other companies that might be benefi cial to their 
personal careers. All other things being equal, the larger the available 
high-tech labor supply, the more dependent the high-tech worker on 
employment with his or her current company, and the greater the power 
of the employer to demand that the employee work long and hard.
Here then is the signifi cance of Bill Gates’ demand for unlimited H-
1B visas. Besides increasing the labor supply, the holders of H-1B visas 
are much more dependent on their current employer for continuing 
employment. Moreover, they also tend to be younger than citizen mem-
bers of the U.S. ICT labor force (U.S. General Accounting Offi ce 2003, 
pp. 14, 42). Among electrical/electronic engineers, the median age of 
H-1B workers approved in 2002 was 32 years, compared with 41 years 
for U.S. citizen workers, while among systems analysts/programmers 
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these median ages were 31 and 37, respectively. The combination of 
youth and dependence makes H-1B personnel able and willing to work 
long and hard (see Matloff 2006a). Moreover, these H-1B visa hold-
ers are ideal recruits for a company operating in the United States that 
may want its employees to pursue global career paths as it decides to 
offshore higher value-added activities. With years of experience in the 
United States, still-young former H-1B holders from places like China 
and India can be very valuable to a company as, through the company’s 
offshored operations, they follow their global career paths back to the 
countries from whence they came.
THE PROBLEM OF MINORITY EDUCATION 
AND EMPLOYMENT
Major U.S. ICT companies could deal with a high-tech labor “cri-
sis” if they would retrain and employ greater numbers of older employ-
ees on reasonable conditions of work and pay. These companies could 
pay for any additional cost of such employment by eschewing stock 
repurchases, which have no other purpose than to boost the price of 
the company’s stock. To take this high road to solving its labor short-
age, a company would, however, in effect be rejecting the modes of 
employing labor and allocating capital that are characteristic features of 
NEBM. Instead these companies will doubtless continue to look to in-
migration and offshoring to fi nd the types of younger high-tech workers 
consistent with NEBM.
Given that the education systems of China and India have been gen-
erating massive numbers of potential ICT workers, both in-migration 
and offshoring have become the most viable solutions in the here and 
now of the 2000s. It has been estimated that, for the academic year 
2003–2004, U.S. universities awarded (in round numbers) 137,000 
four-year bachelor’s degrees in engineering, computer science, and 
information technology, compared with 139,000 in India and 361,000 
in China (Wadhwa et al. 2007, p. 75). The U.S. number for 2003–2004 
was up sharply from 109,000 in 1999–2000, but it declined to 134,000 in 
2004–2005. The increase in these bachelor’s degrees awarded in China 
and India exhibited a much steeper trajectory from 1999–2000 to 2003–
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2004, and grew further in 2004–2005. Large numbers of these Indian 
and Chinese college graduates subsequently migrate abroad, especially 
to the United States, for graduate education or work experience.
The greatly increased availability in the 2000s of a global supply of 
high-quality high-tech labor, via either in-migration or offshoring, has 
raised concerns in the United States about the adequacy of the U.S. K–12 
education system to prepare the next generation of homegrown entrants 
to the U.S. labor force to compete in the global high-tech labor market. 
While the massive fl ow abroad of high-skill, high-tech jobs is a phe-
nomenon of the 2000s, the concern with the adequacy of the K–12 sys-
tem for preparing U.S. youth for a new world of work is not new. Since 
the early 1980s, various interests, including business associations, civil 
society organizations, and government agencies, have expressed con-
cern with the adequacy of the U.S. K–12 education system to provide 
students with the levels of profi ciency in math and science needed to 
pursue college degrees in the STEM disciplines (CPGE 2007; National 
Commission on Excellence in Education 1983; New Commission on 
the Skills of the American Workforce 2007). 
The United States currently participates in the OECD’s Programme 
for International Student Assessment (PISA), which has done three 
rounds of data collection and analysis on literacy in reading, mathe-
matics, and science of 15-year-old students around the world. The fi rst 
assessment, done in 2000, focused on reading; the second (2003) on 
mathematics; and the third (2006) on science. In PISA 2000, the read-
ing performance of U.S. students was just above the average for the 
27 participating OECD nations, among which the United States ranked 
fi fteenth, or just below the median (Lemke et al. 2001, p. 7). In PISA 
2003, the mathematics performance of U.S. students was signifi cantly 
below the OECD average, as the United States ranked twenty-fourth out 
of 29 OECD countries (Lemke et al. 2004, pp. 14–15).12 In PISA 2006, 
the science performance of U.S. students was signifi cantly below the 
OECD average, as the United States ranked twenty-fi rst of 30 OECD 
countries (Baldi et al. 2007, p. 6). 
The roots of the problem of the performance of the U.S. system of 
mass education are deeply embedded in the nation’s social structure (see 
Berliner 2006). In all cases, blacks and Hispanics in the United States 
did signifi cantly worse on these assessments than whites and Asians 
(Baldi et al. 2007, p. 55; Lemke et al. 2001, p. 50; Lemke et al. 2004, p. 
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38). In the PISA 2000 reading rankings, U.S. non-Hispanic whites had 
a score that would have placed them (as a hypothetical nation) second 
after Finland and just ahead of Canada, while U.S. blacks had a score 
that would have placed them twenty-fi fth, leading only Luxembourg 
and Mexico. In the PISA 2003 math rankings, U.S. non-Hispanic whites 
scored above the OECD average and would have placed thirteenth out 
of 29 OECD countries, while U.S. blacks would have ranked twenty-
eighth, ahead of Mexico. In the PISA 2006 science rankings, U.S. non-
Hispanic whites would have been seventh among 30 OECD nations, 
while U.S. blacks would have been last, just behind Mexico. 
In each case, U.S. Hispanics performed better than U.S. blacks but 
well below the OECD average. U.S. Asians did less well than U.S. non-
Hispanic whites and were above the OECD average in reading and math 
but just below it in science. Much of the poor showing of the United 
States as an actual nation in PISA, therefore, can be attributed to defi -
ciencies in the K–12 educations of blacks and Hispanics. During this 
period, of the U.S. population aged 15–19, non-Hispanic whites made 
up 63 percent, blacks 15 percent, Hispanics 16 percent, and Asians 4 
percent (U.S. Census Bureau 2004, 2005, pp. 14–15).
An inadequate education places one at a great disadvantage in the 
global competition for good jobs. Even for well-educated whites, the 
employment trends under NEBM that I have documented do not give 
cause for optimism. For blacks and Hispanics the problem is far worse. 
Increasing proportions of the black and Hispanic populations have 
attained university degrees at the bachelor’s level or higher. Neverthe-
less, their numbers still lag far behind those of the white population 
(National Center for Education Statistics 2008, Table 8). In 2007 blacks 
and Hispanics were also still lagging behind whites at the associate’s 
degree level, which includes qualifi cations for entry into many ICT 
technician jobs (ibid., Table 9). 
While some progress has been made, thus far blacks and Hispanics 
are not well represented in the STEM occupations—in sharp contrast 
not only to whites but also to people of Asian origin in the U.S. popula-
tion (Lowell and Regets 2006, pp. 16–18). Much of the progress that 
blacks and Hispanics made in the STEM occupations in the last decades 
of the twentieth century was at the lower-paid technician levels (U.S. 
Census Bureau 2008f, p. 388), and these occupations are among the 
most likely to be offshored. 
Lazonick.indb   271 7/31/2009   8:43:03 AM
272   Lazonick
The lack of representation of black and Hispanic workers in the 
ICT industries is evident in those cases (all too rare) in which compa-
nies make data public on the changing composition of their U.S. labor 
forces by race, ethnicity, and gender. Exceptionally, IBM has provided 
detailed employment data by race, ethnicity, and gender for eight occu-
pational categories, from offi cials/managers to operatives, for the years 
1996 through 2008.13 
In 1996, 9.9 percent of IBM’s 125,618 employees were black. In 
2008 IBM had 120,227 U.S. employees, but the proportion who were 
black had fallen to only 7.5 percent. On net, blacks had 3,439 fewer 
U.S. jobs at IBM in 2008 than in 1996, while Asians had 5,281 more 
jobs. Hispanics saw their numbers increase slightly, but they represent-
ed only 4.0 percent of IBM’s U.S. labor force in 1996 and 4.2 percent 
in 2008. 
The main reason for the decline in black employment at IBM was 
the reduction of employment in the types of jobs that blacks had occu-
pied in 1996, when over 43 percent of blacks were clustered in the oper-
ative and offi ce/clerical categories. In 2008, as the combined result of 
divestments of manufacturing facilities and offshoring, IBM employed 
only 78 black operatives in the United States, down from 3,474 in 1996. 
In 2008 there were 885 black employees in offi ce/clerical work, but in 
1996 that number had been 1,905. In 2008 IBM employed 3,347 blacks 
as professionals, but that number was 8 percent less than the number 
employed in 1996. Blacks benefi ted from the growth of marketing posi-
tions at IBM, with the number of positions they held rising substan-
tially, from 1,248 in 1996 to 2,853 in 2008. Nevertheless, the proportion 
of all marketing employees who were black declined, from 7.9 percent 
in 1996 to 7.2 percent in 2008. 
Overall, then, in this age of high-tech global competition, the data 
on education and employment by race and ethnicity in the United States 
strongly suggest that signifi cant groups within American society will 
still face tough times in the years and indeed decades to come unless 
public policy knocks down the systemic socioeconomic barriers to 
advancement that still face large proportions of blacks and Hispanics 
in the United States. Besides confronting the substantial supply-side 
problem of the transformation of the K–12 education system, public 
policymakers must also consider the types of policies that can deal with 
the demand-side problem of the expansion and augmentation of high-
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tech employment in the United States in the face of the apparently irre-
versible tendency for U.S. jobs of ever higher quality to go abroad. The 
challenge of sustainable prosperity in the United States is not simply to 
replace the jobs that disappear but to generate an ever-expanding num-
ber of high-quality jobs that can draw members of previously excluded 
groups into remunerative and meaningful work.
To have any chance of success, legislators must desist from viewing 
the resource allocation decisions of companies such as Cisco, HP, IBM, 
Intel, and Microsoft as market forces that are presumably outside the 
purview of legitimate government policy. The analysis that I have pre-
sented in this book argues that, for government investment in the U.S. 
science and technology infrastructure to have any chance of resulting 
in prosperity for most Americans, blacks and Hispanics included, over 
the next generation, the government will have to intervene strategi-
cally to infl uence the allocation of resources by business corporations, 
U.S.-based and foreign, in a way that would make use of the high-tech 
knowledge and highly qualifi ed people that government investment 
would generate.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR 
SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY
The critical area for strategic policy intervention—yet one that has 
been virtually absent from the U.S. policy debate in the 2000s—is cor-
porate governance, by which I mean the institutions and mechanisms 
that determine and regulate the ways in which business corporations 
allocate resources. More specifi cally, for the sake of sustainable pros-
perity, government policy must focus on the role of the stock market 
in the corporate allocation of resources. I have argued that stock-price 
movements can be driven by innovation, speculation, and manipula-
tion. The general objective of government policy in the area of stock-
market regulation should be to eliminate the forces of speculation and 
manipulation in the determination of stock-price movements so that 
the stock market can function to support, and stock-price movements 
refl ect, innovation. 
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A prelude to such policy intervention is a rejection of the overwhelm-
ingly dominant ideology that maximizing shareholder value results in 
superior economic performance. A rejection of this ideology will not be 
easy, to say the least. Shareholder-value ideology derives its credibility 
from the theory of the market economy that dominates the thinking of 
academic economists. It is, however, a theory that, as I have argued 
in many contexts, cannot come to grips with the role of the develop-
mental state and the innovative enterprise in the process of economic 
growth (e.g., see Lazonick 2008b). In practice, moreover, as I have also 
shown in this book, the fi nancial affairs of U.S. households, businesses, 
and governments have become tied up with the stock market. Powerful 
fi nancial interests, including the top executives of major U.S. corpo-
rations, who profi t enormously from the willingness of households to 
speculate on the stock market, will vigorously oppose any signifi cant 
policies that threaten to bring their party to an end.
One might argue that, given that they are so invested in the stock 
market, U.S. households also benefi t from the boosts to stock prices that 
stock buybacks generate. There are problems with this argument, how-
ever. Insiders who know when buybacks are actually to occur (as dis-
tinct from when the authorization of a repurchase amount is announced) 
will be best positioned to take advantage of subsequent stock-price 
increases (see Fried 2000, 2001; Netter and Mitchell 1989). More gen-
erally, households, as outsiders, lack the sophistication and knowledge 
of corporate executives and money managers as insiders to gain from 
stock-price volatility. Moreover, even before the fi nancial turmoil of 
2008, the evidence on pension assets suggested that working house-
holds had not been well served by corporate securities markets in the 
2000s in terms of their expected retirement earnings (Munnell and Sun-
dén 2006; Sorokina, Webb, and Muldoon 2008). The best way to ensure 
income security in retirement is to have well-paid employment as long 
as one can be productive. Yet in the 2000s, even for the best educated 
and most experienced middle-aged workers, such sustained employ-
ment has become hard to fi nd.
Corporate stock repurchases and executive stock options must be 
brought under control if stable and equitable economic growth is to 
become a possibility over the next generation. The government needs to 
enact legislation that restricts, and indeed even forbids, the practice of 
corporate stock repurchases. It is a practice that only serves to manipu-
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late the stock market in the interests of those with the power to allocate 
corporate resources. If economics is about the “optimal” allocation of 
resources to achieve superior economic performance, stock buybacks 
on the scale to which corporate executives and Wall Street have become 
accustomed represent a gargantuan misallocation of resources in the 
U.S. economy. 
As shown in Chapter 6, the obsession with buybacks pervades the 
U.S. corporate economy (see Lazonick 2008d). U.S. companies that 
profi t from offshoring buy back stock rather than augment the quality 
and quantity of jobs available in the United States (see Milberg 2008). 
Leading ICT companies do huge buybacks even as they demand that 
the government invest in the knowledge base, and they cut back on U.S. 
employment even as they expand abroad. Leading oil companies do 
huge buybacks even as U.S. households fi nd their real incomes shrink-
ing because of rising energy prices. Leading pharmaceutical companies 
do huge buybacks even as they argue in Congress against the regulation 
of U.S. drug prices because they ostensibly need as much of their profi ts 
as possible to pump back into drug research. Leading health-care pro-
viders do huge buybacks even as Americans face ever-mounting costs 
for health care. Leading Wall Street banks did huge buybacks even as 
they speculated on credit default swaps and collateralized debt obliga-
tions to such an extent that they brought the global fi nancial system to 
its knees. U.S. government–sponsored fi nancial entities Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac did huge buybacks even as they embroiled themselves in 
the subprime mortgage mess to the point where the government had to 
bail them out. And if bailed-out General Motors had banked the $20.4 
billion distributed to shareholders as buybacks from 1986 through 2002 
(with a 2.5 percent after-tax annual return), it would have had $33.8 
billion of its own cash to help keep it afl oat and respond to global com-
petition in 2008.
The government also needs to enact legislation that drastically reins 
in top executive pay, which means placing restrictions on stock-based 
remuneration, especially stock options. The greatest gains from stock 
options come in periods of stock-market speculation, when holders of 
options benefi t from the fact that in the United States there is virtu-
ally never any requirement that option gains can only be reaped if a 
company’s stock does better than similar companies in its industry. And 
when the market is less speculative, corporate executives can allocate 
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resources to stock buybacks to give a boost to the company’s stock 
price. Presto, the “performance” of the company improves, and it is 
time for executives to exercise their abundant options once again. Is it 
a surprise, as investigations into the 2008 fi nancial crisis have revealed, 
that top corporate executives are prone to speculate with other people’s 
money and to manipulate earnings per share when they are remunerated 
in ways that encourage them to speculate with other people’s money 
and manipulate earnings per share?
The problem of exploding executive pay has been around for a long 
time, and virtually nothing has been done about it. The last serious chal-
lenge to the legitimacy of executive stock options in the U.S. Congress 
was in the 1960s, when Senator Albert Gore (D-TN) was engaged in 
a battle with corporate tax-dodgers (Gore 1965). Congress did not go 
as far as Gore would have liked, but until the Tax Reform Act of 1976 
there was a legislative movement toward restricting the tax advantages 
of stock options. All of that changed in the latter half of the 1970s as the 
newly organized high-tech lobby swung into action and got the capi-
tal-gains tax reduced, got accounting rules changed, and ensured that 
stock repurchases would be freely permitted to enhance the benefi ts of 
employee stock options. 
The one attempt in the 1990s by Democrats to control the rise of 
executive pay ended up doing just the opposite. In 1993, after Bill Clinton 
assumed the presidency, his administration implemented a campaign 
promise to legislate a cap of $1 million on the amount of nonperformance-
related, top-executive compensation that could be claimed as a corpo-
rate tax deduction. One perverse result of this law was that companies 
that were paying their CEOs less than $1 million in salary and bonuses 
raised these components of CEO pay toward $1 million, which was 
now taken as the government-approved “CEO minimum wage” (Byrne 
1994). The other perverse result was that companies increased CEO 
stock option awards, for which tax deductions were not in any case 
being claimed, as an alternative to exceeding the $1 million salary-and-
bonus cap (Byrne 1995). 
A further irony of the Clinton-driven legislation was that the high-
tech lobby at the time was fi ghting against an attempt by FASB to 
require companies to expense stock options (see PR Newswire 1994; 
World Accounting Report 1994). Especially for companies with broad-
based stock option plans, this prospective regulatory change would 
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have resulted in lower reported earnings that, it was thought, would 
result in lower stock prices. Hence, even though the proposed FASB 
regulation (which was ultimately enacted in 2004) would have reduced 
the corporate tax bill, corporate executives were against it. Why would 
these same executives give much thought to the fact that there would 
be no corporate tax deductions for personal pay that exceeded the mil-
lion-dollar cap?
Now, as then, it is futile to talk about placing restrictions on execu-
tive compensation without limiting the extent to which executives can 
reap gains from stock options that result from either speculation or 
manipulation. Besides making stock repurchases illegal, legislation is 
needed to place limits on stock option grants to individuals and to make 
the gains from the exercise of stock options dependent on achieving 
a variety of performance goals, including fi rst and foremost ongoing 
contributions to job creation in the United States.
Finally, to pay for the many things that the United States needs, 
taxes on stock-based income, whether in the form of dividends or capi-
tal gains, need to be raised substantially. By lowering both the capital-
gains and dividend tax rates to 15 percent, the Jobs and Growth Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 further enriched those who receive 
stock-based income, including income from the exercise of qualifi ed 
stock options that can receive capital-gains tax treatment. The dubious 
rationale behind these tax cuts for the rich was that they would spawn 
real investment and economic growth. The result, however, has been to 
give corporate executives even greater incentives to do stock repurchas-
es, a mode of resource allocation that reduces the number of productive 
jobs that U.S. corporations can generate for the U.S. labor force.
The OEBM was hardly perfect, but it did provide employment 
security, health coverage, and retirement benefi ts to tens of millions 
of people whose work was at the heart of the economy. Under NEBM, 
the corporate economy no longer assumes these collective functions. In 
an era of open standards, rapid technological change, convergence of 
technologies, and intense global competition, business enterprises do 
need to be fl exible in the deployment of capital and labor. One way of 
attaining this fl exibility is by giving the organized labor force a major 
role in enterprise governance, as for example the Japanese, Germans, 
and Swedes have done, each in their own particular ways (Lazonick 
2005, 2007d). In such a system, there is the possibility of an interaction 
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between business and government to provide widespread economic 
security in employment and retirement while permitting business enter-
prises to remain innovative and competitive on a global scale. 
The other way is the American way in the era of NEBM, which, 
in an updated version of what I have called “the myth of the market 
economy” (Lazonick 1991), works under the pretense that the collec-
tive provision of economic security is not required. Just get enough 
education to be “employable” in a well-paid job, and individual initia-
tive will provide one with the lifetime of security that one needs. From 
the NEBM perspective, the only legitimate function of the government 
is to invest in the knowledge base, and even then with no notion that, 
through taxation, a substantial proportion of the gains from innovative 
enterprise that this knowledge base makes possible should be returned 
to the government to support the ongoing development of the economy 
as a whole. 
In the United States in the 2000s, the quest for economic security 
evades even a substantial portion of the better educated population. In 
its stead stands the quest for shareholder value; the worship of wealth in 
the 2000s has rewritten the 1980s’ motto “greed is good” to read “greed 
is god.” The small minority of the population that controls the allo-
cation of corporate resources is reaping unprecedented wealth—even 
when some among them cause a fi nancial meltdown—while demanding 
that the government spend more of the taxpayers’ money on knowledge 
creation and warning that only lower taxes on their wealth can keep the 
spirit of innovation alive. With the aid of a compliant government, the 
NEBM may continue to generate respectable U.S. economic growth—
although, given global competition and the U.S. fi nancial crisis, even 
that outcome is in doubt. What does seem certain is that for a growing 
majority of Americans, the stock market–oriented political economy 
that has NEBM as its foundation will continue to generate instability 
and inequity as a normal way of life.
Notes
 1. During this period, Cisco paid no cash dividends but did a total of $508 million in 
stock repurchases from 1995 through 1997, which represented 21.0 percent of its 
net income for 1995–1997 and 11.5 percent of its net income for 1990–1998. 
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 2. In September 2008, having completed a $40 billion stock repurchase program, 
Microsoft announced that its board had approved another $40 billion program 
through September 2013. Microsoft’s board also authorized debt fi nancing of up 
to $6 billion, some of which could be used for buybacks (Associated Press News-
wires 2008).  
 3. For an attempt to use newspaper articles and press releases to track the number of 
offshored jobs and the companies that are doing the offshoring, see the TechsUnite 
offshore tracker at http://www.techsunite.org/offshore/.
 4. Brown and Linden point out that the data are not strictly comparable from year to 
year but nevertheless capture the general trend in the location of the employment 
of engineers in the U.S.-based semiconductor industry.
 5. For a list of problems with the H-1B program from the perspecitve of an anti-H-
1B Web site, see ZaZona.com (2008). See also hireamericansfi rst.org, launched in 
January 2008.
 6. For more information, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comprehensive_
Immigration_Reform_Act_of 2006.
 7. Gates was undoubtedly referring to the 2003 International Student Math Assess-
ment, sponsored by the OECD Programme for International Student Assessment 
(PISA) (OECD 2004), which is discussed below. 
 8. For a critique of the argument that there is a shortage of qualifi ed science and 
engineering graduates in the United States, see Lowell and Salzman (2007).
 9. According to Norman Matloff (2006b), who is among the most vocal critics of 
corporate and government policies that have generated surpluses of experienced 
engineers, in 2000 “IEEE-USA came under heavy pressure from the IEEE parent 
organization, which is dominated by industry and academia and thus is highly pro-
H-1B. So IEEE-USA suddenly changed its stance. It still was critical of the H-1B 
program, but it started extolling ‘instant green cards’ for foreign workers instead 
of H-1B visas. It ignored member complaints that the green card idea would be 
just as harmful to IEEE-USA members as H-1B. The Misfortune 500 Web page 
was taken down.”
 10. Hyde (2003, chap. 12) argues that employment discrimination law, including that 
which relates to age discrimination, is based on “an assumption of stable long-
term careers inside individual fi rms,” and hence employment discrimination is 
very diffi cult to prove in the context of what he calls “a high-velocity labor mar-
ket” such as exists in Silicon Valley.
 11. The article can be found at http://ea-spouse.livejournal.com/; see also http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erin_Hoffman.
 12. Trailing the United States were Portugal, Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Mexico. 
 13. IBM’s diversity employment data for 1996–2008 are available at http://www-03
.ibm.com/employment/us/diverse/employment_data.shtml.
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